

Department of Political Science
University of Helsinki
Helsinki

DELIBERATIVE REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT

Jenni M. Rinne

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION

To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in lecture room 302, Athena building, on 17 January 2020, at 12 noon.

Helsinki 2020

Publications of the Faculty of Social Sciences 134 (2020)

© Jenni M. Rinne

Distribution and sales:

Unigrafia, Helsinki

<http://shop.unigrafia.fi>

books@unigrafia.fi

ISBN 978-951-51-3424-0 (pbk.)

ISBN 978-951-51-3423-3 (PDF)

ISSN 2343-273X (pbk.)

ISSN 2343-2748 (web)

Helsinki University Printing House

Helsinki 2020

ABSTRACT

This research sets out clarifying theoretically the relations with two democratically relevant concepts: political representation and deliberation. It does so by developing the idea of ‘deliberative representation’ and studying it empirically in a parliamentary context.

Recent scholarship of representation, namely the constructivist turn, sees the concept of representation as dynamic and fluid. As such, this paradigm shift looks past the electoral notion that highlights the premise of interests and preferences. Scholarship on deliberation is similarly revising its focus. This research draws especially from the systemic approach to deliberation. It implies that loosening traditional normative criteria will advance the study of deliberation in politically charged settings such as legislatures. Both strands of theories are gradually assuming context and function sensitive perspectives that are merged in my reading of deliberative representation.

The under-theorised link between representation and deliberation has resulted in shortage of empirical accounts of where representatives operate in. The research is motivated by a simple question: what do representatives actually do when they represent? Finding answers to this question helps in understanding what drives deliberation in parliaments. The proposed framework of deliberative representation allows a more nuanced outlook on representative activities and practices. Consequently, this refined perspective allows addressing and re-assessing some prevailing assumptions of political science about the strategic and adversarial incentives and orientations of elected representatives.

In this research, the dynamics of deliberative representation are studied in and illustrated through a particular legislature, the Parliament of Finland. For this purpose, 60 Finnish Members of Parliament (and 5 parliamentary committee chairs) were interviewed over the period of 2008–2016.

The research illustrates that although institutional and procedural settings of legislature incentivise representative practices, thus inducing deliberation in various ways, the contextual and functional interplay argued by deliberative representation adds to the analysis in novel ways. Three dominant contexts of representation are identified: the affirmative, operative and performative context. Each discussed context specifies how the functions of representation are established and carried out. Also, features relating to the deliberative process are explored. Finally, three deliberative modes are detected in the contexts of representation: what I call expressive-deliberative, strategic-deliberative and expressive-partisan deliberative mode.

The novelty of this research lies in its aspiration to use the language of political theory more closely in conducting empirical inquiry. While doing that, it has also contributed to the scholarship on representative practices in parliaments. Finally, the research suggests that the contexts of representation are generally recognisable, and therefore they may find applications outside the parliamentary setting.

KEYWORDS: representation, deliberative democracy, political theory, legislatures, elected representatives

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selvittää edustuksellisen demokratian kannalta kahden keskeisen käsitteen, poliittisen edustamisen ja deliberaation, välistä suhdetta. Tämä tarkastelu tapahtuu kehittämällä ajatusta 'deliberatiivisesta edustamisesta' ja tutkimalla sitä empiirisesti parlamentaarisessa kontekstissa.

Edustamista käsittelevä viimeaikainen tutkimuskirjallisuus, erityisesti sen konstruktivistinen käänne ymmärtää edustamisen käsitteen dynaamisena ja joustavana. Tutkimusnäkökulman muutos ylittää perinteisen vaalikeskeisen ymmärryksen edustamisesta, joka korostaa intressejä ja preferenssejä ennakko-oletuksina. Samoin myös deliberatiivinen demokratiateoria uudelleenarvioi omia tarkastelunäkökulmiaan. Tässä väitöskirjassa edustamisen ja deliberaation väliin avautuvaa teoreettista aluetta kartoitetaan deliberaation systeemisen teorian inspiroimana. Systeeminen tarkastelunäkökulma mahdollistaa deliberaation normatiivisten kriteereiden liudentumisen, mikä edesauttaa deliberaation tutkimista poliittisesti jännittyneissä asetelmissa kuten parlamenteissa. Väitöskirja nostaa esiin edustamista ja deliberaatiota käsittelevistä teoriakeskusteluista konteksteja ja funktioita korostavia näkökulmia, jotka yhdistetään deliberatiivisen edustamisen luentaan.

Johtuen siitä, että edustamisen ja deliberaation välinen suhde on aliteoretisoitu, on myös tästä näkökulmasta tehtyjen, edustajien toiminnalliseen työympäristöön sijoittuvien empiiristen tutkimusten määrä vähäinen. Tutkimus lähtee liikkeelle hyvin yksinkertaisesta ajatuksesta: mitä edustajat oikeastaan tekevät kun he edustavat? Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on myös paremmin ymmärtää, mitkä tekijät motivoivat deliberaatiota parlamenteissa. Tutkimuksessa esitetty deliberatiivisen edustamisen tutkimusasetelma mahdollistaa edustuksellisen toiminnan ja käytäntöjen hienojakoisemman tarkastelun. Samalla voidaan kriittisesti tarkastella edustustoiminnasta tehtyjä olettamuksia siitä, että toimintaa ohjaa pääsääntöisesti strategiset ja kilpailulliset (adversariaaliset) tavoitteet.

Tässä tutkimuksessa deliberatiivisen edustamisen dynamiikkoja tutkitaan ja illustroidaan yhden konkreettisen esimerkin eli Suomen eduskunnan kautta. Tutkimusta varten on haastateltu 60 kansanedustajaa (ja viittä valiokuntaneuvosta) aikavälillä 2008–2016.

Väitöstutkimus osoittaa, että edustuslaitoksen institutionaaliset ja proseduraaliset tekijät motivoivat edustustoimintaa ja näin ollen kannustaa deliberaatioon monin tavoin. Deliberatiivisen edustamisen kontekstuaaliset ja funktionaaliset yhteistekijät lisäävät uudella tavalla analyttistä ymmärrystä edustustoiminnasta. Tutkimus hahmottaa kolme edustamisen pääkontekstia: affirmatiivisen, operatiivisen ja performatiivisen kontekstin. Jokainen konteksti selittää, miten edustamisen funktiota eli tarkoitusta tuotetaan ja toteutetaan. Toiseksi, tutkimuksessa kartoitetaan deliberatiivisen prosessin osa-alueita. Kolmanneksi, edustamisen konteksteista johdetaan kolme toiminnallista orientaatiota eli deliberatiivista moodia (deliberative mode), joita kutsun ekpressiivis-deliberatiiviseksi, strategis-deliberatiiviseksi ja ekpressiivis-partisaaniseksi deliberatiiviseksi moodiksi.

Lopuksi, väitöstutkimuksen ansioksi voidaan laskea se, että se hyödyntää politiikan teorian tulokulmaa empiirisessä tarkastelussa mutta kontribuoi myös edustamista ja edustustoimintaa käsittelevään kotimaiseen ja kansainväliseen kirjallisuuteen. Tutkimus

ehdottaa, että edustamisen kontekstit ovat tunnistettavissa yleisemminkin, jolloin niiden merkitys laajenee myös parlamentaarisen asetelman ulkopuolelle.

AVAINSANAT: edustaminen, deliberatiivinen demokratia, politiikan teoria, edustuslaitokset, kansanedustajat

Acknowledgements

I have so many people to thank. I have been fortunate enough to have surrounded myself with wiser and brighter minds. These people, their advice, critically commentary and shared comradeship have been most valuable in the making of this research.

I am indebted to my supervisor Juri Mykkänen who resiliently and patiently guided me through the process. The way Juri's vision was always clear about the direction this research was going over the years was astounding. I could have not managed without his profound understanding and knowledge of parliamentary practices and MPs. Thank you, Juri.

Equally, I want to thank Anne Maria Holli who came along as my second supervisor in the later stages of the process. This was a crucial step since Anne's involvement pushed more coherence and clearer argumentation to the research. In addition to this indispensable help, she has always been the most supportive and kind on a personal level. Thank you, Anne.

I am extremely honoured to have received substantial support and guidance from two important figures who I hold in high regard. Firstly, I want to thank Kyösti Pekonen. His critical insight as well as patient and profound commentary are rooted in years of experience and immense understanding of the field. If one would like to learn how complex theoretical matters are argued in a truly elegant manner, one should turn to the works of Pekonen.

This same rare quality is present with Mark Warren. During my research fellowship in 2015 at the University of British Columbia I came to understand the breadth and depth of his scholarship. Now, looking back to my notes from the discussions we had about my research, I continue to be impressed by Mark's ability to disentangle multiple strands of thought that are swirling in democratic theory and distill the essence from them. I want to thank Mark for always encouraging me to 'take the bull by its horns' and remain persistent in writing.

I also want here to take the opportunity to extend my thanks to Jenny Mansbridge, finding ways to support me across the oceans and believing in my project. Without her inspirational work and novel insights this dissertation would have been significantly poorer (and shorter).

I want to thank my two external reviewers, professor emerita Marja Keränen and professor Mark B. Brown for lending their scholarly expertise to the benefit of this PhD dissertation. The same thanks goes to professor André Bächtiger who will act as my honoured Opponent in my upcoming defence. Considering his cross-cutting theoretical and empirical expertise I am looking forward to the special opportunity for discussion.

The department of Political science, and the many names it has been called during this past decade, has offered a solid base for undertaking this project. The doors of colleagues have always been open for my questions and general concerns about doing research. I thank you all for your kindness and encouragement. My work has benefitted from continuous input given by the PhD seminar members, thank you. I am indebted to the commentaries and inspirational discussions by so many (also people that are not mentioned here), including Halil Gurhanli, Staffan Himmelroos, Lauri Holappa, Salla Huikuri, Paul-Erik Korvela, Kanerva Kuokkanen, Mikko Mattila, Laura Nordström, Emilia Palonen, Achilles

Papageorgiou, Laura Sibinescu, Ville-Pekka Sorsa, Santtu Sundvall, Teivo Teivainen, Jemima Repo, Isak Vento, Marjukka Weide, and Matti Ylönen.

Throughout these years, Tuija Lattunen has been my ultimate bedrock and most relentless supporter, always finding the exact right words to keep me going. My words cannot express my gratitude to you, Tuija.

Especially I want to thank Hanna Wass for her endless kindness and encouragement, and always being interested in the wellbeing of people close to her. Hanna has been always insisting me to push forward and aim high. Thanks to her, I have always considered the scientific community outside the immediate floors and walls, in international terms.

Outside my alma mater, I have had the privilege to call three Maijas–Maija Jäske, Maija Mattila and Maija Setälä–my friends. Thank you for sharing your scholarship and opening my horizons on matters of representation and deliberation. Similarly I want to thank Kimmo Grönlund, Kaisa Herne, and Kari Palonen for always making me feel welcomed and giving thought to my research project.

I am grateful for the support of professor Simona Piattoni for hosting me for a visit at the University of Trento in 2014. At the University of British Columbia, I had the pleasure to meet and work with the brilliant people like Jennifer Allan, Edana Beauvais, Meghan Dias, Chuka Ejeckam, Hailey Graham, Yana Gorokhovskaia, Spencer McKay, Rebecca Monnerat, David Moscrop, Daniel Westlake, and Carla Winston. Special thanks to Max Cameron for his brilliant insights into political institutions and representative agency. His work on practical wisdom has truly been influential to this dissertation. Then, my other close peers at UBC whom I miss dearly: Guðrún Rós Árnadóttir, Gregor Levi, Alessia Musso, Hema Nadarajah, Andreas Østhagen, and Kate Stewart.

Professors Kasper Møller Hansen and Christian Rostbøll, in addition to the fantastic Lise MacInnes and Lise Sonnichsen, were kind enough to allow me to join the great community at the Institut for Stadskundskap at University of Copenhagen. Thank you for your warm hospitality. I want to thank all the PhD group and other brilliant scholars such as Michael Bossetta, Dean Cooper-Cunningham, Malte Dahl, Peter Dahler-Larsen, Peter Thisted Dinesen, Benjamin Egerod, Mads Ejning, Yevgeniy Golovchenko, Lene Hansen, Wiebke Junk, Karina Kosiara-Pedersen, Tobias Liebetrau, Carolin Rapp, Anne Rasmussen, Livia Rohrbach, Reini Schrama, and Lars Tønder. Also the best team members of eternal international research fellows, Clara Vandeweerd and Tom Henderson. See you on the other side! Most of all, I want to thank Liv Bjerre, my sister-in-arms and persistent office partner, for always having the time to listen, discuss and eat (too) many *romkugels*. I am in awe by your scholarship and discipline.

I want to thank the staff of Eduskunta, Parliament of Finland. Especially I want to thank the Library of the Parliament for their practical help, also allowing me to use their extensive facilities for research and conducting some of the interviews in their premises.

But foremost, I am thankful to all the interviewed Members of the Parliament for making room in their busy schedules and sharing their thoughts about their special line of work. I have deep appreciation for all of those who put themselves up for such public service.

I want to express my gratitude also to the many funders that have supported this research and enabling full concentration. In chronological order I thank Finnish Cultural Foundation (Urho Kekkonen Fund), Graduate School in Political Studies (POLITU), Kone Foundation,

and the finishing grants from Doctoral School of Political, Societal Regional Change (PSRC) and Finnish Cultural Foundation (Eeva Rauhakallio Fund). I am also indebted to Anu Kantula and the mighty BIBU (Tackling Biases and Bubbles of Participation)-project (funded by the Strategic Research Council). It has not only allowed me to finish this dissertation but included me into a vibrant research community. Thank you all!

Finally, this endeavour could have not been possible without the affection and encouragement by my friends and family. As I name some of them, there I am ascertained that many are left out from this text but not from my sincerest thanks. Thank you—Terhi and Tuomas, and Kea and Lasse—for keeping me sane in København! Your support and friendship was most valuable.

Then, my dearest Anni, Eeva, Heidi, Inka, Jussi, Kirsi, Miia and Sanni: we celebrate and endure together all weathers that life bring us. Thank you for the companionship, good laughs, and allowing me to be just me.

Unfortunately, my father Risto Rinne did not live to see this day that I finally seem to accomplish the doctoral degree as the first in the family. I am sure he would have enjoyed reading what I argue about political representation and political institutions. I miss the humorous criticism that I'm sure he would have had to say.

Then there is my dear mother Hilde Backman, to whom I owe all my deepest thanks. She has always believed in me, supporting me no matter what, as well as giving me a hug when I needed one. I have the greatest appreciation of her practical wisdom. Kiitos, *äiti*. Olet rakas.

In midway this journey of getting this PhD came along Petteri Hyvärinen, an Instant crush rocking my existence in the very best ways. Not only being similarly (un)wise and (un)fortunate to strive for academic life (and succeeding in getting his PhD done in half the time compared to me) he has always acknowledged the curious particularities that this line of work necessitate. Thank you for being there for me, encouraging me, and patiently listening my theoretical ramblings and surprising me with you fresh insight. I think you are a political scientist by heart! And now we have Aliisa, the most precious little creature who generally is not very interested in the finesses of representation, but is currently more engaged in insisting on getting a *jäätelobaari* (an 'ice-cream parlour') for Christmas present and making sure I read Richard Scarry's 'School Book' to her every night. I would not want anything else.

I wish to *dedicate this doctoral dissertation to the memory of my grandmother Mirjam Backman* (1917–2002) who, despite her aspirations and intellect, did not have the opportunity for education.

In Helsinki, 16th of December 2019

Jenni Rinne

Contents

ABSTRACT	3
Acknowledgements	6
I Introduction	11
i When representatives represent and deliberate: the point of departure	11
ii The parliamentary arena of representation and deliberation	15
iii Deliberative and strategic virtues in parliamentary assemblies	21
iv The task ahead: deliberative representation	26
2 Convergence of political representation and deliberation	34
2.1 Context of representation	34
i Tracking representatives and keeping them in check	35
ii Assuming the role of a representative	39
iii Breaking away from the ‘standard account’ of representation	45
iv The constructivist turn: from aggregating interest to mobilising people	50
v Performing representing with context-sensitivity	56
2.2 Deliberative acts	64
i The promise of deliberative democracy: Between the real and ideal	65
ii Deliberative politics, dispositional deliberation and power	70
iii Deliberative accountability and political representation	74
iv Deliberative ecologies hosting and sustaining various deliberative acts	78
3 Methodology	85
3.1 Elite interviews with members of parliament	85
3.2 Interpretative approach to parliamentary practices of representation and deliberation	91
4 Deliberative representation in parliament	95
4.1 Affirmative context	100

i Halls and walls	101
ii Representing to and with each other	104
iii Expertise and credibility	111
iv Relying on others	117
v Deliberation in parliamentary party groups	121
vi Managing torment	129
4.2 Operative context	135
i On making a difference (and representing)	136
ii Being able to agree and make decisions	141
iii Game of experts and expertise	146
iv The limits of compromise	154
v The (relative) spirit of compromise	162
4.3 Performative context	173
i Plenary sessions as the façade of democratic representation	174
ii Structuring and maintaining parliamentary tension	183
iii Deliberative control and ‘means of survival’	190
iv Sailing close to the wind: negotiating the rules of the game	198
v Why deliberate?	203
5 What can be gained from deliberative representation?	211
APPENDIX	221
i List of research interviews	221
ii Framework for the semi-structured research interviews	223
REFERENCES	231

I Introduction

i When representatives represent and deliberate: the point of departure

What do representatives do when they represent? This seemingly self-evident question belongs to a more complex and intellectually appealing domain. Representatives do many things when they represent. When they go about their daily lives in legislatures, often late into the evenings, they spend time reading and preparing for various kinds of meetings. They write speeches, legislative initiatives and newspaper columns, and reply to emails and messages and requests from the public. They sit in parliamentary committees, hear experts and lobbyists inside and outside the committee, and host various visitors. Representatives negotiate with other representatives, bargain and make promises and commitments. They plan and prepare future activities and aspirations individually and collectively. Most of these activities include contact, association and communication with other people. Crucially, these communicative encounters entail what democratic theory calls *deliberation*.

This research is about the construction of deliberation in these encounters. It asks how different material contexts of democratic representation set conditions for different aspects of deliberation. Deliberation anticipates and facilitates some kind of physical connection with others, while also assuming reflection and interaction with other people, and with their arguments, claims and reasoning. Deliberation is not only about reflection on ideas presented during the deliberative process; it is also an activity that includes the physical presence of others. This shows that although representation can and will in many instances remain virtual and less tangible, it can be approached through accounts of activities. This touches on physical and material notions that are relevant also for consideration of political theory (Parkinson 2012). It is problematic if democratic theories would disregard the way in which deliberative engagements take place in a physical and not virtual space (*ibid.*, 8). It is worth paying attention to activities that constitute democracy, as well as to the conditions that allow them to emerge, and to fuse action and emotions.

As theoretical concepts, political representation and deliberation are deeply enmeshed, making it difficult to pinpoint where and how these concepts enter the discussions. Despite the differences in understandings of representative democracy and deliberative democracy that are considered to be ‘merely an artefact of academic politics’ (Brown 2018, 172), the dilemma persists. One of the most recent comprehensive attempts to clarify the relation between representation and deliberation concludes that they are closely intertwined (Brown 2018, 181).

My argument in this study is that disentangling these two concepts in the context of representative institutions, in what representatives do, helps in grasping questions about what drives deliberation in parliaments. I propose an analytical tool for pinpointing and addressing some of the dynamics that are evident in legislatures, in this case the Parliament of Finland. The first research question of this study is, what is deliberative representation, and how does it function in a parliamentary context? This question will connect the emerging features of representation and deliberation instead of always assembling the concepts as we go or treat them interchangeably. The utility of deliberative representation

is in tracking and exploring the deliberative faculty of representation. Gaining a better and more in-depth understanding about the ways in which deliberations occur in one particular parliament can contribute to consequent proposals and ideas about democratic innovations within the institutional design of legislatures. No prior relevant literature really exists.

Over a decade ago Dario Castiglione and Mark Warren (2006, 2) have argued that democratic theorists have ‘embarrassingly little to offer by way of guidance or critique for emerging issues of representation’. Their conclusion is still relatable from the starting point of the necessity of examining empirical accounts such as the ones presented in this study (Dario Castiglione and Warren 2019). My interest is in translating ideas posed by empirical research on the conducts and practices of representatives (see e.g. Esaisson 2000 on the process of defining the tasks of MPs) into the language of political theory. On these assumptions, I treat representation as a praxis, a way of doing representation. As such, it has an empirical appeal. As Michael Saward argues: ‘if representation is made and disputed in real-world politics—then it *happens daily and in detail* below the standard-issue radar of political theory and in a realm more akin to that of the political anthropologist’ (Saward 2019, 286, emphasis added). What can be gained from such a point of departure? Are these activities relevant from the perspective of democratic theory—that is, do they somehow speak to the emerging issues of representation? In this research, my argument is that they are and they do, and I make this argument by exploring the representative activities that members of parliament engage with daily and in detail. I explore real-world practices in light of new conceptual scholarship. By eschewing the standard account of representation—which takes political representation to be merely about preferences and interests—it is possible to retain conceptual complexity and diversity, thereby making it possible to see the practices and activities of representatives in a new light.

The starting point of this study is the ambiguity of the conceptual counterparts of representation and deliberation. Deliberation, particularly when it occurs in the legislative setting of parliaments, takes the presence of political representation for granted, and often takes it at face value that elected representatives are non-deliberative actors. Matters of democratic politics—power and interests, linking also to the themes of resistance and disputation—have not been sufficiently addressed in deliberative theory. Therefore, it has been said, provocatively, that deliberative theory has forgotten about democracy (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 4). Political representation seems to be a theme in deliberative democracy that is shrugged off. This study addresses the need to re-politicise deliberation, something that André Bächtiger and John Parkinson (2019, 82, 132) have also argued for. Parliamentary deliberation is by default ‘political’, but this starting point does not render all deliberative accounts strategic, coercive or manipulative. We can reasonably assume that other action logics are also present, and that constructive politics is demonstrated by parliamentary representatives. The juxtaposition of strategic and sincere motivations by participants of deliberation has been a theme that early deliberative democracy struggled with. What if actions and incentives of deliberative participants are not sincere or authentic, despite demonstrating and endorsing deliberative styles that fulfil the deliberative desiderata?

The analysis of institutional deliberation often takes its point of departure in treating representatives as strategic and unitary actors with a unified purpose (Goodin 2005, 186).

This is highly problematic. The prevalence of parliamentary rules and procedures highlight this interpretation, namely that legislatures should operate according to the same standards of logic, order, coherence, and so on, as a single and individual deliberative participant would on the same matter (Goodin 2005, 187). This research is indebted to Robert E. Goodin's notion of distributed deliberation (2005; 2008b). Distributed deliberation rejects the idea that actors in deliberation strive towards the same goals that would manifest themselves in the way that deliberation is used. A similar argument for a sequential approach to deliberation has also been put forward by Bächtiger and others (2010; also Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019), calling for consideration of how deliberative (and representative) tasks are dispersed and distributed throughout the legislature.

My research touches on this theme of the type or form of parliamentary deliberation—even though it does not make it central—and contributes to it in two ways. First, by the methodological choice of conducting research interviews with members of parliament I have not acquired the skill to 'read minds' as a solution to uncovering the extent to which representatives are 'really motivated by a logic of common understanding' (Bächtiger and Beste 2017, 108). When the deliberation of representatives becomes the focus of study, scholarship often turns to rhetorical styles or measuring the quality of deliberation, thus making it an 'ethical-evaluative' enterprise (Schäfer 2017). Although it may be true that the scholarship on parliamentary deliberations uses transcripts as a primary source of research data that forces researchers to make rather far-reaching assumptions about representatives' motivations and incentives, gaining a grasp of these through any research method remains difficult. The profound universal question about why people do what they do can be to some degree a mystery, even to oneself. In this case, however, extending the reach of deliberative scholarship with research interview methods is a viable way to approach this question.

Secondly, the relevance of distributed deliberation does not only regard the incentives of the actors and how it reflects the use of deliberation, but it also implies another critical feature argued in this study that can also contribute to discussions about the type of parliamentary deliberation. This is the role of contexts. It matters where and in what context parliamentary deliberation occurs. Some of the institutionally and structurally facilitated features that have an effect on the quality of deliberation have been systematically analysed (Steiner et al. 2004). According to these studies, deliberation is likelier to be of high quality (envisioned through Habermasian discourse ethics) when it takes place in a parliamentary system (rather than a presidential system) with coalition governments and with issues that are less polarised (as opposed to highly polarised) as well as behind closed doors.

Although the institutional and procedural structures of legislatures provide an overlay informing and affecting parliamentary deliberations, I argue that there is room to push the explanatory power of contexts further. As such, the qualitative features of deliberation appear to be less an array of isolated cases of speech acts held together by the institutional structure. To give more analytical depth to the question of the parliamentary deliberations and respective representative activities, I propose turning to the concept of political representation—more specifically, to the newer traditions and formulations of the concept, following the work of Lisa Disch (2011; 2012; 2015; 2019), Jane Mansbridge (2003; 2009; 2011; 2016; 2019), Andrew Rehfeld (2005; 2006; 2009; 2011; 2016; 2018) and Michael Saward (2010; 2014, 2017; 2019). These are authors associated with the representative turn

in political theory. While this conceptualisation will be discussed later in chapter 2.1., we can argue in short that proponents of the representative turn see the grounding of the concept in the electoral connection, roles and typologies and interests to be insufficient. Instead, representation turns out to be a more dynamic process, one that is not bound by the relations with the representatives and the represented. This is also what is articulated further, following the work of Disch and Saward, what is referred to as the ‘constructivist turn’ to which this research also is intended to contribute (and which will be discussed more fully in chapter 2.1. section iv). Resisting the Anglo-American tendency of reducing representation into these electoral accounts the constructivist reconceptualisation understands representation “‘intrincit” to democracy’ (Disch 2019, 2–3).

For this research, what this new paradigm can offer is another contextual overlay to supplement the institutional ones that can better explore and address the contingencies of representative activities. From these discussions, I trace the argument that contexts offer resources for, but also restrictions to, the practices with which members of parliament engage. This brings us to the second research question: What are the contexts of representation found in legislatures, in this case the Parliament of Finland?

Approaching deliberative representation provide a contextual overlay that helps explain and illuminate the settings where deliberation takes place. Here I endorse the ‘contextual-systemic’ approach that similarly distinguishes features constituting and facilitating deliberations (Schäfer 2017). As such, I will offer a blueprint through which representatives’ activities can be read and interpreted. Deliberative representation, and the specific three major contexts I trace it through, escapes the ‘ethical-evaluative paradigm’ of parliamentary deliberations (Schäfer 2017) that focus on the form of deliberation in normative terms as a question of deliberative quality.

To get to this, I will locate a further prevailing idea embedded in the argument for context, namely *functional representation*. This idea has been developed by Andrew Rehfeld (2006), but I will connect functional representation to more specific contexts of representation and present an empirical inquiry to go along with it. For this purpose, and to clarify the relevance of function, I will further consider the subject of motivations. If one were to ask why representatives represent or deliberate, the simple answer might be that they have no other choice. It is indeed correct to argue that representatives are bound by ‘deliberative mandate’ (Pekonen 2011, 110): they are forced to deliberate to make their case. It would be difficult to envision a parliament that did not deliberate. This point already hints at the next step in the argument. Not only is deliberation connected to representation, but by deliberating representatives can make things happen. When representation is taken as a praxis, representing has a function that representatives make use of in the contexts they find available. Put simply, representatives deliberate to legislate—to argue, dispute and resist, but they also represent when they compromise, when they seek to understand what the other is trying to say and demand. This perspective invites almost an endless number of accounts of representing. But until one gets to the root of what representation actually is (Rehfeld 2017; 2018), alongside understanding its purposes (Saward 2010; 2006), we are left with the tautological view whereby representatives represent when they represent.

Through deeper analysis, by breaking representing and deliberating into smaller parts, they can be grasped as practical activities. Therefore, the second research question entails

the idea that contexts of representation are functionally differentiated and therefore host various deliberative acts. The same line of thought is present already in deliberative theory: in the idea of distributed deliberation that predates the influential systemic view of deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2012), and more recently by André Bächtiger and Simon Beste (2017). They propose a ‘functional approach’ to deliberation that resonates with the idea presented in this research. For deliberative democrats, uncovering strategic behaviour of representatives becomes less of a problem when we supplement the approach to deliberation with the kind of contextual and functional understanding (Bächtiger and Beste 2017, 110). Based on this, the third and final research question is: How do representative contexts facilitate and justify deliberative acts?

Before I develop in detail the argument presented in this introductory section, I will first discuss it from the perspective of parliament. The argument about the relevance and implications of convergence of representation and deliberation would be incomplete and isolated were it not placed in the precise context.

ii The parliamentary arena of representation and deliberation

The puzzle of political representation and deliberation manifests itself in the notion of representative government. Notably, the longstanding ‘formula of government of discussion’ according to Bernard Manin, (1994, 143) is confused, as it does not precisely indicate the role of discussion in government. Importantly, however, the link of deliberation (or discussion) and representation ‘can be *understood only by introducing the intermediary notion of assembly*’ (Manin 1994, 144; emphasis added). How do parliaments, as venues for deliberation and representation, fit into the theoretical convergence of representation and deliberation?

Consider a naive thought experiment. Imagine a parliament with elected representatives who are completely silent. They would not associate with one another in any way. They would neither discuss legislation, negotiate nor explain where they are coming from with their reasons and justification, neither to each other nor to the public. They would just be physically present. Would we say that such a mute parliament would not be representative, and that those representatives would not represent? It would seem incorrect to say so. But we could certainly cast some doubt on the legitimacy of the decision-making process if matters would be dealt merely by counting heads. What this tells us is that while decisions are ultimately made in legislatures, finalised through means of voting, there is something additional that deliberation brings in.

From the very beginning of representative government, these concepts have found shelter in the representative institutions that simultaneously protect and exercise democratic principles such as political rights and rule of law. As Manin argues (1994; 1997), the link between representation and deliberation—or discussion, as he calls the latter—puts the assembly in the limelight, without which the proposed convergence of representation and deliberation cannot be understood. Tracing the deliberativeness of representation, or something of a representative deliberation, are valid themes in the literature on the premises

of representative government, as set forth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by James Madison, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Walter Bagehot and others.

The novelty of deliberation can be highlighted by studying these ideas of liberalism and republicanism. In that tradition, republicanism can be regarded as the ‘high-minded sibling’ (Uhr 1998, 40) or the ‘conscience’ (ibid., 36) of modern liberalism. However, for Jürgen Habermas (1994, 1), the republican view contains the flaw of imposing ‘ethical overload’ on citizens and legislators alike, transforming politics into a ‘hermeneutical process of self-explication’ (ibid., 4).

So, what are parliaments to do in a system of representative government from the perspective of democratic theory? The contemporary understanding of parliaments as legislatures that embody popular sovereignty as the ‘integrating institution of the polity’, and thus as being capable of law-making, is due to John Locke (Uhr 1998, 48). This liberal view, according to Habermas (1994, 1), gives rise to the task of ‘programming the government in the interests of the society’. Secondly, Mill paid special attention to the tasks of the parliaments and how they bestow representative qualities in representative government (Uhr 1998, 70).

What is noteworthy for present purposes, however, is that Mill did not appreciate parliaments for their ability to make laws. On the contrary, he saw them as less than competent in that role. The value of parliament for Mill was in the formation of a representative assembly as a ‘community of opinions’. According to Uhr (1998, 72), Mill consequently ‘remodels and republicanises the responsible government tradition’ while maintaining that the function of parliament is to see that legislative issues go through ‘trial by discussion’. Interestingly, the ‘trial’ is not meant in terms of finding out the ‘truth’ (as in ‘government by truth’, along the lines of Carl Schmitt) through deliberation. The reason why, according to Manin, founders of representative government rarely discussed the exact nature of what discussion should accomplish, was due to the ‘obviousness of the solution’: namely, convergence of the wills can only be achieved through deliberation (Manin 1994, 143, 145). Equality of wills, as a profound principle of representative government, mandates that ‘all participants must win the consent of others through persuasion’ (ibid., 145).

Leaving aside Habermas’ influential discourse theory and the corresponding proceduralist view that supplements the briefly mentioned liberal and republican view, this traditional binary setting influences how parliaments can be seen to function and operate. Uhr, in his analysis of the Australian parliament as a deliberative assembly, endorses a republican stance and combines ideas of the public voice and the public mind as put forward by James Madison. These representative functions ascribes representation to ‘operate on two levels’, as Uhr (1998, 86, 91) argues: on the first level, the public voice ‘ventilates and provides’ (articulates) through representation, whereas the second level involves a ‘proactive role in re-presenting or reshaping’ (forming) public opinion. Representatives, as a chosen body of citizens, can avoid ‘irregular passions’ and ‘temporary errors and delusions’ for sustaining ‘the cool and deliberative sense of community’, to cite Madison (cf. Manin 1994, 139). Notably, considering recent theoretical scholarship, the Madisonian and republican understanding of the public mind is not far from the ‘constructivist turn’ and its take on the concept of representation (to be discussed more fully in chapter 2.1., section iv). Indeed, Manin (1994, 139) claims that the superiority of the representative system lies

in the fact that it permits a distance between governmental decision and the popular will. For the representative assembly, this entails that there is no alternative to deliberation.

However, as Walter Bagehot (1867, 118–120) noted, ruling—that is, the electoral function—and the expressive functions do not exhaust all accounts of what parliaments do. Thus, the deliberative flow can also be seen to flow from the legislative body to the represented. Bagehot recognises the role of teaching and informing in this. However, his view raises concerns about the elitist and paternalistic tendencies of representative rule: electorates need to be ‘educated’, since their opinions and preferences may be ill-informed or biased. In modern societies, however, the ‘teaching function’ that Bagehot saw legislatures as also carrying out is less plausible (Strøm and Bergman 2011, 16, 22–3). On the other hand, strategic incentives may overtake the deliberative functions of enlightening and weighing of arguments, and therefore meddling with the public opinion-making process. Since legislatures operate through elected legislators, the question of representation and deliberation should also be posed by always keeping these actors close to the argument. The roles of legislators, representatives and deliberators as distinctive characters will be elaborated fully in the upcoming theoretical chapters, and illustrated in the empirical chapters.

Contemporary parliaments and parliamentary systems are faced with challenges on many fronts. Pressed in between ‘constituency advocacy’ and ‘government determination’, parliamentary institutions struggle to find ground in its tasks of reflecting, refining and enlarging views of the political community (Uhr 1998, 91). The position of legislatures occupying this middle ground is becoming questionable. When provocatively asking whether the parliamentary system in general has a future, David Beetham (2011) claims that legislatures are being by-passed from two different representative fronts. The assembly does not function as a sounding-board to the sentiments and grievances of the represented. According to Beetham, targeted surveys and other methods are more viable for mapping electoral opinions. From the citizens’ side, influencing cabinet policy-making seems more effective and tangible through single-issue rallies and campaigns (Beetham 2011, 125–6).

David Judge et al. (2018) explicitly turn away from what they call the ‘futurology’ of parliaments—that is, the attempt to predict what the future may bring for national parliaments. Among other things, they recognise in the context of Westminster ‘the puzzle of representation’ that includes the cross-cutting ‘representational forces’ spelled out in MPs’ capacities to act as delegates and trustees. Perhaps more importantly, the authors recognise the pressure of collective decision-making entailing legislative scrutiny in the face of an overwhelming amount of information (Judge, Leston-Bandeira and Thompson 2018, 351–2). Legislatures are subject to ‘epistemic performance’ (Quirk, Bendix and Bächtiger 2018). Legislative matters are weighed and considered through gathering and sorting relevant information which, in principle, should be reflected in the policies that legislatures formulate and enact. The epistemic performance of legislatures is dependent on the committee system. We can also think of committees as ‘creatures of the parent assembly’ (Goodin 2005, 40), and as such they enhance the deliberative capacities of the ‘parent’ when deliberative tasks have been assigned to them.

It would be nearly impossible to comprehend how a parliament in contemporary democracies would operate without the division of labour that is bestowed on committees

(Strøm 1998, 21–22). The centrality of the committees is a defining feature of parliaments that are labelled as ‘working parliaments’ and not ‘debating parliaments’, something that applies to the Parliament of Finland as well as to other Nordic parliaments (Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 16). A working parliament is defined by a committee system that reflects the structures of policy-related fields in ministries, providing committees with a defined area of expertise. Consequently, representatives focus their efforts more on the committee work and the expertise it provides rather than the plenary sessions (*ibid.*). Secondly, in working parliaments work is concentrated in the committees and the scrutiny is allotted accordingly. Such institutional mechanisms support what committees are supposed to do: scrutinise legislative bills. Where Finnish parliamentary committees lack in ability to set their own political agenda, as they are bound to handling of the legislative and other official issues (such as EU-related statements and reports), they gain in ‘drafting authority’ (Mattson and Strøm 1995, 298–99). Finnish parliamentary committees have the power to modify and re-write paragraphs of a bill, or propose to reject it entirely. The latter option seems only to be rather formally available: nowadays in every parliamentary term one or two bills are withdrawn (implying committee rejection of the government bill).

In summary, without committees the central parliamentary functions of oversight and scrutiny of legislation would be hindered, as would the task of keeping the cabinet in check. The sheer number of legislative tasks would be overwhelming. While the variables defining their autonomy vary from one country to the next (Mickler 2017), it can be said that without committees, representative democracy could not properly function and the democratic implications would be severe (Mattson and Strøm 2004, 93–95; on the relevance of the Finnish committee system see also Anckar 1992, 180–6).

Another issue undermining the deliberative tasks of parliaments relates to political parties. What committees are to the parliament, political parties are to representative democracy. Any discussion of representative democracy or representative institutions would not be satisfactory without acknowledging the existence of political parties. Also, it is hard to see how modern-day democratic representation could be organised were it not for parties. While they might be claimed to be ‘on the side of angels’, as Nancy Rosenblum’s (2008) volume title sympathetically suggests, they also play the role of the villain. Until relatively recently, if there was a gap in research with democratic theorists studying legislatures from the deliberative-representative perspective proposed above, similar half-blind corners are to be found with political parties (Muirhead 2006, 715). When democratic theorists address real-world politics, the analysis falls short without a sufficiently theoretical approach to political parties. The present study will not attempt to alleviate this regrettable situation. In the following, I try to briefly lay out some points that I see as valuable for stating the argument of this research.

What is the position of political parties in the current theoretical revival of political representation? And in what way, if any, can they be seen as vehicles for democratic representation operating through individual representatives? Even though it is true, as Rehfeld notes (2016, 31), that they insert an additional level, a ‘mediating step’, more focused research on political parties is needed. The problem of treating them as a separate issue (Rehfeld 2016, 31) could be eased by resorting to the selection model of representation (Mansbridge 2009; 2016). Parties assign and enforce ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’

accountability in the sense that representatives are monitored and disciplined. They also orient actors towards and sensitise them to other incentives and align causes and themes of representation supporting intrinsic motivation of representatives (Mansbridge 2016, 18).

If we shift the perspective of parties as enabling and restricting varying operations of representative actors to their ontological stance in representative democracies, F.R. Ankersmit's work (2002) is illuminating. Rather than seeing them as theoretical or practical nuisance, for Ankersmit the subsistence of political parties is a lifeline for modern representative democracy. Political parties make claims and, as such, offer re-presentations to the potential electorates for them to decide whether the rendition is accepted.

Goodin (2008c) also sees, as does Uhr, that 'party is a requisite for representation' (Uhr 1998, 83). 'No-Party-Democracy' would confine democracy to 'clientelist politics'. What parties do, then, is that they can order and translate collective action to a ratio, to a proportion or a relation. Without such a coherent ratio (often in a form of a party programme), the democratic determination as in 'giving the laws to ourselves' would not be applicable in the first place (Goodin 2008c, 210, 212–3.) The urgency of this ratio spurs Uhr (1998, 83) to argue that party is 'one of the most important devices of deliberation available to the supporters of deliberative democracy'. Empirical scholars of parliaments note that party affiliations are informative cues to voters that can work along deliberative lines in organising and highlighting representative claims and arguments (Strøm and Bergman 2011, 13). Interestingly, if we take a step back in time, Jeremy Bentham and Edmund Burke, both known for their dislike for factions, defended political parties. Bentham saw them as capable of invigorating parliamentary deliberation:

The member of the same party ought to possess every facility for concerting operations and distributing their parts. Without this concert, it is impossible that the arguments should be presented in the most suitable order and placed in the most advantageous light... It is necessary for the public good that each party should plead its cause with all its force (quoted in Uhr 1998, 83).

The originality of political parties lies in the fact that they can pose somewhat consistent perspectives and inquiries about society. In practice, these are weighted by popular vote in general elections where political parties and their ideological packages and proposals compete against each other. From the perspective of representative theory, what they do is make re-presentations. In doing so they play with the indirectness of representation (Urbinati 2006) in their claims and offer these to the represented for judgement.

Despite his unique approach to political representation, Ankersmit fails to extend his argument to the conformist and uniform tendency of logics of party representation (on party democracy see Manin 1997, 206–18). Here, parties play the role of the villain, and not of the angel. Extensive discussion of the effects of parties on their representatives holding office can be found in parliamentary studies. Implications of party representation direct the operation of representatives through positive and negative sanctioning mechanisms (gaining positions in the former and being disciplined in the latter case), but they are also said to displace the parliamentary tension of parliament and the government to that between government (governing parties) and opposition (Wiberg 2014, 168). Political systems with coalition governments further the challenges, and extend it to making it difficult to

distinguish and assess the determination, outlined in the party programs, of enacted policies (Goodin 2008c, 219). We can say that party influence is pervasive, extending to the central parliamentary institution of the committee system. Committees exchange their ideal placing as the agent of the parliament ('universalist perspective') to that of the political party ('partisan perspective') (Mattson and Strøm 2004, 93–111).

To be more precise, the operating unit of political parties in the parliamentary context is parliamentary party groups (PPGs). Their important role in Western parliaments (Heidar and Koole 2000), including the Finnish Parliament (Wiberg 2000; 2014), makes it difficult to assess the influence of the committee system, as Mattila argues (2014, 130; see also Arter 2003). PPGs also start taking a leading role in the Finnish parliamentary landscape, which indicates that they exert pressure on committee work through their MPs, who act as the party delegates (Raunio and Wiberg 2008, 592). Despite the significance of PPGs, it has been found that Finnish parliamentary committees are very autonomous (ranking in the top third of the 30 countries chosen) (Mickler 2017). There is a lack of research on the determination of the relations between committees and PPGs.

The idea of party democracy and the urgency of PPGs give the impression that PPGs operate rather cohesively (also through sanctioning). In reality, discussions and cooperative measures take place outside the formal parliamentary platforms, thus making them difficult to observe, and therefore 'they tend to be neglected in political representation research' (Thomassen and Esausson 2006, 218–19). This research will fill some of the missing gaps in the Finnish context, shedding light on the group dynamics within the PPGs, and especially on conflict resolution (Wiberg 2000, 174). The aim is to explore the claimed decline of the parliament by gaining a better understanding of what parties do to parliaments in terms of democratic processes. I also examine the role of PPGs in this (Heidar and Koole 2000a, 5) and the way parties control committee members (Damgaard 1995).

Adding to the body of knowledge about the workings of MPs and PPGs through a considerable number of research interviews can illuminate the question of whether there can be democracy within a party without losing the ability to be accountable. In parliamentary studies, the theme is treated in terms of party discipline and group cohesion (Heidar and Koole 2000b). In the extreme case, all members of a party (or, in practice, PPGs), given the stabilising effect of party representation, are bound to deliberate according to the united party platform.

Considering the centrality of committee system for the functioning of parliament as a whole, party cohesion and committee cohesion are at odds: if members are whipped in committees and obliged in practice to follow a party line determined, or at least formulated in advance in the PPG, cooperative working between members of the committee will plainly be threatened, notwithstanding common denominators of expertise, mutual respect and longevity of service on the committee (Arter 2003, 78).

In the backdrop of the Finnish constitution, Wiberg (2000, 168) sees party discipline as problematic from a legal point of view. Accordingly, theorists such as Anne Phillips (1995), Jan Teorell (1999) and, more recently, Fabio Wolkenstein (2016) insist on the warranty of intra-party deliberation. Depending also on the political system (e.g. consensual, adversary), or perhaps more crucially on the electoral system (e.g. first-past-the post, proportional), elected representatives in legislatures strive for these deliberative resources. To seek out

these resources and make use of the deliberative capacities, representatives appear hesitant when it comes to engaging in a more explicit and active contestation of the government. The dynamic of governing party groups and their presumed support for government makes the Parliament of Finland ‘rather weak or unwilling to use even those control mechanisms’ (Raunio and Wiberg 2008, 595). This tendency is often amplified by large oversized governments, which is typical in Finland (Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 11).

Party discipline, and the positive sanctioning that is significant to political career-building within the party, therefore relates to the larger issue of parliament holding the executive accountable. Making representative institutions more representative through applications of democratic innovations fail to fix democratic deficits if parliaments have lost their democratic functions (Beetham 2011, 132).

iii Deliberative and strategic virtues in parliamentary assemblies

As with democratic representation, the idea of deliberation is to be institutionally embedded in the functions of legislatures. By deliberating, legislatures act as representative institutions, but more importantly (since institutions lack agency as such), representatives reflect and foster a vital connection with the represented. The electoral connection by popular vote is no longer seen as sufficient for the maintenance of this relationship. Proponents of deliberative democracy argue for a shift from a ‘vote-centric’ to ‘talk-centric’ notion of representative democracy (Chambers 2003, 308). At best, this relationship forms a dialogical, deliberative relationship between the representative and the represented.

The quality of public deliberation exercised by representatives is generally not held in very high regard. Parliamentary deliberations are often seen as ‘ritualised performances’ (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 9), lacking many of the standards associated with good deliberation. Arguably, many debates violate premises regarding respect, mutuality and the willingness to listen to ‘the other side’. Representatives do not alter their preferences or positions after engaging with each other. In that sense, they do not surrender themselves to the deliberative process that would allow reflection, demonstration of mutual respect and yielding to the force of the better argument. Plenary sessions are venues for ‘political talk’ (Pekonen 2008) up for strategic purchase, for scoring points and paving the way for electoral success. Socratic reasons lose out to ‘plebiscitary’ reasons, something that contributes to plebiscitary rhetorics (Chambers 2004).

When elections approach, parliamentary debates transform even more into venues for electoral campaigning, thus paying even more lip service to prospective voters. However, the observation that publicity ensures that what Elster (1998, 111) calls ‘the civilising force of hypocrisy’ restrains the formulation of the most self-interested aspirations. Further, going public with an opinion or argument prescribes a path dependency. Consistency constraint (ibid., 104) entails that failing in the premise of ‘talking the talk, walking the walk’ causes politicians not only to lose face but also has negative effects in terms of accountability. In the domain of democratic politics, electoral promises are often associated with the principles of accountability and responsiveness.

When seeking to understand legislatures as deliberative assemblies and the actors that inhabit it, the strands of scholarship take quite different perspectives as their starting point. The rationalist orientation of comparative scholars capture legislative behaviour exclusively through institutional framework, with it consequently being seen as a formal structure or endorsing strategic action. Arguably, it has ‘forestalled constructive engagement between institutional scholars and classic deliberative democrats’ (Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010, 610; Thompson 2008; see also Sabl 2015). Studying deliberation as a legislative practice obviously raises the question of pre-formed interests and opinions.

As I will argue, the maturation of deliberative democracy enables it to accommodate features of democratic politics, which means that opinions may not result from the deliberative process but are external to it¹. This has led to the very recent claim by Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 82, 132) to repoliticise deliberation. This would entail a retreat from administrative-oriented safe havens of deliberation, and recognising and using the analytical toolkit of deliberative theory to also account for competitive political encounters (ibid., 153). It also means that players enter the ‘deliberative game’ with various motives, hence implying holding on to self-interested ones—at least to some extent. Generally, lacking the idea of self-interest would obfuscate deliberative democracy—most deliberative processes in plural societies would make no sense (Mansbridge 2015, 37). For this reason, the premise of preference change is exchanged into an understanding of ‘preference structuration’ (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 46), ‘meta-consensus’ (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010) or ‘open-mindedness’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 22). As noted by empirically-oriented theorists of deliberation, a ‘weaker’ deliberative programme is needed to conceptualise deliberation as a continuum and not as a binary opposition of true or false (Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004, 3; Bächtiger 2005; Bächtiger et al. 2018; J. Mansbridge 2015).

Similar developments in the form of loosening normative desiderata take place in discussion of political representation. The traditional rationalist orientation towards representatives’ incentives takes a ‘sanctions model’ of representation as their starting point. In this model, representatives’ legislative conducts are thought to be erratic, and for that reason there is call for constant monitoring and surveillance by the represented. Along liberal lines, representatives seek opportunities to maximise their personal gains and shirk to attain those goals. *Ex ante* and *ex post* sanctions, an emphasis on electoral accountability, and interest congruency are also part of the vocabulary of the sanctions model. This default position has totalised the scholarship since the 1970s, narrowing the range of alternative avenues and research designs to be considered. Referring to the traditionalist reading of political representation, Mansbridge (2016, 14) has declared that this ‘eclipse’ is coming to an end. Opening up the discussion to a full range of potential considerations of the treatments of political representation should readily be embraced, as it would induce intellectual interchange between empirical and theoretical scholars (see e.g. Bühlmann and Fivaz 2016). The present research is part of this endeavour.

Furthermore, when it comes to deliberation, rationalist inclination to strategic-partisan functions by the legislators cannot fully explain ‘why rationally motivated politicians would be susceptible to deliberative virtues’ (Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010, 611). Viewed from

¹ It would be difficult to think of any communicative action that would not entail at least some initial understanding of basic interests and nurturing of some fundamental self-interest.

this restrained strategic-partisan perspective, it makes no sense for legislators to commit to deliberation when the same aims can be achieved regardless. What is needed, according to Bächtiger, is a readiness to endorse a ‘deliberative approach’ to parliamentary debates. In that, analysis would not be limited by the strategic incentives of legislators. The context of legislature ‘may also create *spaces* for different action logics (including deliberation)’ (Bächtiger 2014, 151; emphasis in the original). This line of argumentation also resonates methodologically with those proposing an interpretative approach to the study of parliaments (Geddes and Rhodes 2018; also Bessette 1994). Finally, Bächtiger, Dryzek, Mansbridge and Warren have argued against the false prevalence of these strategic features of political speech, which accordingly denies that

actors can and often do influence one another with reasons and arguments, and fail to identify the ideals embedded in these moments of speech. Indeed, by flattening speech to its purely expressive and strategic elements, criticism overlook not only instances in which politics is conducted through deliberation (and there are many, once we look for them), but also *strips democratic politics of deliberative ideals altogether, leaving us with an impoverished landscape of political possibility*. Nor [...] are aspirational deliberative ideals undermined by the empirical fact that political actors do not instantiate them fully in practice (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 18; emphasis added).

Regrettably, there are only a few empirical studies of legislatures that aim at systematically exploring notions of deliberation from the distinct perspective of deliberative theory (see Bächtiger 2005; Bessette 1994; Pekonen 2011; Uhr 1998). Together with theoretical formulations such as distributed deliberation (Goodin 2005) or a sequential approach to deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2010), and the currently influential systemic approach to deliberation (Mansbridge et al. 2012), these studies enable new insights into such empirical inquiry. What is common to these few studies is that they can go after the presumption that deliberation in legislatures does not only belong to textbooks but exists in practice. In the following, I briefly lay out that particular yet relatively scarce scholarship in chronological order. The theoretical implications are to be discussed in the forthcoming subchapter (2.1.).

The *Mild Voice of Reason* by Joseph Bessette (1994) remains one of the few studies that emphatically focuses on deliberation and the deliberative process within a single legislature. Similarly, as the second such study, John Uhr considers in his volume *Deliberative Democracy in Australia* (1998) how a representative government corresponds to deliberative democracy. As with Bessette’s volume, the body of deliberative scholarship was significantly thinner, which partly led Uhr to doubt the empirical feasibility of deliberative democracy at that time. As such, it would be ill-suited to the study of legislatures. In Uhr’s view, seeing deliberative democracy as a continuation of consensual democracy, deliberative ideals give a better fit for judiciary institutions (Uhr 1998, 7, 11). He explores a republican take on liberalism, a ‘Madisonian approach’, and applies it to the Australian parliamentary system with numerous case studies. The results of the study are presented in the form of tangible recommendations that would enhance deliberative capacities (in this case) of the Australian parliament. But as Bächtiger (2005, 15) puts it,

Uhr retreats to a position that treats parliaments as mere rubber stamps, therefore binding its deliberative capacities only to reflect public policies, but not to refine them.

Bessette, for his part, builds up a convincing argument on the state of deliberation in the US Congress by going through legislative material illustrated through selected legislative cases. He relies on literature on legislative behaviour and suitable autobiographies and other sources to portray the typical member of Congress. In doing this, Bessette takes his cue from the ideas of the Founding Fathers of the United States as to how representative rule should best be organised. He comes to the conclusion that the original emphasis of the framers of the American constitution on deliberative functions and capacities of governing institutions have now been eclipsed by ‘powerful and alternative interpretations of legislative and governmental decision-making’ (Bessette 1994, 56). This relates to the point presented above about the narrowness of deliberative reading. Bessette and Uhr turn to classical writers such as Aristoteles and Madison partly due to the normative rigidity of deliberative scholarship at that time.

Bessette sets out to uncover to what extent strategic practices existed in post-war Congress. More precisely, he explores whether bargaining and other self-interested motivation for getting re-elected explain politicians’ incentives for taking on deliberative behaviour. Most famously, Richard Fenno (1973, see short overview in Bessette 1994, 108–110), in his work on United States congressional committees, presented a view of members of Congress who are driven by the prospect of re-election. Their secondary motivation, according to Fenno, was to seek power and prestige within the legislative institution. As stated before, the group interest theory perspective reduces politics to forms of bargaining, but also ushers in a concentration on strategic (de)motivation of engaging in reflective consideration on legislation. This has come with the cost of limiting the deliberative account (Bessette 1994, 56–65), thus eventually overshadowing the third incentive Fenno found with US Congress members. Aiming for good public policy Tendency to frame politics in similar convenient manner is heightened by the media (see e.g. Gutmann and Thompson 2012; Habermas 2006). A careful reading of legislative portrayals allows Bessette to argue for representative’s *modus operandi* that defy these premises, which conflict with deliberation. For example, he finds the role of bargaining as a pejorative method of decision-making to be less significant than is commonly assumed. While the narrative concerns the overall legislative process within American political system and its implications to deliberation, the ultimate question that Bessette proposes relates to the legislative actors: can elected politicians confer to ‘lawmaking as a rational effort to do good’ (Bessette 1994, 99)?

Maxwell Cameron (2018) follows the same line of thought, arguing against the one-sided utility-maximising perspective in politics. Exploration of the role of *representatives as practitioners* who are capable of moral virtues in the exercise of practical wisdom, Aristotelian *phronesis*, critically highlights the aspects of judgment. It requires from the practitioner the ability to judge, weigh and balance goods and matters, and align performance according to the preferred ends. Practical wisdom is about performing any action well (Cameron 2018, 157). The argument invokes, or reinvokes, the moral side of human activity, and in the case of politics connects the argument to the overall performance and dignity of political institutions. If legislatures are stumped to the arena of party

competition inhibited by ‘hyperpartisan’ representatives, the deliberative capacity, the most essential role of legislator, is lost (Cameron 2018, 132). However, Cameron is not claiming that political cause should be given up, but it is a matter of critical balancing acts between ‘fanatical devotion’ and hyperpartisanship, and ‘political indifference’ (ibid., 139). Political parties play a role in this, which Cameron does not explicitly address. When it comes to deliberative processes, corresponding partisanship should act as an energising and not marginalising force (Uhr 1998, 82; see also e.g. Ankersmit 2002; Muirhead 2006; Rosenblum 2008).

So, what Cameron seems to be asking is—as Mansbridge (2009; 2016) asks when promoting intrinsically oriented agents—can representatives assume the role of practitioners of practical wisdom? And, can they resist the most restraining dynamics of party democracy and electoral politics? Similar questions were posed (and partly answered) by Pekonen (2011) in his study of deliberation in the Finnish Parliament, focusing mainly on committee work. Before that, the knowledge of what actually takes place in the committees was limited in Finnish scholarship. The study concluded that while there are glimpses of deliberation, especially to mutual respect, the party dynamics is overriding. When it comes to making decisions, deliberation as persuasive speech, aiming to opinion-change is powerless. But when one shifts the focus of analysis from decision-making to other processes of committee work, collegial compromise-building and reciprocity prevail. As such, Pekonen’s study provides a partial answer to the question of Bessette on the effects of persuasion, which he believed to be ‘more common than is usually believed’ (Bessette 1994, 54).

Finally, a concise approach to measure the quality of deliberation has been developed by Jürg Steiner and others (2004). Their Discourse Quality Index (DQI), which draws from Habermasian discourse ethics, allows a systematic grasp on the components that affect the quality of deliberation. It has been influential and widely used (e.g. Bächtiger 2005; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010; Himmelroos 2017; Roger and Schaal 2013) to measure the quality of deliberation in various deliberative publics, ranging from mini-publics to different level of representative assemblies. Also Pekonen’s study, presented above, drew its understanding of deliberation from the DQI. In the original study by Steiner and others and closely related studies (Bächtiger 2005; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010; Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004), statistical analyses of an ample amount of legislative records (i.e. plenary speeches and committee minutes) were conducted to give a refined picture of the variables affecting deliberation.

Importantly, DQI allows comparative research regardless of the fact that institutional frameworks differ from country to country, which allows an even more nuanced view of these institutional implications (consensual vs. adversary democracies, parliamentary vs. presidential systems). In a revised version of the original study, Bächtiger and Hangartner (2010) claim that these institutional aspects affecting deliberation should be supplemented with actor-centred, cultural and issue-specific variables, each with their own pattern of logics. When measuring the level of respect distinguished by contextual level (coalition vs. government-opposition setting, veto power, publicity of the arena, consensus vs. adversary cultures, issue polarisation and timing) and the actor level (partisan dimensions, roles, gender, age), they find that respectful behaviour is enhanced by coalition arrangements, low issue polarisation, a longer time frame to next elections, and, not surprisingly, non-publicity

(Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010, 622–23). These studies point out the conditions that enable deliberation with different degrees in regard to justifying arguments (from no justification whatsoever to sophisticated ones) (see also Landwehr and Holzinger 2010). As Bächtiger foresees, this programme ‘makes the question *whether and under which conditions* real world politicians enter argumentative processes extremely relevant for the further development of deliberative theory’ (Bächtiger 2005, 15; emphasis added).

The general conclusion from studies of DQI is that aspects of deliberation are context-specific and sensitive. This idea gets even more impetus when it is connected to ideas of distributed deliberation (Goodin 2005; 2008b). What it means is that understanding legislatures calls for ‘sequencing deliberative moments’ contrary to seeing deliberation (and representation, as I argue) as a comprehensive activity extending over different sites (Bächtiger et al. 2010). Also, as argued earlier, the systemic approach to deliberative democracy (Mansbridge et al. 2012; see also Mansbridge et al. 2010) proposes and further advances this kind of differentiated perspective on deliberation, something that acknowledges the context-specificity. They spell out the general idea that parliaments and parliamentary actors as non-unitary, hence there is no ‘deliberation of parliament’ as there is no single ‘representation of parliament’.

Finally, the kind of approach to parliamentary deliberations that this research relates to is emerging. Recently Andreas Schäfer (2017) proposed a similar analytical framework as Rinne (2016), which seeks to differentiate the elements at play in parliamentary deliberations. Schäfer’s model combines the institutional context (conditions), practices of communication (processes) and functions between integration and contestation. He also recognises how issue structures, the potential polarisation of issues, affect the kind of practices of communications (e.g. cooperative or confrontational) are endorsed. The model looks past the transformative nature of deliberation still present in earlier works of Landwehr and Holzinger (2010, 376), who argue that ‘contextual parameters determine different modes of interaction that are more or less favourable for preference changes’. These new approaches also help refine the causal effects that institutional settings are often assumed to have on the quality of deliberation (Ercan, Hendriks, and Boswell 2017, 204).

The next section steps back and looks at the discussion so far from a political theory-sensitive perspective. I introduce the complete argument presented in this study, before moving on to the literature outlining and framing further the convergence of representation and deliberation.

iv The task ahead: deliberative representation

This research has two paramount objectives, the first being theoretical and the second being an application of the proposed theoretical argument. The latter will show how elected representatives deliberate and represent in a national legislature, in this case the Parliament of Finland. Theoretically, this research addresses the complex yet joint role of deliberation and representation—a relationship to be explored in a more rigorous manner. These two internally complex concepts are usually treated as mutually exclusive, and therefore discussions take place in isolation and ‘past each other’, as I have argued elsewhere (Rinne

2016). The other common solution is to see them as profoundly enmeshed. Obviously, democratic representation is somehow invoked, sustained and legitimised through deliberation or deliberative process. Both are intrinsically present, but the ‘nuts and bolts’ of this configuration have not been adequately examined.

The elements for an initial roadmap are beginning to be in place (Rinne 2016; Schäfer 2017; Brown 2018). The revival of the concept of political representation in democratic theory has opened plausible and promising avenues for studying and assessing the features of contemporary representative democracy. It concerns the representative actors, conditions for democratic representation and the overall dynamics affecting how political and democratic representation is perceived and operated.

I take as my point of departure the idea that political representation is a ‘political function’, and thus a praxis, in two of the following senses. First, as the discussions that reconcile political representation and representative democracy state, political representation carves out deliberation (and differentiates it from voting) because it renders its powers *to the activity of judgment* (Ankersmit 2002; Urbinati 2006; Näsström 2006; Disch 2011; 2012; 2019; Saward 2010). The notion of judgment states how ‘ideas are its form’ and ‘voice its visibility’ (Urbinati 2006, 33). When political representation is cast through the paradigm of deliberation, it manifests ‘presence through voice’ (ibid.). Second, the reason for grasping representation as function, from this perspective, it becomes possible to understand how deliberation can constitute, ‘make’ representation. Crucial to this process is judgment; democratic participants make judgments and use their discretion to formulate an understanding on the subject matter. Deliberation linked with representation involves two different, and opposite kinds of activities: the positive one relates to activating and proposing, and the negative to receptivity and surveillance (ibid., 5). As briefly discussed earlier, parliaments as institutions importantly facilitate both of these functions.

The newly introduced paradigm of representation overlaps with the democratic demands proposed by deliberative theory. Both strands of theory—theory of representation, and deliberative theory—are currently undergoing thorough re-examinations. Most importantly, these shifts provide the missing key feature that arms the argument for the dynamic interplay of representation and deliberation: both strands of theory are moving from a normative to a contextual approach.

Would we benefit from a conception that explicitly combined deliberation and representation? What would come out from an understanding that seeks to capture the interplay of these democratic principles? I propose that deliberative representation assumes *contextuality, performativity, and reflexivity*. The benefits of such an understanding of deliberative representation surpasses the complexity that would follow. I argue that there are grounds for such a work that would explicitly address such an approach, and perhaps more importantly, allow more thorough empirical investigation. I follow Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 7, 107) in their view that ‘deliberativeness’ refers to a feature, a ‘timbre’, a distinctive quality that resonates in various ways in deliberative democracy. Basing on these assumptions we can begin locating deliberativeness also in political representation, as well as in representative activities.

However, the idea of deliberative representation is neither new nor non-existent in the literature. In the discussions that explicitly yet in a fleeting manner mention ‘deliberative

representation', *selection* and *action* seem to be the primary themes. In the case of selection, representation is treated through the principle of inclusion. For this reason, the question of selection forms grounds for arguments of making representation more inclusive. For Parkinson (2003; 2006), elections form the basis through which accountability can be met. In representative democracies then, the outcome is projected in legislatures that stand for 'authorised representation', as Saward (2008, 1007) defines it. Deliberative systems, in which legislatures are part of, can nurture and strengthen deliberative representation, as James Bohman (2012, 74) argues. He makes the important distinction for 'functional role of representation' within deliberative systems. It is crucial how representation 'makes the emergence of communicative freedom and communicative power possible through practices of inclusion' (ibid.). To highlight the prospect of selection, through the division of labour assumed by deliberative systems where deliberation takes on different tasks in each of the parts of the system, there is a consistent need to differentiate between the electoral and non-electoral conceptions of representation. Deficiencies in the inclusion of perspectives make all representative settings, electoral or not, vulnerable to hierarchies and other asymmetries of power. Fortunately, for democratic projects to live up to their promises, each democratic function is not expected to accomplish everything at once. It may be that a combination of representation, voting, inclusion and deliberation is needed to maintain a balanced and legitimate democratic system (Warren 2017).

These discussions on the deliberative systems, to which this research also speaks to, present the demand to explore the interlinkages between deliberative sites within the system. As we have seen there are legislatures constituted by the inherently legitimate rule of the people, and then there are other spheres of representation. Such 'variability' according to Saward makes something like 'complex representation' to manifest itself 'in a variety of guises and institutional devices' (Saward 2008, 1004, 1007). Deliberative representation, in the few sections that mention it (Saward 2008; Parkinson 2003) becomes a question of claim-making through institutional mechanisms such as democratic innovations. Consequently, alongside with legislatures, citizen juries and deliberative polls 'may in different ways enact ideals of deliberative representation' (Saward 2008, 1007). Deliberative representation revolves around the problem of selectiveness, in the inherent elitism of representative rule (Manin 1997) to which democratic innovations can bring alleviation.

'Pluralism of representation' according to Bohman (2012) necessitates incorporation of mini-publics and other participatory forms of democracy. The theme of selection then also taps into the 'all-affected principle' that is arguably perhaps less complicated in established electoral and national-bound democracies than it is in deliberative theory. However, as Parkinson (2003) demonstrates, it imputes to a context-specificity. The all-affected principle depends on distinctions about memberships and mechanisms of selection (e.g. proportionality). What is important to note is that the selection discussed here anticipates action.

The deliberative angle of representation comes to define the leeway that representatives have in their activities. When Parkinson (2003) addresses the dual role of representatives, he touches on the mandate-versus-independence controversy. The activity of representation is reflected through the notions of trusteeship and delegated representation. When it comes

to deliberation, the worry seems to be that representatives who endorse trusteeship and independency lose touch with the represented. Delegates, on the contrary, are perhaps no better when it comes to engaging in the deliberative process: when executing the will of the represented they are unwilling to recognise and consider the merits of others' arguments and perspectives. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) helpfully anticipate the problematic nature of the intersubjective positioning in defining the range of activities to which representatives can subscribe. In 'discursive representation' instead of the represented, discourses are the principle of a representative. Representatives align themselves with those discourses, thereby assuming the saliency of reflexivity.

Unfortunately, these understandings are not enough. We would need a better grasp of what deliberative representation could mean. Here it helps going back to the idea of deliberativeness that distinguishes two features that take a somewhat different angle to the question of deliberative quality. The first is an additive quality that is argued to be 'injected' into various settings like sites and forums from where deliberation is then 'scaled-up' ideally to the systemic level. However, this research follows the other feature, the summative quality. Deliberative representation, deliberativeness in political representation, is not so much of 'an ingredient that goes into a system' (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 8). Instead I argue that, indeed, the deliberative quality in representation appears in and accommodates itself in dynamic and contingent ways. Therefore it is not so much of a specific ingredient but a produced potentiality within the sites itself, that can understood in summative terms. Each situation and location vibrates deliberativeness differently, and this is exactly what deliberative representation in this research explores. (ibid.)

This crucial objective is embedded in the perspective of action (and agency) that is articulated in the literature, hinting the prospect of deliberative representation. An important cue comes again from Saward when he says that *representative* 'is less a job title and more a diffuse, aesthetic potentiality' (Saward 2008, 1001). This introduces not only the idea of performativity and context-sensitivity, which resonates with Parkinson (2003, 190) when he argues that situations are decisive when distinguishing which parties are more relevant in regard to the all-affected principle. This perspective renders not only the representative actor and her doings context-sensitive but also the whole notion of political representation.

This idea of contexts bears powerful implications to the union of representation and deliberation. I propose to examine different contexts of representation and deliberative acts within them. This will help discern why representatives in varying contexts of representation resort to different deliberative acts. I do not want to make this argument in normative terms—although I am aware, as will be discussed, of the normative strands regarding the preferable deliberative styles and elements that should prevail in deliberation. Here I will not draw on what has been defined by Schäfer (2017) as the 'ethical-evaluative' paradigm of parliamentary deliberation but draw from the 'contextual-systemic' approach (Schäfer 2017), to which I add some additional commentary. In either case, both approaches, however, do not disprove the general argument to be furthered here; better knowledge is needed of what drives deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; 2004; Williams 1998; Bächtiger 2005; 2014; Parkinson 2006; Mutz 2006; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010; Bächtiger et al. 2010; Severs, Celis, and Meier 2014; Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019).

What is important to note is that when it comes to parliamentary deliberations or any deliberative performances, there is always an element of interaction involved. From this perspective, as with the interpretative approach in social science, I am interested in how representatives, as practitioners, make sense of and give meaning to their doings (Cameron 2018; Geddes and Rhodes 2018). Referring to this with the case of understanding political compromises, Gutmann and Thompson (2012, 68) argue that ‘the mindsets of leaders are at least as significant as the more-often-examined mindsets of citizens’.

On these assumptions about the nature of deliberative representation, deliberators or representatives interact with each other. When we explore representation through the abovementioned perspectives, and its link to deliberation, we come to realise that in legislatures representatives also represent *to each other*. When I argue that representatives represent to each other I claim that representation is always deliberative profoundly in the sense that, apart from voting, they need to engage in collective endeavour while pursuing their own preferred ends. Jürgen Habermas asserts that ‘deliberation and decision-making take place face to face’ (regardless of the fact that the two-track model of democracy loosens this desideratum between the public and the legislative bodies) to concern relations between legislators (Habermas 1996, cf. Goodin 2005, 182). Deliberation can be defined as ‘cooperative game’ (Goodin 2005, 183, 186). It implies a profound ontological dimension of sharing the same understanding that cannot be taken for granted: ‘it is a massive leap of faith to suppose that all parties to a conversation-cum-deliberation share the same view of the ‘purpose’ of the discussion, of “what it is about”’ (Goodin 2008b, 190).

What this means in practice is that legislatures host various contexts which, in turn, serve various purposes and functions of representation. This peculiar interpersonal and interactive perspective can bring new insight as to how deliberation in parliament is incentivised. Additionally, the proposed framing can also contribute to a more nuanced perception of what usually is ascribed to ‘institutional deliberation’. In that representatives’ motives for deliberation are captured as mainly strategic, but relatively scarce empirical research suggest that other action logics are also plausible. I would add that in parliamentary setting, to succeed in representing, other action logics are also necessary, as Richard Fenno has pointed out (Bessette 1994, 108–110).

We need an overarching perspective that considers deliberation beyond the isolated speech acts (see also Schäfer 2017). This dynamic puts judgment at the forefront. I tie this argument into a context-specific and situated understanding of legislative practices which simultaneously highlight the elements of reflexivity and performativity. Navigating in a legislature calls for tact and judgment—an activity representatives bestow also upon each other. It means that while democratic theory put the citizen-represented legitimately centre-stage, to understand aspects of representative and deliberative conduct in legislatures, the judgment of representatives be overlooked either.

This formula for deliberative representation can explain not only why ‘different agents play different deliberative roles’, but why *the same agents play different deliberative roles*. Robert Goodin (2005, 188) makes the manifesto of distributed deliberation very clear:

In a world of delegated deliberation, where different parts of the deliberative task are divided up and shared among various different agents, appropriate behaviour within each component part of that distributed deliberation is not necessarily the same as appropriate behaviour where one body is performing the whole deliberative task on its own.

It follows from this that different deliberative and representative expectations are found in different contexts of representation. I will argue that it is important to understand the variety of motivations connected to acts of representation which are bound by and can be investigated through what representation is thought to be accomplishing in each context. The parts, as sites or forums of representation, imputes to a distinguishable *function of representation*, to some deliberative practices. I will also include in my contexts of representation temporal notions, following Goodin's idea of 'sequencing deliberative moments' included in the idea of distributed deliberation. Following Birch, Goodin singles out authentic and sincere 'caucus room', argumentative 'parliamentary debate', competitive 'election campaign' and finally respective 'post-election arguing and bargaining' (Goodin 2005, 189–193). As seen, parliamentary stages can be seen to entertain different deliberative action logics.

Recently, Schäfer (2017, 420) has defined these logics, calling them—following Habermas—the discursive and positional logic. While discursive logic is derived from the institutional and procedural setting (including normativised conduct like mutual justification), the positional one is motivated by what Schäfer (ibid.) describes as 'relations of representation'. This means that MPs are expected to push their position and judged accordingly by those represented (ibid. 425). Some others, such as Landwehr and Holzinger (2010), formulate the dyad of discursiveness and coordinative. Further, Schäfer puts forward an argument that resonates with what has been argued above: 'Different parliamentary arenas and conflict situations are characterized by a specific balance between both logics, which in turn determines the form deliberation takes, its dynamics, and the functions it fulfils' (Schäfer 2017, 420).

To summarise, this research takes up the task of testing the above discussed analytical plausibility of deliberative representation by using the Parliament of Finland as an illustrative case.² As such, it also adds to Schäfer's proposal for 'contextualized-systemic' approach to parliamentary deliberation. However, by doing so, it goes beyond the 'hypothetical analysis' (Schäfer 2017, 431) and offers a concise empirical account. Finally, this research re-states many of the important observations made by Pekonen (2011) in his study on the meaning of deliberation in the Parliament of Finland (as well as the theme of expertise in committee work presented in Holli and Saari 2009). However, I give an updated and extended reading enabled by industrious scholars of deliberative theory, and by translating these deliberative practices into questions about political representation.

With these ideas in mind, I approach the Finnish legislature in a way that addresses actor-centred and contextual variables that supplement the institutional setting depicted in the core DQI literature (Steiner et al. 2004; Bächtiger 2005, Bächtiger and Hangartner

² A newer theoretical paradigm of democratic representation has been adapted earlier in the Finnish context by Maija Mattila (2017). She also uses the research context of the Parliament of Finland and the Talvivaara mining scandal as examples.

2010). However, what DQI, as an empirical tool, cannot sufficiently address is what other tasks legislatures facilitate. This study opens up the perspective to such considerations that draw from other action logics than mostly strategic vantage point of positional or discursive performance (Landwehr and Holzinger 2010; Rinne 2016; Schäfer 2017). As noted, institutional structures invite debate and contestation but also constructive and cooperative elements in democratic politics. Having legislatures as central arenas for settling disagreements and making political decisions seem to escape from political theorists. To alleviate the kind of theoretical gap formulations about ‘agreement-seeking solutions’ and ‘deliberative negotiations’ (Warren and Mansbridge 2013; Naurin and Reh 2018) have been introduced. Importantly, these theoretical insights imply that representative actors as legislators must overcome disagreements in order to get things done. From this perspective, discussion thus performs the specific task of producing agreement and consent as Manin (1987) argues, not to mention compromises.

Informed by the systemic approach of deliberative theory (Mansbridge et al. 2012), I formulate an idea that there exists within the legislature a similar kind of division of labour where the parts execute different deliberative tasks. In arguing for deliberative representation the systemic approach remains focal because a) it allows invocation of deliberative theory to representative institutions,³ where b) parties and actors are give-or-take committed to their original opinions and stances. In this setting, actors are expected to pursue these interests despite committing to the deliberative process. Consequently, they may be less inclined to consider the arguments proposed by others, thus less open to persuasion, not to mention preference-change. However, this does not rule out demonstrating deliberative virtues and other action logics—something that is also enticed by procedures and legislative norms. Then, c) a systemic view of deliberation invites the idea of contextuality—something that my research argues to be the interlinking piece in the recent discussion on political representation and deliberative democracy.

Turning to the concept of representation in the attempt to capture functionally differentiated ‘reasons’ for the observable deliberative practices helps map the interrelations between the parliamentary deliberations. We can treat the Parliament of Finland as a specific ‘deliberative ecology’ ‘in which different contexts facilitate some forms of deliberation and avenues for information’ (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 6). While it would be tempting to see parliamentary deliberation as one account—something that usually manifests in the public plenary—in fact the legislature hosts many niches where deliberation and representation take place. The way I make use of deliberative representation shows that contexts of representation are interconnected, meaning that deliberative acts can resonate and echo throughout the representative institution. When we add the argument of representative interactions, the less isolated and random these accounts become.

³ From a larger perspective, the ‘systemic turn’ allows viewing representative democracies as deliberative systems where each part (e.g. parliaments, public sphere, political parties, governmental institutions and associations) has their share within the deliberative process. In addition, the dynamics of deliberation but also representation, as I claim, can be seen in deliberative systems as non-monolithic: parties make use of them differently.

In conclusion, I argue that analytically deliberative representation can be seen from at least the following perspectives: Deliberative representation acknowledges the ways interactions are facilitated in democratic processes, how these myriad manifestations of real and assumed relationships and corresponding dynamics take place. Deliberative representation can explore the faculty of deliberation in the forming and articulating reasoned opinions and perspectives. These functions can take place through reflexive means but also for various audiences. Both interactions and dealing with opinions and reason-giving pay attention to the deliberative character of reflection and transformation. Finally, deliberative representation is sensitive to how these functions may travel from one context to another. Thus, it is aware of the institutional impetus that may invoke and restrain deliberative faculties but is not bound by them.

2 Convergence of political representation and deliberation

2.1 Context of representation

Representation, as a concept and phenomenon, is highly complex and multidimensional despite its common usage in everyday language. Although it ‘refuses to be pinned down’ (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, 12), we continuously seek avenues for getting a better grip of the concept itself and its implications. Due to this complexity, some (cf. Pitkin 1967, 6–7) have even proposed avoiding the concept altogether in political theory, or preferring understanding democracy in very minimalist terms (Przeworski 1999). Also, some critics continue to argue that special caution is advisable when using the concept in a non-political sense. However, exploring the concept thoroughly requires terminology from other fields. Indeed, as we will see in this subchapter, the conceptual evolution of representation has re-introduced features that borrow understanding from judicial fields, aesthetics, theatrical and theological studies. This process will never be completed which is what defines the profound understanding of the concept. Therefore, political representation is a transformative concept. This transformative nature is exactly what makes it also a vehicle for representative politics and a site of struggle. And finally, the idea of deliberation becomes possible to read into the narrative of political representation when conceptual re-arranging is taking place.

Using this prevailing knowledge, I will use my analytical idea of deliberative representation that assists in detecting and exploring the deliberative faculty in representation. This exploration framing by my argument for the need to converge political representation with deliberation calls for reviewing the literature somewhat extensively. Building towards a ‘contextual-systemic’ understanding of representation (Schäfer 2017), where deliberative representation is analytically appealing in the focus of this research, many features in representation are called into question. First, when deliberative representation states the assumption that representation is an ongoing process that facilitates and constitutes the actors involved, we must look into ‘who’ the counterparts of representation are. Implications of the traditional principal–agent–model are vast especially in empirical political science. However, as I will show through reading the literature, full reliance of the model undermines the character of judgment that crucially carves out deliberation. It calls forth an investigation of what, and in more detail, through which practices the representative and the represented are bound together.

This is the second assumption that deliberative representation articulates: it is informed by a practical and functional perspective on what representation actually does and can do. This notion takes us beyond the electoral account that political representation is associated with in the standard reading of representation. Making this point in a research project that situates itself in an institutional context of representation sounds curious. On the contrary, the idea of deliberative representation is a good fit since it concentrates on the elements that makes up opinions, interests and perspectives. I argue that the context of representation can,

but it does not have to, take place in e.g. parliaments. The point of departure is in the respective resources and capacities that contexts offer to practices and activities take their cue from the act of representation itself and not only from the institutional setting. Regardless of that, in this process of representation the exercise of judgment is key. I focus on the preferred features in the conducts of the former, especially through representative roles, can mitigate the prospect of deliberation. But the idea of deliberative representation does not spell out (theoretically or otherwise) expectancy of discarding representative commitments. Instead, it articulates a certain sensitivity to the fact of consideration and reflection in the act of representation.

i Tracking representatives and keeping them in check

The most common way to approach the idea of representation is to see it as analogous to an individualistic, person-to-person relationship. Defining such a relationship, which is ‘notoriously difficult to maintain’ (Urbinati and Warren 2008, 389), is a source of confusion. The gap between the represented and the representatives is what can be seen either as the weakness or the strength of the concept of political representation (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, xii). For this reason, and due to the ambiguity that causes confusion and distraction, many strands of political science have been wishing away the complexity or have warned against opening the door to ‘foreign disciplines’ in the treatment of political representation (ibid., 4; see also Disch 2012, 601–2). The debate highlights the ultimate ontological differences between theorists of political representation.

The approach of capturing representation as a two-way relationship is influenced by Hannah Pitkin, who was the first to comprehensively attempt to capture longstanding ‘theoretical confusions and controversies’ (Pitkin 1967, 2) around political representation. Pitkin’s *The Concept of Representation* (1967) remains remarkably current, and it is almost requisite that it is referred to when the concept of representation is discussed. As will be observed later, a re-reading of Pitkin’s work is underway which is a testimonial of the revival in political theory that the concept of representation has undergone in the mid-2000s.

By noting the fluctuating usage of the concept and by taking a ‘language-philosophical approach’ (Pitkin 1967, 8) to finding relating word-families for representation, Pitkin is able to trace one distinct and overlapping definition of representation. As she famously defines it, representation is ‘the making present in *some sense* of something which nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact’ (ibid., 8–9, emphasis in the original). The paradoxical dualism of simultaneous presence and absence in the concept outlines the intuitive idea that representation consists of two parts: the present representative and the absent represented.

Assuming the absence of the former the focus tends to fall upon the latter, i.e. who represents the absent. This approach endorses the view of representation as an interpersonal relationship that contains assumptions on the nature of that relationship. When discussing this I assume that the dynamics of group representation are similar to individual representation. To justify this necessary demarcation, I take it that the discussed and criticised principal-agent model also applies to group representation. However, when considering the implications of the representational relationship the ordering especially falls

upon the agent, regardless of the number of principals. What is at stake is the relative scope of freedom in action that the agent has. This normative constellation sets up what has been called as the ‘standard account of political representation’ (Dario Castiglione and Warren 2006, 1; Rehfeld 2006, 3; Urbinati and Warren 2008, 389). It underlines that the distinctive evaluation and judging of political representation is most commonly defined and validated by the relationship between the one who is being represented and the one who represents. Theoretically this relationship is discussed within terms of the principal-agent model which assigns normative descriptions to both these actors.

The traditional controversy is about whether a representative-agent should act according to the mandate given, authorised by the principle, or be free to roam as they please. The mandate can be understood in a more or less binding manner (‘delegated representation’), also in regard to the extent the representative relies on her own judgment (‘trustee representation’). Edmund Burke’s (1774) definition of a ‘trustee’ form of representation has proven to be remarkably enduring: ‘Your representative owes you, not his industry, but his judgment; and he betrays you, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.’ However, if the represented are seen as plain beneficiaries who are not treated as autonomous subjects but passive objects of governance, the idea of democratic self-rule dissolves (Dahl 1998). Such themes of elitism, paternalism and self-rule were reflected in the debates between the Federalist and the anti-Federalists during the American Revolution (see overview in Pitkin 1967, 190–98). The Founding Fathers had differing opinions on the subject matter, which then has also come to be known as ‘mandate–independency controversy’. Since then the treatment of political representation has been dominated by normative criteria of the relationship between the representative and the represented. Before picking up criticism regarding the static array that they imply, let us take a look at the ‘nuts and bolts’ of representation.

Proponents of the ‘formalistic view’, which Pitkin calls the first approach she identifies in her review of the literature on representation, underline the electoral connection to representation. She finds two differing strands in this line of thought—the authorisation view and the accountability view—both of which she finds equally insufficient. In general comprehension, however, the connection between political representation and electoral dynamic is intrinsic. Authorisation theorists see representation as transference of authority. Authorisation describes an occurrence where someone is given the right to act *on behalf of* someone else. Importantly, the burden of responsibility lies with the one who gives the right to act, and where all rights and privileges dwell within the actor. This ensures that ‘a representative is someone whose actions are not his ‘own’ but ascribed to ‘another’ (Pitkin 1967, 51), similar to the Hobbesian understanding of ‘ownership’ of actions. For example, the attorney representing her client is not held responsible for her misguided or unprofessional actions if the court’s ruling is unfavourable. This is because the only thing that matters is the authority to act in the name of the represented. Consequently, and somewhat paradoxically, the represented are bound, whereas the representative is free (ibid., 16–20).

Lacking detail, the conception of authorisation theorists does not permit evaluation and assessment. In this sense a representative, according to the formalistic view, may deliberate as she pleases, thus exercising her judgment to the fullest. But there would be no connection

to representation other than on the account of being authorised to do so. For this reason, matters such as misrepresentation or ‘representativeness’ are beyond its vocabulary: none of these instances genuinely exist. If the authorised representative surpasses one’s authorisation, one does not represent (Pitkin 1967, 48–49). The accountability view tries to patch up this deficiency (ibid., 55). Its definition turns upside-down the setting regarding the rights and obligations of the representative. For Pitkin, a representative is ‘held responsible in order that he may *become* responsible’ (ibid., 57, emphasis in the original). Measures capable of invoking accountability and responsibility, the existence of elections, become highlighted (Urbinati 2006, 30–31). However, *ex ante* and *ex post* control mechanisms still do not sufficiently replenish the void of representation in the formalistic views. Since ‘nothing follows about any kind of duty, obligation, or role for the representative’ (Pitkin 1967, 58) the assessment of the performance of a representative is conceptually missing. As long as the provision of re-calling the representative exists and it can be exercised accordingly, representation holds ground. There can be no criticism as long as an irresponsible representative is removed from office when re-election time comes (ibid., 57, 59).

The attempt to capture representation by either type of formalistic view demarcates from telling what goes on during the time of authorisation when a right or obligation is being exercised (ibid., 58). The first, the authorisation view, is focused on how representation commences (election salience) and the second, the accountability view, on how it ends (re-election). There is no time in-between authorisation and accountability. Pitkin finds these inadequate by themselves and discards these views as grasping only a part of what representation is. Political scientists often see the formalistic mechanism of accountability as a guiding principle in the treatment of political representation. Arguably, the triumph of the idea of accountability is centrally puzzling in the paradigm as it draws a causal relation between accountability and electoral sanctioning. As Mansbridge observes (2009, 384; revised in 2016), the principal-agent model assumes the importance of sanctions in appeasement of accountability. She calls this array the ‘sanctions model of representation’. Likewise, in the standard account of political representation, the stress put on *ex post* control mechanism as sanctioning via elections is based on the distrust of the MPs and on the conviction that they will most likely shirk if an opportunity arises (cf. Mansbridge 2009). Considering the argument for tracking the deliberative faculty in representation this gives deliberation a meagre start.

Leaving relatively little room for the idea of deliberation has not only analytical but also empirical implications. Mansbridge (2009, 371) notes the way political scientists have a kind of ‘fetishism’ with the sanctions model that focuses on the ‘unruly’ behaviour of elected representatives and their removal from office. Such orientation can also be seen to derive from a critical division between empirical and theoretical scholarship that is underscored also in the treatment of responsiveness criteria (Sabl 2015). Availability and accessibility to relevant data sets highlights the applicability of theory to empirical inquiry. Other than that, reaching out to other methodologies or theoretical formulations would reveal other dynamics than merely sanctioning the agent in the name of accountability (Mansbridge 2009, 371). On similar grounds, Rehfeld (2009, 219) argues that measuring delegated representation is less demanding which consequently underestimates the

complexity and multi-layered nature of representation. Simultaneously, an important ontological remark is addressed to political scientists who should descriptively question the relative balance of sanctioning and other motivations (e.g. intrinsic motivations for the public good) in varying contexts of democratic representation. In addition, contemplation is needed regarding what this ratio or balance should be (Mansbridge 2009, 371).

Pitkin's rejection of formalistic views of representation as incomplete, or the concerns of Mansbridge and Rehfeld about the premise of monitoring and sanctioning, and their intrinsic connection to elections, importantly point to a feature that is still missing. This is the temporal feature of representation. By electoral means, authorisation corresponds to the 'beginning' of forming the discussed interpersonal representative relationship and accountability the 'ending' of it (Pitkin 1967, 59). It is not only that Pitkin is after filling the concept with a tangible substance, what is lacking exactly is the perspective on what happens during representation, when it is in action. I claim that as we move forward in outlining my argument about the importance of capturing the context of representation we have now traced on its sub-category, namely, that of the temporal context. When we analyse representation in almost any form it needs to be kept in mind the way in which it is always embedded in time. For Urbinati (2006, 6), this meant an unavoidable inclination to transcend the present. Representation, then, is not only a matter of advancing and shifting perspectives and of understanding meaning-making during the course of time (as with the Skinnerian approach), but also of the way in which representation is assessed and judged through a feature of temporality. This perspective is defended especially in regard to parliamentary politics, thus granting parliaments various dynamics when it comes to functions (or ideals according to Palonen 2018) representation, legislation and deliberation (Palonen 2018; see also 2003).

Temporality can also refer to a tangible sense of existing in time, in a certain moment. This is, for example, one of the critiques of normative theorists on issue-congruence fostered by empirical research: notwithstanding their validity claims, data sources of issue-congruence are only snapshots, and not dynamic, transformative processes (see Bühlmann and Fivaz 2016). However, the transcending character of representation does not strip away the impetus to incentivise action. For example, Pitkin (1967, 57) very briefly mentioned another temporal notion connected with the control mechanisms associated with the accountability view. The knowledge of being held accountable makes the representative accountable, thus suggesting an anticipatory feature in representative activities. Mansbridge (2003) defines this more precisely in her suggestion about critically supplementing the promissory representation with anticipatory representation.

The anticipatory feature—that representatives ground their operations on anticipating what the constituencies might want—foresees the upcoming transformation. It revolves around the standard account where the represented provide the input to democratic politics, and not the other way around. This paradigm shift raises also new worries about making the representative turn an elitist project (Näsström 2011), thus obscuring the place and significance of constituency in it (Disch 2012). To get a fuller picture of these elements, we will shortly move on to what bridges this temporal and substantive 'black box'. Until then, we need to finish the story of who the counterparts of representative and represented are. Coincidentally, the concept of representation slowly begins to untie and test its normative

boundaries, as we move forward towards what is transmitted in the act of representation and finally arriving at the question of how this is being done. But for now, we will stay with the interpersonal notion while starting to deconstruct the representative roles.

ii Assuming the role of a representative

If we accept the initial argument that representing refers to something that is a practice, then we cannot discard formulations that aim at distinguishing the grounds from which those actions would be derived. The conduct and behaviour of representatives can be viewed through the literature of representative roles. Although they prescribe a dominant understanding of political representation that is, insufficiently, articulated through the principal-agent model, bypassing them altogether would be a mistake. Discussion of legislators' roles help in seeing the many normative layers embedded in the representative roles. What these discussions bring to deliberative representation is that they implicitly inform us to what extent and on what grounds judgment can be exercised when it comes to deliberation. In more detail, representative roles assume the ways in which forming, expressing or even transforming opinions and viewpoints can occur. Further, they also articulate the functions and tasks representatives are assumed to take on, something that I find relevant in the light of newer theoretical approaches supporting seeing representation through practical activities (e.g. Saward 2017, Rehfeld 2018).

Many of these studies of representative roles subscribe to empirically observable or otherwise precise legislative roles situated in the legislative setting (Oksanen 1972; Fenno 1973; Searing 1994; Strøm 1998; Esaisson 2000; Thomassen and Esaisson 2006; Bengtsson 2014; see overview in Andeweg 2014). The roots of these role studies are in the Anglo-American context as in the classic study by Eulau et al. (1959). Authors locate different representative relationships as to whether interviewed Congress members fell inside the delegate-trustee model. For example Wahlke and others also developed a 'role orientation theory' that specified representational, normative roles among other core roles like consensual (rules and procedures shaping behaviour) and purposive (career aims and orientation) roles (Andeweg 2014).

The cornerstone of these representational typologies is in the leeway ascribed to the understanding of the representative mandate. They also pay attention to the impetus of political parties and the possible overlapping of multiple principles. What this means is that if we would want to find clear empirical accounts of 'delegates', 'trustees' or the intermediary role of 'politico' originating from the study of Eulau and others (1959), they might not be there⁴. Conflicting demands are also grasped in regard to a political party, adding to a role of 'loyal partisan', after Converse and Pierce (see Andeweg and Thomassen 2005, 508). Interestingly, the endorsed party delegate role is strikingly low (9 per cent) with

⁴ This is pointed out in one of the only role-oriented study conducted in the Finnish context. Oksanen (1972) notes after analysing research interviews with 191 MPs (out of 200 MPs) in the 1969 legislative session, the roles of trustees or delegates had not been consciously internalised by the Finnish elected representatives. This observation was manifested in the results, where two-thirds of the MPs were identified endorsing the role of 'politico'. This result, according to Oksanen (*ibid.*, 304), 'is a natural response to the conflicting demands made upon legislators' (on the citizen perspective, see Bengtsson and Wass 2011; Harden and Clark 2016).

Finnish MPs in comparison with other Nordic countries. The reason for this has been argued to be in the individual-oriented voting system that differs from neighbouring countries (Esaïsson 2000, 61–62). In the most recent study (Bengtsson 2014), from data collected in 2010, slightly over half of Finnish MPs assumed the trustee role, every fifth party delegate and every sixth found the ‘style of representation’ defined in the study ‘conflicting’.

On these assumptions, it is reasonable to expect that empirically these roles described above are less rigid and therefore do not follow such role orientations. There are different views for what are the motives for roles that go beyond the systemic effects that institutional context warrants them, and to what extent they relate to motivational factors (Searing 1994) or constitute behavioural strategies, as proposed by Strøm (1998). To get to the root of these would require opening the scope of legislative studies to newer methodological and theoretical approaches, as argued by Geddes and Rhodes (2018). For now, it is worth noting that formulations in political theory also aim to engage with these discussions about roles. These perspectives would add more nuance and texture to representing. Incorporation of typological roles has been turned more profusely into questions on the concept of political representation, and not only about the empirical applicability. Reaching beyond the simplistic principal-agent model has led to the distinctive trustee–delegate dichotomy being recognised as inadequate, if not completely suspect (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005; on the same point, in the context of PPG leaders, see de Vet and Wauters 2018, 364). Claims have been made to restrain from its further usage, and even dropping the whole term ‘trustee’ from legislative theory (Mansbridge 2011, 621). Many, such as Mansbridge (2003; 2009; 2011; 2016), Rehfeld (2009; 2011; 2017), Pettit (2009) and Saward (2014, 2019), have challenged this common dichotomy.

There are a few reasons for this. First, the authors claim that the default of trustee–delegate puts too much emphasis on the location of authority hence making it outdated also in globalised and supra-territorial political reality (e.g. Rehfeld 2005; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Saward 2019; see also Teivainen and Trommer 2017). Secondly, as mentioned, conceptual vagueness makes coherent, empirical analysis obscure. Are we even realistically expecting to find such roles that the role orientation theory presumes? Moreover, one of the main objections against outlining the domain of representative activity through the trustee–delegate controversy is that it lumps together representative criteria that in fact should be treated separately (see discussion of Mansbridge 2011 and Rehfeld 2011). Of these features in the deconstruction of the dichotomy Rehfeld (Rehfeld 2009; revised 2017) finds three distinctions that should be considered independently: source of judgment, aims of legislation, and responsiveness to sanctions. Regarding the storyline of this research here we start to see a glimpse of extending the question on representation of grasping it through an activity—a direction Pitkin can be seen pushing towards. However, Rehfeld’s distinctions correspond mainly to the activity of the representative. First, aims refer to representative’s epistemic determination: whether he aspires for the good for all or good of a part. These can also be depicted with universalist–republican or plural-particularistic perspectives. Second distinction, source of judgment, relates to whom a representative turns to for making up her mind on a matter: does she rely on her own discretion or depending on judgment of a third party? The third aspect consists of responsiveness to sanctions: the degree which representative is responsive to re-election or other sanctions (Rehfeld 2009, 215).

Based on the schematic space founded on these three, in his theoretical account Rehfeld increases the number of representative roles from two (Burkean trustee, pared-down delegates) to eight (the first two, plus civil servants, Madisonian lawmakers, anti-federalists, volunteers, ambassadors, and professionals) (Rehfeld 2009, 223–24; 2017, 38). For example, the Burkean trustee is defined by being less responsive to sanctions, being self-reliant in judgment, and supporting republican aims (good for the whole). On the other end of the schematic space, pared-down delegate stands for the total opposite of Burkean trustee. Each of these eight roles play out simultaneously regardless that they may not appear at all in empirical inquiry (on this critique, see Mansbridge 2011).

Before I turn to these important formulations that advance the argument presented in this research, I must continue on the chosen path marked by Pitkin. The idea about representative roles helps to further differentiate not only the ‘who’ in representation, but also the ‘what’ in the ‘who’. What are the features that facilitate the interpersonal link between the representative and the represented? All these perspectives are needed, but none is enough alone. What theoretically binds the representative and the represented together? This question critically opens up the horizon that extends over the formalistic view traced by Pitkin. It made it impossible to make any assertions beyond the act of authority-giving thus, when turned also to the perspective of deliberation, lacks democratic inclination towards commitments. However, the dominance of orthodox understanding of representation through the electoral notion is profoundly set in the heart of contemporary representative democracy. The ‘central normative problem of representation’ (Rehfeld 2006) assumes, as a premise, about the correspondence of interests and policies. How can the correspondence of preferences and interests of the people and the output of these institutions, i.e. laws, be ensured? Notably, the centrality of the normative problem of representation forcefully affects the design and *modus operandi* of representative institutions like national parliaments. Matters such as issue congruency and input-output legitimacy are discussed under this heading. In sum, preferred correspondence, between individual wills and the collective will resonate well with the ethos of direct democracy.

This setting corresponds to the similarity in the form of ‘standing for’ view of representation. It makes a powerful yet contingent claim for a legitimate representative rule. As we will see shortly, this view prescribes its vital connection to voicing out interests, another central and contested feature in representation. This assumption has been criticised forcefully in recent years. At this time, the ‘standing for’ idea advances the formalistic views by penetrating the black box of authority: we can now ask what makes up representation. Notably, this shift in focus gives more vitality to the function of the representative who ‘does not act for others; he “stands for” them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection between them, a resemblance or reflection’ (Pitkin 1967, 61). For some others, like Vieira and Runciman (2008, 6), this representative idiom can be referred to in pictorial terms. There, characteristic, qualitative features take centre stage in the form of representation that Pitkin (1967, 80) calls *descriptive representation*.

As social beings, we tend to take a liking to people who are in some sense similar to us. Also, by being prone to empathy, the intuitive reason is perhaps that if someone resembles ourselves, we tend to assume that they know how it feels to be us. The yearning and motivation for this popular descriptive notion about the significance of shared experience is

captured in the common proverb about walking a mile in someone else's shoes. As William Hakewell (quoted in Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, 19), a member of the Parliament of Elisabeth I of England, put it in 1601:

We must lay down the respect of our persons, and put on others, and their affections for whom we speak: for they speak by us. If the matter which is spoken toucheth the poor, then think me a poor man. He that speaks, sometimes must be a Lawyer, sometimes a Painter, sometime a Merchant, sometimes a mean Artificer.

Notably, this thought intersects with Habermasian discourse ethics and its claim on 'ideal role-taking'. It also precedes the shifting dynamic with representatives when they endorse different positions or roles. Deliberative speech, according to Urbinati (2006, 46–47), consists of faculties of 'understanding' and 'hearing'. They imply to how representatives use the ethos presented in deliberative representation when forming opinions and reasoning with others. This theme is crucial in outlining the convergence with political representation and deliberation. I will take this discussion later when I turn explicitly to discuss deliberation in the next subchapter. For now, however, highlighting the authenticity and genuine resemblance or reflection seen as a proof for 'true' representation proponents of descriptive representation take that it is important to mimic the composition of the people in the representative assembly. This idea of 'microcosm' is developed further in proportional representation where the parliament stands for the exact copy or map of the sovereign, the people (Pitkin 1967, 60–61). Quoting John Adams, a representative legislature 'should be an exact portrait, a miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them' (ibid., 60). In addition to this empathetic notion of being able to relate to someone's personal experiences 'genuinely', the descriptive idea, more importantly, emphasises the qualitative features as the foundation of representation (such as gender, social class or ethnicity).

Along the same line of reasoning in descriptive representation, also defined 'indicative representation' (Pettit 2009), political decision-making and its end product—legislation—would be exactly as it would be if the people themselves would have been deciding it (Pitkin 1967, 84). This perspective is especially relevant when discussing the representation of underprivileged groups and minorities (Phillips 1995; Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999b). From these, as the products of social identities, perhaps age, social class and gender could be seen the most common reference points in the Finnish context when arguing for 'better representation' from a descriptive viewpoint⁵.

The descriptive view allows representation to be seen in terms of information. The sample, microcosm or map standing for portrayals of things to be represented may indeed provide substantial and accurate information about the people, nation or the constituency. This is one of the benefits of descriptive representation: to gather and provide information

⁵ The appeasement of descriptive representation rises also from its ability to transform social meanings. In the case of democratic politics, having a female president, as Finland has had, can make a decisive difference, inspiring females and other under-represented groups to rise to other leadership positions. The second novelty of descriptive representation, according to Mansbridge, is the empirical *de facto* legitimacy it produces. Having a descriptive representative can induce a 'feeling of inclusion', thus increasing the legitimacy of the polity (Mansbridge 1999b, 648–51).

on the nation for the use of the legislature and legitimate political decision-making with. Importantly, the feature of perspectives and opinions hints the deliberative function of representative democracy. Unlike the aggregative function, deliberative function highlights the need to consider the orientation towards and justification of the common good, and to understand and recognise the value of new insights and perspectives brought to the legislative process (Mansbridge 1999b, 634). In this research we are not focusing on the former that relates to the ethical-evaluative paradigm of parliamentary deliberation (Schäfer 2017). Instead, we are more interested in exploring the horizon of how perspectives and possible insights are voiced and articulated not mainly vertically between the representatives and their constituencies but horizontally between representatives themselves.

Now, capturing the function of legislatures as a cross-section of the wills and desires of the nation through the descriptive strand, or its detailed formulation of proportionality, poses some significant impediments. With descriptive representation it becomes impossible to judge the activity or passivity of this rather static 'activity' that this kind of concept brings about. Moreover, it does not leave room for the idea of accountability: how could someone be held accountable for their characteristics or features? In the words of Iris Marion Young (cf. Mansbridge 1999, 630, emphasis added): '[h]aving such a relation of identity or *similarity with constituents says nothing about what the representative does*'. There are no institutional warrants or other that a descriptive representative would act according to the embodied information, experience or any such she would somehow entail that constitutes the kind of representation that is in question here. While it remains unclear how should those representatives with high education, those with blue eyes, or those belonging to a sexual minority perform these entailed qualitative features, there are undoubtedly legitimate claims not to discard the descriptive notion fully. In addition to the creation of social meanings and producing *de facto* legitimacy, descriptive idea can be seen relevant in the following way: instead of accountability deficits it pertains the focus that is turned to the selection of those representatives. As Mansbridge suggests (1999; 2003; 2009; 2016), the myriad qualitative criteria provide hints and predictabilities for the electorates at the time of selection.

Discussion about descriptive representation points out that we are in fact capable of mulling over something like 'the representativeness of representation'. The concept of representation implicitly does entail some stipulation and normative criteria on which it is to be assessed. As seen, these criteria are open, as they are numerous and provisional: implying that representativeness and representation are not synonymous notions. The openness and contingent nature of the substance of representation upon which features of the people or the nation or the represented is to be represented in fact, makes this notion of representation vulnerable. The contingency of such perspective suggests that there is much more to representation than the mimetic presentation, a causal relation by the representative and the represented. Misleadingly, it underestimates the power of intentionality and the specific role played by the audience. Here we find another lead that supports tracking the idea of deliberative representation in these discussions. Even though a map may credibly portray reality, it still requires reading (Pitkin 1967, 71). As Pitkin puts it: '*what constitutes a representative example (or sample) depends on what we want to know about the thing it stands for; it depends on our purposes.*' (ibid., 80, emphasis added).

All this implies the inherent dynamic within representation that assumes some kind of interactions (be that virtual or physical). As such, representation carves out a domain for judgment. Where descriptive representation goes wrong is exactly this intentionality in depicting something but also in ‘reading’ it. The assumed denotation of descriptive representative may not be recognised if one is not familiar with the ‘style’ in question. Here, Pitkin makes an important remark by saying that ‘in politics, too, representation as “standing for” by resemblance, as being a copy of an original, is always a question of which characteristics are politically relevant for reproduction’ (Pitkin 1967, 87). In sum, the project of what counts as relevant distinction in descriptive representation is a political one.

This notion marks a key turning point in tracing deliberative representation and the contextuality it induces. The same dynamic—that can be viewed to anticipate the upcoming constructivist turn in representation—is present also in symbolic representation. I want to briefly mention this addition to the standing for—view of representation. Its relevance is that the undertone is more subtle and less commanding than the above discussed descriptive representation. Therefore, it is also valid for representing an inanimate (another feature that has not been regarded in other forms of representation). In a symbol there is a relationship between the referent it symbolises that is not built upon symmetry but is more of an arbitrary nature. Arguably, a symbol that represents itself is not a symbol at all. Symbolic representation manages to avoid the pitfall of disregarding the interpretative nature embedded in the concept of representation: as if this reading is not affected by our varying conscious and unconscious motivation.

The novelty of the ‘symbolisation’ view lies in its expansion of understanding representation more as a dynamic process between the object and the referent of the signifier and the signified (in de Saussurean terms). Some symbols are more conventional where some demand more in-depth knowledge and awareness which tap into cultural and social elements (Pitkin 1967, 93). Importantly, acknowledgment of the situational elements where a symbol symbolises and where it does not propose the crucial contextual element of representation that has not been explicitly addressed. It also gives a hint about the ways in which representation is a *two-way process* that is not only about representative authorising, standing for or even just acting for instead of the represented.

Additionally, symbolic representation re-introduces and exemplifies the built-in fundamental dualism in the concept of representation where something that is non-visible in nature is made present in the representation. This notion also led Hobbes, and almost a hundred years later Rousseau, albeit for different reasons, to perceive and detect the artificial nature of representation. For both, but with different consequences, *representation is a transformative idea*. For Rousseau, as the general will cannot be represented, people remain in slavery only to rise free on election day (Pitkin 2004, 339). Modern-day proponents of direct democracy owe their idea to Rousseau, who claimed that it was the only genuine way of securing self-rule. Neither did Hobbes particularly favour representation in his thesis on Leviathan⁶, but he realised its potential for transforming diversity into (a political) unity that

⁶ The sovereign that went by the name of Leviathan was a construct that legitimately contained and tamed the state of nature otherwise persisting among array of men. Similarly with political philosophers of the Enlightenment, the major discovery was that of a contract: people willingly give up something to get something in return. Contrary to the modern and liberal reading of contract theories, Hobbes’ Leviathan cannot

is sustainable and durable. By recognising the transformative feature of representation, Hobbes was surprisingly ahead of time even though his model on representation lacks qualities that are come to be associated with political representation (see Runciman 2009). Finally, we can start anticipating representation to turn out to be more fluid and not necessarily constituted on the static setting of principal-agent model discussed and criticised in this section.

iii Breaking away from the ‘standard account’ of representation

So far, we have advanced through the discussion on the concept of representation through the theme of interpersonal relationship of the representative and the represented. The emphasis in political science literature has been put on the former. This is not to suggest that the role of the represented—the whole discussion of political equality and political rights addresses the ongoing struggle on who is ‘entitled’ to representation and in what ways—would be inferior. To a substantial degree, however, we are interested in the quality, nature and characteristic of the representative in within the interpersonal relationship. As said, these notions subscribe to a stipulation that outlines and justifies the boundaries for the agent’s conducts. When we ask what ties these counterparts together, depicted in the default of principal-agent model, we find the act of authorisation and reliance on symmetry. The third aspect is the role of interests in the paradigm of representation. This is the ‘what’ of representation: what is represented in representation? Descriptive representation inherently accommodates interests and opinions as to the ‘what’ in the presupposition that descriptive representatives embody them through the physical features or otherwise they endow. For Pitkin, what is missing so far from the conceptual picture is the ways in which representatives are ‘acting for’ for their constituents, not only standing in as assumingly passive (yet transformative in the interpretative approach would suggest) proxies. Formalistic and descriptive forms do not provide language for assessing the conscious incentives and motives for ‘representing’. The terrain for deliberative representation, as an activity, and not only as an internal reflective measure—regardless it being a crucial one—begins opening up. However, this calls for re-assessing one of representation’s most paramount element: interests.

In the final and complete view of representation is formed when representative’s actions are orienting advancing the interests of the represented (Pitkin 1967, 114, 209). What guides the assessment of representation in this particular form is the content of that activity. Notably, this raises the standard question of representative politics: whose interests are echoed and advanced in representative politics? I will not spend much time in elaborating Pitkin’s substantive representation, something that may be surprising for those who take this

be accused—let alone punished—for breach of the contract, for he is at the same time no-one and everyone. Authorisation theorists such as Hobbes mistakenly find a representative dimension in all relations where authorisation is being subscribed. They parallel authority with representation (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, 24-26, 30; see also Runciman 2009). This view suggests that representation is ultimately about power (ibid., 29).

as the crystallisation of what political representation is about. Central features in the acting for -view was covered earlier by large part with the representational roles. They outline the central features of substantive representation that spells out how representation is, in Pitkin's words, a '*characteristic activity*', defined by certain behavioural *norms* or certain things a representative is *expected* to do' (Pitkin 1967, 112, emphasis added). The interpersonal perspective on representation articulates a relationship that is 'fiduciary', 'involving trust and obligation on both sides' (ibid., 128). As I will soon discuss, Pitkin was advancing her conceptualisation further in the later part of her book that is significantly less cited.

Before we turn to these newer approaches let us recall the criticism about how the delegate-trustee -dyad comprises of elements or features that should be treated separately. If we look at this from the perspective of deliberation, the question about to what extent a representative can operate freely or act merely as a voicebox of the principle becomes analytically more appealing. The three dimensions about judgment, coercion and aspiration form a link to deliberative democracy and the role of deliberation in representing. Rehfeld (2011) does not explicitly spell out the deliberative potential in his reformulation as Mansbridge (2003) does with her proposed forms of representation (anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogacy). In reality it might be difficult to clearly pinpoint 'whose' judgment is considered when a matter is reasoned and decided. Presumably it is a mix of one's own and a third party's. However, in a legislative setting it formulates a valid theoretical argument about the overlapping expectations derived from institutional 'roles' as party members and such, as well as from the electorate. Therefore, locating the source of judgment helpfully extends the criticised mandate-independency -configuration.

Locating further the dynamics within deliberative representation the dimension of responsiveness to sanctions is equally helpful. On the outset, agents in representative government are always subject to democratic principle of facing elections where they can be removed if the electorate so decides. Responsiveness is not applicable from this perspective, but it is from some others. Keenness to engage in full-fledged deliberation where opinions and viewpoints get contested and scrutinised can be affected and mitigated by the logic of party representation. In any modern-day legislatures, representatives are more or less subject to party discipline. This reality and the context in which representatives operate might make them more careful and wary when it comes to deliberating. But again, there must be variations to the extend this affects all representatives equally or if some others are more 'responsive' to these disciplinary measures. The third dimension about the universality and particularity of interests that representatives aspire for in their deliberation is not relevant from now. Deliberative intent is a theme that will be addressed more fully in 2.2. For current purposes, it is noteworthy to acknowledge that the role of interest and its implications in the theory of deliberation as well as in discussions on representation have been under re-inspection.

Summarising, we have covered the ground by following Pitkin's footsteps in her quest for finding a satisfactory form and substance to how this making-present-in-some-sense come about. To sum up chronologically, we have discussed four views of representation: 1) formalistic, where someone is given the 'authority to act' in someone's name or is accountable through the act of authorisation; 2) symbolic view, representing inanimate

objects; and 3) descriptive view, where someone ‘stands for’ someone else as per resemblance or mimetic sameness, and 4) substantive view, where someone ‘acts for’ somebody else in order to advance that somebody’s interests.

For now, we can posit the frame of political representation through the frame of ‘standard account’: archetypical reading sustained by questions of authorisation, accountability and looking out for another’s interests (Rehfeld 2006). Also depicted in the ‘sanctions model’ of representation (Mansbridge 2009; 2016), the standard account emphasises the substantive obligation of the representative to ‘fulfil’ her role as a representative in the purest sense: being mandated by free and fair elections, seeing to it that constituency’s preferences are echoed within the representative institution and lastly, performing consciously in way that potential sanctions may occur as per the principle of accountability in the next elections where ‘rascals are kicked out’ (e.g. Norris 1999). Representation is therefore a question of the functioning of representative institutions that gain legitimacy through electoral means, as well as being responsive to the wants of electorates.

We can start seeing a fundamental shift in the paradigm articulated in the selection model proposed by Mansbridge (2009; 2016). In that the supposition, that deliberation follows representation, is starting to turn upside-down. In this regard in the selection model of representation agents have ‘exogenous reasons for doing what the principle wants’, contributing to a diminished need for constant surveillance. The model puts less emphasis on the idea on sanctioning and more on features that facilitate the selection of representatives. It contributes to a particular ‘contingency theory’ of representation that has selection ‘core’ and sanctions ‘periphery’ (Mansbridge 2011, 622). Building blocks of this model are found already in the idea of gyroscopic representation (Mansbridge 2003) that presents one of three new legitimate forms of representation (anticipatory and surrogate) in addition to the more conventional ‘promissory representation’. These forms are acknowledged to be sensitive to deliberative encounters and deliberation in general. The selection idea also takes the deliberative faculty in the constitution seriously, thereby facilitating relations between the representative and the represented. The gyroscopic representative is selected to act as a representative on the basis of being valued as a ‘nice guy’ who simultaneously is in some way competent of acting as a representative.

Selecting ‘good types’ is more profound than ‘sanctioning poor performance’ as Fearon (1999) also suggests. Competence during selection is evaluated in relation to representative’s political preferences and goals (even concentration to a single political aim, e.g. lowering taxes), moral values as well as to sincerity, honesty and societal background (education, etc.). The blending of these qualitative features gives the gyroscopic representative⁷ an ‘internal orientation’ (like a ship’s gyroscope) that at the same time ensures that the representative’s legislative conduct during the term in office is more or less predictable (Mansbridge 2003, 521). Further, and more importantly, gyroscopic

⁷ According to Rehfeld, formulation of gyroscopic representation involuntarily merges the distinctions of source of judgment and responsiveness to sanctions (gyroscope is less responsive to sanctions and relies on her own judgment and not on the judgment of a third party). On the contrary, we should be aiming at ‘separating the three distinctions and keeping them separate’ (Rehfeld 2009, 221).

representatives (as the ones in selection models) are prone to deliberative virtues while in office.

A robust selection model insists on three necessary components. Firstly, there needs to be a steady supply of self-motivated agents, meaning that there are citizens willing to place themselves as electoral candidates. While in office this self-motivated spirit taps into the logic of gyroscopic representation, as put by O'Neil (cf. Mansbridge 2009, 379) that 'plants don't flourish when we pull them out too often to check how their roots are growing'. The virtue of the selection model therefore benefits both the represented and the representative: the electorate due to its cost-efficiency in comparison to sanctions model and the MP since she is left doing what she can do best. 'Extrinsic motivation drives out intrinsic motivation', writes Mansbridge (2016, 15), undermining the novelty of public spirited motivation that selection model endorses. Therefore, this kind of motivation for the general good is vulnerable to monitoring since it signals distrust when taking 'self-interest as the primary motivation' of incumbency (ibid., 14). Secondly, shared interests and aligned objects are necessary for the selection model but neither way to another extreme. The demand for self-motivated electoral candidates with aligned but flexible objectives inherent in selections model is higher when interests are vague and unfocused (Mansbridge 2009, 381). To promote deliberation, principal should 'tolerate some divergence' regarding goals and interests when needing of an agent '*capable of flexible, adaptive and creative performance, discretion in negotiation, and dedication to long-run aims*' (Mansbridge 2016, 16, emphasis added).

Selection and sorting mechanisms are the third necessary component of a fully functioning selection model. This brings the role of political parties and mass media to the forefront. As in promissory representation or in the sanctions model in general, voters need to have the means and the capacity to follow up political decision-making (Mansbridge 2009, 381–2). In this way, information on political decision-making system is mediated through public media and other methods of personal communication (Habermas 2006; Mansbridge 2003, 516; 2016, 17). As Manin (1997) notes when discussing the erosion of party democracy, political communication has been shifted to commercial and non-partisan channels of communication. This change is eminent in the way the functioning of representative system is perceived and monitored, but also in ways which representatives 're-present themselves' to the public, inviting contingency in frames through which representatives are judged. In lieu of the representative's partisan background, the significance of her persona is highlighted (Manin 1997, 220). 'The less a voter knows about policies, the more rational it is to select on character', writes Mansbridge (2016, 16). When opinions and preferences are uncrystallised, cues derived from descriptive representation may be needed (Mansbridge 1999b, 644).

To supplement the electoral account, political parties bear still a relevant significance in placing electoral candidates, i.e. selecting and sorting prospective representatives (Mansbridge 2009, 2016). Parliamentary studies carry an enormous body of literature on this, to which I will not go into here. On a general level, representation, when mediated through parties, is thought to be more stable, accountable and predictable since candidates (as well as elected MPs) carry party labels. This form of representation has been described as party democracy (Manin 1997). Party democracy also relates then also to indicating a

personal track record or reputation, something that is also pivotal with gyroscopic representatives.

Representation is not only a concept describing a static interpersonal relationship which is specifically tied into normative stipulations. Instead, it is capable of many things: it opens the door to features of judgment, conflict and interpretation. It has a plural nature that is dynamic and reflective. To demonstrate this, Rehfeld (2011) insists on not using the term in the singular but in the plural: concepts of representation. In a similar sense, Brito Vieira and Runciman (2008, xi, emphasis added) have argued that *'representation should be understood as a concept that not only has a variety of different forms, but in all its different forms is capable of various different emphasis'*. Pitkin finds essential, defining features of representation in all her views, but which cannot alone fulfil the criteria, external or otherwise, for representing. She concludes that holding the representative mandate obligates the representative to listen to the will of her constituency and take them into account when advancing their interests. However, while the 'representative must act independently', how this is done, the actual practice is left to the representative: 'his action must involve discretion and judgment' (Pitkin 1967, 209). But in principle, the conflict between the actions of the representative and the will of the represented should be avoided, and if this not possible, the representative is expected to provide a reason and justification for going against or diverting from those interests (Pitkin 1967, 209–10).

In addition to the principle of accountability, the idea of responsiveness is what comes to define representation, thus guiding most investigations in political science. The definition of *'representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them'* (Pitkin 1967, 209, emphasis added) could easily be one of the most paraphrased caption in political science in addition to another formula, of the making present of something that is absent (ibid., 81). Despite various perspectives and views contemporary scholars hold, in a way or another they all come to the question of responsiveness that seems almost inescapable.

Responsiveness can also be seen as the watershed that divides empirical and theoretical scholar dealing with political representation. These differences in what is essentially an ontological question appear throughout the scholarships that study political representation in a form or another. Andrew Sabl (2015) illuminates this and other differences by critically arguing the ways in which empirical scholars use democratic theory as a 'rhetorical placeholder'. Consequently, resorting to a 'doctrine of responsiveness' increases the chances for random selection bias. Along the same lines, Disch (2012, 602) argues that, as with Pitkin also, the classic Miller and Stokes study was appropriated 'reductively' by missing the point of the relevance of specific institutional conditions ushering congruence that facilitated responsiveness. Moreover, ideas of one-sided, 'perfect' and immediate, responsiveness of preferences and the policies is in fact rejected by all democratic theorists. The reason is like the observation that led Mansbridge (1999, 629) to conclude that descriptive representation is not 'popular with normative theorists'. For Urbinati, such a view of representation is apolitical (Urbinati 2006, 43).

These two points about interests and responsiveness demonstrate the differences in the understanding explains why discussions between theorists and empiricists turn out to be problematic. Attempts to bridge these scholarships have so far proved to carve a deeper gap

between mutual understandings (Bühlmann and Fivaz 2016). On the part of underscoring the question of responsiveness, as Sabl (2015) argues, is a matter of conceptual treatment, but also a difference in democratic underpinnings: where empirical research deem inquiries falsifiable—as Mutz (2006) does with deliberation—democratic theorists resort to preserving ‘democratic hope’. For bridging measures, normative theorists should depart from the ‘realm of faith’ and acknowledge empiricists’ accounts of how democratic systems are able to perform their tasks. Insisting on inquiring democratic practices through quality instead of legitimacy would also inhibit the moral superiority of democratic theory acting as the ‘moral guardians’ of democracy (Sabl 2015, 355–56).

ivThe constructivist turn: from aggregating interest to mobilising people

I have now shown how the functioning and realisation of political representation is more complicated than the standard account of representation assumes. Bypassing the centrality of elections as an important manifestation on how representatives are ‘made’, now seen as a democratic way of transferal of representative mandate, and what representation comes to stand for, many are now turning to explore other potentialities relating to the dynamics about how representation is evoked, maintained and transformed.

I formulate the idea of deliberative representation—as a preliminary analytical tool—by understanding political representation as a praxis that fundamentally resonates with the idea of selection and choosing. Pitkin embraces this point in the later parts of her book when arguing that political issues to be addressed, and questions to be tackled, are not closed. They are open-ended, but not arbitrary (Pitkin 1967, 212). Moreover, if democratic politics would be like a ‘choice between two foods’ (ibid., 211), offers a scenario where the one of the choices would displease the principle and the other please the agent. Deliberative representation, something that to me appears alluded in Pitkin’s understanding, captures precisely the deliberative nature of representation that goes unnoticed. This is when it is translated into ‘*questions of action, about what should be done*’ (ibid., 212, emphasis added). Political life, succumbed to political representation, ‘is always a combination of bargaining and compromise where there are irresolute and conflicting commitments, and common deliberation about public policy, to which facts and rational arguments are relevant’ (ibid.). Intertwined with arguments of deliberative democracy, political representation is, therefore, about sorting out and overall exploration of perspectives to be brought forward and articulated.

The contemporary reading of representation that begins to unfold with Pitkin underlines the element of representation becoming more sensitive to context. It is also what this research at hand resorts also to. Context-sensitivity that affects the ways in which political representation is assumed to function connects to reviving interest in the reappraisal of Pitkin’s conceptual work. The dominant view is that the ingredient or glue that sustains political representation is reserved for preferences and interests. Arguably, this is most evident in decoding representation through the interpersonal, principal-agent model. The responsiveness principle, initially argued by Pitkin, was not in her intentions, according to Disch (2012, 600). Reasons for this surface when Pitkin encounters a ‘constituency paradox’

for which she lacks the necessary conceptual language. The paradox traces the constitutive, ‘entrepreneurial’ character of representation that on one hand takes interests of the represented as its starting point while simultaneously seeing those interests being constituted in the act of representation (Disch 2012). What this means is that for the treatment of deliberative representation, ‘radical’ consideration about the precedence of ‘who’ and ‘what’ in representation becomes questionable.

On the contrary, as already brought up, the ‘bedrock norm’ of representation *underlines interests*. This normative presupposition underlines the aggregative nature of interests to be seen transmitted into political system and legislatures, respective. More importantly, the bedrock norm takes for granted that *interests exist, that they are ‘there’ to be represented*. (Disch 2011, 103).⁸ This new notion of interests, that empirical research (i.e. public opinion research) supports, implies that they can be a product of a creative project. Moreover, interests are malleable. All this makes the preference formation a context-dependent phenomenon. Seen this way, any efforts to capture representative democracy and political representation via studying solely preference-congruency is left short-handed (ibid., 101–4; see also Hayward 2009; Rehfeld 2017; 2018).

Notwithstanding, re-reading Pitkin’s work ensue Disch (2011; 2012; see also 2019) to state that contemporary ‘radical’, constructivist reading of political representation owes much more to Pitkin than is credited. Acknowledging the impact of Pitkin’s contribution to these discussions it is true how little has been paid attention to the final part of the *Concept of Representation*. Namely, this is where Pitkin starts unravelling the conceptual framework by introducing many aspects familiar to representative politics which have been outlined above. By the end of the book, Pitkin proposes some criteria for unravelling the remaining questions with representation. Firstly, who is being represented and with what interests? Secondly, what are the capacities, most often cognitive, of the representative and the represented? Thirdly and finally, how are the political issues and decision-making situations portrayed? To the first criteria for assessing representation (i.e. the question on interests) she notes that the will of the constituency can be very difficult to determine among varied political issues. This is due to the observation that many remain inactive outside electoral participation. Additionally, some may not vote at all, and therefore don’t express their ‘will’ or opinions between elections (Pitkin 1967, 210–19).

In the following, I discuss two of the remaining criteria that will lead us to the steps of constructivist understanding of the concept of representation. The remaining of the theoretical chapter will discern this topic and introduce some of the most prominent theoretical applications. The question of the contexts of decision-making is discussed in the final subsection regarding political representation.

The ambiguity of opinions and interests of the constituency highlights the risks caused by informational asymmetries between the representative and the represented. Contrary to the *doxa* of promissory representation, the anticipatory nature of preferences and interests calls forth the idea that representatives can modify ‘the stuff that makes up representation’. Dilemma of democratic competence illustrates the tricky interplay between political

⁸ Downs approached the question about the existence of the will of the people by stating that if there were no such will, there would be nothing to represent (Pitkin 1967, 83).

learning and preference-formation of the people, and the communication of self-interested elites (Disch 2011, 101).

All in all, people tend to form opinions as well as interests to a great degree as a result of electoral competition between parties and representatives in this respect. This raises the worry that the will of the people can be distorted through manipulation and spin-doctoring (Chambers 2004; Goodin and Saward 2005). These tasks, I claim, can specifically be viewed through parliamentary deliberations, and as such, something that deliberative representation should attend to. In addition to feeding off anti-democratic sentiments like lack of toleration, respect and inclusion, harmful plebiscitary rhetorics (Chambers 2004) fundamentally undermines their ability to uphold nexus to democratic principles. Importantly, the 'entrepreneurial' character of representation substantiates how the concept of responsiveness is indeed a 'false friend' (Disch 2012, 600) when it comes to tapping into democratic credentials of representative politics. It seems unclear how representatives should be responsive for something that does not exist prior to the act of representation.

Alternatively, when the perspective is shifted to the notion of responsibility obligations become better discernible. 'Claims and functions that follow from them [...] constitute and mobilize [...] by the "biases" they tap: the identifications they activate, the conflicts they prioritize, and even the stereotypes they call forth' (Disch 2012, 608). The democratic implications are profound considering the ways in which deliberation in the public sphere facilitates the process of collective reasoning. Consequently, deliberative representation seen this way does not merely impute constituting identities, non-crystallised viewpoints and perspectives that can translate into action, but it is essential in the context of keeping matters off the public agenda. The tendency of such non-articulation can contribute to 'non-decision-making', a term associated with Bachrach and Baratz (Disch 2012, 608). When political issues are not worded by any actor in the political system they do not become detected and decided upon.

As said, by the end of her book Pitkin starts wavering in her argument for the forms of representation. Importantly to this research at hand, she also acknowledges that special considerations are needed when approaching actual legislative behaviour that contains 'great complexity and plurality of determinants' (Pitkin 1967, 220). As Urbinati notes, with her concept of political representation Pitkin fails at making a sufficient connection to democracy and democratic politics. This point is something she herself admitted in her later works. She treated representation analogous to democracy (Pitkin 2004). This gap in understanding leaves out several questions, such as the question of how political representation induces political participation through what Pitkin describes as political activity of political representatives (Urbinati 2006, 10). When representatives are expected to advance and pursue the good of their principles 'leads us to *expect of or demand features* in representative relationship which are not there and *need not be there*' (Pitkin 1967, 221, emphasis added).⁹

⁹ The eloquent statement implies, again, the perpetual theme of degree of freedom of representatives. By re-reading Hobbes, Runciman (2009) proposes a solution on how to square a circle, i.e. how to dodge stark choices on the dependence and independence of representatives. "Either democracy abandons the language of representation and employs other terms to describe the relationship between governments and electorates

Contrary to the previous conception that representation defines a single action, it should be seen in a context as embodied in a whole political system. Pitkin continues by arguing that representation could be seen as an ‘overall structure and functioning of the *system*, the patterns emerging from the *multiple activities* of many people’ (Pitkin 1967, 221–2, emphasis added). This is what Disch (2011, 107) traces from Pitkin’s argumentation, and therefore goes about defining representation as a ‘mobilization concept’. As such, representation contains constitutive elements which enable representatives to present as well re-present societal issues, cleavages and problems to be addressed and deliberated on. Along the same lines, Dryzek (see Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008) has anticipated the problematic nature of interests. Instead of interests that oversimplify political representation, deliberative process can be constituted by discourses and not by ‘people’. By discourses he means ‘a set of concepts, categories, and ideas that will always feature particular assumptions, judgments, contentions, dispositions, intentions, and capabilities’ (Dryzek 2010, 31). Discursive representation induces a sphere where consistent ideas, perspectives and viewpoints can be communicated and contested.

On these assumptions, interests may not exist prior to representation, prior to deliberation. For this reason, it makes the bedrock norm of interests unstable. According to Disch, ‘[Pitkin] effectively redefines democratic representation from an interpersonal relationship to a systemic process that is anonymous, impersonal, and not seated in intent.’ (Disch 2011, 107). Notably, in representation there is implicitly something more than a mere aggregation of interest. Instead, it can be regarded as *loci for action*. As such, it then allows also an activist reading on representation, grasping the nuances of power and representation more fully (Disch 2019). As such, it underlines the inherent function of judgment embedded in the activity of representation. Brito Vieira and Runciman (2008, 67) point out that interconnecting representation with interests in a manner depicted in principal-agent model ends up overemphasising the side of interests with the cost of leaving out the presence of the represented in the action itself (Runciman 2007 illuminates this point by giving an example of the ‘Not In My Name’ anti-war movement). Therefore, Pitkin’s “point is not that representation invents constituencies—but that it draws them together: it imputes to them a *unity that they discover only through being represented*” (Disch 2011, 107, emphasis added). It is hard not to hear the echo of Hobbes here. What this tells us is that representation deems an interpretative nature (Pettit 2009), something that also connects with an argument in deliberative theory about its incomplete consideration about mass democracy. Here, Chambers (2009) argues that deliberative democracy should pay more attention to the ways in which citizens form their opinions and not perceiving these as ‘a wasteland of nondeliberation’ (Chambers 2009, 333). Keeping this point in mind, we can start unravelling the ways that deliberative performance and acts, assumed in deliberative representation, occupies the act of representation. The picture of ‘how’ representation comes about starts emerging. Representation starts claiming things.

The constructivist turn and the mobilisation feature of representation introduced above originate to a large extent from Michael Saward’s (2006; 2010) work. For him,

[...] or representation abandons the idea of national collective identity and *looks for other outlets* for representation of individuals [...].’ (Runciman 2009, 33–4, emphasis added.).

representation is an activity defined essentially by a dynamic process of representative claim-making. The general formula of representative claims is defined as the following: “A *maker* of representations („M”) puts forward a *subject* („S”) which stands for an *object* („O”) that is related to a *referent*¹⁰ („R”) and is offered to an *audience* („A”) (Saward 2010, 36, emphasis original). By introducing the now-influential idea of claim-making, Saward insists on turning back from the ongoing tendency for exploring ontological questions such as “what representation is” and turning into asking “what can be done with representation”. It permits a better look into the “black box” of representation. It is worth noting how the current discussions now going on in deliberative democracy have taken on this same position that sets to understand deliberation through as activity-centred perspective, when deliberation is ‘in action’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019). To continue, claim-making eludes the normative trap of capturing representation from an interpersonal viewpoint and solely from a democratic constellation, since representative claim-making is not bound only to the electoral notion. Secondly, it expands the act of claim-making into a ‘systemic’ sphere of re-presentation, contestation and judgment.

Similar performative nature of representation—tracked already with Pitkin—comes up in the aesthetic theory of Ankersmit (2002) where he argues for a vital ‘aesthetic gap’ between the representative and the represented. Only under the auspiciousness of this critical aesthetic distance representations can be created: the emphasis is put on the first syllable of the word *re*-presentation. Representation is representing presentation. Along with Pitkin’s definition, in representation something is made and constructed, not just in a temporal sense (bringing back to present something which is absent, i.e. the represented) but the essence lies in understanding something being made *again* (Disch 2011, 109). The constructivist turn in disguise of performative act ‘creates’ as well as ‘recruits constituents’ (Disch 2011, 102).¹¹ Mimesis, the aesthetic closeness, does not permit representations to be created nor evaluated since there is nothing ‘there’ to re-present. For example, a photograph depicts reality ‘as it is’. In similar vein, descriptive representation as a form of pictorial understanding of what representation is, or mimesis as Ankersmit would prefer, lacks the feature rendition. Consequently, since there is nothing to re-present, there is nothing to assess or make judgments of. And, perhaps more fundamentally, there is nothing to be accounted for.

Continuing on a philosophical note, when seeing that representative democracy is not a ‘second best’ solution for or a substitute due to the practical impossibility of direct rule, we are left with a view that ‘perspectives are all there is’ (Näsström 2006, 326).¹² Therefore, it

¹⁰ The need for a referent in political representation has been questioned by Decreus (2013).

¹¹ Representation understood as a mobilization concept enables us, for example, to capture in a new light the controversial connotation of Burke’s (1774) famous postulation that parliament is ‘a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole’. From this perspective not that parliament is standing for an idealist unity and uniformity (however, we cannot wish away Burke’s conservatism and elitism) but by shifting around the formulation as per constitutive turn, we can claim that through indispensable contestation and framing provisional unity can be sought or called upon. All representatives, when offering a representation, assert that there could be some kind of collective reality to be represented.

¹² Justification of a representative’s arguments is derived and drawn from the act of representation itself. To collapse the whole argument to the fullest allows us to come to the point where the standard articulation of sovereignty and popular rule can be seen misguided. It is that *representation precedes the people* and not the

is futile to try to seek unity between the represented and the representative. The same goes with truth and consensus in that matter. Political world needs to be left ‘broken’, as Ankersmit insists. On these grounds the vitality of representative democracy relies on this perspectiveness where representatives are able to re-present *via deliberation* something: be they values, preferences, ideas, perspectives, and that those representations are subordinated to the judgment of the represented (and/or audiences). Representation can be seen as a proposal, as Samuel Hayat (2019) argues. In the Ankersmittian and Sawardian formula representation is about judging and assessing this ‘artistic’ interpretation. Accordingly, in the wake of the representative turn and the associated constitutive conception, some, such as Severs and others (2014, 619), have referred to representatives as ‘political artists’.

Finally, we can argue that Saward’s formulation of representative claims (maker-object-referent-audience) fills in the blanks of Ankersmit’s idea, since it specifically amplifies the elements rendered to judgment.¹³ Arguably, judgment has been regarded as a neglected feature of political representation, perhaps most clearly so by Nadia Urbinati (2006) in her genealogical argument for representative government and the centrality of judgment to it. Pointing out correctly how the will of the people is non-representable, she urges attention to the ‘indirectness’ of representation that lays the basis for judgment. Contrary to the will of the people, judgment *can be represented*. It is exactly the indirectness that calls for judgment, in essence, that makes room for deliberation. Additionally, as such, it differentiates the activity from voting (Urbinati 2006, 16; see also 2014).

Judgment, therefore, calls upon presence through speech, through voice (ibid., 5, 24). It is a reflective and reflexive process of articulation that has particular objectives rendered to judgment: ‘for principals to be present in the actions of agents, they have to be present *for* someone else [...]. As well as principals and agents, representation also requires an *audience* of some kind’ (Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008, 69, emphasis original). In addition, claim-making in a more concise manner can show how the ontological counterparts of representation or Ankersmittian re-presentations are simultaneously present in multitudes. This argument highlights the notion that representation is judged not necessarily by the represented, but that the audiences may very well be a third party altogether. The vitality and influence of representative claims rest on whether the audience—whom the claim is offered to—resonate with the claim in the first place.¹⁴

other way around. As David Plotke (1997) puts it: “Representation *is* democracy’ (emphasis in the original; see also Näsström 2006, 322).

¹³ In an earlier publication (Rinne 2016) I argued for treating judgment as a separate analytical unit when approaching the convergence of political representation and deliberation. In this research, this position has not changed, but it has been revised in the sense that judgment is now embedded in the discussions outlined in the theoretical part.

¹⁴ However, this ambiguity re-introduces the worries of blatant rhetorical demagoguery (Chambers 2004) and ‘dog-whistle politics’ (Goodin and Saward 2005). Evidently, these democratic implications of the ‘representative turn’ bring forward troubling notes questioning ‘where representative turn is going’ (Näsström 2011b)—whether, as Pitkin (1967: 221) says, ‘representation in politics is only a fiction, a myth of forming part of the folklore of our society’, or becoming (yet again) an elitist project leading to a ‘normative dead end’ (Disch 2015). Perhaps the elitist nature of representation depicted well in the dilemma of democratic competence cannot completely be warded off for many reasons but in the clearest sense as we refrain from electing our representatives by lot (Manin 1994, 137).

For the prospect of deliberative representation argued here, it is worth noting how there is a constant contingent interplay between the maker of a representative claim and the audience (Saward 2010, 47–8). This, in turn, makes political representation a sequential process that bears implications also to what representation as a practical phenomenon can be thought to be aspiring. When representation has this kind of intrinsic orientation that presumably aspires at succeeding since it would be counterintuitive to build a representative claim only to be failing and rejected, it spells out the functional character of representation. This observation, to be continued in the next subsection, is powerful to the central argument of this research. Namely, it outlines the context-sensitivity of representation as a praxis that is presented through the theoretical lens of deliberative representation. Representation is performed through different deliberative practices that are intended and posited towards different audiences. Hence, assessment of this deriving performance made by the audience can be demarcated by the function of representation and vice versa.

In practice, parliamentary deliberations occur in various sites where concrete audience can also refer to other parliamentarians. Considering the contingency of not only who is judging the performance but also on which element this judgment falls upon in claim-making is important. For example, assessment can focus upon the ethos (e.g. credibility of the claim-maker) or logos (reasonability of the argument). But, perhaps most importantly, as suggested by Rehfeld, the judgment can apply also to the function of representation. To get to where we want to go, into tracing the deliberative faculty of representation and how the new conceptualisation of representation make room for it, we need to revisit representational roles. Their relevance derives not from the respective expectations on the part of the agent but from the particular consideration and interplay with the surroundings where they manifest in. The structures that legislators inhabit also suggest some of the ‘special considerations’ that Pitkin (1967, 220) acknowledged in her theorising.

v Performing representing with context-sensitivity

The argument about the epistemic grounds for interest-formation projected in mobilisation concept, and its corresponding aesthetic, performative and surfacing contextual features beg for more elaboration. It can help us map the activities and functions that revolve around representing. Breaking away from the individualist ‘single action’ approach and moving towards a systemic view where representation comprises of various forms of activities and dynamic processes opens up a promising inter-related domain. This domain of contexts of representation can be thought to provide resources for representative activities (such as deliberation) and arm representatives with various capacities and resources. Consequently, it also clarifies the motivational aspect of representation that extends beyond the proxy of sanctions model assuming the goal of election or re-election (Bühlmann and Fivaz 2016; Mansbridge 2009; 2016). As discussed, the perspectives spelled out by the standard account of representation and the sanction model narrow the incentives for representation as it downplays the dynamic and dialogical nature of processes where representation is created, sustained and challenged: when all representatives are thought to care about it securing their seat in the next elections.

To advance the argument about the expansion of the conception of representation, Pitkin's ideas about the conditions and circumstances that representatives operate in needs to be further developed. When this picture about what Pitkin reduces to legislative behaviour is supplemented with some more recent theoretical orientations about the more profound substance of representation and re-formulation of representational roles, we can start to grasp the argument for capturing representation as a practice that takes place in interplay with contexts. And in this case, we discuss the institutional context of a legislature. However, I tentatively suggest that the idea of deliberative representation that I am after, and its interplay with certain functionally ascribed contexts, extends over the legislative context. This aspiration is in line with the recent re-orientation within parliamentary studies that has been reigned by traditional institutionalist approaches featuring 'limited theoretical and methodological approach to the study of Parliament' as Geddes and Rhodes (2018, 91) argue. This research here aspires to bridge political theory with empirical research on parliament that usually remains outside the reach of political theory.

Political denotations of representation were also acknowledged by Pitkin in what she calls '*realities of legislative behaviour*' (Pitkin 1967, 219, emphasis added). Namely, there is 'a great complexity and plurality of determinants are at work, any number of which may enter into a legislative decision' (ibid., 220). What she finds is that instead of principal, representative-agents have constituencies, in the plural. Secondly, the institutional setting where legislators operate in attaches 'obligations and expectations' also in correspondence with traditions and rules of the legislatures. Finally, Pitkin concludes that representatives have their own 'views and opinions' that may take shape in the interactions with other representatives and other key players (lobbyists, party leaders, etc.) as well as information that is passed through the legislature.

To someone familiar with the body of literature on parliaments and parliamentary actors, these insights seem self-evident, but from the perspective of political theory they are not. Remember, we are after gaining a more nuanced and analytical take on inquiry that comfortably could sit also to the field of institutionalism or neo-institutionalism in political science. For deliberative representation, through theoretical outlook, we would need to retain a certain connection to the idea of substantive representation. In the light of contemporary constructivist reading, what are representatives doing? Here I find Urbinati's argument most helpful. Carefully positing her argument for a *political theory of representation*, Urbinati (2006, 50) balances out the constructivist perspective without fully erasing, as it seems to me, the criticised individual-to-individual rendition of representational relationship. She builds upon the ideas of representativity and advocacy. Urbinati helpfully steps into the domain where one cannot dodge from the straightforward encounter with the normative premises of representation. Similar to parliaments, representation inherently contains the two features of adhesion (of social differences): re-produced direct and produced reflected adhesion. Parliaments, for the apolitical perspective of the former, stand for the aggregative notion where communication is not needed between the 'separate enclaves' (ibid., 49). Adhesion is direct and unmediated, recalling themes of responsiveness and congruency. On the other hand, parliaments and its actors take part in the producing of conditions that allow adhesion in the first place. We have reflective adhesion that Urbinati prefers to define in terms of representativity (ibid., 47–9).

When taken as a certain kind of activity that inherently occupies functions of judgment and deliberation (without which there would be no need for advocacy) Urbinati proposes for understanding representation *as an advocacy*. As advocates, representatives are deliberators, and in deliberative speech the main faculties at work are the understanding and the hearing (Urbinati 2006, 46–7). Urbinati continues:

They express the complex nature of the work of the representative, which should adhere to her cause but not be driven by it. Advocates believe in their cause but understand the reasoning of others to the point of being able to reconstruct it in their minds. They must “feel” the force of others’ arguments in order to envision the path toward the best possible outcome (ibid., 47).

Representation as advocacy locates the feature of deliberation necessary in political representation. As such, it demonstrates that political theory-driven approach to political representatives is plausible. It also reaches out to Pitkin’s realisation about representatives having a mind of their own as to the ways in which they are forced to accommodate the views of others. As we will see in the next subchapter, deliberative theory can deepen our insight in this regard. However, to advance further into the contextual argument appearing here in the literature on representation, we must find variables, also structural ones, to the advocacy representation and thus embrace the political nature of representatives.

Almost as re-visiting the past, theoretical implications of representative roles are ongoing in political theory. Following the detected trustee and mandate representative roles in the original work by Eulau and others (1959) a third role of ‘politico’ is now being evoked in the idea of ‘shape-shifting representation’ (Saward 2014). Proposition springs from the incapacity of political theory to address the ‘unnerving figure in the shadow’ (Saward 2014, 723). It refers to professional politicians, to what the standard account of representation and discussed sanctions model assume for a pejorative, self-interested actor whose actions are directed towards getting re-elected. Importantly, this shape-shifting idea furthers even more of the arguments of advancing the veracity of political theory engaging with empirical accounts of representation. The core criticism by Saward against these representative typologies and corresponding formulations is that it ascribes to consistency, be that in a moral and practical sense, in legislative behaviour. The appeal of consistency derives from the notion that breaching from it implies to shirking’ and breaking of electoral promises. Moreover, it grants MPs the feature of a Machiavellian cunningness of the prince. What we have to expect, warranted by democratic measures, is that representatives ‘shift’, in good and in bad (see Dovi 2007).

Detaching from earlier restrictive dyadic dichotomies and developing the notion of representative roles that makes way for the emerging ideas of variability of representative domains; contingency and dynamism of representative behaviour and its ‘aesthetic and cultural character’ (Saward 2014, 725–6). Saward argues for seeing roles in terms of ‘*mobility* rather than *occupancy*’ (ibid., 726, emphasis original). For this reason, he proposes to displace the concept and abandon the language of roles which are seen consequential the mixture of po-litical reality (ibid., 727). Despite the myriad ways of performing ‘a representative’, role as an activity ascribes to the occupation of a pre-ordained course of action. In contrast, choosing to talk in terms of positions, these roles ‘become (in principle)

malleable resources for would-be representatives who *position* themselves to exploit those resources' (Saward 2014, 727, emphasis original). Further elaborating, Saward grants as 'subject positions that are *intersubjective*, culturally and discursively *constituted* stances that are (differentially) *available for adoption* for actors' (ibid., emphasis added). Four representative positions based on the actor's willingness to shape-shift and the extent the structures enable it are then derived: shape-accorder (lacking in both dimensions); shape-retainer (lacking willingness, structures allowing); shape-confined (will-ing but confined structures); and finally shape-shifter (including both dimensions) (ibid., 728).

Argument for representation as advocacy seems unanswerable whether advocates perform from such advocate position in all situations and contexts. And further, if they retain, which feature of advocacy would they retain from? Moreover, Saward's insistence on positions and not roles, explicitly highlights not only the willingness of the representatives to alter her 'roles', but also the corresponding situation where shape-shifting takes place. This restates the urgency of interaction between the actor and the context, consistent also with the claim-making view (Saward 2010). What is noteworthy here is the potentiality of these shape-shifting stances that relies on intentions¹⁵ by the representative and the structures allowing this conscious activity. This sophisticated notion allows further explanation to my formula of deliberative representation that aims at analysing the reasons and ways why *same agents* play *different deliberative roles*. Therefore, the analytical approach enabled by deliberative representation must include the motivation and judgment by the representative vis-à-vis the contexts (also implying judgment of the audience) in which the activity takes place. In sum, these notions suggest that political representation is not a transient but a sequential process where claims, shape-shifting and deliberation are all constantly judged and assessed¹⁶.

Saward's (2017) idea of performative representation is a clear follow-up on his previous argumentation on shape-shifting. Briefly outlining earlier scholarly work on the performative elements of representation, referring to thinkers like Judith Butler and Jacques Rancière, he claims that the idea of performativity explains '*range of ways in which actions [...] produce effects and affects for subjects, audiences and observers*' (Saward 2017, 76, emphasis added) bundles these previous discussions together. In performative representation the constitutive character becomes ever more cemented in the understanding of representation. Importantly, however, without an audience of some kind the activity of representation, e.g. claim-making as a deliberative practice (Saward does not use this term), is a void: a performance is not a performance in an empty room. It is a rehearsal. Saward also confirms a rather long tradition of transcendental and indirectness of political

¹⁵ The mobility and fluidity of these positions advances some of the reservations about the constitutive and mobilisation notion of representation. When preferences are seen indigenous to political processes, representative claim-making may take democratically turn for the worse. Acknowledging people's agnostic if not apathetic perception of political participation raises legitimate worries that interests and preferences could be manipulated and exploited (Chambers 2004; 2009). Granting that the domain of claim-making establishes plurality, reflexivity, equal access and variability, Saward (2014, 734) asserts that shape-shifting representation dodges the puzzlement of endogenous or exogenous preferences in regard to democratic processes.

¹⁶ But this, as mark of authorisation, as a signal of acceptance or denouncing perhaps more potentially is always done in retrospect, as Montanaro (2012, 1101) points out.

representation by stating ‘the simple fact of the activity of rule—the *doing* of it—cannot readily be sustained as a rule without *being shown to be done*.’ (Saward 2017, 81, emphasis added).

Performative representation is inherently unstable and unpredictable due to it being tied to visibility, perceivability and accessibility. Moreover, performances have an inherent temporal quality, something called ‘set pieces’. Performative representation demands that cultural and socially comprehensive components produced are readable. This point was briefly mentioned when we discussed the critiques of descriptive and symbolic representation¹⁷. But Saward uses the concept of performativity to discuss *effective* performance: the production of it (what can be produced, and how) as well as corresponding techniques (ibid., 79) for it. Through roles (and other notions that bear similar theatrical references like staging, scripting) as techniques, performances can produce effects that are affective and affirmative (ibid., 83–4).

To what extent can consent or acceptance of representative claims or performances be validated (or studied)?¹⁸ When it comes to empirical inquiries, representative claim-making has been used as a viable tool that can offer insight into practical democratic politics (e.g. de Wilde 2013; Severs 2012). Critical tones have mostly been focusing on the constitutive character of representation but due to the recentness of its latest addition, the performative representation, scholarly discussion on it is still underway.

Another perspective that relates to the mitigation of diffuse distrust calls for extending the scope of representative claim-making to institutions. Recently, Judge and Leston-Bandeira (2018, 154) have acknowledged how claim-making describes the intersubjective ‘first dimension of parliamentary representation’ that implies that the interlocutor is the representative. Looking beyond this would allow revealing a neglected dimension of ‘what parliaments “are” and ‘what claims are made on their behalf’ (ibid., 155). The kind of *institutional representation* of parliament, what authors suggest, offers an interesting scope of empirical inquiry to representative claim-making. As such, it supplements the constructivist perspective towards representing institutions and especially detachment from a more familiar partisan oriented agency.

But all this still fails to answer the question of what defines the substance of representation as an activity. What is a performance of representation—what is being done?

¹⁷ Consider inanimate representation, symbols of rule like insignias and such, as constant reminders of that rule. The similarity with performative representation (e.g. as claim-making) is that as for symbols there is no concept of misrepresentation. If a symbol or representative claim-maker, fails to invoke an intended relationship, it is not a case of misrepresentation but there is simply no case of representation at all.

¹⁸ For determining and evaluating good representation in terms of preserving the autonomy of the represented Dovi (2018) finds also proponents of ‘procedural approach’ like Disch and Saward as well as the more traditional and discussed ‘interest approach’ insufficient. Where the latter adopts the ‘currency of interest’ (ibid., 324), the former, when putting emphasis on the openness of process is ‘outcome-blind’, as Dovi (ibid.) puts it. The ‘autonomy approach’, proposed by the author, argues that good representation, which as a normative question is beyond the scope of this research at hand, must acknowledge the fact that policy outcomes may in reality reduce opportunities for those in the most vulnerable position to resist representative claims. Also, taking the ‘making of’ perspective to politics risks reducing the role of the represented, however central in consenting and constituting, to spectators and politics to ‘spectator sport’. Consequently, the democratic polity as an ideally robust site for discursive struggle and debate confine into logics of ‘audience democracy’ (Manin 1997). It can affect the appeal for the types of representative candidates that hold various positions in regard to their ‘role morality’ (Hardin 2004).

And finally, how can we detect and make judgments on activities of representation if there are no criteria allowing us to do so? We have one more point to make before closing this subchapter. Under these questions most recently Rehfeld has put a reminder for spelling out the boundaries for representation, or representing in accordance to his argumentation. Its significance relies on the fact that he ushers the idea that representing denotes a particular activity. While doing so, and unlike Pitkin (1967), Rehfeld does not see political representation as a family of concepts. Rather, he sees it as ‘multiple and very different concepts that may be related but are not the same kinds of things’ (Rehfeld 2017, 51, also in 2011). Analytical ‘fuzziness’ or the ‘impressionistic manner’ of treatment of discussed concepts of representation as in mobilisation (Disch 2011), advocacy (Urbinati 2006), democracy (Plotke 1997) are all, for him, metaphorical excuses for bypassing the to-the-point question on what political representation actually is (Rehfeld 2018, 219). For now, then it seems striking that after all the discussions presented so far, we would be still be lacking the answer to the basic question that Rehfeld poses: *what does it mean to represent?* (ibid., 216). Especially claim-making and shape-shifting fail in this, however convincingly characterising political behaviour of representatives, but still only circulating around the question on what representation is (contra to what can be done with it). Conceptual unclarity that Rehfeld sustained argumentation illuminates is connected to the normative desiderata that are treated through implications of political representation.

As with others whose ideas have been previously discussed, Rehfeld finds the ‘interest and responsiveness approach’ to representation to be insufficient for providing the criteria called for above. Whether some activity is or is not counted as representation fails since it views the normative standards analogical to the activity itself. Representation becomes tautological. Instead, he argues for a constructive proposal for representing that emphasises the *exercise*, or *potential exercise* of a particular social power in a specific context (Rehfeld 2018, 213). So, what becomes highlighted is the social power ascribed to the representative. Using a depiction of ‘representative Tom’ throughout the article, Rehfeld shows that while the democratic principle of responsiveness provides qualitative criteria for evaluating representation, he demonstrates that any kind of activity that advances someone else’s interests cannot count as representing. The formula Rehfeld proposes is intuitively so self-evident, the examples he provides seem almost naïve.

In the first sense, representing is refers to the activity associated with the exercise of the specific social power that any individual representative has on account of being a representative in that context (ibid., 235). Tom the congressman represents his constituency when voting, but if a man-on-the-street would be pressing that button in the plenary session, that would not make him a representative. Exercise and possession of social power ascribes to certain functions which then draw the boundaries for representing. In the second sense, a derivation of the former, Tom, the representative, is a representative by possessing the mandate, even while he is sleeping. Yet, him sleeping does not in itself count as an act of representation. The third sense is that representing is ‘separate act of ‘conveying one thing for another’ and conducted through language. The reference is validated through acceptance of the relationship between the signifier and the signified (as in the Statue of Liberty signifying freedom) (ibid., 217–8).

What is interesting is the importance of the *intentionality* of such actions—voting, deliberating, negotiating—in the exercise of that social power. We can think of how representatives engage in variety of assessments and judgments with regard to those activities that can be connected to considerations of principal–agent relations. But they might not. For example, when we think of representation in legislatures, a lot of activities are not visible or accessible to the represented who cannot at that instance judge that activity as a representative performance. Therefore, by default, we should accept that representatives can advance interests (if any) by engaging in surprising and first and foremost practical activities. What matters is the *particular functional domain* which allows the activity and/or possession of social power to define cases of representation.

This idea falls back to my reading that invokes the idea of seeing representation through notions of functions as interplay of motivational activity, contexts and audiences. This was evident in Rehfeld’s earlier work, where function of representation ‘explains what kind of activity a representative will be engaged in and defines audience by context’ (Rehfeld 2006, 10). It indicates that contexts of representation in fact essentially frame what can be viewed as varying and contingent activities defining representation, and arm those activities with resources. They also impose limitations. Consequently we can see how representatives are object of various obligations and duties that draw from them being representatives. But what Rehfeld (2018) is able to show is that representing contains the element of function upon which representation is used in that particular case. This critical perspective that I would claim to embody something of a *functional approach* to representation underscores the faculty of judgment. As Rehfeld (2006, 18, emphasis added) writes: ‘This means that our judgments about the quality of representation are in fact *judgments* about the quality of a *particular activity* specified by the function given a *particular context*.’

This is important, as we have arrived at the core of the theoretical argument. We can try to draw together from these seemingly isolated and rich discussions a few points relevant to this research at hand. To start off from the most recent, firstly, representation is functionally differentiated, and functions are connected to the contexts in which it is being used. Activities that representatives engage in have different representational aims and aspirations. This idea derives from the systemic approach to deliberative democracy (Mansbridge et al. 2012) that implies how distribution of deliberative work is at play (already available Goodin 2005; Bächtiger et al. 2010). The audiences (not as a monolith but as in plural), referring to their exercise of judgment, are embedded in the contexts. This is partly related to the connection between the actor who is engaging in a certain representative activity and the audience to whom that action is directed at.

Secondly, representation puts forward the idea that representation, as an activity, is motivational (excluding the Rehfeld’s second sense where a representative retains ‘representativity’ also when e.g. sleeping). More specifically with the case of performative representation, it is motivated in so that it becomes successful and hence reaches the achievements set for the task of performance. When collapsed on the level of a legislature it naturally fuses the premise of strategic measures taken by the representatives. Drawing straight from this point, thirdly, in order to be successful in representing requires contextual and situational sensitivity on the part of the representative. Pitkin was aware of these

complexities that political representation summons and puts forward when considering representative politics (and politics of representation).

As said, Pitkin raises the question of the type of issues and matters representatives are expected to take on and take care of, to which the institutional framework can provide more explanation. For such, obligations and expectations of the representatives derive also from the rules and norms of the legislative institution (Pitkin 1967, 224–5). Finally, still following the same line of argumentation presented above, when representation is captured through the idea of deliberative representation, it renders special attention to the function of association with others for the purpose of affirming and accommodating different perspectives. Especially to this last point, taking representation as an activity that involves accommodation of various representative claims, deliberative democracy has provided commentary that should be addressed.

2.2 Deliberative acts

The ‘deliberative turn’ (Dryzek 2000, 1) had a major impact on political theory in the late 1990s. It had profound implications not only in shaping democratic theory, but it also spurred other considerations as well as practical applications. If political representation has, provocatively, been called ‘a rather dowdy Cinderella topic’ in political science (Tormey 2015, 3), the same could be said of legislatures in the case of deliberative democracy. Their place in the theoretical paradigm of deliberation remains somewhat ambiguous: in the search for democratic hopes in mitigating legitimacy deficits, commentators have often overlooked them. On the other hand, studies discerning the quality and form of parliamentary deliberations have concentrated on the tangible outputs of parliaments: verbal speeches. Here, I will try to shed light on the question of the contextual relevance that the institutional setting assumes but, more importantly, on what the practice of representation adds to the picture. Considering the hints available in deliberative speech, we need a better grasp of the nature of understanding and listening in the ‘faculties at work’ (Urbinati 2006, 46–47).

Deliberative democracy can critically supplement this understanding. Notwithstanding that deliberation prescribes the legitimacy of a vote that eventually finalises the deliberative process (Goodin 2008a), it is necessary to add elements regarding the process of decision-making also through the attributes that some values like ‘listening’ and ‘understanding’ refer to. But they make reconciliation and settling political conflicts and disagreements meaningful not only through some ideal deliberative virtue but also through mechanisms deliberative theory is more attuned to discuss. For a definition of deliberative democracy, we could turn to Dryzek’s (2010a, 3) notion of how democracy is, instead of simply an aggregation of interests, ‘also about processes of judgment and preference formation and transformation within informed, respectful and competent dialogue’.

The question on feasibility of deliberative democracy as a normative theory (e.g. Bohman 1998; Thompson 2008) has been following the discussions on deliberation basically as long as there has been a particular meaning for such a thing as deliberation (see also Shapiro 1999; Przeworski 1998). Etymologically, the term refers to a scale (*libra*) that captures neatly the idea of weighing (*librare*), and more specifically, weighing ‘pros and cons’ (Mansbridge 2015, 28). Also, it implies to ‘deliverance’ and ‘bringing to life’, connotations to a process that aspires to achievement of a decision (Urbinati 2006, 198). Its particular modern meaning surpassed the usage in American constitutional debates by the founders (Manin 1994, 143–45). Deliberation was coupled with discussion. As such, it lacked distinctive normative characters which began to form between 1980’s and 1990’s. Arguably, one of the first to use the term in its current understanding was Joseph Bessette in his 1978 PhD dissertation *Deliberation in Congress: A Preliminary Investigation*, which was turned to a paper in 1980 and later published as *The Mild Voice of Reason* (1994). To Bessette, while taking into account the legislative context of his study, deliberation was defined in broad terms as ‘reasoning on the merits of public policy’ (Bessette 1994, 74). To contemporary readers, his usage of the concept may seem too rigid, thus lacking philosophical underpinnings. However, it should be remembered that the scholarship on this topic was almost non-existent at that time.

On these assumptions, when we turn to deliberative democracy it is important to consider the place of political representation in it. This is especially evident in the recently discovered systemic approach of deliberative democracy, which subscribes to an understanding of deliberative systems (Mansbridge et al. 2010; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). It postulates a macro-level examination about the role of deliberation on a large scale, consisting of various different sites where deliberation occurs. Deliberative democracy, extending now to a large scale, continues to seek after the pertinent question about the legitimacy of people's self-rule—a task that calls for exploring the role of deliberation and political representation more fully. This subchapter takes on the discussion of the previous chapter by critically *adding the deliberative component to political representation*. Or, better, adding the notion of representation to deliberative democracy—a theme much evaded and bypassed. Also, the question about *what deliberation is expected to do*—ranging from e.g. formulations of opinion and preference-formation and change, role of decision-making and having participants of deliberation informed about and emancipated—is discussed and revised. The scholarship of deliberation stretches long and far, making room for many arguments about the contributions of deliberative democracy.

This chapter narrates the story of deliberation, not in straightforwardly chronological terms but by covering some of the questions that are theoretically relevant when we are looking to study deliberation in the context of representation. Before we reach the thematic sub-sections, I find it necessary first to re-state some of the main arguments in the rich body of literature. It sets the field that deliberative democracy has carved out in political theory.

i The promise of deliberative democracy: Between the real and ideal

By the end of the 1990s, it was declared—perhaps prematurely—that deliberative theory had ‘come of age’ (Bohman 1998). Specifically committed to advocating for deliberative rule as a ‘stronger democratic ideal’ (ibid., 401), the field of study has even since then evolved towards a notable ‘working theory’ (Chambers 2003, 307). These ongoing developments have opened up the theory to a wider scope of enquiry (ibid.) as well as openness to multitude of research design and methods (Curato et al. 2017, 34, Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 75, 138-145). The triumph of deliberative democracy has left a trail of nearly overwhelming, yet rigorous and nuanced collection of literature. Shifts such as ‘turns’ (Dryzek 2010a), or ‘generations’ (Elstub 2010; Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016) have been retrospectively distinguished. Arguably, the boundaries of these developments are not clear or detectable: they should not be regarded as ‘camps’. Notwithstanding that ‘normative theorist make a living in large part by disagreeing with and criticizing each other’ (Curato et al. 2017, 28) the general perception should capture them more as a flow of overlapping discussions, rather than adversarial ones.

As said, deliberative theorists disagree, or perhaps more accurately have different perspectives and approaches to deliberation. Steiner (2012, 9–11) identifies at least seven ‘disagreements’ regarding the concept. First there remain differing perspectives to who should be included in deliberation? The prevalent answer is the citizens, but the question is *to what extent* should they be involved? Is providing a fair opportunity enough or should we

aim at a more idealistic inclusion of all, as per the all-affected principle (see Näsström 2011a)? Second and third disagreements spring from the comparison to real-world conditions that may not offer room for genuinely deliberative politics: what counts as deliberation? Only rational, argumentative modes of deliberation delivered from neutral (dis)position or can deliberation accommodate other forms of communication? Can deliberation be partial in the sense that the participants carry ulterior motives to public interest like self and group interests? Fourth, in proving arguments, where to draw the line to what qualitative feature in relation to coercion and power? Fifth disagreement relates to the assumption of a ‘basic core of rationality’ (Steiner 2012, 10) supporting the prospect of deliberation ending with consensus. Notwithstanding irreconcilable values or interests, is it also unrealistic under pragmatic constraints to expect deliberation to reach a consensual agreement? Sixth, should all deliberation be public, or can some deliberations be shielded from the public glare to allow some delicate perspectives to be induced, and have participants persuaded? And finally, bridging to the disagreement over positional standing of deliberative actors: how genuine and truthful should the motives for deliberation be?

Let us try briefly to respond to these disagreements. If retaining the argument on the ‘indirectness of representation’, that representation creates as well as mobilises the represented, then the inclusion as well as participation of citizens is less clear. To some extent, we cannot engage in Steiner’s first observation, but retreat here to the myriad dynamics of claim-making that takes place in the representative institution. Claim-making generates communicative transmissions between the institution and the public. The second and third disagreements ring more bells. Empirical inquiry into legislatures attenuates the deliberative requirements, especially since most inquiries concentrate on the public deliberations, i.e. plenary debates. Legislatures also include other functions than the democratic one which seeks for the inclusion of arguments and policies. When doing this, legislatures fail on deliberative standards. As such, legislatures are sites of power where subtleness regarding coercion is negotiated. In democratic politics, the institutionalised way to settle disagreements cannot be aligned with the ideal of consensus. Relating to the former, the way legislatures are currently set up, striving for a partial and provisional resolution entails venues where deliberations are not public.

Studies that endorse deliberative approach informed by deliberative theory are often forum-focused, either on a small or large scale (Pateman 2012 makes this point well). What we are discussing in this research, what we evidently have here is a forum-bound one. Following Bessette (1994), Bächtiger (2005), Pekonen (2011) and Steiner et al. (2004), I claim that to perceive configuration of deliberation and legitimacy of representation also within an orthodox institutional context, such as parliamentary assemblies, should not be completely overshadowed by these other possible contexts. Retreating into mini-publics in the search for robust justification *and* reflection undermines the potentiality of legislatures to provide a place for such deliberative virtues. Often forgotten by theorists is the notion that legislatures establish also other functions than the ones empirical research seeks to understand. Although it may hold true that parliaments may indeed suffer from ‘reflection deficit’ (Dryzek 2017, 613), however, committing fully to this observation can undermine other effects and elements embedded in deliberative practices of legislatures. Better understanding of internal functions and the way deliberation is sequenced within the

legislature can illuminate the considerations given to these reflections. This aspiration also touches, if not pertaining disagreements, but remaining hesitations and unsettled positions about features that political deliberation induce to the deliberative process.

Furthermore, more understanding is needed of the part of the political actors, of the representatives, what are the drivers for deliberation for them. This inquiry, to which I want to contribute with this research, is not available through legislative debates even though it provides meaningful insight to the ways in which representatives formulate justifications and portray reciprocal attitudes. When the impetus of institutional and procedural features on the quality of deliberation (e.g. Steiner et al. 2004; Bächtiger 2005; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010) are considered, it tends to be concentrated on the formal structures of representation but leaves open many of the questions about representation as a practice. When thinking of MPs not only as representatives but as practitioners and deliberators, the interpretative connection of representation and deliberation to the legislative institution is made. For this reason, it is also important to consider institutions that enable practitioners to 'understand and value the goals and aims that are intrinsic to the institution' (Cameron 2018, 3).

And finally, even though this research focuses on elected, formal representatives, members of parliament, I claim that the suggested analytical idea of deliberative representation is applicable also to deliberations in other forums and sites that carry notions of representation too. Outside the nation-state sphere with democratically elected representatives in modern polities there exist actors whose mandate or authority to claims for representation vary—ranging from the rock musician Bono to supranational organisations (e.g. Parkinson 2006; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008; Saward 2010; Montanaro 2012; Kuyper 2016). Arguably, this refutes the appreciation of deliberation to the surroundings of representation, and in that it affirms how representation and deliberation has complex yet joint affiliation. Isolating and treating these strands of theory apart is where a wide variety of actors ascribe to deliberation and representation in their own way while forming myriad associations with others. The act of deliberation makes representation visible but also enforces participants of deliberation to address and recognise subjects and issues involved.

As is well known, the story of deliberative theory usually begins with thinkers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas who in their work were both induced into developing a distinct model, a complete system to tackle such universally underscoring democratic questions as justice, rights, and aspirations for common good. These theorists are regarded as 'the first generation' of deliberative democrats (Elstub 2010; also Bächtiger et al. 2018, 3–4) since they laid the normative foundations to the aim and scope of deliberation which was to be seen through norms of reasoned and impartial argumentation, that of 'forceless force of the better argument' (Flynn 2004, 436). Providing that necessary conditions and procedures for deliberation were in place, and were essentially public in nature, communicative rationality could be produced. This procedure of public deliberation on the common good argued through universal reasons entail equal treatment of all on reasons everyone can accept, referring to what some scholars have been defined as 'type I' deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2010). The first generation of deliberative theory underscored the aspirational feature of deliberative democracy when aiming for consensus and unanimity were heightened through the process of reasoning. This process ensured the legitimacy of the outcome in which

everyone has had equal opportunity to take part. The public sphere is to remain 'wild' (to use Habermas' terminology), but it also functions in a way that Chambers (2017, 270) describe as 'laundering': public sphere revises and refines arguments and reasoning to be put under public discussion again.

Deemed too idealistic, 'the second generation', such as James Bohman (1998), Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), recognised the challenges that deliberative theory faces when it turns into practical world of contemporary plural and globalised societies where contexts of deliberation are far more complex and intertwined. The second generation maintained the undeniable thrust on advocating citizen perspective as in the form of 'middle democracy' in the face of sources of 'moral disagreements': self-interest, scarcity, limited generosity, incompatible values and incomplete understanding (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 16–26). According to Gutmann and Thompson (*ibid.*, 41–44) deliberative democracy offer solutions to these disagreements by, for example, promoting mutual respect via 'economy of moral disagreement', as in finding the smallest common denominator that participants can agree on, despite remaining incompatible values. Deliberative democracy also help in clarifying the nature of the conflict while detecting and identifying self-interested claims from public-spirited ones, and by involving spheres promoting these public-oriented claims.

Deliberative democracy offers a compelling account on refusal of aggregative models of democracy and social choice theory. It originates its reasoning for collective action by holding on to 'its promise to go beyond the limits of liberalism and to recapture the stronger democratic ideal that government should embody the will of the people formed through the public reasoning of citizens' (Bohman 1998, 401). Its novelty lies in its ability to deal with conflicting moral disagreements uncovered by 'first-order theories' (like theories of justice) and in that 'make room for continuing moral conflicts that first-order theories purport to eliminate them' (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 13). Amongst its great many definitions, deliberative democracy has been defined as 'any one of a family of views according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision making and self-government' (*ibid.*).

Regardless of the formidable reach of the second generation of deliberative theories, according to critics 'they offered little substantive detail in terms of the types of institutions required to ensure that deliberative democracy could be actualised' (Elstub 2010, 291–92; see also Macedo 1999b). This gave rise to a set of third-generation projects, containing references to 'realness', to underline the perspective shift towards institutionalised deliberation. Can deliberative democracy, and if so, to what extent, purchase its claims and principles when brought down from theory to practice? For example, John Parkinson's *Deliberating in the Real World* (2006) depicts a case study on national health care plan in UK, focusing on the legitimacy of deliberative process involving various (representative and non-representative) actors, including citizens' panels and other forms of democratic innovations. For Dryzek (2010) these advancements mark 'the 'institutional turn' since it emphasised the study on particular forums of deliberation in a way that connects citizen participation into political decision-making. As mentioned, a few studies focused on institutions such as parliaments (Bessette 1994; Uhr 1998).

Various forms of participatory mechanisms are presented in democratic innovations such as ‘mini-publics’ and citizens’ assemblies, juries and panels (see extensive overview in Grönlund, Bächtiger, and Setälä 2014; also Goodin and Dryzek 2006; Warren and Pearce 2008). These innovations have often a rather clear objective and defined motivation of the deliberative tasks such as advocating, discussing, proposing and deciding on an issue. Pateman (2012) defends the distinctiveness of participatory democracy (by discussing the famous case of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre) from deliberative democracy claiming that only the former can operate as a genuine tool for democratisation while the latter is inherently bound onto specific forums.

The institutional turn bleeds into the ‘practical’ one, something that aspires in designing those forums (e.g. deliberative polls; see Fishkin, Luskin, and Jowell 2000). Through these mechanisms the prospect of citizens having a tangible impact on policy-making process is thought to critically increase the legitimacy of representative rule, highlighting the mission statement of deliberative democracy. These novel participatory, democratic innovations currently taking centre-stage in the applications of deliberative theory proposes a partial antidote to the alleged ‘legitimation crisis’ of modern representative democracy.

Criticism of democratic innovations¹⁹ demonstrate how unclear and undefined is the macro-level impact of the outputs by these micro-deliberations: an open question remains, to what extent democratic innovations and their outcomes are to be ‘scaled-up’? Such themes are touched in the empirical turn when refining ‘claims about what deliberative democracy can and cannot do, and how its better practice might be informed by understanding of what is and what is not possible under particular condition’ (Dryzek 2010, 6–9). Being defined as the ‘fourth generation’ (Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016, 144), the ‘systemic turn’ can be seen as the offspring of the previous turns, aiming at connecting the theoretical and empirical, negotiating the relation between the ideal and the actual, while refining the dynamics of deliberation which is distributed and dwells in various sites and forums. While the picture of deliberative systems (which also conjure comparative research to be undertaken, see e.g. Boswell and Corbett 2017; Dryzek 2016) on a large scale becomes more absolvent and some pertaining hesitations are diminished, new ones appear. Deliberative theory might be on the verge of yet another turn, the epistemic turn (Landemore 2017b).

¹⁹ As important and salutary as citizens’ juries and other deliberative experiments are, they cannot solely cover the ground for democratic representation and decision-making. Dryzek (2016, 210) puts it bluntly when noting their methodological parsimoniousness to ‘innovate piece-meal rather than changing the whole system’. In all fairness democratic innovations have not been offered or even claimed to fully substitute democratic decision-making in contemporary representative institutions such as parliaments. Instead they legitimately supplement the decision-making, as Maija Setälä (2017) has been proposing when advocating for including mini-publics to the work of parliamentary committees. Open question remains whether mini-publics are best suited shaping public policies or should they remain vital (institutionalised) practice to inform and spur public opinion (Lafont 2015; in connection with political parties, see Kuyper and Wolkenstein 2019). As in the case of citizens’ initiatives, belonging to the democratic innovation family, has had also the novelty of putting issues on the political agenda that the elected political actors, politicians and political parties, have for reason or another been unwilling to advance. On a long shot, these views echo with the potential unwillingness of deliberative representatives to create political agendas and insights through means of representative claim-making and generally through discursive politics (Disch 2012; see also Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010, Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008).

I have briefly introduced the vast sphere of discussions that deliberative democracy has undergone over the past few decades. Going through them is necessary, as it allows digging our way towards the intersection with the concept of political representation. Another motivation lays in exploring the elements that drive deliberation. Vibrancy of these debates and furthering developments of the theory also inherently concern the identity of deliberative democracy. Which values and principles are indispensable when seeing deliberative theory as an ongoing democratic project? Also, when wanting to decipher conceptually what ‘deliberative’ in deliberative representation might mean and imply to *in action*, it is necessary to address the question between the ideal and the real outlined in this sub-section. The struggle of deliberative theory’s empirical applicability in political contexts becomes more distinguishable when advancing next towards substantial features of democratic politics: representation, interests and power.

ii Deliberative politics, dispositional deliberation and power

Democratically chosen representatives deal with what Gutmann and Thompson call moral disagreements in what they define as ‘middle democracy’.

Middle democracy is the land of everyday politics, where legislators, executives, administrators, and judges make and apply policies and laws, sometimes arguing among themselves and listening to citizens, other times not. Middle democracy is also the land of interest groups, civic associations, and schools [...] sometimes arguing among themselves and listening to people with differing points of view, other times not (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 40).

We can say in representative terms that on behalf of citizens as writers reserve their discussion on moral disagreements mainly taking place between citizens as *reason-givers* and *reason-demanders* (Macedo 1999b, 5). When doing this, they deal with conflicts, values, interests of many sort in a political world defined by scarcity of resources such as material goods, wealth, and time. The range of interests travel from self-interests or vested interests all the way to ‘general’ or public interests. Deliberative politics, the domain where political representatives also dwell, contain attributes such as vision, judgment and understanding. Democratic politics belong to ‘a land that democrats can scarcely afford to bypass’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 40). Representatives can be thought as deliberators who negotiate between ‘the forum’ and ‘the market’; between ideals of commonality and aggregative self-interested preferences (Elster 1997). To be able to do this (or whichever task they are set to do for reason or another), representatives travel up and down the spectrum of dispositional and positional deliberation. This is reflected in what is done with deliberation. We will return to this point of intermediation in the next sub-section, when we discuss the issue of deliberative accountability.

What the study of political representatives and political representation in general bring to the study of deliberative democracy is that it serves the question of power—something that has escaped from deliberative theory. Here deliberative democrats made a ‘mistake’, as Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 1) recently argue. By doing this, ‘they forgot about democracy’ (ibid, 4). Early deliberative democrats understood questions of power as being

too simplified, if not irrelevant. Namely, in Habermasian discourse theory there is no 'self' in the public will-forming processes but that 'self-organizing legal community disappears in the *subjectless forms of communication*' (Habermas 1994, 10, emphasis added). Thus, no individual holds personal 'communicative power' but it is dispersed in the collective public reasoning process. Henceforth, the public sphere entails a self-correcting function (Chambers 2017, 270; Flynn 2004) aiming at dissolving the matter of power. However, as it remains, attempts to affect opinion-building, reasoning or position-taking in other ways than on the basis of respectful and reciprocal exchange of reasons, justification and arguments are generally not well received. Coercive measures, threats and manipulation have no place in deliberative process since they produce asymmetry of power regardless of how 'minimally' deliberation is defined (Mansbridge 2015; Bächtiger et al. 2018, 5). Not only in terms of the ethical function of deliberative democracy defending the autonomy of subjects, but principles of inclusion as the democratic function becomes questionable when faced with coercion (Mansbridge et al. 2012).

Power is to some extent an undeniable factor in all social relations. Mansbridge (2015, 36) makes this clear by arguing that the absence of power is a regulative ideal. Nonetheless, in deliberative theory the question of power raises the question about the principle of equality of wills in democratic politics. For the founders of representative government the idea of equality of wills was so evident that the detailed link of discussion and representation was largely dismissed (Manin 1994, 143–45). Moreover, the function of deliberation was in producing *agreement* in inherent diversity that was produced by the social fact that everyone (every *man*) is equal. The outcome, the resolution is therefore founded on consent: the idea that people yield 'their will'. This is often accomplished through persuasive measures, since there is ultimately no other legitimate way to provisionally settle disagreements. For these early thinkers, then, any kind of coercion violates the autonomy of subjects to willingly consent or transform their preferences spelled out within the democratic (deliberative) process.

Unfortunately, the principle of political equality of representative government uncovers a deeper contradiction in deliberative democracy that is not explainable only by rejecting coercion (see also the defence of equity in Moscrop and Warren 2016). It gives grounds to further consider when interlinking deliberation to political representation. Against the idea of liberal democracy supporting political equality in aggregative terms which is safeguarded by the principle of one person - one vote (and backed up by constitutionally derived formal processes and political rights), in deliberative democracy the ideal that everybody's voice bears equal weight is less self-evident. The idea of 'counting heads' as per the liberal notion is not applicable, as it immanently gives way to the justification 'by' those heads in deliberative democracy. Seeing voting as an 'attempt to give ideas weight' and 'not make them identical in weight or with weight' explains the difference in logic with voting and deliberation (Urbinati 2006, 31). Consequently, deliberative democracy demands more: the content and merits of deliberation by each deliberator should be weighted equally. Thus we are left with a dilemma: we simultaneously want to retain the 'all affected' principle, that everyone who are affected gets their say, but at the same time give priority to deliberative claims and justifications ascribing to reasonability and acceptability.

Secondly, the democratic function of deliberative democracy—defending inclusion of arguments and voices—become more negotiable when being introduced to democratic politics. As summarised by Parkinson (2006, 26–41), these problems with deliberative legitimacy when it comes to addressing questions of power are defined as the scale problem and motivational problems. Democratic deliberation addresses the question of ‘who gets to be at the table’ (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 12). Ultimately, the so called ‘scale issue’ is evoked: to live up to the all-affected principle that secures legitimacy, everyone should be included. Due to practical, physical constraints not everyone can deliberate at the same time. Also distance and time, as reasoning together takes time, is an issue (Goodin 2000, 82). Distinguishing who should be included would be ‘an imprecise art at best, entirely arbitrary at worst’ (Parkinson 2006, 5).

For Parkinson (ibid., 29), the idea of representation ‘offers a way out’ the scale-problem. Bohman (2012) shares the same position when concluding that *all deliberation is representative*. Then, if this argument holds ground—that deliberation is necessarily representative—then deliberative theory is facing the exact same question as discussions presented in the previous subchapter on political representation: how to ensure that deliberators assume in their deliberations of those they represent? Let us elaborate some of the observations available in the literature that point towards tackling this normative expectation. For one, deliberative democracy renders an ‘external-collective’ focus that makes it vulnerable to legitimacy deficits mentioned above. Can a collective reason and justify matters in such a manner that it would at least satisfy the individual perspectives and viewpoints? For this Goodin (2000) offers a supplement of ‘internal-reflective’ mode where deliberative actors deliberate ‘within’, as in their heads. The novelty of Goodin’s intuitive proposal is that internal-reflective perspective, unlike external-collective, can extend beyond physical boundaries of space and time. Therefore, it also allows for the inclusion of future generations (ibid., 99).

Internal-reflective mode relies on the idea of ‘ideal role-taking’ in discourse ethics. Note here the echo of claims for descriptive representation when invoking ‘intersubjectivity’ as a form of bringing someone to presence by imagination (ibid., 94). Relating to their descriptive features, one could sense what that person would be feeling and thinking, thus acting as a catalyst for empathy, a vital element of deliberative democracy. The argument for empathy has been explicitly pushed by Michael Morrell (2010). The claim of standing for -view of representation has a strong take on legitimacy despite the theoretical criticism discussed earlier.

For the few deliberative democrats explicitly touching the theme of representation, when a subset deliberates instead of the whole community, presents what Goodin (2000, 87–88) calls ‘ersatz deliberation’. It raises a representative dilemma, defined as ‘Grandview problem’, in reference to Fishkin’s deliberative polling (Parkinson 2006). The basic set-up is this: if representatives change their minds due to deliberative process, their legitimacy as representatives become doubtful. Representativeness disappears since they are no longer like the represented. Lafont (2015) correctly points out a parallel problem of legitimacy within deliberative polling. When representatives should prefer to follow a judgment (refined through deliberative poll) of the constituency instead of representative’s own judgment (or the ‘raw’ opinions of the represented), the representative criteria implied in

the Grandview problem does not apply in the sense that it ‘accrues no additional legitimacy’. The counterfactual setting, when people deliberate and opinion change occurs, according to this criteria, fails to explain why the representative will not choose to act according to one’s own (better) judgment (Lafont 2015, 51). Reasoning about claims of representativeness and legitimacy is shorthanded, which demonstrates one of the difficulties with endorsing descriptive, ‘micro-cosmos’ type of ideas of representation, as discussed in previous subchapter.

If we move on from the scale problem to the other problem that representation invokes within deliberative democracy according to Parkinson (2003; 2006), we arrive at motivational problems. If scale-problem is treated in terms of standing for -view of descriptive representation (‘who’ is represented), the motivational problem applies to the question of substantive representation (‘what’ is represented). Representatives might be holding what Parkinson (2006) calls ‘pre-deliberative commitments’. They can turn out both ways: by not being interested in hearing what the others are saying, or by demonstrating too much keenness to the extent that deliberative commitments to the represented are lost. What is noteworthy here is the discursive overlap with discussions on representation and deliberative theory that also show how the struggle over normative inclinations in them goes actually towards the opposite ways: as we have seen, theory of representation is retreating from the centrality of interests as the core and the standard account of political representation.

The prognosis of representation shows that preferences are in fact endogenous of the process of will-formation. With deliberative democracy this position is the complete opposite of the former: deliberators, especially if they are representatives acting in a representative compound, hold pre-deliberative commitments. This is merely a euphemism for interests. This implies that deliberators, regardless of how controlled and moderated the deliberative setting might be²⁰, are never Rawlsian *tabula rasae* but always bring something to the shared table, also power and interest. The composition of the deliberative assembly importantly affects scope and content of the deliberation that takes place

These notions speak to the *contextual conditions*, something that scholars working both with deliberation and representation should explicitly consider (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 40–42). These conditions affect how we interact with each other but also impact motives for deliberative interaction in the first place. On one account, Shapiro (1999) argues in his catchy-titled article ‘Enough of deliberation’ that incentives for engaging in deliberative process may differ across the participants. As the title sub-header refers– ‘deliberation is about interest and power’–according to Shapiro, Gutmann and Thompson’s thesis on deliberative democracy critically leaves out the liberal aspect. From this perspective, even self-interested actors like corporations and the like can contribute to the

²⁰ Deliberative experiments aim at creating favorable environment for deliberation where possible inequalities of many kinds such as knowledge resources are diminished or at least controlled. It has also been noted that the role of moderator is crucial as moderating discussion tend to limit the group polarization tendency (Grönlund, Herne, and Setälä 2015). Social capital and social and economic inequalities may not be completely erased despite paying attention to these factors in the research design. Deliberative experiments demonstrate worryingly that for example, less-educated and females take less part in deliberation. Females get also more often interrupted when speaking than men (Mendelberg, Karpowitz, and Oliphant 2014).

deliberative process by introducing relevant information. As such, they can clarify about the nature of conflict and what is at stake in the handling of the disagreement (Mansbridge 1992). Instead, deliberative scholarship has been concentrating only on the morality of disagreements, which, as their endeavour, is to underline the moral nature of democratic questions. By using an example of couple's therapy Shapiro demonstrates how a deliberative process with unclear or unformed interests take shape. This results in ever-deepening swamp of conflicting interests or perspectives (Shapiro 1999, 32).

Along the same lines, the 'difference democrats' such as Anne Phillips (1995) and Iris Marion Young (2001) have criticised deliberative theory for being naïve for assuming that 'power can be bracketed by the soft tones of the seminar room' (Young 2001, 675). These critics also bring up that those better off, who have more advantageous socio-economic background, are favoured by the intrinsic qualitative criteria within argumentation. It can relate to upright asymmetry of power between deliberators or they can relate to deliberative capacities like speech skills.²¹ Those with higher societal status endorse a distinct propriety for deliberation, a jargon of their own, which may not be similarly applicable to others who do not share the same background. What this also indicates is that references to coercive power can be more subtle. Moreover, its relation to affecting the principle self-autonomy is less clear. Violating the autonomy of deliberating subjects' rationalising and decision-making puts a question mark on persuasive measures such as rhetorics, pleading and other than *logos*-derived forms of communication.

These critiques have shaped how deliberative democracy departs from dispositional and non-emotional ideals of deliberation and give way also to other forms of communication like story-telling, testimonials, and rhetoric (Young 2002). These can be regarded as legitimate justifications for argumentation, despite their shortcomings from a pure epistemic perspective. Rhetoric may, however, also crucially generate 'bridging' and 'bonding' measures that enhance the reason-giving of participants (Dryzek 2010b). In sum, what these discussions portray is that it is not only external inclusion but internal inclusion that proponents of deliberative democracy must also attend to. It bears significance also in relation to political representation and to what extent differences in resources and capacities are in the use of representatives. Before we can complete this argument, we need to look at postulations that extend towards politics, thus enhancing the reach of deliberative democracy.

iii Deliberative accountability and political representation

Fundamentally, democratic deliberation aims at altering the epistemic conditions for decision-making and bringing about a change in the pre-deliberative commitments of participants (Parkinson 2006; Elstub 2010). This is done, for example, through bringing in new information on provided facts, defended positions and other relevant insights. One interpretation would pose democratic deliberation as the enemy of representation since it

²¹ Also Shapiro (1999, 34) points out that deliberative democracy is underdeveloped when failing to pay attention that those with better financial resources can advance their cause by framing the deliberation in their favour (Przeworski 1998; see also Habermas 2006).

can cause preference change. As such, it implies giving up original representative commitments. This said, we should distinguish deliberation from its democratic implications which ties the meaning of binding collective decision-making processes. Democratic deliberation ‘should not be disconnected from questions of agendas, decisions, and actions’ (Parkinson 2006, 3). Sometimes to defend this interpretation the formula of ‘first talk, then vote’ has been endorsed (Goodin 2008a). To underscore the importance of this conceptual distinction it should be explicitly addressed here that this research, when talking about deliberation, is using it as synonymous to democratic deliberation. However, this reading does not rule out the necessary articulation, construction and contestation of democratic identities and packages, generating salient reasoning as well as reflection.

The connection of deliberation to democratic politics sets certain preconditions that are discussed partly in contradiction to the theoretical deliberative paradigm as a whole. When doing this, some neglected elements in regard to representation are explicitly brought up. Admittedly, while this chosen positioning may not fully and fairly reflect the ongoing maturing of deliberative democracy, I still find it necessary for the sake of teasing out the implications of political representation. One such account is the previously discussed perspective argued by difference democrats who capture the value of deliberation through in terms of inclusion but also self-actualisation, autonomy and respect. All this then, resonating again with representation, relates to the question of what is to be done with deliberation? Clearly, the motivation with story-telling might differ from those who want to see deliberation in a more restrictive manner, as Joshua Cohen does, ‘in close proximity to binding collective decision-making’ (Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016, 143). Also others, like Parkinson or Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004), endorse this position while others see the value of deliberation as a procedure that produces other things. Shared understanding, meta-consensus or clarification of the perspectives causing disagreements are such reflective transformations that deliberation can bring about, something that may not per se translate into the decision itself. What this variability tells us is that we cannot realistically expect deliberativeness to check all the boxes yet its distinctiveness should be preserved to some extent. Most recently, two core components of deliberation are defined, namely *reason-giving* and *listening* (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 23).

When democratic deliberation is brought together with realities of political representation not only such ontological consequences but also other features are established. Urbinati’s (2006) idea of political representation as ‘presence through voice’ together with the constructivist turn assumes the deliberative act that puts things (be they people, interests, discourses and such) into being and sets them in motion. This process of creating and making the grounds for representative relationships visible is where Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 11–13) interlink the relevance of political representation with deliberative democracy. For them, representation ‘closes the gap between the real and the ideal deliberative democracy’ (ibid., 11) since through established visibility, democratic processes can be traced and assessed vis-à-vis ideals of deliberative democracy.

Deliberation’s orientation to decision-making calls forth questions of representation that, as well known, translate into the language of accountability. Along these lines, Gutmann and Thompson (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 132; see follow-up discussions in Macedo 1999a) pose the haunting question: ‘how can deliberative accountability be

consistent with democratic representation? When discussing the scope of accountability (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 128) the authors advance their argument on the tensions that political representation brings to the idea of universal accountability. Reading this side by side with what was discussed in the previous subchapter illuminates the attempts within deliberative theory to tackle questions relating to democratic politics. When it comes to ‘universal accountability’, that representatives are accountable to all, authors fall back to the representative spin-off of the scale-problem. The basic tension then ‘implies to a comprehensive constituency while representation supposes a circumscribed one’ (ibid., 129). Since the authors are one of the few who take on these discussions in close connection with political representation, I will next go through them in more detail. They give us the stepping-stone into approaching parallel impediments in the maintenance of the intersubjective electoral connection. Accordingly, they find two difficulties with accommodating deliberative principle of accountability and actual politics.

The first is the specialisation in the form of division of labour that political representation enforces and necessitates, i.e. that one deliberates for many as the solution for the discussed scale-problem assumes. Further, representatives in representative institutions accrue also specialised knowledge due to the availability of extensive resources (e.g. time, information and money). This leads to the supposition that deliberation turns out elitist (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 129, 132; see also Manin 1997). The lack of marginalised and disadvantaged group in politics is not due to ‘deliberative deficit’ but ‘lack of power’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 133). To counterbalance the social injustice and background inequalities, in the ‘deliberative playing field’ the marginalised have moral arguments on their side as ‘moral appeals are the weapon of the weak’ (ibid.).²²

Second problem of deliberative accountability is termed the ‘challenge of the constituency’ (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 128, 144). Opposite to the previous case of deliberative accountability which worked on a vertical dimension, here the problem arises from giving too much to a horizontal constituency: to the many constituencies that representatives have. In addition to electorate constituencies, representatives have what Gutmann and Thompson call *moral constituency*. In the example of a controversial abortion bill in South Dakota in the 1990s, the writers find similar dilemma as in the mandate-independency -controversy. In the treatment of the second accountability problem that derives from the multitude of constituencies Gutmann and Thompson see the burning deliberative question in a manner that strikes odd. For the authors, the setting is connected to whom the justifications for one’s actions should be given. In this particular real-world

²² To demonstrate this point, writers use an example of Carol Moseley Braun, a black congresswoman, who was able to overturn the minds of fellow congress members, on the case of renewal of patent on the Confederate flag in the United States. The value of *testimony* (regarded here also as rhetorical use of language), drawing from social background and in this case from historical wrong-doings, in a deliberative sense is that it can force an issue on the agenda thus spur deliberative process (without this action in the example, the decision would’ve been made without hesitation). Secondly, by expanding mental horizons of the listeners testimony can advance agreement by parties who do not share the same opinion or perspectives. However, even though the purpose of deliberative democracy is to mitigate and correct background inequalities (e.g. race, gender, wealth) testimony lacks the two-way, *reciprocal* communication that deliberation enforces. It bypasses the idea of reciprocity, to seek agreement in fair terms and with mutual respect (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 135–7).

example (where close pro-choice majority won) representative's 'position seems to force him to choose between an account that would *satisfy more qualified* deliberators and one that would *appeal to less qualified* deliberators' (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 130, emphasis added).

In the suggested frame of accountability problem facing the option of restraining from deliberation altogether due to being caught 'between elitism and demagoguery' (ibid., 130) I do not see why it would be such a strain to address and reason to multiple audiences, or constituencies, and sensibly and deliberately tailor justifications to them. This particular dynamic comes up with elected representatives who bear responsibility through their mandate, but also through their specialised practice that teaches them to navigate among overlapping and contingent legitimacy claims. Even though Gutmann and Thompson extend the discussion on accountability to cover multiple constituencies, their understanding of the accountability function is very electoral-centred (as in their terminology of procedural democracy). However, they are correct in their worries of the demagogic, populist tendencies that the deliberative principle may produce the legitimate need to please supporters and to gain new ones. The worry resonates with 'dilemma of democratic competence': political elites, when creating and invoking representative claims and constituencies, respectively, make use of apathy and disinterestedness of the public that may be prone to accept claims that lack factual basis (Chambers 2004; Goodin and Saward 2005; Disch 2011).

The treatment of audience (regardless of their idea of horizontal constituency) in Gutmann and Thompson's reading assumes that the receiving party of these deliberations to be a single monolith or a clearly defined unit. The concept of constituency is messy (e.g. Rehfeld 2005). For deliberative democrats, when approaching political representation, it may not be fruitful to even try to trace and focus on *who the constituency is*, to whom one should practically be accountable and to whom one is to address the justifications. Instead, discursive representatives, as Dryzek (2010a) helpfully proposes, can sustain legitimacy through discourses that they claim to represent. Namely, discursive accountability is established when the discursive premises are tapped into and engaged with (similar to deliberative accountability, see Mansbridge 2009). The problem of the multitude of constituencies outlined by Gutmann and Thompson dissolves when the corresponding discourses amalgamate discursive accountability. For that reason, 'discursive representatives *do not have to be 'delegates' of discourses*, unable to reflect and change their minds. But if they change their minds, they *must justify the change in terms set by the discourse(s) they represent*' (Dryzek 2010, 61, emphasis added). Along with Dryzek, the constructivist turn and representative claim-making is better equipped to acknowledge that audiences of deliberative acts may be plural.

Despite the ambiguity of their section on accountability Gutmann and Thompson does not diminish the relevance of the following point they make. Crucially, they state that deliberative democracy does not specify a single form of representation. In their view it '*searches for modes of representation that support give-and-take of serious and sustained moral argument within legislative bodies, between legislators and the citizens, and among citizens themselves*' (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 131, emphasis added). Two things in this quotation are worth noting. First, in my understanding of deliberative politics and

representative institutions I am not convinced that all questions or practical legislative issues can be collapsed into moral arguments. However, I agree with the fundamentals of continuous reiterated deliberation for providing reasons and justifications, but I doubt the foundational substance of morality claims. Also, the question of deliberative accountability remains unsolved: how to resolve and deal with colliding viewpoints (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 142, 163)?

Admittedly, this tension is built within representative democracy itself, and by advancing the arguments of deliberative theory this question of arbitration can be put on the table perhaps in a more robust manner than with the concept of representation alone. Conjoining these discussions on deliberation and representation in the idea of deliberative representation, as I argue, can offer valuable insight reflecting the theoretical claims made. The second point to note in the quotation is perhaps more intriguing as it specifically commits deliberative democracy to interweaving political representation, or modes of representation, to the sphere of inquiry. Work of a deliberative representative is certainly more difficult than that of a 'procedural representative' who defers to her constituency's wishes or that by 'constitutional democrat' who relies solely on reasoning of legislative justice (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 163).

These critiques have shaped how deliberative democracy departs from dispositional and non-emotional ideals of deliberation and give way also to other forms of communication like story-telling, testimonials, and rhetoric (Young 2002). These can be regarded as legitimate justifications for argumentation, despite their shortcomings from a pure epistemic perspective. Rhetoric may, however, also crucially generate 'bridging' and 'bonding' measures that enhance the reason-giving of participants (Dryzek 2010b). In sum, what these discussions portray is that it is not only external inclusion but internal inclusion that proponents of deliberative democracy must also attend to. It bears significance also in relation to political representation and to what extent differences in resources and capacities are in the use of representatives. Before we can complete this argument, we need to look at postulations that extend towards politics, thus enhancing the reach of deliberative democracy.

iv Deliberative ecologies hosting and sustaining various deliberative acts

The outcomes of the search for modes of representation by Gutmann and Thompson over twenty years ago have been relatively modest. Arguably, it seems that the playing field for exploring the possibilities and prospects for deliberative representation is substantially open for further formulations. In this final section, I revisit the themes already discussed in a way that supports my argument for deliberative representation. Moreover, it responds to the proposition for the search for a mode of representation Gutmann and Thompson were after. As such, as argued earlier, the idea of deliberative representation can also be supported by Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 7–8) when they see deliberativeness to be used as a summative quality that resonates with the constructive perspective on political representation. Both views are responsive to the general idea of deliberative representation that perceives the qualities to be 'effects of complex interactions' (ibid. 11–12). Setting out

to examining, mapping and measuring deliberation in this sense gains its purchase from such a notion that does not make us stop every time just to ask: ‘is this proper deliberation?’ Therefore, arguing for a perception of ‘deliberative timbre’ critically advances the reach of deliberative democracy (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 7–9).

While this research does not measure deliberation in parliaments as such, it does map and more precisely, seek to point out the origins of deliberative accounts, of situations and occasion when deliberation is at play. Therefore, this research speaks also to the deliberative democrats. However, when we follow newer formulations in deliberative theory, we find that the necessary trade-offs embedded in the inquiries of representation and deliberation lessen the worries of concept-stretching. Deliberative actors assume both strategic and deliberative goals as explained earlier in the parliamentary context (chapter I, section iii). Most importantly, I have proposed, deliberative theory is now paying attention to the functional character of deliberation (Bächtiger and Beste 2017). Further, the argument for deliberative representation in this research and the way it will be empirically investigated situates itself among the conceptions of deliberation and deliberativeness: *performativity*, *distribution* and *contingency* (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 16). Importantly, these conceptions lessen the leap of faith that is taken when representation and deliberation are converged so that they can set out for a dialogue and contribute to further developments. This final section will be structured to reflect this helpful three-fold distinction vis-à-vis the earlier discussions on representation.

Deliberation when seen in terms of *performativity* relates to the loosening normative parameters of deliberation. Arguably, deliberative democracy has been subject to injustice when some of its central literature has been regarded as blueprints for the type of acceptable and legitimated deliberation to which empirical considerations on institutional designs should be contrasted (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 86). Ideals of impartiality and common good orientation, distinguished in ‘old deliberation’ (Bächtiger and Beste 2017) or ‘type I’ deliberation by the ‘first generation’ theorists (e.g. Habermas, Cohen), could be seen as one of the relevant standards at stake when democratic politics is considered (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 34). In the earlier attempts at positing deliberative theory with questions of political representation Parkinson made a convincing start by conferring that representatives play a ‘dual role’ of delegates and trustees when acting as deliberators (Parkinson 2006, 35). While the binary setting of principal–agent model is now seen somewhat outdated (also for the reason that parliamentary studies about representatives do not in reality resonate with typologies of representative roles), the motivational issues (i.e. pre-deliberative commitments) that political representation brings along are current.

When thinking of political representatives operating in legislatures, exchanging the premise of preference-change to ‘*open-mindedness*’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 22), seems valid. As such, the argument for performativity increases the appeal to robust empirical inquiry. It is more likely that we will find MPs who foster the kind of open-mindedness discussed here than those who would readily give up a prior stance, especially principled ones. However, as Gutmann and Thompson (2012) show, representatives are forced to balance between accountable governing and credible campaigning to which the necessity of compromise relates. Hypothetically, the proposal for open-mindedness and the implied readiness to hear out arguments and proposals made by others, especially by

political adversaries (Manin 2017), are qualities fostered by representatives who mix strategic and common good orientations.

The idea of discretion that representatives assumingly exercise connects with the second feature of deliberativeness argued by Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 44): *distribution*. We can see how its earlier formulations in the so-called ‘sequential approach’ help in ‘integrating different forms of communication while at the same time relaxing the idea that each moment of the communicative process must fully embody rational discourse’ (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 34–35; see also Goodin 2005; 2008b). Further, deliberative democracy can ‘accommodate different aspects or dimensions of deliberation’ (as having ‘many principles’) instead of trying to ‘capture them all in a single set of principles’ (Bohman 1998, 404, 408).

As Curato and others (2017) claim, and on what many other current collaborators to deliberative democracy most likely agree, the juxtaposition of ideal and realist tendencies of deliberative theory is dated. It is considered as one of resolved key findings of deliberative democracy. In representative politics power and coercion are hard not to come by, and these features are difficult to erase from corresponding political processes and communication. Considering that representatives whose trade is ‘the art of feasible’ may indeed foster instrumental goals, as mentioned before (Bohman 1998, 412, 416). Such variability also puts aside the juxtaposition of strategic and authentic or sincere, non-manipulative incentives of deliberative participants that early scholars struggled with. Now, incorporating the notion of interests (Mansbridge 1992; Mansbridge et al. 2010; Mansbridge 2006; Warren and Mansbridge 2013) bear implications to how deliberative processes can be assessed in democratic terms. This is also a matter of *need*. The developing new approaches to deliberation help not only through measuring but also by mapping and pinpointing the moments and places in democratic processes where high-quality deliberation is needed the most. (Bächtiger and Beste 2017.) In democratic politics, we should not expect to find high-quality deliberation in every corner we study. However, as argued earlier, merging the concepts of representation and deliberation encourages making these democratic processes visible, forcing participants to address and respond to claims and arguments, weighing them sometimes in public and sometimes behind closed doors. Additionally, I argue that while the institutionalised setting and the controversy in public–versus–private deliberation cannot fully be settled, more consideration should be given on the perspective on how the function of deliberation and representation changes when operating within these settings. Furthermore, the ‘need-oriented’ perspective to deliberation (ibid.) helps clarify how representatives choose adversary style that may undermine qualification of respectful conduct for the justificatory benefit. In the plenary debates members of parliament may choose to ‘hit hard’ to ensure that the legislation is sufficiently scrutinised and argued for.

Similarly, Manin (2017) has put forward recently a related formula for adversarial *political* deliberation that has many virtues. Political deliberation assumes a setting that bears epistemic credentials through the fact of criticism. Decisions that have been surrendered to criticism tend to be better. Secondly and thirdly, whilst adversarial deliberation clarifies the positions in terms of comprehension of choices, it fights back the fragmentation of the public sphere (see empirical counterargument in the study of Mutz

2006). This kind of deliberation can also help understanding and clarifying of the political conflicts. And finally, dynamics of arguing for and against establishes respect of the minority. (Manin 2017, 42.)

Increasing the appeal of deliberative representation, deliberative democracy can be seen now to hold a ‘nuanced view of power’ (Curato et al. 2017, 31). Regardless of the limitations imposed by these consequences, political processes can and should embrace deliberation:

Decision-making in deliberative democracy can involve voting, negotiation, or workable agreements that entail agreement on a course or action, but not on the reasons for it. All of these benefit from deliberation, which can involve clarification of the sources of disagreement, and understanding the reasons of others. Rather than consensus, deliberation should recognize pluralism and strive for metaconsensus, which involves mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the different values, preferences, judgments, and discourses held by other participants (ibid.).

All this tells us that deliberative theory is enhancing its empirical applicability with variety of methodological approaches (Curato et al. 2017, 34; Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 18, 75). Such methodological choices should not be fixed to a set of standards that deliberation should meet on each account. Refining and critically adjusting normative ideals vis-à-vis contextual conditions where actual deliberation takes place calls for different approaches to capturing the meaning of deliberative quality (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 18, 75).

Simply, legitimacy cannot be fully accomplished in a single institution or as a unitary set of standards. Instead ‘democratic deliberation should be the *result of several different processes, because different processes motivate different kinds of representatives* to take part’ (Parkinson 2006: 165, emphasis added). Noteworthy here is that here Parkinson, along with Goodin (2005; 2008b), sets in motion the idea of systemic approach to deliberative democracy when he argues that legitimacy should be sought on a macro level rather than on a single, bounded forum. And in terms of decision-making processes he distinguishes the corresponding steps to see ‘how different institutions might make useful contributions to each’ of the function (ibid., 165, on similar accounts Warren 2017).

This argument took full form in the mission statement proposed by a group of leading scholars of deliberative democracy who suggested approaching deliberation from a systemic viewpoint (Mansbridge et al. 2012). Deliberation is dispersed within a deliberative system conceding that deliberation has many functions and motivations within these individual sites. The system operates with distribution of work. Some sites may be more deliberative in reaching deliberative ideals and solutions (ibid., 2–3). The parts of the system, as ‘deliberative ecologies’ (ibid., 6), are interconnected, and interchangeable, also in the way that if deliberation fails in one part, it does not render the whole deliberative process futile on a large scale. Diverted forms of deliberation or otherwise skewed deliberative process in some parts of the system can be still regarded acceptable on the systemic level. For example, protests and other actions that are not considered to entail deliberative credentials can still accrue and spring deliberative outcomes on a large scale. The ‘two wrongs make a right’ type of rationalisation is found only distantly plausible (Bächtiger and Beste 2017, 114), but

worries remain that it is used as an excuse to accommodate and accept accounts of various deliberative sorts for the sake of maintaining the cohesiveness and comprehensiveness of the ‘system’ (Owen and Smith 2015). In other words, nondeliberative acts are not rejected but included in the deliberative system. On the other hand, while the picture of the deliberative system is getting clearer, Dryzek (2016, 211; 2017) reminds that it is better to comprehend the system ‘as being potentially deliberative’ and not to go, as William Smith (2016) does, to search for the boundaries of deliberative systems.

These may sound like accusations of concept-stretching. To what extent can the theory and the concept of deliberation be outstretched before it loses not only its analytical impact, but more importantly its credibility, as intrinsically normative project and become indistinguishable? (Thompson 2008; Elstub 2010; Owen and Smith 2015; Elstub, Ercan, and Mendonça 2016). Also, detaching deliberation from its philosophical prescriptions that underline prospect of preference change, justification and respect causes some to urge that the concept of deliberation ‘should be used with care’ (Steiner 2008, 3). In a more substantial argument, Landmore (2017a), while acknowledging that the linkage between deliberative democracy and representative democracy has been ‘undertheorized’ (ibid., 52), argues that deliberative democracy should ‘dissociate itself’ completely from the paradigm of representative democracy. Fearing that the crisis of representative democracy will drag deliberative democracy down to the pits of non-democratic despair she calls for an ‘open democracy’ that sets the basis of setting up new standards for democratic deliberative associations.

The argument that the systemic approach puts forward is important, as is its critique. However, the distributive idea—that deliberative acts are to be found across various sites and can be sequenced—points out also to division of labour not only with deliberation but also with representation. In the future, projects that set out to outline something similar in terms of systemic representation would be valuable.

Something like a systemic view of representation is not original in the sense that Jonathan Kyuper (2016) has argued for it in the case of non-electoral representatives. Recall, the idea was originally suggested by Pitkin but surprisingly neglected by scholarship that followed her (Disch 2011). In her work Pitkin came to a radical conclusion after considering the implications of democratic politics that in many ways conflict with her forms of representation. She writes suggestively: ‘Political representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the *over-all structure and functioning of the system*, the patterns emerging from the *multiple activities of many people*’ (Pitkin 1967, 221–2, emphasis added).

Presume that we would adopt the systemic approach from deliberative democracy and use that framework to a representative institution. What would come out of it? Based on how the constructivist turn understands the concept of political representation it is possible to comprehend representation in a similar way deliberative theory has done with its central conceptualisation. Naturally, to attain a complete and cohesive system of representation one would need to extend the level of analysis accordingly and acquire new, cross-disciplinary research data. This task would be immense but potentially fruitful. In deliberative

democracy, research on systemic level is slowly emerging after the ‘calls for arms’ initial piece was published in 2012 (on such methodologies see Boswell and Corbett 2017; Holdo 2018). It is hard to encapsulate how a ‘representative system’ would look like as the sites of representation are plenty especially when including the non-electoral representatives, to which Kuyper (2016) focuses in his research. It would also take the concept of representation even further to the theoretical outskirts, thus pushing the boundaries and inducing liminality (Saward 2019) and recursiveness (Mansbridge 2019).

Returning from this minor but relevant sidestep, the distributive element defining deliberativeness allows us to appreciate a site, venue or any such ‘micro-deliberative’ forum from macro perspective. What we can do, for instance, is that we see legislatures as particular *deliberative ecologies* consisting of smaller parts and venues. They take on different tasks and thus entertain various deliberative acts within a deliberative system. This line of thought finally brings us to the third element of deliberativeness proposed by Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 44, 153): *contingency*. Now, what is extremely important to note here is *how the argument for the variety of goals and intentions in deliberation speaks to the idea of the function of representation*. In that representative acts align themselves according to this functional aspiration that also simultaneously orients towards a particular audience. Along these lines, circumstances and conditions where deliberative acts—like opinion-building, reasoning, negotiating, listening and such—take place, should be considered every time when considering the claims of deliberative democracy.

In the case of deliberative democracy these new approaches now underscore similar ideas of functionality and contextuality, something that strongly resonate with deliberative representation. ‘The functional perspective’, proposed by Bächtiger and Beste (2017, 107, emphasis added), introduces a ‘new approach to deliberation—emphasizing that the various forms that deliberation can take should *depend on the goals of that deliberation and the contexts* in which it takes place’.

Importantly, as Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 2, emphasis original) write: ‘Context, too, can alter the *meaning* of deliberative acts’. This point is valuable when considering practices that take place in the political world which handles the dynamics that political representation necessarily invokes. The context-sensitivity of deliberation, analogous now with political representation, starts with the notion that the meaning of deliberative acts is, in a way, proportionate or regulative to the situation where it occurs. The styles or forms of deliberation become meaningful through this context-sensitive understanding (ibid., 40–42). Through this new horizon of deliberative understanding, it is possible to trace how deliberation is ‘*transformed by creative agents, in situ*’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 15, emphasis added). Further, when deliberation is associated with shape-shifting representation, as Bächtiger and Beste (2017, 107) do, representatives endorse various subject-positions for their deliberative performances. Following Rehfeld (2006), Rinne (2016, 31) proposes an idea of functional representation that ‘explains how *representation in a given context can have different aims and functions* that are then *reflected in deliberative performance*’. Deliberation remains part of its context, and some of these contexts are far from the ideal-normative situations generally associated with its democratic applications.’

If it is the case that much rests on the capacities of representatives as deliberative participants to alter the meaning of deliberative performances in the interplay of representative contexts then ‘we should desire creative political actors who can engage in deliberation when deeded and where contextually possible and appropriate’ (Bächtiger and Beste 2017, 110). Moreover, the motivation embedded in reciprocity or in any attempts to reach out toward the other interlocutor, signalling for ideals of respect, recognition of autonomy and such, appear very different let us say in everyday deliberation (Mansbridge 1999a) than in a polarised political negotiation. Also, when the meaning of these deliberative acts alters, a shift, a transformation may occur hence changing the course of the deliberative process. But then again, they may not. My idea of deliberative representation meets these claims about the contingency, distribution and performativity of deliberation.

3 Methodology

3.1 Elite interviews with members of parliament

The data used in this research consists of 60 elite interviews with MPs. For background, five interviews with committee secretaries were conducted. The interviews are organised in three sets collected between 2008 and 2016. The last interview set, collected in two separate rounds, is specifically for the present study. All interviewees were promised full anonymity. I will introduce the interviews next, but more detailed information can be found in the Appendix.

The first set of interviews were collected by professor Anne Maria Holli and researcher Milja Saari on the committees of the Finnish parliament. The results are published in *Gender in Expert Consultations of the Parliament of Finland* (2009). Altogether 15 semi-structured interviews with MPs (and three with committee secretaries) were conducted by Holli and Saari during 2008. The interviewed MPs were selected from three committees: the Legal Affairs Committee, the Employment and Equality Committee and the Social Affairs and Welfare Committee. The main focus in the semi-structured interviews was on gender issues in the committee (committee assignments by the parliamentary party groups, effects of gender balance in committee deliberation), internal rankings of committees (which committees MPs are most eager to join, and which are least popular), and selection and diversity of external committee experts (see also Holli 2012). Overall, the interviews relate to the deliberative culture of committees and tasks of MPs regarding informational capacities and use of expert knowledge. The responses regarding gender balance and diversity were included for the present study. In the analysis, interviews belonging to this set are marked with the Roman numeral I. Only the interview transcripts were made available instead of the recordings therefore the length of the interviews is given in number of transcript pages. The overall number of pages in this interview set (excluding committee secretary interviews) is 486 sheets (font 12; spacing 1,15), where the average length of interview transcript is 27 pages long.

The second set of interviews were conducted by Kyösti Pekonen for the project *The role of talk in the Parliament of Finland and the problem of representation* in which I was involved as a research assistant. Most of the MPs interviewed were members of the same parliamentary committee (kept confidential). In total 15 MPs and two committee secretaries were interviewed. The interviews were carried out by me during winter 2008–2009. In total, 18 hours of interviews were recorded (excluding the two committee secretary interviews). The average length of one interview was approximately one hour and 10 minutes, but they ranged from about 40 minutes to one hour and 40 minutes.

The focus was mainly on committee work. The semi-structured interviews were based on the themes of the Discourse Quality Index (Steiner et al. 2004), with questions on the themes of content and level of justifications, showing respect and demonstrating reciprocity, as well as general questions about participation and the working atmosphere in the committees. The interviews give a glimpse into previously uncovered territory of what goes

on inside the Finnish parliamentary committees and how committee reports are drafted in practical terms. The interviews collected for this study were part of the research data in the Finnish monograph *Talk in Eduskunta (Puhe eduskunnassa)* by Pekonen (2011). In the analysis, citations and quotations from these interviews are marked with the Roman numeral II.

The third and final set of interviews was conducted in two rounds: in summer of 2015 and 2016. In the first round, I interviewed 16 MPs, all except one of whom had given up or lost their seat in the general parliamentary elections in April 2015. There were two reasons for choosing former members of parliament. The first reason relates to acknowledgment of some particulars in conducting elite interviews. Currently serving MPs tend to be busy, reaching them might be more difficult than reaching those who are not anymore serving as MPs. The second, more important reason also relates to elite interviews. Since elites, by virtue of their status and profession, have discreet information that they might prefer to withhold, I decided that interviewing former members might mitigate the problem. The decisive reason for my choice, however, was that former representatives might be more willing to reflect on the dynamics of parliamentary work and especially its less-positive aspects. Simultaneously, I was interested in exploring the idea of understanding ‘representing’ as a practice tied to wielding social power (Rehfeld 2017; 2018). When a person no longer has the status of MP, do they no longer represent, in Rehfeld’s sense of that term? Whatever ex-representatives do in their private lives can be taken as a token of representation (perhaps in the form of macro-level institutional representation of some sort), for which reason they might still be able to initiate notions of representing.

Conducting this kind of ‘exit-interview’ turned out to be a good decision. Not only had these former MPs more time in their hands to participate in the study, they also showed a lot of dedication in terms of reflection and concession. Interviews in this set were long: on average a bit less than two hours. The shortest one was a test interview with an MP in office (bit over an hour) but otherwise they ranged from one hour and 20 minutes to a staggering three-hour marathon. In total 31 hours and 10 minutes were recorded.

As said, the third interview set was collected in two parts. To secure the anonymity of the interviewees, the two parts are merged as one (under the heading in Roman numeral III) and the dates of the interviews are withheld. Also the coded order of the interviews is shuffled (1–29). After the initial analysis of the collected interviews in the 2015, I decided to supplement the research data with more interviews. For such, I wanted to include MPs that are currently in office at the time of interviewing them in the summer of 2016. I ended up conducting 14 more interviews out of which one was not a sitting member of the parliament and who specifically wanted to appear in this research non-anonymously (perhaps most known former Speaker of the House, Riitta Uosukainen). In comparison to the interviews done a year earlier these were shorter but still considerable in length: on average one hour and 15 minutes. In total 17 hours were recorded, and the shortest interview lasted 30 minutes and the longest an hour and 50 minutes.

The themes in these interviews were roughly divided into five sections. First, the motivations for becoming and acting as an MP were asked about, before turning, second, to the interviewee’s particular experiences and reflections on the practicalities of holding the office. Third, I wanted to determine whether one’s representing is differentiated in the

forums within the Parliament, and what functions they entail for one's practices. Perspectives and opinions about the role of the media were also inquired about. Fourth, I wanted to specify some aspects of committee work that were not explored in the second set of interviews (Pekonen 2011).

Among such themes were compromise-building and coordination with parliamentary party groups. Questions about grounds and possibilities for cooperation, in particular in terms of coalition government dynamics, supplemented the interviews collected in the first set (Holli and Saari 2009). Finally, I extended the themes to the role of Parliament as a representative institution, something that also helped highlight some of the frictions with party democracy undermining the role of parliaments. Both these two last interview rounds included a short questionnaire to the MPs, something I will discuss shortly.

It is helpful to discuss briefly what it means to conduct what the literature calls 'elite interviews'. I find it valuable to outline the discussion through my own observations and experiences having myself interviewed 45 Finnish MPs (the interviews marked II-III). In general, all interview methods rely on the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. Some types of interviews, such as 'in-depth interviews' (Aalto 2001), are more sensitive to these interactions, since typically lengthy interview experiences allow sharing of information that can be difficult for the interviewee to discuss. The defining feature of elite interviews, of course, is that elites hold higher positions of power than most others. Distinguishing and defining who the elites actually are is a question that has not been extensively explored or theorised (Harvey 2011). For present purposes, it is appropriate to define elites simply: a person belongs to an elite when he or she holds a position and status of exclusion that is societally and politically relevant. In the case of elected members of national parliament, there is less room for misconceptions about such positions of power.

The success of interview methods depends on the amount and level of interaction and communication that can be achieved; and in the case of elites, the first challenge is initiating this interaction. Some researchers, such as Goldstein (2002), have discussed the challenge of gaining access to elites. In the Finnish context, this is less daunting than in some other countries, judging from the fact that almost all the MPs who were approached and subsequently interviewed by myself responded very quickly. Only a small number of MPs who were approached declined to be interviewed. The invitations were also designed to establish trust and the credibility of the research project, as well as outlining the basic themes for the proposed interviews (Mykkänen 2001a). The invitations also emphasised that the anonymity of the interviewees would be ensured (see also Goldstein 2002).

As mentioned, research interview settings differ significantly from more everyday forms of social interaction, regardless of how relaxed or chatty the atmosphere turns out to be during the course of the interview. What most obviously distinguishes interviews from other kinds of social interaction is the motivation of the researcher to glean specific information from the interviewee. This setting automatically forms a distinct frame within the social interaction, one that is hierarchical in nature. As mentioned, the motivation of conducting research interviews in the first place draws elementarily from the respective research and its objectives. Often, the interviewee is in effect an informant. This is especially true in the Finnish case, since not many of the practices that take place behind closed doors (in committees and PPGs) have been explored in the literature.

It is crucial to the success of interviews that enough time be reserved for advance preparation. Such preparations include doing background searches about the organisation or institutions (in addition to being familiar with the research literature), while at the same time carefully formulating the interview question framework and deciding on the order of the questions (Leech 2002, 666), and other such matters. Understanding the context in which the interviewee operates in is important, something that also helps when interviewing those who may be wary of or especially sensitive to certain questions or approaches (Woliver 2002).

Bearing in mind the information-seeking incentive in the context of elite interviews, the interviewed people usually are the best experts on the subject, as they also have access to undisclosed information. Warranted by that elite position enables the research to obtain, at best, valuable notions and perspectives that may have larger societal implications. Because elites often hold exclusive and discreet information and experiences, they may not want to share it. Here, we return to the feature of interaction that is essential in any research interview setting. However, with elites, it needs to be recognised that most often elites are also professionals in public relations, and experts in arguing and convincing. The validity and reliability of research interviews can be severely hindered if the interviewer were to 'fall under the spell' of the interviewee. Open-ended questions typical to semi-structured interviews always entail the danger that the interviewer loses control of the interview situation especially if the interviewed elite member is persuasive and articulate. (Berry 2002, 681.) Doing MP interviews for this study, I also came to realise the complex dynamics of their incentive to keep up appearances as parliamentary representatives, and on the other hand their sincere willingness to engage with me and this research. While they may feel obliged to take part in various studies and surveys, many elites, especially elected representatives, most likely consider the PR aspect as well.

Sometimes, the MPs tried to 'charm' me by their smooth and jovial behaviour and smart answers. Therefore, recognising the hierarchy issue—that elites are elite because of their status, good manners and expert skills—is prevalent when conducting elite interviews (Mykkänen 2001a, 117). Many have received media training (Harvey 2011, 438). Presumably this is true with those interviewed MPs who have acted as cabinet ministers or party leaders. To diminish the potential threat of getting mainly glossy and analytically poor answers (such as 'democracy must be defended'), being pushed a certain agenda (Mykkänen 2001a, 118) and falling into the unequal power trap, interviewers need to be well prepared on many levels. First, a researcher has at least theoretical knowledge of the field in which they are conducting the interviews, and perhaps also practical experience. These experiences and prior knowledge can be used as assets. Referring to some piece of knowledge that may not be available to outsiders can create a sense of companionship with the respondent, but may also lead to a higher standard of responses when the researcher is able to specify and clarify a response in the moment (*ibid.*, 111). Here I personally benefitted from working in the Parliament of Finland in the early 2000s.

Semi-structured interviews also allow the researcher to deviate from the question frame to explore where the interviewee is taking them. Going further along the uncharted grounds and asking for analytical elaborations is called 'probing' (Berry 2002). It entails striking a delicate balance between open-ended and close-ended questions, as elites don't usually like

to be confined as to how they can answer (Harvey 2011, 434–35). But again, consideration about whether or not encourage the interviewee to continue relies on the researcher's expertise and advance preparation (Berry 2002).

Notwithstanding the sincere willingness of trying to help an outsider to understand life within a representative institution and practices accordingly, some themes were found sensitive, as already discussed above. Some themes are bound by internal norms: there are certain 'house rules' about how certain matters are to be discussed or not discussed, as is the case here. To this latter point, the initial idea was to set this research as a case study by focusing on a few carefully selected legislative bills. These bills would have been exemplary on cases where coalition party dynamics, such as cohesion and discipline, were put to the test. There would have been many features of what can be seen as decision-making paradoxes, overlapping and conflicting obligations and expectations which could have easily been tapped into by the interviewed MPs. After trying this out in the first few interviews in 2015, it turned out that the case study idea will fail. MPs, even those who were not in office anymore, were noticeably uneasy and reserved with the questions. As a researcher and interviewer in that situation I soon realised that norms of disclosure hold even after some time has passed. And if enough time would've passed, the details and memories of the exact legislative process could be fading leading to an obscure and imprecise study.

Other sensitivities and taboo subjects were detected also in the interviews by Holli and Saari (I), as well as by Pekonen (II). Both these semi-structured interviews contained questions about participation and attendances to committee meetings, from which respondents did their best to squirm away from replying. Also, elected representatives seem very hesitant to talk badly of others. This may come as a surprise, as politicians are often perceived as self-seeking Machiavellian characters. One explanation of this hesitancy could be that tightly exclusive groups, such as elites, out of courtesy or general loyalty do not feel comfortable criticising practitioners of the same profession behind their backs. As I will discuss in the analysis, being considered as trustworthy is one of the best currencies an MP can acquire. On the other hand, interestingly, many also avoided mentioning people by name in a positive instance or context. Many times I encouraged a hesitating interviewee by explicitly stating that I simply wanted to understand various incentives for representing. To overcome some sensitivities or taboo issues such as party discipline and other internal PPG-related topics, a useful interview technique was to formulate questions in a way that takes for granted such conditions tacitly; instead of asking, for example, 'does your PPG have party discipline?' or 'does your PPG endorse sanctions as a disciplining measure?', the preferred approach was to ask 'what kind of experiences do you have with differing from your own PPG on some issue, and what consequences did this have?' However, questions involving significant presumptions should be used sparingly (Leech 2002, 666).

Another, practical procedure relating to overcoming such sensitivities that I used in both sets was a simple survey format sheet with 14 articulated claims (presented in the Appendix), asking interviewees to reply to them on a scale from 1 to 10 depending how strongly they disagree or agree, respectively, with each claim. The claims were purposely blunt (as in 'party discipline is a necessity' or 'members of parliament are estranged from

the general public'),²³ something that received criticism from the MPs. The purpose was not, as I explained, to argue that the claims would bear truth-base or that I would make a quantitative study (with a small number of subjects). The survey proved to be useful for paving the way to the relevant themes, and—depending on how knowledgeable the respondent was of the topics—I sometimes administered the survey exercise early on and sometimes at the end. With difficult themes it is usually advisable to place them somewhere in the middle of the interview (Harvey 2011, 437). Returning to a tricky theme at a later point in the interview is also useful, even though it might be unwise to leave them right to the end and risk getting relevant information too late in the course of interviews (Bailer 2014, 175).

²³ In the survey I also included the famous caption by Edmund Burke's Speech to the Electorates of Bristol (1774); the MPs generally felt it resonated with them. All found the caption intriguing also because it offered many points of departure that each reflected from their own position. In hindsight, it would have been useful to have given more time to dwell on this issue.

3.2 Interpretative approach to parliamentary practices of representation and deliberation

What defines representation, and how can one operationalise a phenomenon that resists many of the labels and descriptions that are bestowed upon it? Moreover, how can representation be coded? Answers to these questions rely on the newer understanding and conceptualising of representation that takes us beyond electoral, interest-centred accounts.

The empirical work provided in this research is illustrative and descriptive regarding the context of representation. It will steer away from the ‘ethical-evaluative paradigm’ that is often applied when studying parliamentary deliberations (Schäfer 2017). This evaluative approach also tends to embrace the individual level, thus making assumptions about individuals’ motivations and aspirations. Rather, the contexts of representation should be recognised—that deliberations always take place in a time and place, ridden and combined with implicit and explicit rules, institutional and inter-subjective expectations as well as actor-centred aspirations and motivations. As quoted earlier, contexts change the meaning of deliberative acts (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 2).

An alternative approach that steers away from the ethical-evaluative paradigm supports Schäfer’s proposal for a contextualised systemic approach. His theoretical model has three features: conditions (‘institutional context’), processes (as ‘practices of communication’) and functions (‘integration–contestatation’). Instead of the institutional context that describes positional and discursive logics in roles, rules and resources (Schäfer 2017, 426), I differentiate in more detail what the contexts could look like, also in a way that surpasses the institutional setting. However, the institutional effect is included in what I would call the spatial context. We can expect different tasks from different venues, as long as we distribute them accordingly.

Obviously, institutional and especially parliamentary procedures are temporal matters. This is implied in Schäfer’s (ibid.) idea of institutional context where the rules ascribe to ‘guidelines for situational contexts’. The idea behind the temporal context follows the idea of seeing deliberation sequenced, thus something that is conveyed as dynamics of representation. Parliamentary procedures are prime examples of this. For this reason, the temporal quality nods also to political artistry and mastery of playing with time, as Palonen (2003) has shown. Finally, and more centrally, I locate the functional context that also draws from institutional context but is not bound by it: I claim that a more nuanced understanding is rendered when representative practices (of which deliberation is the most central) are also viewed from the functional perspective.

There are more to the functions than in the dyadic setting of contestation and integration in Schäfer’s model: that representatives are incentivised to challenge and criticise political opponents while simultaneously also seeking compromise and cooperation. The same dyad is present in the positional and discursive logic within the institutional context. These functional features may correctly reflect the internal orientations of parliamentary deliberation that balances between disagreements and agreements. However, when associating deliberation more explicitly with representation, but remaining within the institutional context, we also find other functions that manifest in practical actions that representatives engage in. These practices may linger somewhere in between demonstration

of adversary and constructive capabilities, but they are often connected to interpersonal practices to which the legislature sets the backdrop. Because political actors show both, adversarial and constructive capabilities, in their line of work we must also include in our analysis some social features. These social aspects may also turn to deliberative resources that may convey political currency but also to attain deliberative ends. These include different levels of compromise and even consensus, clarification of conflicts, as well as empowerment and sentiments of legitimacy.

When analysing the interviews the features of contexts, spatial, temporal and functional, were coded into the Atlas.ti programme. Code groups for contexts were thus formed. The main spatial contexts used for the spatial code were the parliamentary party group, the committee and the plenary, all coded individually under the 'spatial' heading. Other referred spatial contexts were the informal venues of hallways, cafeteria and, for example, the sauna where the so-called 'sauna committee' convenes. The spatial codes operated as a sort of background variable, and therefore many of the code entries in Atlas.ti include this spatial code (for example, the plenary spatial context code had over 200 entries).

There were less than 100 entries in the temporal context code, significantly less than for the two other context codes. The entries entailed descriptions regarding the temporal ordering of things, as well as the game that is played with them within a legislature. This coding was also used when MPs observed or discussed time, for example how some aspect in their line of work has changed over time.

The functional code is more varied. Evidently, that became the main theme through which the proposed contexts emerged. The functional codes were the ones that were merged and redefined during course of analysis. Following Rehfeld (2006), the idea of functionality defines the kind of representative activity a representative is engaged in, consequent also to his view of representing (Rehfeld 2018). It allows us to grasp the question of what actions constitute representation. I began coding the functional context in a detailed manner, detecting descriptions in the interviews through an interpretation of what is to be done or what is being done in each situation. For example, I used codes such as "functional: committee report", "functional: knowledge" and "functional: opposition functions".

To provide a backdrop to the context codes, and especially the functional codes, I formulated three additional code groups: institutional, political and social. These pin down the corresponding structures that state some of the restrictions and incentives that may affect the given activity. They were valuable in supplementing the similar, yet undefined features already included in the functional context. The combination of these was crucial in articulating the contexts of representation that began to surface through the rounds of recursive and re-iterated analysis. Importantly, the contexts argued in this study are not exhaustive but merely illustrative of plausible contexts that are at play when looking at deliberative representation. Each of the "structural" code groups of institutional, political and social were further collapsed into more detailed codes. For example, there codes such as "social: informal norms", "social: networks", "political: sanctions", "political: party dynamics" and "institutional: procedures", just to give an impression of them. In addition to these, I used a code group for roles, for example, for tracing the roles of committee chairs, senior MPs and head of the committee group (*valiokuntavastaava* in Finnish).

When there is an interest to understand how actors give meaning to their actions, the interpretative approach becomes available (Bevir and Rhodes 2006; Geddes and Rhodes 2018). At the outset, the claim that interpretative research starts with a puzzle applies to the research paradigm of parliamentary deliberation thus relevant in this project as well. Indeed, there is friction between prior expectations and observation (Yanow 2006b; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). It is reasonable to expect that representatives, in their deliberations, entertain other action logics that do not speak to the strategic orientations (see e.g. Bessette 1994; Bächtiger 2014; Bächtiger and Beste 2017). In short, parliamentary deliberations are not unitary and neither are the actors who construct and give meanings to them. Deliberative representation in the contexts of representation help mapping out the shifts in the practices and functions, therefore mitigating the puzzle. Moreover, the idea that the understanding of the phenomenon develops as the analytical process progresses is the one of the key arguments of interpretative approach. Consequently, although the original puzzle may be resolved, new ones appear (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 27).

To develop a study that focuses on actors who inhabit representative institutions, such as parliaments, requires a standpoint that is attentive to situated agency. Recently, interpretative and ethnographical methodologies have emerged that come to the aid of normatively oriented research. What has been advocated as ‘ethnographical sensitivity’ sustains that goal, when indeed, ‘trying to understand practices of politics’ as they ‘actually exist’ (Herzog and Zacka 2017, 764). According to the authors, such sensitivity does not require fieldwork, something that is associated with ethnographic research, but engaging with interviews meets similar purpose and requires only the kind of ‘frame of mind’ (ibid., 765). Similarly, Saward (2019, 286) has recently argued that democratic politics happens every day and in varied practices embedded in myriad interactions. This position was already defended and its democratic underpinnings stated in landmark studies, for example by Mansbridge (1983) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996).

The ethnographical sensitivity tied to these claims and values, to be compared to the extent that the empirical meets the requirement of the theory, are relevant. Insight into the construction of meaning through the practices that MPs adopt, for example, and the normative undergird spelled out in institutional rules and orders, are elements that need to be considered. Lending such sensitivity to actions that are often routinized, like many parliamentary practices are, permits new readings and interpretations to these accounts. On these assumptions, parliamentary deliberations become less and less ritualised (as the accusation often goes about the lack of deliberative orientation). Therefore, the institutional conditions set out through the positional versus the discursive frame is central but too rigid, as is the functions of integration and contestation too (Schäfer 2017). Parliamentary deliberations entail other horizons than just communicative practices that orient either towards adversarial or the deliberative, discursive side. Henceforth, additional layers and dimensions are added when endorsing the kind of ethnographic take that grants new meanings and insights to the role of parliamentary deliberations.

Notably, the definition of parliamentary deliberation can also be taken out of the institutional premises (that rules and orders guide them) and capture it in action, for example in social interactions reinforced by deliberation. Doing this requires a certain openness from the researcher: ‘a readiness to be surprised by ruptures’ as well as ‘to abandon one’s tacit

assumptions and pre-conceived ideas' (Herzog and Zacka 2017, 777). Endorsing this position helped me deal with the three separate interview datasets introduced in the previous section. My theoretical treatment of representation as a praxis, as something that is being conveyed, communicated and constituted in the activities by representatives, allowed me to tie together valuable insights embedded in interviews. Characteristic of the interpretative approach is the tendency towards *abductive* rather than deductive analysis, where the process goes back and forth between the empirical and theoretical aspects recursively and iteratively (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 28–29).

Drawing together the multiplicity of activities and actors in varied locations and context there is a push towards 'interpretative parliamentary studies' suggested recently by Marc Geddes and R.A.W. Rhodes (2018). This change has been initiated by the observation that 'legislative studies has been curiously immune to theoretical or empirical innovations found elsewhere in political science' (Geddes and Rhodes 2018, 88). While this study offered on these pages does not locate itself in the tradition of legislative or parliamentary studies, it still does speak to them in a way that might curate some theoretical implications, thus reorienting future enquiries into the legislative setting. As argued, wider theoretical grasp on dynamics of political representation can achieve bringing new perspectives to the traditional institutionalist approaches on how parliaments operate. This research paradigm requires taking 'seriously the way in which political actors interpret the world around them' (Geddes and Rhodes 2018, 94), which therefore calls for 'decentring' the concepts and interpretations that are available.

Such a decentred approach is suitable for studying how representative actors interpret their roles, and has implications not only for accountability in representative democracy but also since those interpretations affect MPs' priorities and consequent behaviour (*ibid.*, 99). Similar attention should be given to practices by representatives, that can become basic units of analysis and thus capable of adding 'much greater nuance and depth to accounts of parliamentary scrutiny' (*ibid.*, 100; see e.g. studies of Loat and MacMillan 2014; Crewe 2015). Namely, authors suggest turning to semi-structured interviews, among others, as promising empirical methods in attaining the goal for a deeper texture in legislative studies (Geddes and Rhodes 2018, 102).

4 Deliberative representation in parliament

This chapter presents the context-dependent empirical analysis of deliberative representation. As the main argument of this study claims, deliberative practices take shape in a dynamic interplay with contexts, hence I will first describe the dominant contexts of representation, which will be called affirmative (discussed in 4.1.), operative (4.2.) and performative (4.3.). These contexts do not exhaust, if any would, all contexts of representation available in any legislature, but, as I will show, they are well justified given the way representation unfolds within a parliament.

I will look at deliberative representation and the way it plays out in the three contexts through elements which relate to different aspects of deliberative representation I find relevant. They concern, first, the democratic functions that representatives serve while deliberating. Each deliberative act prescribes to different deliberative expectations. Consequently, when deliberation in one setting is “*appropriate behavior*” it is ‘*not feasible in another*’ (Goodin 2008b, 194, emphasis added). Second, I will look at the overall deliberative process in which deliberative representation takes part and concentrate on features regarding understanding and hearing, following Urbinati’s (2006, 46) idea of ‘deliberative speech’. Third, I take this as referring to ‘open-mindedness’ in the way that relates to the transformative character of deliberative processes. Openness to the transformative nature of deliberation is now seen as sufficient (Bächtiger & Parkinson 2019, 22). Fourth, to dissect the deliberative process, I pinpoint how opinion-making is affected and conditioned by the context. Since deliberative representation bases on the idea that while representation can be understood through various activities and practices, it therefore also concerns human interactions and communications. For this reason, they are relevant for the exercise of judgment which forms the backdrop of the initial idea of deliberative representation. For this purpose, I have included a fifth element, one that is derived straightforwardly from deliberative theory, namely authenticity. To what extent are the opinions, perspectives and reasons revealed to the participants? Importantly, authenticity as an element through which deliberative representation is explored does not imply a moral standing. Instead, tying the dynamics of information related deliberative practices to contexts can help understand legislators’ context-dependent reasons for not being inclined to sharing all the information they have or deliberate sincerely.

This brings us to the last observed element that help locate deliberative representation in action: deliberative mode. Even though I have systematically argued throughout this research that the quality of deliberation is not of primary importance I found it relevant to include some reference to how deliberation occurs. Calling styles as modes takes also into account the element regarding incentives that representatives endorse. They relate to the specific functions spelled out in the contexts that overall align differently with strategic, partisan, expressive and deliberative aspirations. In the end of this introductory section the reader will find a table summarizing the different elements of deliberative practices discussed here and which are to be fully elaborated in the empirical analysis that follows.

Next, let us look at the contexts of representation that form the outline for the analysis in a more detailed manner. The adjective *affirmative* describes practices that refer to validating or confirming; asserting something as valid or confirmed; and finally showing of

expressing a *strong belief* in or dedication. The adjective, affirmative, means asserting a fact; relating to positive (as in affirmative approach); and finally, favouring or supporting a proposition or motion. These definitions resonate with contexts where representatives actively seek support from each other, also of emotional kind. I will call this the affirmative context.

As argued many times, parliamentary deliberation is not a unitary entity. Regardless of its essential processual features—that in legislatures deliberation is reserved and controlled by institutional aspects of time, place and form— it can still be seen to contain certain fluidity. Moreover, parliamentary deliberation serves many purposes: in myriad deliberative moments while deliberating, MPs also make sense of each other. They make judgments on their capacities and abilities in order to form an understanding not only about legislative issues, but also of *each other*. It should be remembered that deliberation is as much about arguing and justifying as it is about listening and understanding. It can entail a transformative property but also a reflective and affirmative one: becoming certain about e.g. a position or a perspective that can go against another position or perspective. Affirmative context also reveals the degree of self-sufficiency of actors: willingness to learn and hear out others' points assumes a relatively high degree of open-mindedness. It concerns opinions not fully formed or in the making through reflection and contestation. In order to live up to these expectations, a certain level of sincerity is expected from the participants. What I call the *expressive-deliberative*²⁴ mode contributes to managing collective actions as in allowing coordination to take place. The affirmative context will be presented first in the analysis because many of the most profound reflective activities belong to that context. Also, this order of presentation helps demonstrate how deliberation is 'sequenced' (Goodin 2005, 2008b; Bächtiger et al. 2010).

Operative context describes parliamentary activities and practices when representatives set out to work. This is often the non-visible side of parliamentary work for which many MPs crave more recognition and appreciation. Here, democratic politics, the way it takes place in legislatures, is made manageable and goal-oriented. The latter feature is embedded in the function of representation that practically disassembles and orients the representative activities towards something. Also, the institutional emphasis on this is significant: especially when considering how the committee system facilitates the practical operative measures that bestow resources such as expertise on representatives. When it comes to individual representatives, efficacy and decisiveness are important. In short, representatives want to 'get things done'. To get things done requires the ability and knowledge to navigate within the institution. Democratic politics is often driven by disagreement and, therefore, the operative context highlights the urgency of compromise (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, Rostbøll and Scavenius 2017). It means that representatives need skills to work and negotiate with others. Aspiration for agreement and negotiation are often reflected through institutional positions and 'roles'. They give the actors resources when it comes to managing deliberative representation, but they also limit the way representatives can go about doing it.

²⁴ I thank Mark E. Warren for suggestions for the naming of the earlier versions of deliberative modes.

Especially the operative context resonates with governing and campaigning dynamics discussed by Gutmann and Thompson (2012) as the basic action modes of legislative practices. In a well-functioning democracy, both are needed: agreements and decisions need to be made, and they need to be contested and debated in and between elections. In my overall treatment of deliberative representation, however, these governing and campaigning functions are translated also into other representative functions than compromising and other agreement-seeking procedures like ‘deliberative negotiation’ (Warren & Mansbridge 2013, see also Naurin and Reh 2018). The operative context hosts a *strategic-deliberative* mode of deliberation, which requires a certain level of adaptiveness when it comes to orienting towards decision-making in legislative matters. This recalls the fact that representatives’ opinions may be set in advance, but they are not always carved in stone, and as such, representatives are sometimes sensitive to the reasoning of others. Moreover, when we add the role of expert-knowledge prevailing especially in the committee stages this consideration makes the deliberative process not predetermined but rather a contingent one. Positional logics can yield to such epistemic reasoning.

Performative context outlines the prevailing idea in democratic politics that all operations, representative or otherwise, need to be presented. This is the underlying ethos of the performative context. However, it is not only about ‘presentability’ of representative acts. Although they get articulated through well-defined stances as well as the general rigidity in showcasing open-mindedness towards adversaries, the performative context also relates to a more principled, inherent performativity that brings forth more clearly the question of audience. Performative context carves out a sphere where representation of ‘what has been done’ is being ‘shown’ (Saward 2017). Despite the negative connotation of falsifiability and adversity in political deliberation prevalent in public forums, performative context entails a commitment to democratic principles of publicity and accountability that ground legitimatisation of representative rule. Performative context underlines the elements of deliberative representation that acknowledges how politics is about justifying decisions, contesting discursive frames and providing avenues for new ideas and agendas. For this reason, I propose we call the prevailing style of deliberation in the performative context the *expressive-partisan* mode of deliberation.

The distributive or sequenced idea of deliberation (Goodin 2005; 2008b; Bächtiger and others 2010) forms the broad theoretical background in the analysis of deliberative representation that I approach through the affirmative, operative and performative contexts. The approach is supported by the timely view that deliberative theory makes ‘a common mistake’ if it tries to “box” specific situations and institutional arrangements into fixed action logics’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 42). Curiously, even though Goodin briefly mentions legislative committees he leaves them out from his exploration of sequenced deliberative tasks. I will fill this gap and place most of my discussion on the operative context into the committee stage. Within a legislature, I argue that the governing functions as ‘getting things done’ also find home in the committee room. The affirmative context handles the caucus room deliberation, which in this case translates into parliamentary party group meetings. Finally, the performative context mainly circulates around the plenary that is dominated by the campaigning and partisan oriented functions. Downside of these neat typologies is that real-life accounts are much messier. But the basic outline is applicable and

aligned: when representatives talk about the many trade-offs and contingencies that they are bound to meet and negotiate with others (and inside one's own head), the proposed contexts provide an analytical frame through which these actions can be described and explained.

Finally, the analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates the interconnectedness of these contexts. Approaching deliberative representation through contexts allows capturing the “flow” of deliberative processes within a legislature. As such, it provides much needed understanding of institutional deliberation. Representative contexts are not only linked to spatial (i.e. public–private) or institutional (differences in political and electoral system) references, but also to functional considerations: what is representation expected to ‘do’ in each context? While the performative context will restate much of what is already known about pejorative strategic orientation of political deliberation, many important legislative processes escape from this rigid view but are then captured by the affirmative and operative contexts. What is regarded as strategic use of deliberation may echo or resonate differently in these other contexts. It also tells us how the institutional settings guide deliberation in different ways. At the same time, we can expect a kind of ‘path dependency’ to manifest between the spatial contexts—something that representatives utilise in different ways depending on their purposes and aims. Intentions that are not necessarily deliberative in the first place ‘can produce dynamics that are deliberative in function’, as Warren (2007, 278, cf. Bächtiger et al. 2010, 44) nicely puts it. It is important to acknowledge that while contexts can accommodate different kinds of political practices (deliberation being one of them) (Warren 2017, 39), *not all actors use them for same purposes*. Often, the most interesting accounts arise when a representative interprets contexts and situations differently and breaks away from what is usually expected.

For the time being, the analytical dimensions of deliberative representation can be summarized in the following table:

		Context of representation		
		Affirmative context	Operative context	Performative context
Elements of deliberative representation	Functions of deliberative representation	Reflection and contestation Opinion-formulation and articulation Cooperation and coordination	Reasoning Decision-making Negotiation and compromise	Justification Argue for and against (<i>pro et contra</i>) Claim-making and articulating
	Deliberative process	Open	(Contingent)	Closed
	a) (Level of) 'open-mindedness'	Deliberative	Adaptive	Tenacity
	b) Opinion-making	Not defined	Defined	Well-defined
	c) (Level of) authenticity	(Expected) sincerity	Strategic openness	Negotiated (excl. truthfulness)
	(Major) deliberative mode	Expressive – deliberative	Strategic – deliberative	Expressive – partisan

Table 1. Deliberative representation in parliament

4.1 Affirmative context

Affirmative context enables us to get a grip on the character of judgment and the part it plays in legislative practices. It makes it possible to pay attention to the uncertainties of policy-making and to show the appropriate discretion by also allowing unwavering devotion and duty to shine through; politics, after all, is a passionate sport. This context is also the domain of moral and value-based convictions, and of questions of conscience to which party discipline does not apply. The process of affirmation entails taking a deliberative position most clearly when it involves scrutiny of how opinions are formed. It concerns what Goodin (2000) describes as ‘deliberation within’—that is, weighing matters in one’s own mind. This is not inertia but rather its opposite, as it affirms the inclusion of others by acknowledging and recognizing perspectives and opinions of others. It also indicates open-mindedness when it comes to considering the value of these other opinions.

The affirmative context of deliberative representation leads us to consider a less-noticed perspective of democratic representation, which is that in specific legislative settings representative actors also represent *to* each other as well as representing each other. This notion allows us to approach legislative behaviour and parliamentary deliberation from an alternative and somewhat provocative perspective. What this indicates, and what affirmative context offers up for analysis, is that deliberative representation is a constructivist praxis rendered to others for judgment. As such, the idea of deliberative representation affirms and assumes the presence of other people whom one deliberates with, and whose contributions to the deliberation one listens to. Moreover, deliberative representation articulates an interpersonal setting, despite also involving what Habermas called ‘ideal role-taking’. Put briefly, it forces a person to put themselves in another person’s place, figuratively speaking, as an imaginative operation that also paves the way for virtues such as empathy and respect.

If one wishes to think in temporal sequences, affirmative context often precedes operative and performative contexts. However, contexts are overlapping and inclusive in the sense that in their work members of parliament make use of and toggle between the features available within the various contexts each according to their own best, and sometimes worst, judgment and discretion. The way I treat affirmative context is perhaps most central in looking at individual capabilities and capacities for reflection. For this reason, in this subchapter I will discuss the role of expertise and committee memberships, which both bring forward particular epistemic credentials. As such, this knowledge and the facilitated interactions highlight the functions of affirmation, validation and accommodation. And from an institutional perspective, we know that this kind of reflective character of legislatures is not only functionally, but also spatially dispersed. As I will show, parliamentary party groups (PPGs) are central actors within this context, emphasising the need to get everybody on board.

Even though rationalist and liberal approaches take strategic and interest maximising orientation to democratic politics as their starting point, not everything will be acceptable: “offers”, in relation to bargaining or other kinds of collective interactions, can be turned down. The affirmative context addresses deliberative interactions, but also collective action

problems, from the perspective of how political opinions and viewpoints in some cases can be rather non-existent or nascent.

In democratic politics and legislation, deliberation reifies choosing, or at least limiting the available options and reducing the amount of contingency. Deliberation is a matter of which opinions and positions are taken after they have been brought up, argued and considered, preferably in an equal and balanced manner. In some sense, representation in its simplest, liberal sense can be argued by taking a shortcut and avoid contingencies that remain with deliberation (Przeworski 1998; Shapiro 1999). Through the novelty of affirmative context, it becomes possible to theoretically satisfy the understanding about deliberative representation by offering analysis on how collective dynamics, on one hand, offer support to the representative. On the other hand, it imposes a considerable strain – something that every MP needs to decipher and come in terms within their own work. The final subsection will discuss the paradoxes of decision-making in more detail.

i Halls and walls

I want to begin with something that may seem odd, by explicitly acknowledging the spatial feature in representative context as a physical structure. Democratic theory, often situates discussions about discursive engagements in the virtual rather than in physical space (Parkinson 2012). Both consciously and subconsciously, physical structuring and organisation affect our behaviour and attitudes. Physical space can also be interpreted (Yanow 2006a). Profoundly, halls and walls tell us who we are (Parkinson 2012; Judge and Leston-Bandeira 2017).

The term ‘built environment’ or ‘built space’ is used when discussing matters of, for example, how power relations are mediated in the physical world (Yanow 2006a). This is evident in the way in which institutions (in the areas of education, healthcare, and also political and administrative institutions) are physically designed to express and order power relations and hierarchies (Judge and Leston-Bandeira 2017). Judge and Leston-Bandeira (2017) argue that institutional representation is a neglected theme in the theorising of political representation. They refer to the interpretative condition in symbolic representation which makes it possible to understand how legislatures as buildings have various connotations. Conveying the idea of something by reference to something else, as in the case of a parliament standing for ‘the people’ or ‘the nation,’ is as one form of representing (Rehfeld 2018).

Against this backdrop, it becomes evident how parliaments, understood as built environments, connote similar symbolic features of power and hierarchy. An examination of plenary venues, such as the plenary hall of Eduskuntatalo, the Finnish Parliament House, shows that they are laid out in a way that serves a particular purpose. As the etymology of the word *parliament* suggests, the archetypal function of representation comes from the French *parler* or the Italian *parlare*: to induce talking, discussion and debate (on rhetorical understanding of parliamentarism see Palonen 2004, 274). Here, the institutional arrangements can arguably affect the ways the design of the plenary space is set out. For example, the epitome of the Westminster parliamentary system of government, the British

Houses of Parliament, have two opposing blocks of seats, hence showcasing the systemic dynamics within the built environment. This design can be seen to promote or at least invoke adversarial deliberation between the government and the opposition.

In contrast, the Eduskunta adopted a rather standard semi-circular seating model where the political parties are seated directionally according to their position within the Left-Right -scale (e.g., the Left Alliance is in the left from the Speaker of the House). In the Swedish seat of parliament, the Riksdag, the overall floor plan is similar to the Finnish model except that the members of parliament are seated according to their electoral districts (Strøm 1997, 169). Physical structuring encourages cross-party encounters and communication, as members of opposing parties may be seated side by side. The Speaker of the Parliament is physically segregated to the front of the plenary space (or in the middle), to highlight their impartial role as well as their authority to control and monitor the deliberations. In general, physical ordering of space and its inherent linkage to the status of the speaker is evident, for example in the case of the 'back-benchers' in the Westminster system, the rank-and-file representatives (who may include previously high-ranked MPs who have fallen out of favour) and sit at the back. In the Eduskuntatalo, the seating order is organised so that new MPs are first seated at the back, and advance towards the front, if they serve further terms. Senior MPs can request to be seated elsewhere if they do not wish to sit in the front.

In the interviews conducted with the Finnish MPs, spatial notions of the plenary forum were not mentioned at length. Some junior MPs, those seated at the back, speculated that perhaps one reason for not being granted a turn to speak is that they sit too far back for the Speaker of Parliament to be able to see them. However, the physical structures in committee work were briefly indicated in the interviews by using phrases such as 'being around the same table' and 'shared table'. All the committees of the Finnish parliament, which typically have 17 permanent members, have a large table with members of the government on one side and members of the opposition on the other. In larger committees, such as the Finance Committee, which has 40 members (deputy members also take part), the floor plan is similar to the plenary hall, and the 25 members of the Grand Committee sit in a large circular formation. External experts invited to give their testimony and statement on issues come and sit at the same table with the Grand committee members, whereas in all other committees they are seated outside the deliberating group. It seems natural to assume that deliberation while seated at the same table enhances the sense of commonality and cohesiveness.

Returning to the issue of the plenary hall, there were few descriptions by Finnish MPs of feelings of excitement when entering the plenary hall for the first time after taking office. Several interviewees described being impressed by their initial experience of the plenary hall and, more importantly, by gaining the mandate to be present in the space were something that some fondly reminisced. It must be noted that access to the floor of the plenary hall is highly restricted in Eduskunta (apart from the opening and closing of the annual sessions when the president delivers her speech): only elected MPs and a few authorised parliament officials serving the plenary are allowed to enter the hall. This rule applies to all other personnel, also when the parliament is not in session.

I want to read the above description as a short illustration of the spatially potentially constitutive components of what makes representative a representative. For the MPs who

recognised this notion, the mere presence in a physical space constituted them as elected representatives. In this case, passive presence means that in limited cases an 'act' of political representation does not require any particular activity—only presence suffices to legitimise that position. The audience who knows the 'rules' of excluded entry, and by reading the clues of built environment, recognises and acknowledges those people as legal and legitimate representatives. The reading of the built environment enhances this notion as many recognise the floor design of representative institutions regardless of the institutions in question. Here, the notion of representation also draws from Pitkin's (1967) standing for-form since these relevant markers need to be 'read' to make sense. However, unlike in descriptive representation, in symbolic representation there is a specific conveyance in the physical features as markers of representation. A symbol fails or ceases to be a symbol; it represents nothing if the signifiers are unknown.

The spatial notion of representation was not explicitly asked in the research interview questions. However, it appeared in two different senses in the interview round conducted in 2016. Some MPs pointed out that because the plenary hall was under renovation until the end of 2017, plenary sessions were held in a nearby location, on the premises of Sibelius Academy, a music academy. It is situated in the adjacent building from the Finnish Parliament. The design of the temporary plenary hall was considered inadequate, and was considered not to permit the natural flow of discussion and debate. As the design was similar to a large lecture room, addresses were not given from the podium at the front were hard to follow or even hear. Another remark regarding the deficiencies of the temporary plenary was that the non-elevated, flat floor made it even more difficult to be granted a turn to speak from the Speaker.

In addition, the lack of a semi-circular design was considered to prohibit the flow of natural debate, since addressing fellow MPs is more difficult (officially, of course, all addresses are directed to the Speaker). In most cases speakers ended up having to talk from behind the backs of other MPs. A few of the MPs interviewed felt that the reason for the lowering of deliberative standards in the plenary was partly due to the substitute plenary hall. The classroom type and plain surroundings were thought to encourage restless and disrespectful behaviour which more readily polarise positional deliberation.

Regardless of the scarcity of these accounts in the interviews themselves what is valuable is that they support the argument that spatial context also lends resources for and guides deliberative acts. The spatial structure entails an affirming feature. It is a worthy yet neglected task to also pay attention to the physical place where deliberation takes place. It can incentivise action and guide our operational attitudes. In this research it is indicated in the sentiments that are drawn from being in the plenary hall, and in social interactions within the premises of the Finnish Parliament (e.g., sharing a table in a committee or a canteen; taking a sauna; partaking in clubs). On the large democratic scale physical structures most likely are relevant since they affect political participation and opinions about others. For our current purposes, the idea that spatial context often entails cues for reading off representation from the walls and halls ushers us forward to the next interrelated topic. It addresses further constitutive character available in notions of becoming a representative.

ii Representing to and with each other

The plenary hall discussed above as a spatial structure was tied to constituting the role of democratic representative as an elected member of the parliament. How to go about after this affirmative moment is, however, left open. One MP (III: 22: 2:19) put it figuratively: *‘Every parliamentary term there are 200 different stories, everyone does it [i.e. plays the role of MP] on their own terms, and there is no one right way to do it’*. Despite this diversified existential condition—something that is touched on in other interviews as well—relating to how MPs themselves define their task, institutional norms and practices set some standards for and expectations of their conduct. I will discuss these throughout this research. Even though the kind of ‘rules and procedure-centred view’ can be criticised, it helps us to understand why some positions in institutional deliberations are captured as if actors would be unitary, thus acting with a unified purpose (Goodin 2005, 186). The assumption reflecting the ‘unitary model of deliberation’ are to some extent in place when we discuss some of the institutionalised roles later. Additionally, however, there exists a certain kind of affirmative representative ethos that can be explored and analysed through the idea of context.

For example, the constitutive setting described and perceived through the plenary hall shows us that MPs can be treated as a unitary actor in some restricted cases. Here, just by being allowed in the space they are not distinguished from one another but are treated equally as elected representatives. This implicit understanding among MPs forms a crucial “meta-consensus”, a deep-down shared view of the appreciation of each mandate that is bestowed on MPs by the electorate. This analysis reflects the profound principle of equality of wills of representative government: all representatives are equal regarding their representation. It gives deliberation an agreement- and consent-seeking role, which comes together in the institution of a representative assembly (Manin 1994; 1997). Despite the political conflicts and pressures that MPs are subject to, this meta-consensus of equality seems to affect how democratic conflict is dealt with in a legislature (see also Kontula 2018).

I want to show that there is more tangible evidence for the unitary view in the interviews. It derives from the elemental recognition that authorised representative mandate to rule is inalienable and indivisible. One of the most tangible demonstrations of this is the practice of always addressing representatives by their surname. Doing this and preceding it with ‘representative’ (similar to ‘honourable’) indicates that the person being addressed or referred to is a member of the parliament and a representative of the people. Without much exception, it is in place throughout the house. We could argue that it has an illocutionary capacity. Following Pitkin’s definition, invoking the notion of ‘representative’ gives the otherwise absent represented presence in the action itself. For this reason, as equals, they are also the tokens for representative ideas, interests, and constituencies: as representatives, they represent the people, not themselves. While doing this, they represent the institution to each other as well as to the public.

It is not a major revelation to say that formality in legislative conduct is an institutional practice that aims at detaching the persona from the position. Explicit reference to the position of a representative also ascribes to those certain expectations that being a representative entails. Therefore, in the backdrop of the democratic task of ruling in the state

of disagreement typical to pluralist societies, representatives are expected to carry out many sorts of tasks that relate to negotiating and settling those disagreements through the legislative process. When deliberating, they cannot completely cut off these premises of governing that include dealing with interests and preferences. It is up to every MP to decide how to acknowledge, treat or allow these to affect the forming and articulation of their own opinions. As briefly mentioned above, some formal positions within the legislature form institutionalised internal expectations. They are more rigid in the sense that they guide and restrict the actions of those holding these positions. For example, committee chairs are expected to deliberate with impartial tones in the plenary sessions, but it also applies to some extent to the committee as well. This overlapping setting is prone to some tensions that derive from these differing expectations.

Expectations regarding forms of conduct are significant in public appearances also. For this reason, disrespectful language, pandering, and features of plebiscitary rhetoric caused some MPs to worry about the impression this gives to the public. When representatives misbehave, whether in or out of the parliament, they can be thought to represent the institution badly.

What we need to remember [...] is that every MP represents the Parliament [Eduskunta]. We are not only representing ourselves and our own party, but also the Parliament as an institution²⁵. The rougher the language we use, the more graceless we are towards each other, the more it labels the whole institution, the Parliament in this case. Everyone should understand that you don't just represent so that me-me-me as an MP, and me-me-me as member of this group, and me-me-me-as the chair of this committee. But when you represent that whole folk that has been before me and who comes after me, then everyone carries a responsibility for that piece of history that is written about it. You can use colourful language, but you cannot be distasteful, and you cannot purposely offend anyone. (III: 22: 15:02)

These brief descriptions seemed to hide the unspoken question that is linked to reflections about institutional representation. MPs seem to give some thought to what does tell of the state of the country's democracy when representatives behave and talk the way they do. Also, in describing the lack of appreciation for politicians, while at the same time endorsing polarised and pejorative deliberative modes, they contribute to reinforcing this negative image. For the representatives, these dynamics involve and can be explained by the role of the media. The performative context in which I situate these elements into will be discussed in 4.3. but related notions are examined throughout the text.

What else is referred to by the official recognition of each Finnish parliamentarian (*kansanedustaja*, literally 'representative of the people')? When analysed through the internal practice but considered on a general level, reliance on the formal status explicitly indicates that instead of 'Tom', to utilize Rehfeld's example again, it is 'representative Tomsson' who is expected to consider and deliberate on the legislative matter. This view is available in the interview captions where MPs underline the sustenance of civilised and

²⁵ All underlined sentences in all citations presented in this research are my emphasis, and do not suggest an original emphasis made by the interviewee in the interview situations. These are only meant for assisting the reader to find the relevant point efficiently, especially with longer citations.

respectful conduct. Ideally, premises of legislative deliberation concur with what deliberative democracy is also advocating in terms of equality and respect. When underlining the significance of respect, one MP (II: 9-2: 3:48) specified it in terms of *[R]especting other's opinions, give other a turn to speak and address each other formally*. The deliberative norm of respectfulness postulates the democratic stance that makes the person a tool for representative rule. The norms are also constant reminders to the MPs that when they represent and deliberate with one and another, they are at the same time representing the representative democratic institution (in the thinnest sense of seeing representation as authorisation).

Regardless of the expected normativised conduct, what kind of 'mindset' (Gutmann and Thompson 2012) a representative operates with makes a difference. In this, personality counts a lot, according to the interviews. One MP (II: 4: 15:47) emphasised, contrary to some others' remarks, that the saying 'issues argue against each other, not people' could not be more wrong. Deliberation and representation take place in a dynamic interaction with contexts and more importantly, with people. Therefore, if one is engaging in the legislative process with people who are ready to put up a fight immediately, the constructive and discursive type of politics is highly constricted. And vice versa: if people get along, cooperation comes easy. Most likely this kind of adversarial mindset would not be open to hearing others' arguments or otherwise demonstrate reciprocity in accommodating others' perspectives in forming opinions. Affirmative context would not be applicable if legislators did not feel that their perspectives or opinions should become revised or reaffirmed when hearing what others have to say. In other words, the institutional context that differentiates between the discursive and positional logics holds ground in incentivising actors (Schäfer 2017). However, it cannot exhaust the analysis when taking into account the interactive perspective. In order to grasp what the dynamics with 'practices of communication (ibid., 427) are, the contextual feature needs more clarification.

I propose two less-discussed perspectives on democratic representation that can be found in the idea of deliberative representation. The first states a specific dynamic available within representative institutions, and the second discusses the facilitation of it. When operating in legislatures, representatives also *represent to each other*. This perspective does not discredit or bypass democratic inclinations of rule of the people. On the contrary, it provides an analytical layer for further inquiries into political deliberation in a concrete legislative forum. What does it mean when representatives represent *to each other*? One way to argue for this somewhat provocative claim is by following the argumentation of 'politics of presence' put forward by Anne Phillips (1995). It is not an endorsement for descriptive representation but a stepping-stone for explaining how, through presence, 'politics of ideas' come to be. This view is transferable to a practical legislative setting when we think of representative 'bodies'. The kind of 'materialism' is perhaps more recognised in deliberative theory. Deliberation is thought of as an intersubjective act that takes between two or more people. The whole ethos of deliberative theory is built on addressing and recognising this relationship which facilitates the whole deliberative process and adds an ethical perspective to it.

For the assembly to succeed in its tasks of legislating, its members must be able to associate and to cooperate with one another, at least to some minimum degree. Accordingly,

within these institutional boundaries the question of to whom representation is made, and who judges it, are not always the represented but instead other representatives. In general, passing issues, attaining consent as an assembly as a whole (through legitimate procedures), requires that one is willing to engage with others. ‘This is work between people’, as one interviewee summarised it (III: 26: 1:07:48).

This leads to my second suggestion, already stated: instead of exploring the more common question of what is represented, here we are after analysing *how* a certain thing is represented. I claim that the question of how something or someone is represented is immanent in the criteria for judging political representation: the represented warrant a presence in the action of democratic representation. What the represented want that (presence) to be or manifest, differs, naturally. Whatever that may be, presumably the desire is for it to be done *well*. We want our representatives to strive in their office. From a democratic standpoint it would be self-contradictory to choose a representative only to want to see them act poorly and fail. Crucially, this kind of ‘normative’ viewpoint adds a plausible level to the current discussions on representation. It also connects with deliberation when seeing it as the main medium through which representation is carried out. I also suggest that this aspirational idea is already included in all the new theorising: ‘mobilising’, ‘representing’ or ‘claim-making’ which as activities, are taken on for the simple reason of hoping it, as accounts of representation, to be successful. This goal-oriented perspective or incentive, to be discussed further in the next subchapter on operative context, is not well articulated in the current theory.

However, a results-based understanding of democratic legitimacy, available for example in the issue congruency idea of representation, is not what I have in mind here. Instead of such, what could be called ‘output representation’, what I am after when arguing for the perspective of performance is more what Mansbridge (2009; 2016) envisions with her selection model of representation. To me, the foundations for performance derive from selection of representatives that also highlights the persona of the representative. Therefore, the selection model of representation places more theoretical emphasis on the premise of ‘what goes in’ rather than ‘what comes out’. When electorates choose their representatives, the process of sorting and selecting plausible candidates involves many kinds of scrutiny and judgment. Getting a sense of what kind of a person a representative candidate is can be a viable indicator of one’s legislative performance. The novelty of selection model also reaches well beyond the trustee-delegate dyad. As such, it pays attention to assessing candidate’s capabilities for deliberation in which, for example, gyroscopic representatives would most likely excel (Mansbridge 2003).

In practice, when MPs go about representing in the legislature, they become subject to other representatives’ scrutiny and judgment—just as they would be to the electorate, represented. For this reason, these interactions also assume the meaning of deliberative accounts accordingly: that representatives reason with each other and provide justifications, and at best, in ways that can contribute to constructive politics. However, it is the power-seeking aspect of political life that tends to reduce the scholarship on legislative behaviour and consequent deliberation to mere strategic-partisan operations. Along these lines, institutional framework is often highlighted. It is seen to counterbalance and restrain most severe positional and contestant power plays when it forces actors to deliberate as a unitary

actor, and thus according to the rules. In any case, taking strategic (or even manipulative) orientations as face value can disregard or overshadow other factors that relate to integrating and accommodating policy-making. For this reason I have specifically raised the notion of affirmation under exploration. However, the institutional context within which the availability of discursive and positional logics can be negotiated should be complemented also with views that are sensitive to which functions are to be accomplished in each.

Representatives are very attuned with functional differentiation of representative contexts. The contexts relate to the question of how one carries on representing. Outside the plenary hall and when the media is not present Eduskunta is '*such a collegial and friendly institution*', where staff and representatives '*across the party lines are very friendly to each other*' (III: 9: 8:50). Adopting the '*mindless plenary rhetoric*' in one-on-one situations or in the committee raises criticism as it challenges the inexplicit understanding of what is achievable in each context. Persuasion and convincing others do take place within legislatures but not with the kind of style that is '*theatrical and flat*' (ibid.)

Representatives understand the pressure-filled environment that they work in. One MP (III: 22: 13:22) explained that the Parliament forms a '*curious world*' that makes it possible to relate to each other's positions, spurring solidarity: '*[y]ou shouldn't laugh when your neighbour's sauna is on fire, when it could be your sauna catching fire next*'. It must be noted, however, that this kind of gesture of sympathy can also demonstrate a strategically wise move in a political system that creates large coalition governments. Cross-partisan and interparty cooperation is a necessity, and therefore knowingly lessening your desirability as a coalition partner is something that is kept in check. Rejoicing over others' failures and corresponding ridicule as an argumentative, rhetorical tactic is part of adversary discourse that is difficult to erase from public deliberative venues. However, if the performative element of ridicule and the like is transferred to other legislative settings, which I discuss as questions of affirmative and operative context—the consequences are different.

Awareness of such an ethos as an application of successful representing converge with Cameron's (2018) argument on the value of practical wisdom. A prudent representative can and should pursue one's goals, but can also put these matters in perspective. As with compromises in politics, this kind of weighing and accommodation can easily invite accusations of abandoning or selling out principles. Here, it is meant that choosing the best practice how to mediate and judge the course of action. Inhabiting a political office does not come with a guidebook, as Cameron (2018) notes. '*Effectiveness*', writes Cameron (2018, 153, emphasis added) '*is a matter of converting capabilities [...] into functionings*.' It means knowing when to do what and how. Crucially, it is also very much about putting one's expertise to good use, learning the 'ways of the house' but also being mindful and respectful of others. Display of respect is also a matter of rationing the time one spends talking. As Pekonen (2011, 184–86) rightly notes, silence also 'talks'. It means that some people '*take a lot of space*' (II: 8: 10:04) which can make it difficult for others to listen to them. Some MPs are more extensive in their deliberations, which is a plainly a euphemism for saying that some simply talk too much. Here this notion refers to the committee sessions where short and concise argumentation is preferred, but the same analysis is available also in the performative context. According to the MPs, when presenting opinions and arguments there is a delicate balancing act between the affirmative and performative context, between one's

contribution being interpreted as mutually beneficial and modest, thus seeking affirmation, or its being interpreted as merely making a case for oneself.

Of course we have people everywhere who always want to make themselves heard all the time and always tell what their opinion is. But in politics I've also noticed that sometimes you must just listen what the other has to say and comment on that, rather than making a huge deal about how knowledgeable you are in this area. (I: 1: 1:27:05)

**

And also, those personal relations have an effect there [in the committee]. Those people who have driven themselves onto the political sidelines in some committees have it really difficult regardless of how they present fact-based arguments. No-one cares anymore, and no-one notices them. (II: 1: 3:41)

While it may be too much to suggest that in a particular, theoretical sense, as argued above, a representative fails in their task when they refuse to recognise other people (or otherwise don't comply with the implicit norms), how representatives operate socially with one another—how they represent, in practice—is not democratically insignificant. As one interviewee put it (III: 14: 53:35):

Even though all MPs have the same mandate, inevitable dynamics appear where someone has more power than others. And it doesn't necessarily relate to your formal position but to how you use that talk. And how you act.

Ending up on the sidelines is not only a question of social skills but also a signal of one's ability to work in a group. As said, while interviewed MPs were very reserved in criticising their colleagues out of solidarity, they give a lot of thought to in what manner they proceed towards their political goals.

Succeeding in the affirmative context, using it as a venue for building up your expertise as well as career, might not be enough. Being popular and respected by your colleagues, considering the perspectives of adversaries and deliberating with them respectfully, do not in themselves get you re-elected. Aspects of affirmative context, discursive practices of building up opinions and reaffirming them through the interchange of perspectives with other MPs, do not automatically transform into votes. This is a paradox all representatives face to some extent, and especially those who are not in the public limelight daily. One must be able to penetrate the opaqueness of parliamentary work. This is one of the biggest dilemmas many representatives face: gaining credibility within the legislature while succeeding in communicating the fruits of one's work publicly. Arguably, considered from a strategic point of view the logics of affirmative and performative context are mutually somewhat exclusive. Both these notions are brought up in the following exchanges:

Respondent: If you gain a reputable status in the committee, use it right and tactfully and are worthy of colleagues' trust, then you succeed in the Parliament. It is not in the plenary but in the committees where you create your prestige, in my opinion. And which is in fact the most important thing if you want to advance your own political goals.

Interviewer: What skills or abilities do you need to obtain that prestige?

Respondent: Personal skills, social skills, trustworthiness, stoutness and expertise. (I: 10: 13:16)

**

Interviewer: But isn't it a bit challenging when you know that within the house there are those 'workhorses' who work a lot and are appreciated by colleagues across party lines. But they are not those who would be re-elected... or those who don't get those positions?

Respondent: Yes, yes, there are a lot of problems there. Or then they get them those good positions in those trusted places, but they are necessarily those who are those so-called media-sexy people who present themselves to the media outside Parliament House. And it's really a pity, when you learn to know people inside the Parliament, and you get to know whom you can trust, and who you can collaborate with across party lines. Then someone happens to lose their seat in the elections. It feels like, "how could the voters not have noticed this person who's absolutely fabulous and who should have definitely been re-elected for another term?" Then comes in someone—without judging these representatives—someone who is not at all in the same league, who has jumped on the media wagon, but everyone knows that you don't see them much in the committees, for example. (III: 20: 1:30:53)

In this subsection, I have introduced the basic deliberative setting in place within legislature where representatives practically engage with each other. It highlights how in social interactions respect and recognising one another facilitate the representing we discuss here. The analysis offered resonates with Fenno's original argument, something that Bessette (1994) and Cameron (2018) also point to: legislative influence is not merely a matter of power plays oriented towards re-election. More importantly, gaining prestige and trust within the house is a question of how one manages these crucial deliberative interactions with others. Before moving on to party dynamics and cooperative aspects of legislative work, the notion of expertise needs to be analysed, because together with the concept of trust it lays the foundation for the division of labour. For the MPs, gaining expertise is an asset that benefits multiple partners, and not only the individual.

iii Expertise and credibility

The vital parliamentary functions of oversight and control over the executive require that legislatures have sufficient informational capacities. Recently, the notion of ‘institutional deliberation’ was connected to the ‘epistemic performance’ of the legislature (Quirk, Bendix, and Bächtiger 2018). Touching on the significance of information and expertise bear significance regarding deliberative representation: they can point out the ways in which opinions, interests and perspectives come to being.

The kind of interdependency corresponds to the legislature as a whole. Building up the expertise through specialised committee system help resisting the asymmetry in resources also regarding drafting legislation. As we know, parliaments differ in their institutional prerogative to alter bills proposed by the government. Parliament of Finland has been classified as ‘*policy-influencing* legislature’. Unlike ‘*policy-making* legislature’, it practically cannot completely revise bills and substitute them with its own proposals. But it has enough powers to modify them unlike those legislatures that cannot ensue policy effects. (Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 31.) The drafting authority of the Parliament of Finland is, however, considerate (Mattson and Strøm 1995, 298–99). In any case, Finnish parliamentary politics is very much ‘led from the front’, that is, the executive holds agenda-setting power over the Parliament. We could argue that the citizens’ initiative, in effect since 2012, can be seen as a way to introduce issues on the political agenda of the parliament, thus bypassing the executive.

Within this backdrop, expertise provided by the work done in specialised committees is not only instrumental to parliamentary functions but is also meaningful to parliamentary parties, not to mention the individual representative. What motivates MPs to become a member of particular committees? For individual MPs, committee memberships are important for their representative identity-building capacities. Committee memberships boost the activity of representing and affirming in many ways. Gaining substantial knowledge and understanding of the policy field and ongoing legislative processes are resources to be applied in legislation. Committee work provides at its best an invigorating sphere to become an expert and use the accumulated knowledge in all the instances when MPs are expected to deliver, justify and defend opinions and political stances.

In addition, through committees MPs can advance the interests their supporters find important. From an individualist perspective, since detailed drafting legislation takes place in committees, influencing it from the outside is very difficult for an individual MP. Unless supported by a powerful network, one needs to become a member of the committee. Memberships and the knowledge brought along can be a valuable resource when communicating to the public about a particular legislative matter. As members can also obtain detailed knowledge of the administrative plans regarding policy processes in the future, MPs can develop a profile in the media as experts in that field. Expertise such as this can benefit also the political party in question thus attract new supporters.

The first set of interviews (marked I) set out to ask after the (gendered) dynamics of committee assignments and placements. They reveal that the ‘wish lists’ by the representatives turned in at the beginning of the parliamentary term favour the high-profile committees, most notably the Finance Committee (in charge of the budget), the Grand

Committee (responsible for Finland's EU policy), or the Constitutional Law Committee (a 'non-political' yet respected committee scrutinising the constitutional validity of legislation). According to the interviewees, the desirability of the committee is not only linked to the overall status of the committee but also to the function of allocation of funds or resources. Summarising the criteria for the most-valued committees, one interviewee stated that the Grand Committee and Finance Committee were the two most important regarding decision-making on the allocation of funds or Finland's relations with other countries or its status in the world. (I: 14: 64:22). It makes some committees more attractive from a partisan perspective.

These circumstances shed some light on the undeniable internal hierarchy that exists between the committees. The Legal Affairs Committee, referred to in the interviews as the 'Siberia of the Finnish Parliament' (III: 2) or 'the sweatshop', partly due to its high workload and 'schooling' of new MPs, remains one of the least popular choices. At the other extreme is the Finance Committee, which one interviewer referred to 'the crown jewel' of parliamentary committees (I: 1). The Finance Committee oversees the budget, and even though the parameters up to which the budget can be altered are very much dictated by the Ministry of Finance, there is some small amount of leeway for Parliament to influence spending. The Finance Committee decides on the allocation of these funds (based on budget proposals by the MPs—interestingly, some government MPs were advised to abstain from proposing them in order to not to dismantle the united government front.).

By contrast, the Legal Affairs Committee produces very little legislation that involves allocating funds. Two of parliamentary committees produce no legislation, which gives them their own places in the hierarchy in the eyes of parliamentarians. Interviewees who have worked in the Committee for the Future found it invigorating, but added that the committee attracts 'daydreamers' (I: 8), whereas the Audit Committee, which in the words of one interviewee acts as the 'conscience of the Parliament' (III: 29), nowadays appeals to senior politicians also.

To portray the urgency and societal significance of particular policy areas that committees are responsible for—how their imposed legislation affects the citizen—one MP (II: 10: 11:32) contrasted the role of the Social and Health Committee by stating that '*we don't make decisions on whether the seatbelt is put on from this side or that side*'. This representative narrates the idea that notwithstanding the epistemic gratification in partaking in whichever committee an MP finds personal or other interest due to prior working life experience (attributes that build up one's expert reputation within the house), there is this endemic drive to make a difference. Making an impact can be viewed through linkage to constituencies. Some committees, like the Grand Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Committee to some extent, operate more on the basis of general 'national interests'. But many others handle policies that have tangible geographic implications thus district-bound interests. Decisions on educative institutions, health care units, as well as traffic and transportation, have grasping effect on citizens. There is a clear division in the *modus operandi* with MPs from 'counties', i.e. outside capital region (or other major city hubs), and those who are not.

In general, specialisation and selection seem to be tenets for credible legislative work. Also, what MPs describe 'prioritisation' is just a euphemism for what you can neglect, was

how one interviewee (III: 28: 17:30) put it. My general impression is that many representatives are shadowed by constant guilt and frustration of not getting enough work done regardless of pulling very long days. As with rationing one's deliberation in terms of not being vocal all the time, the same kind of judgement seems advisable with issues in general. What is essential is to *'choose your battles'*, as one MP (III: 26: 1:03:12) said, *'since you cannot have an influence on everything. Instead you must choose the issues where you want to make an impact. And then do that work to the maximum'*.

Acceptance of the practically constricted and confined nature of representing is the best currency in a legislature. Aiming to have an impact on all matters, and seizing all opportunities for deliberating on them, translates into an action logics that prefers quantity over quality. The main argument here is that in order to do your work well, you need to be able to focus, otherwise there is a risk of losing credibility among colleagues: *'it's no use scurrying around in every direction'* (III: 15: 32:33). Of course, here one must also consider the alternative, opposite interpretation: that interviewees are creating a consistent argument for not doing their work properly when in between the lines criticise those who do not. Instead, I read it as an occurrence of overlapping contexts of representation that are always available. Performative context is the domain that mainly attends the public and partisan features. It serves the reasonable expectation of the general public that their representatives are doing their work to the fullest. The performative context, to which the kind of hustling mentioned above refers to, enables testifying and affirming that representing is *'being done'*. It gives out an impression of an effective representative. Within the house, however, it can be a sign of a hyperpartisan representative. As we will see later, the internal affirmation functions of seeking assurance and weighing arguments in a non-strategic manner are most often discarded in the performative context. However, the affirmative context ascribes to a more considerate and prudent take on deliberations. Consideration to which this mindset implies to necessitate that one deliberatively controls showing off: being more mindful and selective in what and when issues are brought up, and the manner of doing do.

This bears resemblance to how expertise can be demonstrated. From the perspective of representatives, there is a normative difference in being a representative and performing (as one even though everyone recognises the necessity and urgency of the latter). Similarly, there is a difference in being an expert and pretending to be one. The distinction is perceivable mainly only by other representatives, in the sense that they represent to each other. Unfortunately we do not have authentic recordings from legislative venues to pinpoint addresses where this distinction would be available. However, the following citation shows that the contexts of representation are connected, and the notion of expertise travel through them. Overall, the interviews acknowledge that expertise needs to be adjusted according to the context and that justifications need to be elaborated publicly. However, when taking the perspective of representatives representing to each other, one cannot expect to get away with flimsy argumentation, even if that works in other settings.

To me it's perfectly clear that one who doesn't do any work in the committee, and a representative is not doing his job if he fails in that work or neglects to do it. He is not knowledgeable in any area. He doesn't know anything; he just talks hot air when speaking in the plenary sessions. He doesn't even understand his own district's issues. He jumps straight into an obscure question or is completely off, to be honest. And it's evident that [MPs] like that haven't actually done any committee work, and have never done any preparation—other than babbling on about the same things as always. But you can get by with that, of course. I do take it as a profound question. What remains from the work that MPs do, when thinking of its substance, if these activities are not carried out? (III: 4: 1:23)

Although several interviewees duly highlighted the fact that expertise benefits multiple parties, also some reservations were brought up. There are limits to expertise. The accumulation of certain professions in a committee, by one's own personal choice or by PPG assignment, orbiting towards the corresponding committee is not unconditionally perceived only as a positive tendency. When discussing the implication of committee composition in such an accumulation of specialised expertise supports the gathering of policy-specific information and often first-hand knowledge and experience. The downside is that centralisation may go too far to the detriment of the range of perspectives. The vertical, in-depth expertise may be significant but the horizontal direction, the breadth of perspectives can be modest. What this means is that the scope of representation narrows down while the quality of deliberative justifications might be expansive. According to the MPs, the handling of legislative issues should not be limited only to the scrutiny of those professional, vertical perspectives since the goal would be about reaching of general understanding of all possible perspectives and implications that the law influences. As one said, *'professionals usually get entangled in their own area... they start circulating around their own noses'* (I: 8: 11:4).

On a different level, yet along the same lines, sympathies towards 'epistocracy' are faced with counterarguments that touch the core of democratic parliamentary politics. Parliamentary politics is about reason-giving and weighing perspectives and not truths, as epistemic tenants. When MPs argue with each other, each perspective should be backed up by and justified through factual knowledge. Even though here the respective argument is more empirically grounded, on theoretical level operating with 'truths' (as Ankermittian descriptive mimesis) leave no conceptual space for representation. Representations, as claims or re-presentations, facilitate the process of weighing and debating. The affirmative context would become dispensable if no reflexivity were necessary. Regardless of Landmore's (2017b) convincing analysis of deliberative theory's mixed inclination towards truth-claims, from the perspective of what we are arguing here for the constitutive nature of representation, the aspiration for truth is incompatible. This theme is far too expansive to discuss in detail within this research, but it is worthwhile to acknowledge it as we move on to discuss the committee sessions, how this epistemic backdrop becomes even more pressing.

When political realities are negotiable in the absence of truths, but at the same time expertise is valued, what is thought of as being 'political' is even more strongly conveyed in parliamentary work. This notion is something that should be kept in the back of one's mind as we advance further in the analysis. The constitutive conception subscribes to a sense

of ‘political artistry’ (Severs, Celis, and Meier 2014, 619). One first-term MP spontaneously began the interview by mentioning the creative work that representatives engage in. Instead of the framing of expert work more commonly assumed in the interviews, this MP delightfully described:

It has amazed me as well, when I had thought that poets, stage and visual artists, writers and rock musicians are those who do creative work. But the work of a representative, that is truly creative! You can pretty far define yourself how you do it, using your own persona. You can showcase your strengths in all possible ways. I have often compared the Parliament of Finland to a theatre, because it really is one, when you want to consider it that way. It’s a kind of improvising. (III: 25: 36:48)

What is interesting in this above citation is the understanding that does not adhere to the negative connotations of plenary as a theatre. Instead of making the common reference to faking, the MP implies here to the idea that when it comes to political artistry *the ‘performance’ is as real as any other*. Therefore, it fits nicely to the constructivist and aesthetic paradigm of representation when rendering representative practices, claims and performances to the judgment of the audience. Through the process of assessment and judgment the others–represented, the audience or the other representatives–have a constitutive and legitimising quality to it, without which there would not be such a thing as an artistry.

Another conveyed image brought up in the interviews regarded an ideal parliamentarian, refined by knowledge and often by experience as well as long committee incumbency. Such refinement often tends to refer to seniority. However, it tells us that representatives can *become experts in the field of representation* which is enabled by parliamentary politics. This ‘beauty of transformation’ is depicted on a positive note in the following citation:

[...] And I think that in parliamentarism, if we talk about this estrangement²⁶ or if it [Eduskunta] is a bubble or an institution, one of the most *beautiful* [emphasised] aspects is that you can become a professional in being a parliamentarian. Here I don’t mean a professional politician who can smile but is a professional from the perspective of know-how. To me there is such beauty in I when somebody in a wrong package, could be a nurse, could a ‘hayseed’ [a farmer] or what not, and she has a tremendous ability to perceive the legislation very broadly. [...] MP [name withheld, committee chair]. Comes from a manual worker background and is the most cultivated legislator. Absolutely magnificent. The ability, when he gets a new document in front, the ability of perceive the entirety and take everybody along to work on it. There is something scrumptious about it when you have been refined there, that you have come from a factory or behind a taxicab wheel or wherever you’ve come from, to the ways [of the house] you become refined. To me that is what is brilliant about it. Then you get to talk in the plenary, if there something to say. In that case it’s not empty talk. (III: 20: 2:17:29)

²⁶ The topic of estrangement relates to the questionnaire the MPs were delivered in the interviews.

Arguably, committee memberships boost representation in the sense that MPs become better and more refined as parliamentarians. This resource or capacity to represent extends beyond the plebiscitary or geographically bound constituents' preferences more towards independent judgment on the public good or general interest. This discretion portrays, even in its limitedness, a sort of impartiality or at least the ability to treat competing viewpoints and implications in a more fair and balanced manner. This refinement crucially enables and enforces deliberation that is grounded on the merits as well as demerits of legislation, and is not partial or one-sided, either professionally or politically. As such, it does not fully yield to strategic consideration of party and constituency dynamics. Relating to what Bessette (1994, 135, emphasis added) writes, the mere strategic incentive of re-election lacks the 'vocabulary' of explaining why 'legislators would choose *substance* over symbols, *hard work* over posturing, or *responsibility* over popularity'.

Presumably, a few underlying reasons for any theoretical framework to give up on the deliberative aspect of legislative activities could be relating to the following. Firstly, in the case of deliberative democracy, parliamentary deliberations embedded in the respective practices have been treated as a unitary phenomenon (Goodin 2005). With the aid of a systems approach to deliberation combined with the sensitivity to context, deliberative practices can be analysed in a manifold. Legislatures and other 'parts' of the deliberative systems form their own deliberative ecologies within. Secondly, many of the dynamics of judgment and discretion come to define the deliberative practices between the representatives that are available for the represented. Representatives do not single-handedly operate in an adversary setting that impoverish the deliberative landscape in exchange for a strategic one. Instead, they systematically seek support and cooperation as well from one another, also across the division of government and opposition. Arguably, deliberative faculties are systemic when it comes to representing. Deliberative representation covers this missing perspective, where representatives are drawn together for the need of affirming and making up minds.

One very showcasing example of the differentiation that has implications to the substance of deliberation is expertise. According to the interviews, the significance of expertise hinges somewhere in between two extremes: one being ignorant and ditching 'homework' discussed earlier in a citation, and the other as too pure, hypopartisan expert. The former does not need others thus comes out as self-sufficient which is not thought credible, therefore counts as 'posturing'. Another plausible viewpoint to expertise here is hyperpartisanship, to use terminology by Cameron (2018). Hyperpartisan representative might not be inclined to consider the viewpoints deriving from expertise, in the case it hinders the chances of scoring a political point. The latter kind of representative lacks necessary representative incentives and thus dismisses relevant orientations regarding political representation within the legislature.

Conversely, the ideal parliamentarian who singles out the refining feature of incumbency shows how the ability to reflect and negotiate various perspectives is deemed important. Such endorsement does not mean that partisanship is rejected, but it is more subtle. Those regarded as parliamentarians enjoy respect throughout the house, but skilled and balanced use of expertise enable also deliberative accountability. Deliberative accountability, or 'discursive accountability' as preferred by Dryzek (2010), hinges on the

ability to communicate and justify made decisions and opinions to the constituencies. It relies on experience but also subject-specific knowledge and expertise. Reasoning and justifications are more legitimate when they are more considerate of the varying perspectives and matters that are at stake, respectively.

In addition, expertise and endorsement of a relatively impartial perspective can affect the dynamics of party representation, thus potentially reducing party allegiances. In the framework of committee system committees can advance a 'universalist' position, acting as the agent of the whole parliament (Mattson and Strøm 2004). So far this discussion has been taken without the comprehensive and dictating notion of collective action. In practice, however, the legislative performance and the successfulness of representing are also in the hands of other representatives and political collectives. The dynamics of affirmation regarding dealing with opinion-making gains more depth as we advance further. In the next section, collective dynamics are brought together with expertise and experience—with the potential for both cooperation and conflict.

iv Relying on others

When carrying out representative tasks, representatives also represent each other, which heavily implies in practice that they deliberate on behalf of each other. This is plausible point of departure that is not always considered. It is circumstantial to the fact that representatives cannot attend to all matters they encounter while holding office. The committee system is an institutional example of such a division of labour where part of the whole institution takes on the task on behalf of the whole institution. As such, it becomes a matter of delegation.

In the political science literature, the theme of delegation is often discussed in terms of chains of delegation. Such a chain runs up to the ministerial officers, and through the legislature to the executive (Müller 2000). For some, this is the defining feature of parliamentary democracy, understood as 'a particular way to structure political delegation' (Strøm and Bergman 2011, 5). As such, this setting prescribes representatives a role as delegates of the parliamentary party groups to which they are accountable, and who enforce the principle of accountability on behalf of the represented (Heidar 2000, 185–86; see also Damgaard 1995; Wiberg 2003). Party representation is generally thought to stabilise the otherwise fickle representational relationship between the representative and the represented. However, the representational relation between the political party and its corresponding PPG is not as sound as is assumed, as I aim to show. Even though the MPs interviewed for this research have given much thought to where they stand in this representational constellation, analysis must go beyond these delegated accounts.

The argument to be presented here is that the building blocks for these delegate accounts of representation are founded on the circumstances and conditions stipulating them—that is, on the need for specialisation and expertise. Also, the political parties represented in the legislatures and the PPGs practically managing this representing need information (and ideas and viewpoints) that are available through the committees. The depth of justifications provided by the MPs depends heavily on their prior knowledge and accrued information.

The second strand of the argument presented here opens the domain of intraparty group dynamics. When it comes to giving their opinions, MPs cannot affirm all the political matters that are on the table but must instead rely on the judgment of others. The MPs interviewed referred to challenges in their day-to-day work time-management and to extremely demanding workloads. It is when faced with such difficulties, the importance of one's own group comes most strongly to light. Taking into account the complexity of legislative issues and the sheer number of them, it is not surprising that no single representative can become familiar with all of them. As one interviewee noted: *'There is absolutely no time to read all the papers that come to the committees. Whoever claims otherwise is lying [laughs]. No-one reads every single page, at the moment'* (I: 16: 64:25). As a solution for the informational overload, this interviewee proposed that each MP would serve on one committee only instead of two. Being so constrained with time and the volume of information to be digested seems to suggest that there are many occasions where representatives make political decisions in plenary sessions simply by pushing the 'yay' or 'nay' button, without much knowledge of what is actually being decided.

Epistemic deficits in the face of the ever-growing number of legislative issues are alleviated by dispersing responsibility. The institutional setting enables the division of labour. The interviews conducted provide a glimpse of how legislative burden is evened out and work is distributed between MPs from the same group. These practices, also covered by parliamentary studies, can and should be also read in the language of representation, as portrayals of accounts for representatives representing each other through these arrangements. For this reason, representatives must rely on their colleagues' discretion when it comes to forming opinions, policies and legislation, in cases when they did not exist. Reliance on deliberative abilities required that a variety of perspectives is allowed enough consideration.

Delegation is a necessity in a parliamentary context. Representatives cannot be members of all committees. Firstly, it would be an impossible endeavour not only because committees' meetings overlap but also the sheer amount of work would be overwhelming. The second reason is that committee memberships are allocated proportionally according to party size, and as a result not all parties are represented in all the 16 parliamentary committees (17 as of spring 2019, when the Surveillance Committee was established). In committee assignments, the PPG leadership are the ones who decide which MPs get which committee memberships (Holli and Saari 2009, 30–37; see also Forsten 2005; Hagevi 2000). The sovereignty of PPGs to allocate committee memberships can be thought rather unquestionable, and according to one interviewee it would not be 'fair play' to meddle with them from the outside (I: 1: 4:20). Each MP's own wishes are taken into account, but in the allocation of positions seniority and other factors such as prior work experience are also emphasised. As with individual MPs, representation-based considerations also apply to PPGs not to mention the political parties. In addition to the 'office-seeking' party goal, parties foster also 'policy-seeking' goals (Damgaard 1995, 309). In practice, then, this second goal collapses on the committee structure where different policy areas are handled in corresponding parliamentary committees to which parties get "access" through their MPs.

Arguably, smaller political parties are forced to consider aspects of political representation more than the big parties. Whereas bigger parties have enough

representatives to serve on all the committees, smaller PPGs need to weigh which policy fields are more relevant to their political platforms. When allocations to the committees are not favourable to their priorities parties can trade and switch memberships (I: 9, I: 10). In smaller groups, questions of representation are more pressing, highlighting the need for intraparty deliberation (intraparty deliberation has been defended most recently by Wolkenstein 2016; see also Phillips 1995; Teorell 1999). The reason for this is simply that having a presence on a committee is practically the only way to affect the type of legislation for which that committee is responsible. This is emphasised in the partisan perspective to committees, transforming committees into agents of the political parties (Mattson and Strøm 2004). Moreover, without committee representation it is more difficult to understand and remain informed of the opinion-making process and related justifications, since the committees convene behind closed doors. When a policy area is discussed in the plenary committee, committee members are given priority, which also adds to their legitimised expertise in a specific policy. Even though PPG and party leaders can always have their say in the plenary, they cannot always cover all policy corners, at least not credibly. In comparison to the committee members the leadership may lack the detailed and up-to-date information available only through the committee meetings.

The best-informed parliamentarians are those who serve on the committees. They can be assumed to have the relevant information to make convincing fact-based arguments on the subject matter to their colleagues as well as to the public. Acknowledgment of expertise is also connected with long incumbency in the committee. There is also the feature of cross-partisanship to be considered: some representatives are and can be recognised as a particular expert of a policy field, whose viewpoints are appreciated and counselled. When an MP wants to form an informed opinion on some item of legislation, there are usually PPG colleagues that they can turn to. *‘There are certain people whom I can definitely trust, one hundred percent’*, as one MP (I: 8:10) commented. Being considered a specialist in each area and to have the latest, most current information ensures that those people can be relied on to provide precise answers to substantial questions. Generally, when forming one’s opinions it would be unwise not to consider others’ perspectives.

Representatives allow themselves to be represented by others, and according to the interviewees, however, there are specific instances when MPs also become surrogates. The concept of surrogate representation refers more often to geographically confined constituencies that lack representation within a representative institution, in which case a ‘surrogate’ legislator takes on their cause despite it being outside the legislator’s voting district. (Mansbridge 2003.) Since the newer conceptual framework for representation allows analytical extensions reaching out to unconventional designs, and even over territorial-based constituencies (Rehfeld 2005; Castiglione and Warren 2006; Urbinati and Warren 2008; Saward 2019), it seems justified here to briefly explore the concept of surrogate representation through observed parliamentary practices.

When representatives were asked in the first set of interviews about their networks as an indicator of policy influence they stated that cross-party collaborations do happen. What unites these representatives can be a common interest in pushing some policy forward. Additionally, alliances emerge not only through shared interests but also through friendships being formed. Such friendships can extend over many parliamentary terms, thereby also

increasing the chances that the political alignments shift as power positions are re-allocated. When an ally and a friend is a member of the government, not to mention a cabinet minister, influencing specific and well-defined case become possible.

When taking a more specific look into the group dynamics of PPGs, committee groups are often the holders of the most nuanced and enlightened perspectives and informative, factual details regarding specific legislation. Committee members of the same party form a committee group that often hold weekly meetings to recap and go through the legislative issues that are being handled and of which they are assumingly most knowledgeable (e.g. Arter 2003). Committee group is led by the head of the committee group (*valiokuntavastaava* in Finnish) who articulates the formal opinion of the party within the committee. In one survey, it was found that over half of Finnish MPs consider their power to influence the decision-making of their own PPG to be very good, provided that the issue is within their own area.

Committee groups enjoy considerable autonomy. It relates to the building up expert knowledge as discussed previously but it is also linked to practical matters: especially in larger groups there is limited time to embrace full-fledged deliberation for the purpose of forming collectively standing on a legislative issue. Also, it would take too much time to go through and have updates on all committee issues. The committee groups, and especially the head of the committee group, use their judgment regarding to which issues and legislative points are important enough to be presented to the whole PPG (also in Mykkänen 2001b).²⁷ Partly for these reasons, the head of the committee group can be referred to a trustee (Wiberg 2000, 161).

According to one MP from a large group, *'In our party, it's the committee group that grinds. [...]'* (II: 10: 29:12). *'They have the mandate and responsibility. And we trust them'*. When *'power is delegated and allocated to the committee level'*, another MP (I: 10: 16:4) also from a large group explained, means simultaneously that formal and practical opinion-taking and decision-making in Parliament (by each political party) rests on relatively few shoulders. When smaller PPGs have only one member in the committee highlights the significance and responsibility of one single MP. As one interviewee explained, *'to be frank, you need to assess for yourself what those questions are that could generate wider political passions, and act accordingly'* (I: 9: 12:6) are.

The considerable autonomy and responsibility that MPs have remind us how political decision-making is practically operated. Most often standings and decisions are preordained by the party platforms, not to mention the government platform. As such, in the cases of some 'large and difficult' (as the Eduskunta jargon goes) bills these platforms are firmly enforced which limits the deliberative appeal of reconsidering the set premises. This appeal comes from the parliamentary setting of the government and the opposition, thus assigning MPs certain tentative but contested roles. Therefore, when the interviews suggest that when a committee group unanimously arrives at a resolution that goes against the position taken by the party, and the PPG will not hamper it, the interpretation is mixed, at least in the case of governing parties. Other dynamics can be called upon that may overturn the committee

²⁷ Deliberative authority, authority to decide through deliberative process occurring elsewhere, is delegated in PPGs. Also smaller policy specific intra-PPG working groups are established and are open to all interested.

group stance. For one, the informal rule that secures coalition government cooperation ‘by the book’ may take effect. When by the book is called out, the decision is to reflect what has been agreed in the government platform. I will later address this in the context of compromise-building that takes place in the committee, but it suffices to acknowledge here that the idea of party democracy can be more precarious than is theoretically assumed. To continue, we need to take a closer look at collective representative efforts and group dynamics revolving around the operative centre of party representation, which is parliamentary party groups.

v Deliberation in parliamentary party groups

PPGs organise and coordinate democratic representation and tasks accordingly so that legislative work and outputs are efficient, anticipated and responsive. However, when approaching representation theoretically from a deliberative angle, group dynamics also consist of other elements that usher discussion towards interactions between representatives and to the representative resources they enable regarding affirmation. Learning to trust their peers’ judgment as well as their character,²⁸ and getting to know each other, takes place in committee work but also—and perhaps more centrally—through party group membership. Party affiliation forms a natural bond with trust.

For many interviewees, the PPG forms the most important reference group for their work, and it centres in the weekly PPG meetings. On the other hand, the meetings are not exclusively reserved for features relating to affirmative context, as in ascertaining and coordination, but for some it is also a venue for posturing. An observation made in the interviews also highlights the need for ‘keeping up appearances’ in relation to emphasising one’s expertise or highlighting relations to the parliamentarian’s constituency and ‘home turf’. Next, I will distinguish functions concerning developing, testing and criticising opinions and platforms. I will also discuss functions of forming collective bonds as well as coordinating and planning legislative work and gaining information. Whereas the latter feature differs strikingly as to whether the group is in government or opposition, overall the size of the group seems to impact how thoroughly these tasks can be handled in PPG meetings.

Studies of PPGs in the Nordic countries (Heidar 2000; Damgaard 1995; Heidar and Koole 2000b) highlight their relevance and power as central parliamentary actors. Notably,

²⁸ The interviews illuminate how the discussions and encounters that take place outside the formal settings are important. For one, committee travels allow time for its members to get to know each other more deeply, not only as politicians but as persons. One MP described how spending eight hours on a plane next to a colleague gave a glimpse into that person’s thinking. Even though the interviews do not extensively cover these informal accounts, it is nonetheless clear that in legislatures there should be opportunities for deliberation that is not strictly tied to argumentation and justifications about matters that are on the parliamentary agenda. Deliberation should also allow for disclosure and sharing of privately held views and reasoning and reflection, since it is inevitable that in their decision-making MPs will contextualise their opinions and viewpoints to their life stories and political aspirations. This may not make it more likely for MPs to accept each other’s future claims and arguments, but it is at least likely to deepen their understanding of why they hold the views that they do and how they justify them. In general, committees allow too little time for these kinds of deliberations.

their centrality can be seen in relation seeing Nordic parliaments as ‘working parliaments’ instead of the ‘debating’ ones, more akin to Westminster model. Working parliaments put more effort on the legislative stage of scrutiny that takes place within the committees. (Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 16). Concentration on the committee work and the expertise that follows from being a member of a committee can be seen to project also to the inner workings of PPGs. It can be assumed that deliberation has a critical role to play if some consent-seeking measures are sought within those meetings. In the Finnish context, not much is known of the inner life of PPGs (Mykkänen 2001b; Wiberg 2000), even though they are argued to enjoy ‘de facto control over parliamentary work (Heidar 2000, 187). From a deliberative standpoint, PPGs can resemble ‘caucus room’ deliberation, which can be thought to function towards what I want to argue in the affirmative context. As such, caucus room deliberation emphasises ‘authenticity, without deception’, according to Goodin (2005, 189). For him, authenticity is the ‘principal deliberative virtue’ and the caucus room is the ‘principal place in the deliberative process where it is found’ (ibid.).

The interviews resonate with this description. Indeed, even though much of the time in the PPG meetings are reserved for management and briefing tasks, and less on deliberating on matters, the idea that people ‘put down their guard’ does have an effect. In my view, this is where the affirmative context embedded in the features of sincerity and authenticity comes in. Dealing with these two (normative) ideals of deliberative democracy within a context does not solve the puzzlement of their relevance that is attached to the rationalist-oriented Habermasian ‘type I’ deliberation (Bächtiger et al. 2010) that differentiates between the strategic and communicative intent. Even though questions of sincerity and authenticity are more relaxed in the ‘type II’ deliberation (ibid.), the present study can contribute in explaining the contextual circumstances that affect the prevalence of such accounts. Taking this approach can illuminate the ‘deliberative functions of institutional norms, rules, and constraints’ (Warren 2007, cf. Bächtiger et al. 2010, 44). Here, the intentions of deliberators may get overlooked as drastic strategic aspirations, but the outcome still may be deliberative in function (ibid.).

If one accepts the idea that the PPG meetings operate with the logic of caucus deliberation, characterised by authenticity and sincerity, then this may enable parliamentarians to test their own ideas and thoughts. This reflexive attitude was referred to by one interviewee in terms of ‘brain work’:

It is in the group where you can ponder things and pitch rough, untested ideas to the others. Would there be any sense in this, could we solve it like that? And it is actually where you develop your own thinking [*aivotyötä*, literally ‘brain work’] and your relation to some matter. PPG meetings are also the kind where you get the kind of information that is not available anywhere else. (III: 14: 46:11)

[...] the best kinds of revelations are those where you realise that I previously thought this could have been the best solution, until I learned additional information and came to see another perspective on the matter. It is exactly that you get to hear and reflect these also with your PPG is immensely important. What I've come to understand in politics and with people in it is how differently people perceive the world. One person can see things as being very straightforward, whereas another sees things very diversely. And when different people meet and communicate, we don't genuinely communicate—we can come to a conclusion without sharing the same understanding. We use the same words, but we're talking about completely different things. (III: 13: 37:27)

The ability to pitch undeveloped ideas assumes at least relative openness of the deliberative process. The willingness to learn and listen are virtues encompassed by deliberative processes that are potentially open-ended and transformative. What the second quotation above portrays is the idea that deliberation is 'a cooperative game' which aims profoundly at making sense of the world (Goodin 2008b, 189). Without sharing at least the minimum level of understanding on things and meaning the substances of these interactions become meaningless (ibid.). What is being discussed remains an open question. Nonetheless, as this MP hesitantly says, political decisions can be carried out.

Revealing that one's opinions and stances are not permanently fixed is easier in a setting from where institutionally ascribed 'enemies' are absent. Sharing of some rough political ideology and corresponding vague opinions is assumed by the very fact that MPs belong to the same political party and have voluntarily decided to be members of the PPG. For some, relying on justifications derived from this shared value basis makes listening to argumentation enjoyable and interesting (III: 28: 1:19:39). When deliberation takes place only among peers it affects how argumentative practices are adopted.

In argumentation, for one thing, the party stance and platform can be endorsed without elaborate justifications. In this setting, justifications are not 'owed' as they would be with opponents, or in particular the general public. Consequently, orientation towards common good can be downplayed in argumentation and consideration to particular interests can be more readily exposed in reason-giving. Authenticity can also be thought to be manifested when justifications of opinions are drawn from the 'home turf' (Mykkänen 2001b). In PPGs this is a legitimate reason-giving, whereas in other contexts it would be more suspect and in need of more general 'representative' glossing. 'My constituency does not like this' or 'I heard this from my home turf' would hardly be a justifiable or credible claim in a committee room. The implicit continuation of this statement—'it would be politically harmful to me to support this legislation'—is an entirely legitimate and acceptable claim in a PPG. In those situations notwithstanding demonstrated sincerity—voicing concerns about personal political losses—does not count credible if used to justify diverging from the party line. These implicit norms about self-interested motivations can be thought to guide deliberations towards other-regarding direction, but with a strategical twist: reasoning from a collective point of view where lost votes are not only personal but can affect everybody who 'sails under the same flag'.

United party standing is neither carved in stone nor unison. The opinion-building function is also politically reflected in retrospect, but it can also reveal great differences in how things and their importance are perceived:

We are not controlled by any party office. That is why PPG meetings are like a small sampling and sounding out of ideas. Do we at all think the same on matters? In some cases yes, and in some you in fact note that this issue has not been critically handled in ages in this party. (III: 9: 39:24)

Intragroup deliberation, and especially its critical forms, is so important that one MP (III: 12: 36:53) referred to it as a *'life insurance'* to the party. It means that PPG meetings should be the place where uncertainties and disagreements are publicly voiced. When asked about why bringing up dissident voices more openly in a group, one MP replied that it is the party that *'carries the political responsibility'* (III: 20: 1:01:16). Governing takes a toll on party support and individual support: *'what it will cost me, in my districts'* (ibid.).

In particular, these concerns embody governing coalition parties, which give up part of their *'representational autonomy'* in exchange for governing. Opposition parties and their representatives are entitled to larger freedoms when it comes to taking dissenting opinions all the way through the deliberative process, i.e. by pressing the *'wrong'* button in voting. Representatives are entitled to have dissenting opinions—which are after all inherent to democratic politics—but they also need outlets for voicing those disagreements that are directed to one's own political group. In general, however, the expressive-deliberative mode discussed here assumed in the affirmative context states the following: when endorsing the expressive-deliberative mode participants are encouraged that uncertainties, including those that articulate ideological and other commitments, are voiced out and expressed. Entailing a reflective understanding of what kind of representative one takes one to be or aspires to be are often inherently posited, not always against but towards ideas of democratic governing.

From the perspective of group dynamics it is the individual representative's responsibility is to share those concerns—if not for the purpose of trying to persuade others, then at least for the purpose of informing others and especially the leadership about them. Letting others know of one's opinions is thought to be one of the most central responsibilities when operating within a collective. There is also that perspective that not keeping the PPG leadership informed is very much frowned upon at least when being asked by the MPs who act in those positions (party leader, PPG leader, head of the committee group).

When these utterances are treated as representative claims, they are in effect submitted to others for judgement, and if these claims fail to persuade and win a majority the opinion is not accepted. If the representative happens to convince their colleagues of their opinion in the PPG, *'it's a big thing'*: *'it matters, and then we talk about general politics'* (III: 4: 20:24). But if the representative's opinion *'gets heard and appreciated'* (ibid.: 7:30) but turned down after the process, it is then up to the MP to decide what to do and how to advance. In general, however, *'nobody cooperates with a fist'*, as one interviewee put it (III: 29: 2:27:02).

Loyalty is measured also in terms of not acting behind the back (of the PPG). What deliberation does from the perspective of the leadership, and of the collective, is revealing members' positions, which makes it possible to ensure and secure the cohesiveness of future action. Most importantly, only intra-party deliberation that is sufficiently able to bring hesitations and concerns to light can verify that representatives can submit and commit themselves to the decision that is collectively taken. One MP who has acted in leadership position explains:

You gain people's commitment when everyone can discuss things and everyone gets a say, which is important. It is considered when we take a decision and move forward with it. Afterwards, people accept that it doesn't happen 100 percent but 80 percent when everyone has been taking part in modifying it and everyone feels that they have been heard. (III: 3: 36:16)

This contributes to the ability for compromise and gaining and demonstrating loyalty. Although there is a need for a greater focus on the intraparty perspective on deliberation, it is clear that the scale issue of deliberation, as it has been called (Parkinson 2006), is a concern also in legislatures. In larger PPGs, the opportunities for thoughtful and satisfactory deliberation are more difficult than in smaller ones. These observations were brought up by members from smaller groups, but I would argue that the benefits are the same regardless of group size:

[...] when we are a small group it is pretty easy to say that we've always had the tradition, and I've always thought that on a personal and psychological level it's easier to be a member of a smaller group because you have more time for arguing. You can argue back and forth and be angry, and you have the time to make up. And find some common ground. This contrasts with big groups, where everyone only gets a minute or no time at all in a meeting to say what they want to say. And you go through things in a hierarchy and influence in other ways. I could imagine that it is frustrating. We are spoiled in that sense, as we communicate quite a lot in our group. Sometimes it has been quite dramatic, and sometimes less so. But, if you compare to other groups, it shows in some ways, it ties people together and people appear as loyal to the outside. Just the fact that you can go through each other's thoughts and find out why someone else thinks the way they do. (III: 7: 06:00)

The interviews attest to the fact that deliberation is conditioned by tangible elements like the number of participants and time. Temporal significance of representation and deliberation is therefore evident in the practices that make up collective opinion-making and articulating them by which I mean situations in which the premises of party standing restrict the transformative character of deliberative processes. In any case, what many of the MPs interviewed hoped for was more time to dwell on and immerse themselves in discussions in PPGs and in committees. Notably, even though only a few of the MPs interviewed specifically recognised or used the term 'deliberation' when talking about the merits of discussion and having time for it, what they mean by it comes very close to definitions of deliberation.

A clear example of this is that no one really wished for more time for plenary discussions. The other spatial venues of deliberation in the parliament seem congested with

legislative matters on the political agenda ‘for getting to the root’ of matters, and learning from others’ perspectives become limited. Some of the MPs interviewed expressed worries about the lack of time for deliberation, especially in committee settings.

Another temporal feature relating to the functions of representation in a PPG meeting concerns political self-understanding of the party as a collective. An inclination towards self-criticism and reflection is generally welcomed, but is unnecessary if too much focus is given to analysis of past performances. This also relates to general strategic considerations on with what ‘angles’ different PPGs and parties enter the plenary debates on upcoming bills.²⁹

Factors affecting personal and party support are never far away. Ultimately, neither PPGs as political collectives nor individual MPs cannot completely escape the reality of electoral competition. For some early deliberative theorists, for example Bessette (1994, 48), any discussion of planning or strategy would not even count as deliberation, since the reasoning is based on ulterior aspects and not on the matter itself. However, deliberating about different strategic positions and respective implications does not erase underlying capabilities. An experienced, refined parliamentarian can grasp the reasons for colleagues’ dissenting and conflicting perspectives and positions, and may very well come up with novel solutions through strategic reasoning—and despite the strategic reasoning of colleagues. For one, accommodating perspectives can form bridging outcomes for practical disagreements among coalition partners.

Regardless of this relative appeasement on the strategic attributes of legislative behaviour, according to some MPs the necessary collective understanding of ‘*who we are*’ and ‘*where are we going*’ are overshadowed by assessments of recent public plenary performances and overall management (III: 12). Another experienced MP (III: 27: 1:21:44) feared that their PPG was losing their vision of the future: their group was excessively ‘*backward-leaning*’. This failing, in the MP’s view, can take the form of ‘self-flagellation’ in PPG meetings, with considerable time being taken up with mulling over past failures.

However, these differences may also relate to differences in the work mode that depends on whether the party is in government or in opposition. *The ‘rhythm is completely different’*, according to one MP (III: 10: 8:12). It affects what practices can be discussed in the PPG meetings:

²⁹ One MP (IV: 9: 51:02) described this aspiration embedded in the idea of capturing deliberation as a cooperative game ‘*for me, it’s more valuable to talk to XX [name of the opposition party leader removed] than with XX [name of own party leader removed] if I want to understand how things are and why people think what they think*’. All this requires, in general, more time for deliberation, which was something explicitly brought up in some of the interviews (III: 9, III: 10, III: 17, IV: 9). The travel and excursions that committees make together during the parliamentary term are valued not only for the opportunity to experience and learn, but also because of the social aspect. As one claimed (I: 4: 7:13) and I think that this interpretation can be generalised, the ‘*group’s interest can become apparent in a stronger manner in reality than when we just sit in a formal setting together and concentrate on where the comma should be put somewhere in a bill*’.

In opposition, you have time to analyse the political situation all the time and ponder where we are and where we are going, and do we have a good course. [...] The rhythm of opposition is laid-back where you can yourself decide what you do and pay attention to rhetoric, to the display: to which kind of wrapping you place that issue? Versus to government that just tries to survive. At worst, you try to survive from day to day, one hour to the next, one day to the next, week after week. Government lives only just in that moment when in the opposition you can look a year ahead, five years ahead. (III: 10: 8:12)

Ensuring the survival of the government imposes a strain that appears in the trade-off, in the exchange of ruling and governing. Here, the discussed critical deliberations and voicing out disagreements are also portrayals of the struggles on PPG's autonomy over the political party. This is the case with governing PPGs. With legislation that is conflictual or 'big and difficult' support for the bill is dependent on PPG members becoming convinced that the law should be passed. Detailed information and refined perspectives deriving from the committee can contradict with what the bill proposes, and here the opinion of the respective committee group can be crucial. The same kind of affirmative function is not similarly necessary with opposition parties (since 'crossing the floor' is more acceptable since it lacks the dangers associated with overturning the government). Conversation can turn out heated within the governing PPGs, and disagreeing opinions are willingly, even aggressively brought forward:

But then, usually, on general politics we can have a rather hard-hitting discussion. There we have people who have a completely [emphasised] different opinion about some party line or government bill. Although there have not been fist fights, it has come close to it every now and then. The atmosphere has been very heated. And I've been in a bad mood there many times. [...] It's the only place where you could say 'hell no' about some legislation that has been proposed—that we must do something about it now, we have to go and negotiate with the minister. (III: 6: 1:02:17)

If the party is in the government, the ministers are expected to be present in the weekly PPG meetings. This practice seems to be enforced, portraying that strive for classic parliamentarism is not entirely exhausted regardless of the dominance of government vs. opposition -setting. Governing party PPGs can inflict significant pressure to their ministers—a relationship described in terms of 'creative tension' (III: 12) and a theme worthy of a scholarly study, as suggested by another (III: 11). Overall, the studies find PPGs in Finland to be elite-centred, with strong emphasis on personal relations to the party leadership (Heidar 2000)³⁰. On these assumptions, and what this analysis also suggests, there is much to investigate (in another study) when the intraparty dynamics of governing party PPGs and the cabinet ministers are in question.

All interviews highlight the observation that regardless of deliberative moments in legislatures being sequenced and distributed; they are not atomised or isolated. There is a dependency on the past that shows that legislative issues and bills do not come as a surprise.

³⁰ Now a bit dated comparative studies on the Nordic parliaments (Heidar 2000, 201) showed that Finnish PPGs are being influenced by government ministers the most (91 points on a scale of 0 to 100), party leaders coming second (79) and PPG leadership (76) third.

For this reason, the role of the governing PPG meeting includes ‘*getting information on what important issues are coming and what kind of contradictions or conflicts there maybe has been and how to relate to it*’ (III: 6: 26:13). This is also again where the difference with being in a government and being in opposition equals as much ‘*a day differs from the night*’ (III: 15: 20:5)—opposition PPGs operate in the dark, whereas government PPGs have access through their ministers to the plans and justifications of the cabinet for the legislation. In terms of capacities for opinion-building, the opposition is reactionary whereas government needs to worry about securing support for the proposed legislation. When opposition lacks access to this information, they get this information through the media or through other sources (e.g. leakages that do take place every now and then). In this comparison having this prior information makes working more coherent, whereas in the opposition ‘you don’t really know which direction you should be boxing’ (III: 5: 16:05). However, the epistemic asymmetry can be tackled:

When you’re in the opposition you are in darkness when it comes to information. [...] If you don’t have, regardless of your own status, trusted relationships to the governing party people who will shed light on why this thing was made this way, what it has been prepared that way; who’s behind it and who’s not, you cannot with full force tap into the decision-making. You talk nonsense: you talk about trees when others talk about forest. [...] This is basic fundament that you know why it has been taken care of the way it has. Otherwise it’s just redundant, the opposition talk. But you must set yourself into a completely other level in those discussions, and when you know are informed and the background has been analysed for you, then surely you will have a better impact. But you can never tell who your source is. Otherwise you break the trust. (III: 27: 1:05:23)

There is a lot of pre-deliberation and negotiation taking place even before the governmental bill is sent to Parliament. ‘There is a lot of that wrangling being done’, one government MP (III: 24: 1:05:24) said. The MP continued: ‘*We went through certain issues beforehand and made ministers change them before they even arrive to us*’. Here is one demonstration on how the role of the PPG has become more important than the political party in the Finnish political landscape. The kind of practice shown here that aims at securing smoother and less conflictual handling in the legislature can be thought to enmesh the institutional boundaries between the legislature and the executive. Here it suffices to note how this political practice, typical to large coalition formations, of impacting legislative issues upfront and prior to parliamentary handling, avoids deliberation by the entire parliament. Some issues that are unfavourable to a coalition partner, regardless of the demonstrated deliberative virtues within the PPG, never appear on the political agenda of the parliament and never gets argued *pro et contra* by the parliament.

Another related thing that was brought up, was how the opinion-formation function on the collective level is further dispersed in the PPG. As the interviews show, many entrusted representatives take part in negotiating and writing the government platform or program. This means that some of the bills have already been receiving a ‘stamp of approval’ by the leadership and PPG members that have been involved in writing the script, so to speak. Some members are out and need to adhere to these decisions and perspectives. The inner hierarchy, resonating with the relevance of being close to the leadership, can also dictate the

opinions expressed in the meetings. Due to this argued asymmetry ever so elevate the need for deliberation: to allow time to go through the relevant information and arguments. Acknowledging this contested inclusion present in the governing PPGs the opposition groups can start out with a cleaner slate.

vi Managing torment

Deliberations in the PPG meetings facilitate many functions that have been outlined in the previous section and continue in this one. These deliberations often form the bedrock when it comes to position-taking as a collective but ideally, what also happens is that representation becomes refined in the process of opinion-formation. These resolutions and provisional outcomes about what is to be represented and what makes up the particular reasons and justifications echo in the other two formal spatial contexts of Parliament, the committee and the plenary. However, unlike this formal locus, PPG meetings lack institutionalised status and format. Arguably, what is to be done within those meetings is more up in the air when it comes to ascribing tasks.

Therefore, the purpose and function of PPGs is an open question, something into which individual MPs may have more to say also in defining them. It is also part of the reason why PPG meetings tap into all contexts of representation proposed in this research. Even though I see the affirmative functions the most significant here, PPG meetings also result in decisions being issued when things are “getting done”. As such, the operative context is also invoked, which has real consequences in the other venues within the parliament. When matters have been handled profusely enough in the PPG meetings it enables the kind of hitching together which usually translates into unity. Finally, some accounts also conjure performative context when features of posturing, campaigning and purchasing principled and adversary positions are taken on by MPs. What this further tells us is that political parties and PPGs are not ‘monoliths’ but consist of MPs who in democratic politics compete against each other. This feature is heightened by the Finnish electoral system with its open party lists emphasising personal constituency connection (and service).

Expertise that PPG members possess through intensive labouring in the committees is an essential representative resource to the group as well as to the MP themselves, in the way discussed earlier. Connected to the commitment that develops during the long committee incumbency entails the possibility that representatives shift their general position on specific policy issues. This demonstrates the most essential, transformative features that deliberation assumes and illuminates the institutionally built-in friction vis-à-vis party representation. In the case of a certain committee one admitted that *working in the committee*’ made that MP sympathetic to the policy area and aligned some personal objectives accordingly, *‘something I don’t deny’* (III: 15: 20:19). This suggestive re-orienting of prior opinions and attitudes entails the prospect that committee members begin to ‘take sides’ of the policy area within the PPG. In those situations the represented interests implicitly embedded in the collectives start mixing and blending which may turn out sources of disagreement and conflict. This relates to also to how trust—MPs in relation to their committees and their PPGs—affects deliberation (Mykkänen 2001b; 2010).

When it comes to the level of cohesion, descriptions of PPGs will differ from group to group. Parliamentary studies take the feature of group cohesion as one of the variables explaining the maintenance of intra-party conflict (Heidar and Kooole 2000a; 2000b). Further acknowledging what is defined as ‘collective action problem’—how to prevent representatives from ‘shirking’ from the party line—keeping everybody on board is essential. In this research setting these notions turn into a question of deliberation that arguably can facilitate cohesion better than sanctions imposed by the party leadership. This perspective also offers a glimpse into how Finnish PPGs deal with internal disagreement and resistance, and—more importantly—how they can be manifested and dealt with through means of deliberation?

When PPGs are comprised of supposedly politically like-minded representatives, it is not entirely misinformed to note how in some sense PPG meetings or ‘caucus deliberations’ share some aspects with what deliberative theorists would call ‘enclave deliberations’. As has been argued most famously by Sunstein (2002), in a closed setting homogenous groups become prone to group polarisation. If not exposed to different and conflicting arguments and viewpoints during the deliberative process, pre-deliberative commitments can become polarised and opinions shift to the other end. This is not what I am claiming what could be happening with Finnish PPGs, and recent empirical studies have provided a counterclaim to the group polarisation hypothesis in face-to-face encounters (Grönlund, Herne, and Setälä 2015). Neither am I arguing that representatives would be in a disempowered and societally vulnerable position, and therefore would necessitate that their deliberations should retreat to protected enclaves.

However, research in experimental social psychology can show how social comparison affects the modification and articulation of group deliberation. Through social comparison, ‘members fear loss of reputation by being in the minority or because the majority can supply more arguments for their position and thereby strengthen their confidence in their views, win over the undecided, and silence opponents’ (Karpowitz, Raphael, and Hammond 2009, 580). When advocating for political deliberation, conformism deems a problem that circumscribes criticism (Manin 2017).

Overall, this does not seem to be the case with Finnish representatives, since many interviewees emphasised that representatives should be ready and capable to announce opinions, also disagreeing and unpopular ones. Taking into the account the pressure that MPs work under, having the chance to voice one’s frustrations is important, but the function also extends to reflection, as one interviewee explained:

In a parliamentary group, you can genuinely express disagreements. You don’t need to worry about anybody there mocking you for taking that position. And I think that’s really wise, since you have to be able to speak your mind somewhere, after all, and the atmosphere must be one where that can be done—it must be possible to go against the grain within your own group. And this is just how I want it; it would be a terrible situation if you had to bottle it all up inside you. Voicing disagreement does make things easier, even if your opposing view doesn’t win out after all. In my opinion, that’s still better than keeping silent about it. And I think it’s also a really good thing for those who disagree with you to hear your position, and for them to listen to your reasons for it. And then to weigh up their own perspective in light of that. (II: 12: 26:53)

The opportunity for reflection and inherent persuasive character that reasoned justifications of disagreeing opinions imply salutary effects also from a group perspective. As mentioned earlier, if disagreements are buried within the party it becomes ‘demented’ (III: 12: 36:53). Also, it can be argued that regardless of the level of group cohesion deliberation has a conjunctive rather than disruptive impact. What the interviews underscore is that deliberation (having the time for it and allowing sincerity and critical voices to be heard) has a profound legitimising character that purchases trust and loyalty. The atmosphere that grants sincere affirmation and display of uncertainties ushers a deliberative process.

Arguably, however, discretion is advised, especially so in the case of junior MPs when *‘it is important that you conform to the group rather than going solo’* (III: 15: 21:37), as one senior MP said. Questions of reputation and trust, within enclave deliberations can indeed stifle dissent. Even though all representatives need to regulate these in the sense that discretion and judgment is ascribed to situations, it is even more of a concern for junior MPs. This balancing act in the context of governing party dynamics is given a lot of thought—in this case, every day:

[...] It’s good that you asked this. To me, this is the decisive and difficult demarcation when acting as a governing party MP. A tough deliberation [referring here in terms of balancing], to what extent you comment the bills, as supporting them. [...] An MP who doesn’t act as a team member is started to think a weakling, for good reasons. No party benefits from a soloist. You must stay in the team. On the other hand, you must be able to maintain, when I think of myself, a certain kind of a profile of a critical intellect, so that you maintain your own profile and say honestly what you think. For this reason this question, about how to comment about matters, one must think almost on daily basis. I try to do it so that when I want to present a differing nuance from the government decision, I do that seldom. Those are the kind of moments you don’t want to use too often. You let the smallest weaknesses pass... I don’t interfere the small things. I use the occasion when there’s a burning desire but I try to do it, base it on the government programme. [...] But this conflict is real. You must be honest to be credible but support the government. I don’t know how other MPs resolve this question, supposedly in various ways. (III: 9: 1:10:45)

This ‘tough deliberation’, as cited above, governing party dynamics that assumes cohesion with other significance and consequences than with the opposition parties. However, even to those who would like to undermine the collective potential of operating in unison and instead emphasise individualistic elements of representative work, seeing PPGs as ‘collections of self-employed’ (III: 9: 39:24), the group cannot go unnoticed. When being introduced to what Warren (2017, 49) defines as ‘two- and three-level games’, the overlapping representative commitments are consequential to the ways in which deliberative representation takes shape.

The way individual and collective aspirations are prioritised when working in a group are displayed in many ways. For one, attendance to the meetings was not being asked in the interviews but it was hinted that not attending them gives a clear signal to one’s colleagues. In general, the basic ethos is that if one is not interested in others, others have no reason to reciprocate. *‘When they have some important thing they want to move forward with, they*

don't get support' (III: 18: 1:21:37) Elaborating on this another MP (III: 21: 39:15) pondered that *'those who cling only to the matters of one's own district and care little or not at all about other matters is left on the political sidelines'*. Having a *'broader perspective'* (meaning taking responsibility for the whole nation's causes) *'ensures that you can more credibly raise issues that are important to your voters or yourself'* (ibid.).

Notwithstanding the reciprocal setting, it also follows from this that dissenting and conflicting opinions are read from an angle where representatives treat each other as strategic, political players. MPs keep close check of what motives lie behind disagreements that are raised with the PPG:

Interviewer: What are the kinds of situations in which MP goes against their own group on some issue?

Respondent: Well, you must be convinced of your own stance and have very good justifications for your opinion. If you are [disagreeing] just for the sake of disagreeing, or because it would be good publicity, people will see that you are seeking support at the expense of others. (III: 18: 1:22:13)

There are, of course, certain members in the PPGs, who regardless of what is being discussed or done, just go their own ways. Regardless of what has been agreed. Then you also make a mental note that they cannot be [trusted], if they come and ask that could we, as a group, put this forward. No one necessarily goes with it. But, yeah, 'you're only after your own issues, but you are not ready to commit or support anyone else's issues'. It's a significant weighing to be made among themselves. Where the line is drawn, what is so ultimately important that you're ready to against your own group. (III: 13: 32:49)

Dissent is kept in check due to the partisan and electoral elements of politics. Authorship of claims is the battleground of politics, and is vigilantly guarded and monitored. In joint efforts that often include compromise (even in its bitter forms), the authorship is commonly shared. When the burden is shared, the 'torment' (tuska, a Finnish Parliament jargon word to describe making difficult decisions that are often against your opinions and often against the interests you claim to represent), becomes more tolerable. It also mitigates questions with justifications of the torment when it is shared by the whole group. Now, if the deliberative process ends in a resolution that overcomes the initial disagreement and features contributing to it are settled, a certain principle of fairness and mutuality guard communication about the outcome. It means that representatives refrain from publicly commenting about the hardships of committing to a compromise. This observation will be revisited later in the operative and performative contexts.

Many of the aforementioned observations circulate around trust and loyalty, an underlying general theme in the interviews. Two levels of implications that trust entails can be found in the interviews: the micro-level and the macro-level ones. Starting from the former, as a maxim, trust is the most important capital an MP can acquire. It can be a resource that at the same time combines overlapping instances of reciprocity, loyalty, coercion and internal compromise. It is also the cohesive element that sustains complex relations within a party. Therefore, qualifications ensued by the affirmative context, how

you manage and negotiate this process of judgment with others, and reveal it to others, are tell-tale signs that are read into the affirmative context. These virtues can translate into currency that helps push matters forward, with the aid of others.

The notion of trust has many levels, as in the case of forming collaborations that enable getting things done. Consequently, it may be to some extent inaccessible in the language of political theory; as Saward (2019) has argued, many features in political representation and democratic politics happen outside the scope of political theory. When taking the perspective of a 'political anthropologist' (ibid., 286), we seem to lack theoretical language that would explain the observation from the interviews about why some people, such as MPs who are colleagues, can work well together. As in any workplace, those working in the Finnish Parliament establish real friendships in the course of their work. Within the committees in particular these companionships can benefit in the making of good and coherent public policies.

From the macro-level impact that trust can have on deliberation, discussed above, from the processual stance the impact can be different. Mykkänen (2010) makes an important claim that trust not only can improve but actually inhibits deliberation in the Finnish Parliament. Many central mechanisms of delegation that are viable conditions for operations of a 'working parliament' rely on trust, as well as to shielding deliberations from the public like with committee sessions. In addition to these functions that trust supports, it can also induce the kind of discretion and judgment that consequently reduces deliberative accounts (Mykkänen 2010). What happens is that highly enforced distribution of work in PPGs, founded on trusted relations among the members, discussions are not brought forward to be discussed by all participants in the group. Committee groups are selective in deciding which themes are important enough to become dissected and scrutinised by all.

On these assumptions, from the perspective of collective action trust is also a more disguised coercive measure, an unspoken expectation of what one is expected to do. We can say that trustworthiness then, has a retrospective feature upon which forecasting future conduct or action is compared to. As such, it reduces the 'transaction costs' since it lessens uncertainty embedded in all human interactions. A bad track record on past behaviour, such as not keeping a promise, is taken as a guarantee that the same will happen again. Curiously, it seems that the idea of gyroscopic representation (Mansbridge 2003) is applicable also within the legislature, in the way that features of gyroscopic representatives are assessed by the MP colleagues. But perhaps unlike with electoral bonds, defects among parliamentarians can bring trust to a sudden end. The way that the MPs interviewed discuss trust suggests that once trust is lost it is very difficult to regain. *'Trust is something you can lose only once'* (III: 29: 2:30:26) was a maxim echoed in many of the interviewees.

Loyalty translates into trustworthiness in the parliamentary ecology. These notions become applicable in the committee that poses a potential risk that legislating behind closed doors pose to parliamentary party groups as an actor for group representation. As shown, PPGs delegate deliberative authority to their members. It can also manifest how, as 'warriors of the party' quietly accept poor decisions in the hope for reciprocity. This reciprocity could materialise in the form of being granted a position (of trust) within the PPG and in the committee. As already discussed, another reason for abiding by difficult group decisions is the expectation that the loyalty and trust can one day be capitalised on: the others will come

to your aid, and back you up on a matter of importance to you. And in extraordinary circumstances, when a governing party member decides to go all in and refuses to support the bill, it may end up that '*the group gives cover*' (III: 17: 1:09:40). The whole group turns against the piece of legislation.

When it comes to argument about trust reducing deliberation within legislatures (Mykkänen 2010), there could be a counter-claim made here. Some of the smaller PPGs seem to foster an atmosphere that depends on expressed mutual trust and respect. This helps ensure that those deliberations are not disclosed to outsiders. If these circumstances are met, a genuine and frank exchange of opinions can take place. In addition, it is not only that these deliberations are not leaked outside but that if there is trust you can vent. You can be sure that your grievances will get heard even if they do not affect, i.e. you are unable to make others change their minds on the matter. Trust-based deliberations that also reside in the committee are apt for demonstrations of sincerity and authenticity, as Goodin (2005; 2008b) argued with reference to caucus-room deliberations.

To summarize this subchapter we can argue the following: deliberative representation in the affirmative context pinpoints to features in opinion-formation when matters may not be settled yet. The idea of affirmation entails the inherent assumption that, while actors often hold views and opinions exogenously to the deliberative process they engage in, opinions and such are not merely 'checked' with others but also rendered for inspection and consideration. Henceforth, participants will be keener to 'feel the force of others' arguments' (Urbinati 2006, 47). I also briefly pointed out how the physical institutional setting and the acknowledgment of being an elected member of the parliament force a shared understanding that speaks to institutional representation. The mandate to represent is equal. This sensitivity can be thought to explain also the functions of cooperation and concessions available in the affirmative context.

Deliberative representation can also be a matter of contestation. These practices may support epistemic function but when it comes to disseminating information and articulating opinions it is about sharing with others. The kind of sincerity is also somewhat expected from MPs in PPGs. For this reason, I use the term *expressive-deliberative* to describe the dominant deliberative mode available in the affirmative context. It highlights the notions of identity and moral character expressed in the deliberations by the MPs. In the practical parliamentary setting, as we have seen, PPGs can operate cohesively when scrutinising tasks are distributed mainly to committee groups. Deliberation can also purchase the kind of affirmation needed to revise and refine positions, and bringing forward new ones. Consequently, also adding to the lack of clear institutional structures and procedures, the definition, target and outcome of the deliberative process remains open in the affirmative context.

4.2 Operative context

Many parliamentary activities and practices take place in a context that can be described as operative. By operative I mean MPs' references to efficacy, consciously moving forward in a way that produces effects and outcomes. Simply put, the overall impetus is to make a difference, to which the institutional setting also gives support. This desire seems to be uppermost in the mindset of MPs when they describe and justify their conduct as elected representatives.

In this subchapter I discuss in more detail how the functions related to forming and holding opinions and standings translate into action. Democratic politics require decisions to be made, or otherwise representative governance would be unnecessary. Within the backdrop of plurality, decisions translate into agreements. Just as political representation entails the feature of provisionality, democratic agreements achieved within a legislature are also binding (although they may get overturned later). Theoretically, when it comes to decision-making the scholarship in deliberative theory is divided, but the rationale of ending with a consensual agreement has been discarded as an ideal of deliberation. Amongst others, Cohen (1997), Gutmann and Thompson (1996; 2004; 2012) and Parkinson (2003, 2006) strive for a decision-making orientation in their understanding of deliberative democracy. More recently, the problem of deadlocks has been addressed in the US political system, where representative institutions are unable to produce effects (Warren and Mansbridge 2013). Lack of decision-making and impotence in executing them is a recurrent democratic problem, undermining legitimacy of representative government and authority of rule of the people, and something that can guide the framing of research problems by democratic theories (Warren 2017). Notably, as 'agreement seeking procedures' proposal of deliberative negotiation by Warren and Mansbridge (2013; see also Naurin & Reh 2018) as well as distinguishing elements for nurturing a spirit of compromise (Gutmann and Thompson 2012) are welcomed. These insights prove helpful in discerning the operative context of representation.

The operative context that I mainly locate in the committee stage of the institutional setting of legislature also offers a different perspective that highlights the question of the goal of the deliberative process that respective deliberations should aim at. As argued, institutional rules do not guide caucus deliberations the same way as with practices in committees and the plenary. This allows targeting of the deliberative process differently, whereas in committee and plenary work the process follows a set course of action, resulting in a report or a vote.

In what follows, I will go through notions that I read into the operative context. I will start by describing how getting things done translate into theoretical language on representation. Then I move on to discussing the agreements and novelty of compromise-practices that I anchor mainly to committee work. This leads us to an important feature of expert hearings. They form, in many ways, the bedrock for drafting of the committee reports and statements. In addition to this game of expertise I will include some discussion on institutional positions or 'roles'. These positions, assisting the operative context, allow representatives additional resources for making an impact, but then at the same time restrict the carrying out of some representative activities.

i On making a difference (and representing)

Considering their highly select position as being chosen through electoral competition, it is not surprising why one MP (III: 20: 2:27:26) characterised how *'blandness doesn't slip in'* to the house. Elected representatives have presumably some certain capacities or representative qualities that permitted them being elected. As the MP quoted above suggests, representatives need to have an edge and be willing and capable of responding to a wide variety of substantial issues and in a wide variety of situations, many of which may arise without warning. As discussed in the theoretical part, in distinguishing the criteria for the selection more orthodox descriptive and substantive representation notions are superseded by a broader mix of features related to gyroscopic representatives. Relying on a combination of characteristics such a 'likeability' and feeling of aligned interest not only fuse trust on the part of the represented, but—and perhaps more importantly—also allow for the formation of deliberative relations between the representative and the represented (Mansbridge 2003; 2009; 2016).

When working within a legislature, representatives draw on these standpoints as resources that reflect the changing dynamics of representation. Research on legislative roles also tries to grasp the operative orientations from different sociological (motivational theories) and rational choice standpoints (see e.g. Andeweg 2014). On a general level, it becomes possible to read into this frame the ways in which actions and deliberations are performed to be obviously oriented towards certain representative goals and aspirations. *'You are in politics to make an impact. [...] In elections you aim to win, you aim to gain power, at being in the government, at having influence. This chain is clear and is completely natural in politics'* (III: 12: 10:16.) Reflecting on losing power, as happens to many on election night, reinforces the idea that *'politicians go [into the legislature] to get to use that power'* (III: 6: 18:4).

The argument about the foundational motivation for making an impact on societal issues is also reinforced through its negation: not making it into the government leaves the aspirant with limited resources when it comes to wielding power. When relegated to the opposition, the possibilities for exerting a tangible influence are far more limited. In majoritarian parliamentary systems legislative power is almost exclusively reserved to the government (and the governing parties).

While in opposition, claiming to have written *'about 50 objections on a policy [specifics withheld]'* and *'50 columns and held 150 influential speeches, and NOTHING [emphasised] has helped'* (III: 29: 24:37). The only legislation-related impact that this MP was able to make was having a typographical error removed from one legislative proposal. This lack of executive power when in opposition explains why, in the Finnish political landscape, all parties strive for a position in the government regardless of the cost. Support for the governing parties tends to drop in subsequent elections (most recent information in Pitkänen and Westinen 2019; Raunio 2011, 138).

Although parliamentary work in the opposition comes with limited resources of executive power, life in the government is a struggle of a different kind. For some, this can come as a surprise:

When I thought that when we got into the government—now life begins, so to speak, as you don't have to scribble [waste time with writing] these objections. But no, this is truly work here because now you need to be on-board, anticipatorily (II: 10: 33:11).

As discussed before, keeping everybody on board is the challenge for the governing parties in way that members '*would read little as possible about things from the papers and hear about them as much as possible beforehand*' (III: 10: 8:12). Here we also see that contexts of representation have the temporal faculty that makes it also relevant regarding operative context. Generally, when interviewed MPs describe political processes they outline a compound where influencing and the general ethos of getting things done manifest in various representative activities and pinpoint certain temporal points. For this reason, although in practice the operative context is institutionally situated to the committee handling in this research, in reality, for the governing parties, the operative context precedes all. Making an impact on legislation slips beyond the stage of parliamentary handling, that is before the bill is introduced to parliament. Often the opposition has no access to this knowledge.

Analysed through research interviews this implementation-centred notion becomes very clear regardless of government-opposition divide: '*Of course I aim at advancing those [interests] in those instances I'm involved in, because it's my job to do so*' (II: 12: 23:59). On the surface the citation above would support the conventional definition of political representation known as the interest and responsiveness approach': that definitive functions of political representation are advancing of interests and being responsive to the constituency (Rehfeld 2018). However, the theoretical perspective that I take enables a clearer view of the dispersion or dissolution of representation through MPs intersubjective concentration on the functionally differentiated task their case of representation is used. In each particular account the orientation articulated through 'in order to' is implied and performed through the task (Rehfeld 2018, 231–33). Which practical activities and tasks MPs take on in their line of work that defines representation is not only a theoretically aligned question but also an empirically valid one. When MPs refer to their role as representatives, they seem to be addressing descriptions of which representative tasks should take priority, something that they connect with being a representative in the first place. Secondly, this interpretation is also linked to the capacities to function as an MP. Managing stress and fatigue tell a story of the highly demanding nature of representation, since—as several representatives put it (e.g. III: 22, III: 20, III: 23, III: 27)—MPs are in effect 'on call' all the time.³¹

There is a further functional contingency in the way that representatives seem to have *not* sought office in the Parliament of Finland for the purpose of 'talking' but for 'doing',

³¹ In addition, when representation is perceived from the perspective of communication seeing representative practices as communicating and deliberating with various audiences (who also contribute to defining of the tasks) makes the *actual carrying out* representation problematic. There are different perspectives that MPs endorse in supporting representative performance which seem to blend the boundaries of what (activities) counts as representing. For one, when a representative appears in magazines or appear on television, would that, as an activity, count as representing? Or when representative act as 'post offices, taking care of individual people's cases regarding e.g. issues with social security and legal rights, advocating and directing them forward to relevant authorities?

to borrow Mill's words (Pekonen 2008). In parliamentary studies this idea is also reflected in the difference between debating and working parliament, with the Finnish Parliament belonging to the latter (Raunio and Wiberg 2014, 16). Formally, it means that as an institution Parliament has significant legislative powers, including budgetary powers.³² As discussed earlier, committees have a major significance in relation to MPs' toolbox in becoming informed and knowledgeable about specific policy fields but arguably also that 'real work' takes place there. It outlines a general principle that highlights, again, the expertise that committees crucially enable: *'for real, in order to influence you must delve deep into those issues'* (I: 7: 10:21). Partaking actively in highly valued committee work, but also having prior experience and knowledge, makes it possible to make a difference: *'It is, for real, the place where you can have a substantive impact on the handling of an issue and also on the content of the report'* (III: 21: 57:13). This process involves external expert hearings as well as drafting of the committee report (or statement, if another committee has been assigned to give the report) where committee members individually or jointly formulate the text arguing for the committee's opinion.

Committee work is about taking care of issues. Regardless of whether you are in Government or in Opposition, in the committee your possibilities to influence are the highest. Going meticulously through the issues and listening to the experts, a representative has a big possibility to have an effect to the paragraphs and justifications [formal ones in the committee report or statement] and through the changes in the budget. (III: 19: 56:10)

Oversight and scrutiny of legislation in committee work beholds a curious mix of harnessing your individual capacities and capabilities for the collective use of the committee. However, it is also mirrored through the party membership. But then again, in the committee one is alone with one's expertise. What this seem to imply is that while in performative context of the plenary it is *'possible to fake it until you make it'*, as one MP put it (III: 7: 15:41), in the operative context when the function of representation include also specific problem-solving tasks that also test reasoning, 'faking it' does not get one very far. In the operative context when the audience and participants are the same, you need to convince them to have an impact. This notion, again, is critical with those MPs who are the only member in the committee from that (small) party, thus representing alone the whole PPG and making judgments on behalf of the whole group. When there are many members from the same party, not all have to invest in or commit to committee work equally in addition to the fact that distribution of policy areas of responsibilities is often exercised with bigger PPGs.

Committee work also spells out more specifically a requirement for deliberative representation that contributes to the functioning of the legislature as a deliberating institution. As such, it ideally also promotes the articulation and clarification of the elements

³² In reality, however, Parliament formally decides on the state budget but less than one percent is actually allocated by discretion of Parliament. Arguments to enhance Parliament's powers over deciding on the budget (through committee handling) to correct the defect are brought up usually once a year in the media (see also Luomala and Puumala 2010).

that make up politics in the first place. Importantly, it can also reveal that ‘fundamentals’ that parties and political actors disagree upon can be more adaptive than assumed.

Committee discussions are absolutely necessary. It is parliament work at its finest because it is quality monitoring of legislation and sensible articulation of political value difference and fundamental information. (III: 9: 37:12)

**

Well, the main influencing in the committee is not about getting bills changed because that is, in the end, pretty rare irrespective of committee. Instead it is more about affecting the discussion and committee members’ general understanding, something that can manifest so that in the statement or report there are some entries formulated in some certain way. And also those, of course, I laboured with over the years. (III: 28: 1:02)

The deliberative stance and willingness to learn and understand what others have to say, what this interviewed MP cited below underlined throughout the interview, is interwoven in the mutual recognition that everyone is in Parliament for a reason, for making a difference. And it calls for understanding the nature of work that takes place between people:

We are given an enormous [emphasis] bundle of strings in our hand. Like in Linnanmäki [an amusement park in Helsinki], where pulling the string a present moves. My job is to recognise those strings so that I know which string to pull at which moment. It takes time, and knowing who thinks what and who has influence on what. This is work between people. (III: 26: 1:07:48)

The performance-centred understanding of representation highlighted in the capacities for reflexivity as well as in strategical thinking is crucial in the redemption of democratic promises. More importantly, in MP’s own words, *‘redeeming takes place also through how we operate here within this house’* (II: 12: 23:59). The ways in which representatives can manage conflict inherent to the representative institution bear significance to their overall performance that recapitulates the impact that one MP can make (see also Kontula 2018). Resonating with what has been discussed earlier, also in the light of theory, representation is not merely about what but also about *how*. Deliberative representation downplays the idea that representation just ‘happens’ and instead emphasises the particular intentionality of such a phenomenon when analysed from an activity- and context-sensitive perspective. To me, institutional explanations—as to which ways this framework prompt legislative activity—are insufficient, since it expects similarly these activities to be automatic, thus merely ‘happening’. Therefore, when the idea of representation is transplanted into tangible actions within a legislature, we can see that representation becomes an interpersonal phenomenon, making it inherently deliberative in its basic standing.

This relates to the second point about how representative practices are informed by the contexts. Cameron (2018, 152, emphasis added) connects this idea to the activities of the representatives: ‘[R]oles and offices foster functionally differentiated clusters of activities that demand *different excellences*’. Being able to legislate requires representative to act as a ‘practitioner’ who ‘pause or move through available subject-positional resources’, as

Saward (2019, 287) proposes for liminal understanding of representation. Capturing these resources through varied set of available modes of actions we can see how deliberative representation sometimes rotate towards the deliberative side in the sense of ‘open-mindedness’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 22), with unfixed positions and opinions and adaptiveness to existing ones. These can translate into resources that can be used as persuasive means. Persuasion is facilitated through certain kind of modesty and humility, features that do not mean that skills and knowledge should be hidden. However, appearing as someone who holds all capabilities and wisdom to solve political issues is neither credible nor appealing to one’s colleagues working alongside you in the committee. “*If you barge in from the door [MP lifts up sleeves and puts hands on waist], as in ‘so, now let’s fix this social security system’, the other 16 [members of the committee] just stare: ‘Right...’*” (II: 10: 23:26) To the extent MPs discern posturing and pretence seems to underline, yet again, how your persona counts when it comes to interacting with others. On another note, another MP claimed to steer with some questions

... in a manner that when coming forward with my own cause I would not come out as tart, strict or inapt that I would prevent those being so-and-so [in a swing position] from voting as I would hope them to vote. And it is a strength when you know how to use it properly. (III: 17: 13:9:50).

The operative context endorses a deliberative mode I call *strategic-deliberative*, of which this citation above illustrates well. Persuasive means in legislatures can be subtle and they can take shape through prudence and moderate mindset. Essential for the representative is to be mindful when it comes allocation of deliberation and sensing proper moments to engage in persuasive efforts (also in Pekonen 2011). These accounts demonstrate a combination of deliberative and strategic elements at play. For example, in these interactions the realisation that changing others’ minds goes in vain prompts a strategic-deliberative mode where ‘*[i]nstead [of trying to change the minds of others] you need to sense what are those occasions when you can argue for a change in a position and when not. If you preach about everything, people will stop listening to you*’ (III: 2: 1:11:35). The prudence when it comes to refraining from engaging in all opportunities for deliberations, for reason or another (e.g. persuasion, winning the argument, or opening new perspectives) connects with the kind of practical wisdom to differentiate the situations when deliberation can have transformative qualities in the first place. It may also indicate that such strategic openness, contrary to sincerity demonstrated and somewhat expected in the affirmative context (while exercising expressive-deliberative mode), may exclude and downplay viewpoints that are available for the others in formulating opinions and making decisions. From this perspective, then, the expressive-deliberative mode is more apt in facilitating epistemic validity when pieces of information are more readily at hand. Where, on one hand, deliberation does have this enlightening and informing function that is especially available in the affirmative context, on the other hand deliberation needs to end somewhere.

The kind of result-orientedness of deliberative representation is apparent in the operative context that the strategic-deliberative mode supports. Arriving at a decision is often a highlighted feature in institutional deliberation that abides to institutional rules and procedures. They also imply that in order to get somewhere, deliberative process must have

an ending of some kind and conclude something. When MPs nod towards this direction in their understanding of deliberation they are not completely off theoretically in this. Democratic representation and democratic deliberation carry implicit references with binding decision-making (Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Parkinson 2006; Cohen 1997).

As shown in this subchapter, in practical interactions noting these institutional cues relate to seizing deliberative moments available. These conscious decisions translate into the ways representatives present themselves to others—how they represent to other representatives, as an argument not irrelevant in regard also to theoretical applications of political representation. However, this strategic orientation more aligned in the operative context, or consequent strategic openness, does not bracket off deliberative stand. As deliberative democrats now willingly accept, maintaining civility and showing respect to others and their reasons can legitimately be done out of courtesy as a way to increase sociality (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 4–5). The reasons for doing this may not be sincere, but as demonstrating good manners shows, strategic action is difficult to discern or erase from human action. These themes of tact and judgment invite the theme of agreement and compromises, to which we will turn next.

ii Being able to agree and make decisions

Governing demands the ability to make compromises, and in democratic politics this requisite is placed in the hands of elected representatives. Namely, it also reflects the division of labour that the two-track model of deliberative politics by Habermas assumes (see overview in Flynn 2004). Legislatures as ‘strong publics’ have the initiative to make binding decisions. On this level what we can say that compromising is a natural response in democracy when we cannot impose our will upon others, but we are still compelled to make decisions. The perspective about the novelty of compromising and deliberation it necessitates can be forgotten in the prevalence of party democracy. It has been thought that the disciplining measures spelled out by party dynamics provides little room for deliberative manoeuvres, thus signalling the end of the principle of trial by discussion (Manin 1997, 217). As Manin (ibid., 217–8) argues, compromises open up the avenue through which this principle is to be explored.

Legislators and representatives are especially attuned for the necessity to compromise. In the interviews it is linked to intragroup dynamics, as was referred in the previous subchapter. This is especially meaningful when we consider the role of parliamentary committees. When the committee sets out to work, inherently assuming the task of scrutiny and writing of the committee report, compromising faculties and other ‘agreement-seeking measures’ (Warren and Mansbridge 2013) are fused.

I will start here from the more general notion of compromise as an introduction to the theme. Then I turn it into a contrary positioning on the limits and ‘the spirit’ of compromise. This oppositional design is not exhaustive, but it helps to illuminate the differences in the practices. Here compromise bridges the operative and the performative context, thus also having undercurrents within the affirmative context, demonstrating their crucial empirical overlap. More significantly, *political compromises* ‘can be captured only in a context-

sensitive judgment' as Gutmann and Thompson (2012, 49, emphasis added) argue. The contexts articulate how democratic credentials of making a difference and influencing in legislature require negotiations and compromises that are to be publicly discussed and 'shown'.

The idea of compromise, even though it flows throughout the interviews, is difficult to get a grip of since it radiates over many features regarding substance, time and participants. Given the empirical and conceptual opaqueness the intellectual heritage of compromise does not either have a clear home in the literature as Rostbøll and Scavenius (2017) note. Now, when compromise is attached to democracy as the rule of many, then it is '*the price of democracy*' (III: 15: 20:30) since '*no one decides alone in a democracy*' (III: 14: 1:12:17). '*Dictatorships are different*' (ibid.). Or, '*you can be a one-person party and agree with yourself about everything*' (III: 16: 15:12). All things being equal operating in a democracy renders a reflective character to it. As such, it forces participants to interact with one another, and accommodating and being exposed to others' perspectives. Recently Rostbøll and Scavenius (2017, 5) define compromises as interpersonal phenomenon where 'the practical question is with whom, when and about what to compromise'. In the case compromise it is worth paying attention that it is not a democratic (deliberative) practice belonging exclusively to one context. Here I want to raise the point and showcase how there is a path-dependency with elements of opinion-making that manifest especially in compromising.

Notwithstanding the fact that compromises are often interpersonal and take place between participants and parties, the reflexive element of compromise should be considered. Arguably, representatives first ponder elements regarding compromising among themselves just as previously discussed in the affirmative context: they collect and put together the building blocks that could constitute the compromise, and ideally put them into a test in deliberation with others. Resolutions should be consequential also to a reflexive judgment that goes on inside one's head (Goodin 2000), thus also making compromises an *intrapersonal* phenomenon. The idea of compromise is therefore not only framed through the interactions with others but it consists also from a certain kind of mindsets and capacities for reflection and judgment. Also Ankersmit (2002, 195, 205–6), who defended a notion of representation that showcases the feature of (aesthetic) judgment, regarded compromises important.

The way compromises are discussed in the interviews in terms of developing compromises and negotiation reveals that that it is the (many) boundaries of representation that is being negotiated. This interpretation taps into the liminal character of representation (Saward 2019). Representation operates in a transitional manner thus appears to be in constant movement. As such, it complicates indicating the counterparts of representation; who and what they are. It also questions whether it is reasonable even to assume an actor-centred approach to political representation, just as Pitkin (1967, 221) started to anticipate. Therefore, it might even be that the theme of compromise can contribute to the emerging systemic notion of representation. For the present purposes, however, the theme of compromise is a workable framework that can connect with contemporary discussions on representation (and not deliberation in which it is more commonly employed). Here the vocabulary of representation does not cling to the common understanding on interests as

distributable goods and values but instead MPs reflect these in terms of their own self-understanding. The idea through which representative aspirations are projected, MPs acting as parliamentarians and on the other hand as members of collectives, would readily be turned into role orientation theories and representative roles. The problem with them is that they assume somewhat ready set, fixed positions (e.g. of trustee, delegate or ‘politico’) through which legislative practices are carried. In reality they are less fixed, but also that the basic trustee-delegate model conflates elements that should be treated separately (Rehfeld 2009; see also Mansbridge 2011), and therefore analytically truncates understanding on political representation. But as argued before, we will benefit from a more nuanced view on how practitioners negotiate these contextually dependent positions as dynamic ways of staging the legislative performance. And perhaps more importantly, *use them as resources* when interacting with each other.

This point is especially relevant with compromising. The resources that are indicated through the idea of compromise assume that, as one interviewee put it, ‘an MP’s work is not a solo sport’ (III: 11: 1:02:48): ‘in order to operate in any organised community, you must be flexible in regard to your wishes and choose a group where there are as much similarity as possible to your own thoughts’ (III: 16: 15:12). Practicing representative democracy operates very much on the rules stated by party democracy. It relates to the centrality of political parties to organise and stabilise the otherwise “flimsy” representational relationship between the representative and the represented. In practice, however, this dynamic assumes the PPG and the corresponding collective action. On a larger scale, the understanding that MPs employ relates to some democratic ground rules that limit what is achievable and that make it inevitable that compromise is the only way forward in some situations.

Underlining the kind of ethos discussed here justifies the use of party discipline and makes it ‘*indispensable*’, since without it ‘*the hardest decisions would not be made*’ (III: 11: 1:02:48), amongst other similar comments that interviewees made. One interviewee’s remark that ‘*no parliament that works responsibly would do without having also some amount of discipline*’ (III: 19: 59:23) outlines the flickering nature of representation that the standard account and the trajectory of sanctions and embraces. This point that ‘*the system cannot sustain*’ (III: 5: 1:23:08), ‘*nothing comes out from it*’ (III: 9: 1:12:59) –especially in terms of budgetary distribution–was vividly embodied also in animalistic terms, if MPs as ‘*group of chicken that these 200 people form*’ (III: 9: 1:12:59) would be ‘*like wild rabbits out there*’ (III: 5: 1:23:08) or ‘*flock of sparrows when we go the plenary*’ (III: 1: 1:15:42).

But then again, representatives are very attuned with the conflicting feelings, to the extent of being in pains with, and aware that urges to ‘score a point’ must be restrained. Indeed, it portrays the internal tension in political compromise: at the same time democratic processes ‘require politicians to resist compromise, and to embrace it’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 22). Similarly the ubiquity and ambiguity of compromise paints a picture where it is seen in democratic politics simultaneously as a virtue and a vice (Rostbøll and Scavenius 2017, 1–5). The trade-off is further elaborated by Gutmann and Thompson (2012), who place the value of compromise in between democratic functions of governing and campaigning.³³ These two practices derive from two ‘mindsets’ (as Gutmann and

³³ Even though authors pinpoint many of deficiencies in the governing–campaigning in the context of United States, the main dynamics speaks also in Finland. Increasing political polarization and ‘money politics’ may

Thompson call them) that representatives hold: of compromising and uncompromising. The former, pivotal in governing, comprise from adapting one's principles in favour for reaching compromise and endorsing mutual respect. Similarly compromise combines mutual concession and reciprocity (Rostbøll and Scavenius 2018, 1–5), notions that are now detected also by deliberative theory, orienting focus away from consensus-seeking deliberation.

When consensus is not attainable clarification of conflict, arriving at a 'meta-consensus' (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010)—a shared understanding on some issue that participants disagree on—or different forms of bargaining as an agreement-seeking measure are viable results of deliberative processes, given that coercion is kept in check. Coercion that is invoked by mechanisms of party discipline is something that proves problematic to deliberative democrats. Despite relaxing many of the elements relevant to 'first generation' of deliberative theorists the question on absence of power is still 'unchallenged' and 'unrevised' within the paradigm (Bächtiger et al. 2018, 4). The limits of compromise begin to show when natural like-mindedness or cohesiveness ceases—and discipline and coercion set in.

Sometimes representatives cannot compromise with others, thus cannot settle the corresponding compromise that needs to be taken also with oneself (as compromise entails also this internal aspect). The uncompromising mindset corresponds with sticking to principle and not backing down. In the backdrop of competitive electoral politics, compromises have an undertone that refers to 'selling out': selling out principles, interests, and constituencies. Especially from the campaigning perspective dominating the uncompromising mindset it is a sign of weakness and 'surrendering' by the representative not to stand up or hold the ground for what she or he believes in or what is best for the electorate. Instead of 'principled tenacity' he yields to others' assumingly stronger opinions or settle with a watered-down outcome. (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 74–85.) These kinds of notions come to the fore in the interviews of Finnish MPs, although they are more discernible in the performative context. Deliberative representation in the operative context is not marked with such tenacity when it comes to showcasing general attitudes towards the task of legislating. When legislation gets done, something that gives impetus to the committee system, also indicates that the opinions that MPs operate and negotiate with tend not to be fully carved in stone.

Importantly, compromise is a theme through which representation can be looked at. Both mindsets of compromise and uncompromise are needed in vital democratic politics, but the uncompromising mindset should not be overriding. Also the mutual mistrust that it endorses is not a very suitable ground for constructive politics since it is also prone to hamper respectful discourse and conduct towards political opponents who one disagrees with. The novelty of treating compromises through the idea of mindsets, regardless of their somewhat theoretical fuzziness, is that they extend over the temporal moment where compromises practically take place. Instead of focusing on the 'two-actor, one-moment' approach to legislative compromises, the conditions and circumstances of it spread out and are thus highly context-dependent but also vulnerable (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 205–209).

not be as stark as in the US but regardless that Finland is defined as 'consensual' (Lipjhart 1999) parliamentary democracy political parties are not immune to these tendencies.

Similarly, they include, as the MPs describe, also what Warren (2017, 49) acknowledge as ‘two- and three-level games’: political actors operate from various representative positions that can be overlapping and potentially conflictual. Empirical scholars of deliberation should not be agnostic about these as is especially the case with elected representatives within institutional setting. Assuming representative positions and acting on them is dynamic, thus being sensitive to inexplicit and contingent ways that participants endorse representation is theoretically also central here (Saward 2010; 2019; Montanaro 2012)

Different contexts of representation invite and highlight these capacities but also willingness to compromise by tapping into these prescriptions of collective dynamics in myriad ways (and with different successful rate). While contemporary theorising of representation evades from capturing political representation from representational relationships—that the represented and the representative exist independently and outside the ‘act’ of representation—MPs make sense of their activities through these terms. These relationships as well as the practices to be recognised and taken up within each representative context relate also to compromises. When MPs discuss the many aspects of compromises, the compromising and uncompromising mindsets introduced above are detectable in the background. The significance of compromises is not only in its concessional and distributive capacity, but more so in the interpersonal (and intrapersonal) viewpoint of exercising the ascribed mindsets. Also, there is a significant demarcation between the logic of operative and performative context. It is illustrated how MPs ‘keep tabs’ on their colleagues: when judging and anticipating their actions and motivations. The same logic of keeping tabs is present with the coalition government dynamics where governing is a joint activity but when it comes to accountability governing parties are assessed separately. The tendency of governing parties to start distancing themselves from each other is seen when the next elections approaches—something that reflects also within the committee work.

Also from intraparty perspective it makes sense to keep an eye out on what MP colleagues are doing since MPs are relying on their capacities of judgment and reflection as I also demonstrated in the previous subchapter. Informal norms and corresponding discretion aim at restricting attempts for individual political gains that are in the interviews interlinked not with governing but campaigning practices. However, here the idea is endorsed where ‘*one person scores, the team wins*’ (II: 10: 34:52) underlining the notions that democratic politics consists of cohesive collectives bound together through democratic agreements. The idea also sees representatives as purposive, strategic actors that aim for instant wins whereas constructive politics requires one to wait for the gains and sometimes give way to collective compromise. As such, this mindset downplays the role of individual wins, and ties their relevance only when they contribute to the scaled-up governing logic of politics. However, this argument begs for more empirical clarification, and that is where we are advancing next. In that I will offer a more detailed picture of how compromise takes shape on the committee level. Piece by piece I will go through the respective deliberative process that revolves around the practical work being done: drafting the committee report. I first discuss the role of experts and the game of politics that they invoke. After introducing the central building blocks of compromise and non-compromise that expert hearings are

argued to constitute, I will return to the feasibility and urgency of compromises, discussing first the limits and secondly, the spirit of them.

iii Game of experts and expertise

'Information is the weaponry, the ammunition of legislative battle'
(Asbell 1978, cf. Bessette 1994, 49).

In the interviews the value of committee work is recognised from the perspective that benefits not only individual representatives for providing them opportunities to accrue expertise, but committees also benefit the entire legislature. A well-functioning and committed committee system is proof that legislatures perform their tasks well in the face of astounding asymmetry in resources for preparing and handling legislative issues.³⁴

Defining committees as main spatial locus for the operational context of representation is supported especially by one focal findings of previous research (Pekonen 2011): there is a general inclination that Finnish parliamentary committees aim for unanimous reports. Unanimous report is considered as a '*strong report*' (II: 9-2) that states and reflects the collective opinion of the Parliament. Achieving this parliamentary ideal means that when the MPs set to work, in drafting of the committee report (or statement) they are engaging in negotiation and developing compromise. Even though finding a common ground for constructive politics may not ring a bell in consensual systems the same way it would in systems defined by conflict and stark political polarisation, it would be a mistake to undermine the relevance of the competitive nature of politics and campaigning logics. The contingent nature of compromise is relevant also in consensual political landscapes (Naurin and Reh 2018, 732).

Dynamics of deliberative representation are sensitive to these institutional cues mentioned above but similarly important is the social perspective. Long incumbency of committee memberships that last almost without an exception throughout the four-year parliamentary term is prone to strengthen cooperation within the committee (Arter 2003; see also Warren and Mansbridge 2013). It is not unusual that MPs prefer to continue in the same committee if they get elected to the next term. Over time members learn to know each other but more importantly, they learn to 'play together'. For this reason these incentives support the nurturing of relations that are founded on trust and mutual respect—features that also invite compromise and settling the necessary bumps in governing. The institutional setting ascribing to social characteristics, but also the expertise, is crucial as it allows committee structure to perform not only efficiently but also credibly.

Essential elements of deliberative process—argumentation, persuasion and information (Bessette 1994, 49–55)—are readily exposed also within this operative context. So, when

³⁴ Finnish parliamentary committees have only one or two committee secretaries as civil servant staff members, whereas ministries are manned by hundreds of officials. Committee secretaries are in charge of practically writing the draft of the committee report to be then accepted alongside with the bill in the plenary.

committees scrutinise legislative bills through the process of external expert hearings and deliberation that follows, elements involving compromising, agreement and finding satisfactory results are available for further analysis. Therefore, we can argue in the operative context in the case of committees that the prevailing attitude is *adaptive*. As such, it entails a general and principled openness to argumentation by others despite that the opinions are defined but not as transfixed as in other contexts. As we know, in many cases the main lines (collective standings) are drawn in intraparty deliberations. However, these initial positions are adaptable in the sense that while they most likely will not get overturned completely, there might be considerable leeway resulting from reasoning that uses the information available. On these assumptions, I argue in this research that we call to describe prevalent style of deliberation in the operative context *strategic-deliberative*. Strategic features are more present than in the PPG meetings, but communication lacks the most disruptive partisan properties more at display in the plenary. Strategic-deliberative mode captures the idea that deliberation orients towards decision-making and therefore also invites agreement-seeking solutions. Being able to settle disagreements may require strategic manoeuvring but it is, ideally, carried out more ‘deliberatively’ in the sense that it seeks to adapt and accommodate different perspectives also by sorting and selecting relevant pieces of information. For that matter the level of authenticity is also strategic in relation to openness, as I will soon discuss.

As said, here we also find evidence for functional characteristics of representation that in the case of committee orient deliberations towards a defined outcome: drafting of the report that states the formal opinion of the committee. However, the extent government and opposition members, or individual members for that matter, share this understanding on the circumstances of the deliberative process varies. Elements of the affirmative context are constantly at play especially when issue at hand is politically insignificant and when opinions are not fully defined, but more in the making. In general, the way that context is read when it comes to deliberation, negotiation and compromising affects acknowledging the potentiality of these practices in regard to reaching a decision.

The guiding idea is that exposing legislation to ‘*an acid test*’, as one MP (II: 15: 41:32) described the function of legislative scrutiny. This task highlights the role of experts and expertise. However, they can become ‘collateral damage’ of political realities that are projected in the outcome. The powers of committees can be thought to be reflected in the statistics of legislative bills on how many are get modified annually. Throughout approximately 40 percent of legislative bills are changed by the committees annually (Ahtonen, Keinänen, and Kilpeläinen 2011). Even though it would be tempting to argue that this is a clear signal of the willingness of the majority government members to foster a compromise-oriented mindset in favour for the whole committee, the answer is not completely uplifting. The study by Ahtonen and others (2011) noted that a large part of the alterations to the paragraphs are mere technical or superficial. Committees also correct typos and other procedural mistakes (errors in issuing dates, sums etc.) found in the bills. Similarly their incompleteness and declining quality were criticised in the interviews.

Also my interviewees (in interviews conducted in 2015), when I showed them statistics of bills changed by individual committees, many were surprised of the high numbers of reports that altered paragraphs. Therefore, it seems valid that only a fracture of reports that

proposes as a statement of the committee to alter the paragraph(s) are politically significant. To state the obvious, it means that bills that the committees handle are prepared by the government. And when they are prepared by a government in multi-party majoritarian system, this means that bills usually represent a compromise as they come. This is especially true with bills that derive from the government programme, which gets executed accordingly. Bills can be also defined as compromise in the sense that they are coupled as part of a larger compromise where different governing parties get their own ‘riders’ implemented through the proposed bills (Raunio 2011, 125–26).

This problematic path-dependency of compromises, when proposed legislation is interwoven in a process that is in itself a compromise, is truly felt in the Parliament. There is also another point to note underlining the long process of legislation on the ministerial level. Task forces and preparatory hearings take note of various stakeholders and other affected parties that are included in preparation of legislation, at least with major reforms. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, some legislation can be ‘*prepared by a limited group*’ (II: 3: 50:23). Therefore, among MPs there may be significant differences and discrepancies when it comes to access to this prior knowledge regarding legislative preparation done in the ministries. This is an essential point to which I will return soon as it will demonstrate, again, how deliberative representation is connected to capacities to form and articulate opinions as in reason-giving and justification.

Is it futile even to imagine in a legislative context altogether any circumstances where opinions *would not* be defined prior, in earlier stages of the policy process? This point of view about the opinion formation process seems to distract analytical soundness in this research. In that I approach the question of evolution of opinions and preferences from not defined to well-defined. We could argue along with Mansbridge and others (2010, see also Mansbridge 2015) that opinion-formation (and its possible implications of transforming them) in the deliberative process is taken as a ‘regulative ideal’. On the other hand, as discussed, in democracy some preferences and opinions must be inalienable like democratic and human rights are, therefore maintaining these principles are not matters of opinions or pre-deliberative commitments. Notably, some issues are non-negotiable, and so the idea of a deliberative process that would start out with a clean slate is out of the question. In democratic politics prior opinions that are articulated during the electoral campaign are put under the test in parliamentary politics, debated and deliberated. What I offer in this research is a rough outline, a scenario where through the chosen contexts of representation these elements of opinion-making and articulating are called out and operationalised. Only then we can aim at providing a credible overview on how aspects of deliberation and representation that I combine in deliberative representation play throughout the Parliament. This take is contrary to approaches that would try to single out most favourable conditions for ‘real’ and authentic deliberation, which the way I see it would end up treating these essential practices in isolation and as atomistic elements.

This is the framework through which the process of scrutinising legislation by the committees can be analysed. Also, the way it is structured offers significant triggers for communicative interactions, gathering and sharing of information and deliberation, all features that deliberative representation aims at distinguishing. Centrality of expertise and knowledge referred in the beginning of this section as the weaponry hits the nail in the head

as in the operative context it is the external expert hearings where such ammunition is collected. The theme of experts and expertise was addressed at length by Pekonen (2011, 195–208; also Holli and Saari 2009; Holli 2012), but here I want to recapitulate some of the key points and give an overview what constitutes the grounds for compromise when operating on what Pekonen describes as ‘issue-based collaboration’ (ibid., 206). It also opens the strategic field from which MPs can operate in. It shows how defining and adapting perspectives and opinions are proportional to accrued information available through the hearings.

Expert hearings³⁵ affirm committee deliberations a forensic element that puts the capacity for judgment and discretion into full use. Collaboration that is ideally issue-based requires in the first place, from deliberative perspective, that the epistemic grounds are made clear and equally available for all. Only then can matters upon which people agree or disagree be legitimately put on display and argued for. The committee expert hearings also provide this essential function since it lays down a common, equal grounding for reasoning. In this, all members regardless of parliamentary stipulations of the government and the opposition are equal since all have had equal opportunity to take part in the hearings (something that not everybody actively make use of). One MP (III: 23: 21:45) describes this epistemic principle in the following terms:

Respondent: The conclusion of the committee must familiarise itself to what has collegially been heard. Not to what someone has read or got information elsewhere. It must be based on that.

Interviewer: You cannot bring external information to the table?

Respondent: You can, but when many want to leave that mark and say that they’ve been to this place and I know [this thing]. It just doesn’t roll. It is the collegiality that is essential here. I learned to appreciate it. [...] Then the outcome must [be based on], preferably what collegially is heard or visited, or specifically met some actors and hearing them out. Everyone can obtain that same information. Because MPs come from so many different backgrounds.

According to the above, ideally, arguments that are not jointly heard and testified are less credible and legitimate to be used in justification and reasoning. However, it goes without saying that using one’s own personal expertise or what one knows (e.g. what are the consequences of some past legislation in one’s own district), are surely considered, but arguing for and against the matter is dominantly framed through expert hearings. Merely appealing to one’s own expertise and know-how is not usually received well, and such pedantic or *pedagogical reason-giving* is thought irritating. This notion differentiates from being generally active which also pays off in the expert hearing stage of committee work. Justifications of opinions and viewpoints are also explicitly reflected and compared to the bill that always includes a lengthy justification.

Importantly, experts also fill in the gaps in information regarding prior preparation process to which the committee hearings also supplement. The committee scrutiny then has

³⁵ Approximately 5000 experts are heard yearly by Finnish committees. The number of invited experts have more than doubled in thirty years. (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2012, 33)

an important double-checking function. What it means is that in deliberation MPs seek after epistemic validity through expert deliberations, hence they serve a kind of ‘truth-tracking’ function (see also Pekonen 2011, 196–197). However, this issue-based objectivity that MPs highlight is still part of the politically oriented game of expertise. The way the role of information that expert hearings provide is treated and used resonates with the further distinction of information to educate, mobilise and most importantly, persuade as Bessette (1994, 49–51) argues. Availability of information is judged according to its feasibility, thus serving as strategical building blocks for political compromise and non-compromise. These get articulated in the committee report, starting from the official decision of acceptance to modifications, but wrestling can take over single choice of words.

In principle, the committee hearings ideally follow deliberative ideal of the all-affected principle (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 128). It articulates the idea that all participants whom are expected to be affected by the decision should be included in the deliberative process. According to the interviews there is a sincere goal to include as wide as possible range of affected parties, and in the usual situations members’ requests for experts are not turned down (Holli and Saari 2009, 48; Pekonen 2011, 196). As discussed, deciding who are all the affected parties or individuals, is a challenge especially when it comes to questions relating to representation (e.g. Parkinson 2006; Näsström 2011a). The representative application of this, then, is not only that getting heard would be warrant for legislative effect—that the law would be changed according to the interest of the affected—but instead it is up to the members’ judgment to decide who gets invited. What are the perspectives and interests that the committee wants to make itself heard? It is an important question considering how the range of perspectives and opinions delivered and represented by the experts set the frame through which the committee deliberates and drafts the report. According to the question above, epistemic validity in reason-giving is less falsifiable if the piece of information comes outside the expert hearings—a point that makes the selection of heard experts crucial since they determine which representations are placed on the agenda to be discussed and reflected on. Especially those experts who can bring new viewpoints and who are precise in their delivery are greatly appreciated (see also Holli and Saari 2009; Pekonen 2011):

Especially those presenters who can bring something new, a new perspective to the law or to the bill. [...] That is welcomed. In that sense I always appreciate those who can light a fire to the big picture, from a new perspective. Contrary to those who merely repeat that ‘good proposal, good draft, yep we have nothing to say to it. (I: 8: 8:21)

**

The expert says that this [legislation] does not work, this must be changed. The impact of that expert is very considerable. Then there are those who come to complain that everything is bad and wrong. One could say that it doesn’t lead much anywhere. (III: 18: 1:14:13)

For this reason, it is not only the selection of the experts but also the way the information they provide for argumentative purposes is a political question. For these reason presented above Finnish committees have been described as a heresthetic space (Turja 2012, 38).

Following Riker's views on political manipulation, Turja argues that the strategic use of experts can be coined with this practice when MPs invite experts to be heard who are favourable to their own viewpoints. Especially with politically tense bills government and opposition alike march in³⁶ experts with known sympathies or antipathy towards the proposed legislation. As one (III: 21: 19:25) said, members can '*order opinions that are shrouded in the clothing of experts*'. Considering the focal meaning of expert hearings to the expressed arguments in the drafting of the report it makes politically sense to pay attention who the experts are and what they state as their formal statement, and how they do it. But most importantly, there are strategic-deliberative orientation in the ways in which experts are lured into bringing up and illuminating certain points of view.

Well, of course, they are prey to different political groups that you snatch from those that kind of views you want to support your aspirations when making the reports or statements. The best MPs are those who are curious of the whole package, and listens to all, and tries to create a balanced report based on the entirety. I would like to be that kind, but you have to, on the other hand, everyone wants to be tactical to some degree, thinking that the majority of the committee wants to push it some directions and you yourself want it towards a little bit towards the other direction. Then there is the temptation to exaggerate in your questions to the experts just those themes and put weight on those that pull towards that wished direction. (III: 9: 21:10)

**

It has been important that experts represent different paths of life and experiences and interests. And in a way make them discuss together. To me that's the best method for MPs can then perceive the "sore spots", what it is actually all about. That we find out what they disagree on. And then in a way must steer them to discuss among themselves. But really MPs don't present opinions. But it happens all the time. Some are more enthusiastic than others. The most common way is ... your own question. Or you can formulate your opinion into a question, and it's not forbidden. But to a debate between MPs and experts the working orders of Parliament don't encourage. (I: 2: 4:53)

In addition to highlighting points of contention and clearly pinpointing the defects of proposed legislation, there is a hope among MPs that those expert presentations prove influential enough to be able to mediate a preferred revelation to the whole committee. As the quotations bring up, ensuring that experts reveal a favourable point features the most evident strategic-deliberative feature for deliberative representation in the committee: since formally MPs are not allowed to engage in discussion with the experts, but only to ask questions (despite lengthy prologues sometimes often precedes the actual question), the questions are addressed to and formulated in a way that invokes the expert state a point

³⁶ Filibustering or obstruction in the Finnish parliament is not very common, but it does occur and takes a form also on the committee level. There is not known research about committee level obstruction (on parliamentary obstruction in early Eduskunta, see O. Pekonen 2017).

beneficial to what MP (or the PPG) advocates for. Efforts are made to balance the list³⁷ of invited experts by '*inducing a different perspective*' in the case it turns out '*one-sided*'. Remarks made by these experts are needed from the perspective of the opposition, '*that it's always better in the protesting opinion that you can lean on what the experts have said in the hearings*' (III: 2: 47:51).

While MPs place significant emphasis on the information that the experts provide as 'factual matters' they are not out of tune when it comes to distinguishing partisan experts (i.e. lobbyists) from more impartial ones (i.e. researchers) (see also in Holli & Saari 2009). Especially with straight-up interest group or organisation MPs are aware that they mainly serve their principal's interests, and as their agent their purpose is to make the position known on the legislative issue. There have also been arguments put forward to allow external expert hearings become public, also to mitigate the alleged power of the 'usual suspects' visiting the committees frequently (Seo and Raunio 2017).

Finnish parliamentary committee members are also keen to raise a local perspective to the agenda through the experts. However, this is diplomatically portrayed as means for advancing individual members' campaigning purposes (I: 10: 13:44; II: 9–1: 26:22; I: 8: 11:28; I: 9: 12:38; I: 11: 14:26), something that is '*a source of common discontentment*' in Parliament (I: 2: 4:26; also in I: 11: 14:26). Inviting your own potential supporters from one's own district, as a favour to them by allowing them to get heard on the highest legislative level (also in Holli & Saari 2009, Pekonen 2011), can be read off to the performative. In this situation the intended audience ceases to be other committee members but member of the electorate that the expert in a way stands for. Since time is a scarce parliamentary resource, careful consideration about the added value that each invited expert can bring to the scrutiny of the bill is emphasised. Posturing, associated with these trophy experts, diverts from the general ethos of the 'real work' being done in the committees.

Overall, the influence and impact of external experts seems to be linked to the feasibility of their testimony. According to the interviews, it is often those experts who can deliver a well-drafted and exact proposal to an exact part of the bill that they want to put emphasis on are in better position than those who discuss the matter on a general level (see also in Holli and Saari 2009). Usability is of essence to MPs, who are busy and have generally relatively little time to dwell on matters. Therefore, it is cost-efficient to have the message clearly formulated to enhance its implementation regarding the committee report draft. This idea also indicates the results-oriented focus of the operative context that the committee meetings exemplify, and what is in use of the strategic-deliberative mode.

Representatives in the committee, despite attempts to control engaging in deliberation with the experts as such, try to challenge and induce these representative claims of experts for political purposes and finding information outliers. Discrepancies are actively also sought when it comes to representative relationships of the experts. For one, a tension in executing a plain messenger role, as authorised by the interest group organisation, can sometimes be detected in the expert hearings. It can be seen from their faces. It could be that the expert does not agree with the position taken by the organisation one is there to

³⁷ Expert hearings begin with inviting relevant instances and organisation to the committee (also in Holli and Saari 2009; Pekonen 2011). The committee secretaries have what is called a 'basic list', a draft list of experts that is presented to the committee.

represent or, in the case of government officials, there is something discreet they cannot disclose with the committee. Usually this information is available only to a trusted, limited group within the governing parties. However, these hints can be as revealing as what the experts state.

Representation here takes the analogy of perspectives, as discussed. Another tactic is to operationalise detected internal discrepancy into a question that reveals the variety of contingencies either within one expert's statement or between the heard experts.³⁸ On such accounts, members' aspiration for acquiring new information is led by strategic openness in the sense that questions to be addressed to the experts are not sincere. They are targeted in a manner that would induce a perspective relevant to the person posing the question. I want to underline here, however, that many questions that committee members pose are also those that are asked sincerely, because they want to find out more about the issue and get a specification to a detail. Many MPs are active and curious, something that is also appreciated by fellow members. This should not get confused with those who ask out of courtesy and habit, something that irritates many. These are referred in the interviews as 'occupational questioners'.

In sum, detecting any inconsistencies or knowing about them prior to the committee hearing requires a considerate amount of expertise on the part of the representative. When this expertise is combined with political tact underlines the general notion that *'you need to be tremendously active and enlightened'*. This makes it possible to *'seize the matter when others are still wondering about it. Then you are one step forward when others have not yet made it to their trenches'* (II: 9–1: 45:46).

When grand political dividing lines are tried to be pushed back and tend not to be elaborated in committee deliberations, the sensitivity to political aspirations is projected through the chosen experts and pieces of information they provide. As Pekonen rightly notes by following former MP Erkki Pulliainen's (2006) autobiographical account of parliamentary work, in a parliament everything is political. In concluding remarks, Pekonen (2011, 208) argues that while MPs in the case of expertise and experts grasp the overly politicised nature of a given situation and not surrender their judgment accordingly, the testing of specialists is left short-handed. Partly for this reason, refraining from engaging in critical deliberation with the experts (something that the institutional norms in Parliament enforces) would further test the legitimacy and authority of their representative claim-making.³⁹ Also, the

³⁸ The interviews bring up a procedural norm of trying to avoid inviting disagreeing experts into the same hearing session. It is thought disrespectful and uncomfortable for the expert to give their expert opinion in the presence of those who disagree with your view.

³⁹ I want to make a short note on the political nature of factual knowledge from the perspective of representation theory. We can see that how the idea of representation according to the constructivist turn aims at presenting itself as coherent and rationally solid (yet plural and democratic). Take, for an example, a carefully constructed representative claim, like any good argumentation, makes a proposal on how to perceive reality. But what is important to note, and what I have briefly mentioned, is that epistemic democrats' (e.g. Landemore 2017b; 2017a) argument on making truth the priority of deliberative processes is incomparable with representation theory. Importantly, tendency for coherence in representative claim-making is not an indication for truth. If one would even like to discuss these with references to truth we could argue that representation could be treated as a provisional claim *about* the truth but never the truth. The latter would make contestation and debate futile and therefore destroy the very idea of democracy. Following Ankersmitt's (2002) reading of representation that resonates with recent discussions is that the

whole notion of expertise that would imply impartiality raises doubts among interviewed representatives: ‘real experts’ are distinguished from partial ones.

This subsection has addressed the role of experts and expertise in the Finnish parliamentary committees. I have argued that the ways in which perspectives, opinions and facts constitute parliamentary oversight and scrutiny distributed to the committees, but it also turns out to be a game of experts and expertise. In addition to collecting and gathering relevant information about the legislative matter at hand and facilitating decision-making, there are conscious attempts to frame the deliberations through the selection of experts and operationalisation of their viewpoints and opinions. For such accounts, the strategic-deliberative mode is in place.

iv The limits of compromise

I have shown how representatives ‘arm’ themselves with information and expertise. If compromise is to be sought, it is built and arranged by using points, perspectives and opinions that the experts bring to the table. Importantly, however, the government programme and the political deals involved form the backdrop from which compromise can begin. As such, it relates to how disagreements are discussed and dealt with. In this case, the distinction between compromising and uncompromising mindsets articulated by Gutmann and Thompson (2012) come in handy. While compromise is often sought there are limits to compromise. In this section, I go over the elements that comprise to situations where agreement cannot be made. I will discuss the reasons for not being able to compromise and the way it shows during the committee sessions. Often these situations nod towards the affirmative context, to the intraparty discussions. Managing disagreement among coalition partners, something that contains ‘stalling elements’ (Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004, 7) when it comes to deliberation complicates the analysis when partners who to compromise with are many.

Willingness and possibility to compromise is affected by path-dependency available in the policy-processes that finalises in vote in the plenary. Therefore, we can safely argue that when bills arrive to the Parliament, they are a compromise but they also portray a status quo. However, the path-dependency turns around the setting in the positive implications of compromises and failures or refusals associated with uncompromise: namely, within the legislature, it is that the *uncompromising mindset sustains the status quo*. The principles that are embedded in the piece of legislation are holding ground, whereas compromising alters things (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 31.) This point about coalition dynamics leaves open the decisive question posed by Pekonen (2011) about the extent to which opinions and positions that committee members nurture and hold are elaborated and brought forward. This question is relevant not only from the standpoint of deliberative representation that seeks to understand parliamentary dynamics of forming and communicating opinions, but essential when approaching compromising in committee deliberations.

political world needs to be left broken, rather than trying to seek unity between the representative counterparts. Ultimately, ‘perspectives are all there is’ (Näsström 2006, 326).

If we take that tenacity of principles and standing on them combined with mutual mistrust characterise the uncompromising mindset, then we need to understand better whether this ‘standing on principle’ is subject to reason-giving and articulation in the first place (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 71, 85). In deliberative theory these elements are discussed in terms of revealing of private information and demonstrating authenticity or sincerity. Nobody would be willing to approve speaking untruths,⁴⁰ since it would severely harm mutual trust regardless of operating with an uncompromising mindset. Indeed, there is a very high threshold for accusing an MP of lying in Parliament. However, withholding information as a restrained sincerity is another thing. I have reason to assume that it is not uncommon that with ‘big and difficult’ legislative bills governing parties, whose access to background information eclipses that of opposition, sometimes withhold to disclose all information to all committee members. Particularly information on the breakage on the government party fronts is not willingly brought up during the committee session:

Those we don’t discuss really openly. [...] Because [emphasised] if the governing parties are disputing amongst themselves, we try to avoid showing that to the opposition. Also from that the opposition might strike back, it brings weapons to the opposition. So we try to keep those clamours amongst ourselves. (II: 9–1: 56:43)

Counterfactual analysis here asks, would the outcome have been different if, during the handling of the bill, governing party members would have revealed information, for example, that the coalition disagrees internally? Most likely not. Also, prior information is usually there also from the plenary session that appoints the bills to the handling of respective committees. With conflictual bills this ‘referral discussion’ in the plenary is noted and considered as to being sensitive to the perspectives upon which participants disagree. In these cases it becomes known, at the latest, that there is friction between the coalition partners, which is something that the opposition keeps close watch. This tender coalition dynamics should be kept in mind in the last analysis chapter that would on the outset undermine the relevance of plenary discussions as ‘deliberations’. For this contextual interplay, the level of authenticity is more negotiated in the performative context whereas in the operative context it is clearly strategic.

Hesitations to share and reveal those disaccordings notes in the committee, however, could portray that there is a genuine fear of alternative outcome, meaning that they would open the door for transformative faculties that deliberation profoundly entails. Here embracing expressive-deliberative mode to the extreme, demonstrating unrestrained openness and expressing the potential conflicts either regarding factual base provided or those among participants or even personal wavering in supporting the legislation, could put in motion a progress that could, hypothetically, alter the outcome. This feature also relate to the level of open-mindedness, to the extent participants can be affected by the deliberation and opinions that are brought forward. It is reasonable to argue that many representatives can and will detect an opportunity, an opening for the kind of deliberation that could bear these transformative faculties. Instead of acting on them they choose to operate in a manner

⁴⁰ In deliberative theory it has been pointed out ‘selling out’ the truthfulness criteria can expose the theory to strategic behavior that violate the intrinsic value of self-actualization (Steiner 2012, 164–65).

that rules out the possibility. *Deliberative control*, something I discuss later (in 4.3. section iii) is exercised. Openness can be endorsed, but when the time for decision draws near, the lines are united:

Sometimes we might engage in a very open general discussion based on the report draft. In that pretty brave addresses were made where people detached from the government and opposition lines. But tomorrow, when we have the decisive handling, all rows are shot straight until tomorrow, so that it will be taken care of. The government discipline and the opposition setting dictates sometimes also very much in committee work. (II: 1: 1:45)

Government MPs ‘trust’ that disruptions are, as they are, immediately used by the opposition. Hinting any signs of coalition instability proves the way in which information is weaponry in political struggles. From the perspective of leadership of Government PPG this would demonstrate a failure in maintaining commitment by the members, something to be done beforehand. As discussed in the previous subchapter, these functions belong to the domain of affirmative context where such hesitations should preferably be voiced and pleaded for the purpose of getting the PPG to address and even share this concern explicitly and officially.

Discordant notes do not go unnoticed in the committee. These surprising ‘rants’ get a reaction so that *‘people turn on their chairs to look at their own party member, “now now, calm yourself down”* (II: 6: 59:24). Underlining the faculty of listening carefully and being observant in order to detect that *‘ahaa, this is not such a unison thing’* (III: 6: 8:31). Another describes: *‘I do pay attention to these people and how they react. [...] In that sense listening is tremendously important because it helps you to assess what it’s advisable to present our group’s perspective at this point and what is sensible and how we best move forward. The helping blow can come from completely other parties.’* (ibid.) The following illuminates an example on how the opposition can strategically use a breakage on the government fronts:

Respondent: Then if there are political questions that are sensitive then the opposition sees whether there is something that could dissipate the government fronts.

Interviewer: How do you do that?

Respondent: It’s easy in that way that if you were that there is disagreement within the governing group, then the opposition takes a stand for some governing group. Agree with them. Then those disagreeing governing groups are put in a difficult position. “Hey, we don’t have a majority in the committee anymore.” Then disciplining measures are taken. “We don’t agree to changes. We go by the book”. (III: 22: 43: 52)

Opposition starts making a row, and try to *‘drive a wedge in the works as much as possible’*, as one opposition member said (II: 6: 33:16) if they note that a governing committee member might be wavering. Aiming for escalation of disagreement is used as a persuasive measure to allure possible defector(s) to flip sides. With major bills, the situation is difficult, as one stated (III: 6: 1:18:34): *‘Of course, the opposition seized on it to gloat*

about “there, there how things are going poorly in the government”. And it was something that we didn’t of course want to show any direction. And we really were in trouble’.

When motivations for actors are expected and somewhat anticipated, especially with politically rigid tension-filled cases, it is worth noting how the mistrust as a particle of the uncompromising mindset is not posited towards the opposition. Mistrusting them makes no sense. In these cases the opposition will do what they do: bring counterproposals that are voted (down) and an objecting motion (called as ‘minority reports’ in some political systems) is left to the report. Therefore, the conception of mistrust is applicable only to the extent that there is a motivation or a cause to trust the other actor in the first place. When knowing for certain that opposition is not going to confer to any kind of compromising solution due to disagreements on core values or principles that are unnegotiable, mistrust bears no relevance. Instead, you *trust them of doing what you expect them to do*. Through placing an objection or a protest the opposition gets a chance in the plenary to go public with it– also something of a difficult balancing act. Compromises entail distributive elements that are assessed through analysis of costs and benefits.

Trust translates into the deliberative ideal of reciprocity. But this reciprocity, in this given situation between opposition and government, is not symmetrical (in relation to power), whereas when we turn to the relations between the coalition partners it is. Resisting compromise as a refusal to challenge the status quo indicates that in this case the counterparts of compromise are not the usual parliamentary adversaries of government and opposition. When uncompromising mindset is founded on mistrust as Gutmann and Thompson (2012) argue, the true adversary is your coalition partner who you mistrust. Here, and then, deliberation becomes the enemy to status quo as it entails the possibility of change. In case coalition partners in the committee begin to unravel the issue at hand, something that originates from a prior agreement stated in the government programme, differences in opinions may resurface. Especially if participants engage to the deliberative process with unclear opinions may lead to ever-deepening swamp of conflicts, as critically pointed out about deliberation by Shapiro (1999).

For this reason, as we have seen, PPGs try to facilitate enough opportunities for deliberation to establish coordination and cohesion, so that when the time for decision-making comes up in the committee (and eventually in the plenary), everyone is ‘kept onboard’. Disciplining measures may be enforced. Considering the argument that trust in fact inhibits rather than induces deliberation (Mykkänen 2010) seems valid in this case. If deliberation within PPGs have been satisfied with critical and adversary deliberation, then these entrusted MPs might be less inclined to re-state those perspectives among political adversaries, coalition partners included. Status quo may hold when deliberation is restricted for reasons described above.

So, when MPs describe accounts and methods relating to developing compromises, they do not occur only between the government and opposition but also among members between the governing parties. For those legislators, as committee members and as governing party members this is a difficult judgment: the question is not of compromising but an overlapping judgment on *undoing a compromise* on an already agreed-upon issue. The path-dependency of compromises mentioned earlier means that while some bills are compromises within itself (political aims translated into bills are distributed between the governing parties), but

some are products of larger bundle of compromise. Some bills enunciate the interests of one coalition party, thus enforcing the whole coalition to back it up. So, if compromise is defined by alteration to the status quo (when adversaries find mutually acceptable solution), what takes place and gets uncovered when a compromise between political adversaries is undone?

Compromise changes the current situation while not compromising keeps it as it was; this highlights the inter-party dynamics between coalition partners. It is certainly more tension-filled than of those between the division of government and opposition. In the interviews the ascribed roles of opposition and government members make this rough division clear: the opposition wants to change the bill, while the government wants to secure it. These motivations may bear important implications to the extent it is considered even worthwhile to maintain and continue deliberation for the purpose of enhancing mutual understanding (or forms of meta-consensus). According to the interviews, when the opposition goes on making an offer and government rejects it, is not something that members should get upset about. Operating on these role orientations of government and opposition can also be a matter of collegial joking.

Compromises accord with notions of democratic rule. Formally, majority will always rule over the minority. But institutional and procedural warrants, per se, never secure the majority. The idea in parliamentary democracy is that the government, a majority one in the case of Finland, must obtain and maintain the confidence of the parliament. But when the parliamentary majority starts breaking down internally, and especially if the conflict or disagreement is revealed in deliberative processes, the storyline might still turn out different. In consensus system combined with parliamentarism in general, 'the management of disagreement is mostly "stalled" among coalition MPs' (Bächtiger and Steenbergen 2004, 7). Indeed, in the light of operative context this is exactly true. It is also correct in the sense that management of disagreements is rather distributed to the executive and handled in other venues than the committee. Stalling elements have some implications concerning the autonomy and authority of the committee, as well as the individual MP.

In addition to refraining from revealing internal discrepancies and differing perspectives, there are two related institutional features present that deem deliberative representation in the operative context such stalling elements. In the Finnish parliamentary context, the first concerns a practice that inhibits compromising in the committee, and the second concerns how the process unfolds when committee deliberations start showing, or are interpreted politically as undoing a compromise (and not as endorsing compromise that makes the original stipulation better). The first one is the by the book principle. It refers to an informal but enforced practice⁴¹ where the bill is approved as according to the legislative proposal included in the bill. The committee will not make (propose making) any alterations to it. This expresses in the clearest way the urgency of decision-making that dominates in the operative context. When the by the book procedure is followed, it serves as an assurance to the government parties that what has been agreed upon previously is executed accordingly. The path-dependency of 'governing' restricts any coalition party from turning on the 'campaigning' mode that is explainable also by the element of mistrust. Notably, this interpretation is in analogy with what was discussed earlier in the affirmative context of the

⁴¹ By the book derives from a signed agreement among PPGs that states the 'rules of order' in interparty cooperation with governing parties (Wiberg 2011).

PPG where compromising dynamic is similarly applicable. Collective efforts and issuing public policies in a coalition system would not be possible without the ability to compromise.

In the interviews, the theme of compromise is discussed in terms of necessity and urgency but something that is not primarily a positive thing. Coalition government system, especially in its 'responsible party model' and the internal compromises place an additional layer that complicates the analysis and makes it challenging to try to provide a clear picture at once. However, one thing is sure: when compromising everybody needs to give up something. Consequently, it takes place in the backdrop of sanctioning and coercive measures that have an effect on MPs judgment, as the MP admits: '*[W]e are made to make various decisions, especially budgetary and cutting decision sort of with biting our teeth and a tear in our eye. And we go by the book when the governing parties have so agreed.*' (III: 11: 30:17). In the case of broad-based coalitions, this seemingly undemocratic and troublesome practice of often secures the position of minority parties in the government, as noted by one experienced MP (III: 3).

Limits of compromise are drawn in the framework of this path-dependency and opposition of wills. Both outline the way participants of compromise can anticipate and endorse motivations and expectations of others. What is at stake when the committee prepares the report concluding to a decision, is the credibility of both (or many) parties involved in the compromise. It is a question of judgment on what 'matters most to the compromising parties and those they represent' (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 32): whether issues on the table can be negotiated or should the procedure of 'by the book' be initiated at once. One MP (III: 24: 1:13:13) replied to the significance of the principle in the following way, while tentatively accepting that agreements should be held. However, there is an internal tension embedded in it:

Respondent: Well, it's good to have such a backstop, because the reality is that [long pause] publicity and also different people, it can be enticing that you start to seek a detail or an angle to change the bill in a way that is favourable to you, or what you happen to have promised to your voters, so you begin chasing it. In those cases it is good have that back-up [...] "You cannot demand whatever and if that is your opinion, then we go by the book. Then we do no changes, if you cannot give in in this matter". It's good to have but if by the book is the first response, I don't like that.

Interviewer: Are there situations where it is followed so strictly?

Respondent: Yes.

Tension between governing and campaigning is what is decisive when exercising judgment or operating with the compromising and uncompromising mindset. The latter highlights the partisan incentives defying the status quo. Unlike campaigning, governing demands prudence and resisting instant gains that can be achieved by detaching from the collective. Yet, at the same time, MPs would need to stand credible towards their supporters and find avenues to communicate reasons and justifications for actions and decisions taken. This discussion will follow soon and take centre stage in the last analysis chapter that

explores the performative context. For now, it is enough that we recognise how the stringent nature of holding on to a compromise is vulnerable in reducing the operations of MPs.

Also the coalition setting complicates things further for the MPs. In the case of governing party members, in the operative context their job, in the starkest sense that especially affects the head of the committee group, is not so much a question of attempting to advance the party interest but rather secure that of governing takes place efficiently. Accepting bills as they are, without significant modifications that would be politically decisive, is a manifestation that the government is responsive to its program. A government is functional when it executes its programme. According to the interviews, while seen necessary that *'all the most important decisions are made in the government programme'* (III: 20: 29:25, also in III: 22: 6:10, II: 9–1: 41:04, II: 14: 26:49, III: 2: 5:27). It functions in the way that it *'eliminates mistrust upfront'* (III: 12: 5:41) so that *'government executes its programme in an administrative manner'* (ibid.).

Consequently, execution of government programme lies practically in the hands of governing party members who become those warriors of the party or *'watchdogs'* who *'shepherd the bills through'* (II: 3: 3:55). Rationalisation and justification in ensuring responsiveness trickles down to all PPG members—something that many MPs from government and opposition alike find conflictual not only in terms of bounded rationality but also as PPG members. Another argued that *'[t]hroughout my career as a politician and MP I've been irritated by that the government programme is nowadays the Bible'* (III: 15: 48:33). *'Changing it an inch'* (ibid.) is considered as a *'hostile act'* (ibid: 50:31). All this takes a toll on committee deliberations and frustrates members in those cases if committee is nearing the conclusion that the bill needs to be changed. The frustration cuts through government and opposition committee members alike. One interviewee put it as follows:

[I] do also understand that ministers have wrenched amongst themselves and ended up with politically mutual understanding. But. In the committee we could end up with another kind of mutual understanding exactly among governing parties. But when we know that there has been that we give in on this and you receive that. Arm-wrestling. I see it problematic since it frustrates the committee work tremendously. Why are we sitting here if in the end we are told that you cannot change a single comma? Whatever, we'll let it pass. We could spend our time better. Instead it is supposed to motivate for real, to seek a good from the substance. (III: 13: 18:59)

'Sticking to the plan' has also a tendency to suppress and undermine a committee's capacity for judgement (see also Arter 2003). Many find it problematic, *'since it tapers committee's possibility to influence, making the committee act for the government's cause, which is something that I don't find completely correct'*, was how one governing party MP (II: 3: 3:55) put it. If committee deliberations take a turn towards the direction that actual paragraphs are going to be changed, it even more emphasises the collective footing of the entire committee. Here is where the other institutional feature in resisting intracommittee compromising comes in: the cabinet member. Then and there, the committee is faced with the cabinet minister, responsible to the policy sector in question, who is in swing position on deciding whether the committee can propose the alteration. This is readily interpreted as a question of authority on the side of minister who can be made to look weak. Also, the

hypothetical escalation scenario would be that of putting in doubt the confidence of the government (III: 4: 50:31). Those who had been holding cabinet minister posts had had the opportunity to see this from the opposite perspective. It is not completely an insignificant matter to the minister that their bill is changed by the committee. One learnt to think of Parliament as ‘a *chicane*’⁴² when ‘*the real decision-making takes place on the level of the executive, and if Parliament changes it, it changes it for the worse*’ (II: 13: 11:03).

Many kinds of solutions can take place. Proposed changes can be negotiated and back-channelled in a way that minister does not lose face: ministries can modify the bill while in committee process to align with committees wishes or even leave the bill to expire (III: 4: 20:54; III: 1: 1:09:31). A lot depends on the persona of the minister in question—some are more willing and open to accept changes, while others may not (III: 22: 1:57, III: 17: 15:23) and wish to remain ‘*pig-headed*’ (III: 22: 1:09:40). Same dynamics are assumedly present among cabinet ministers who protect and defend their share of the government programme.

What is important here is that from the perspective of the committee cohesion, that committee members from governing parties share an equal standing is crucial. This keeps the dispute, and ultimately decision, in the hands of the committee, and does not renounce its powers to ‘outsiders’:

Interviewer: This is what is really difficult to grasp, this [...] paradoxical situation that the committee finds a big problem somewhere and then the minister says, ‘no way’.

Respondent: Yes. And in that moment, it is important that the government parties are in unison in the committee. Because only if the committee is unified and if the members of the governing parties hold opinion that it should still be changed even though the minister thinks otherwise, then we can make the change. But problem arises if we begin to disagree with each other. The problem arises if we don’t find a solution in the committee, then it is forwarded to [government] PPG leaders who don’t know horse s*** about it. And they are not interested in it, either. Then the PPG leaders together and among themselves discuss and then it goes so that when they know nothing about it, then they say that we go by the book. So, the danger is that if we don’t come into shared understanding then we go by the book. (III: 1: 22:01)

In all the mechanisms introduced above that try to reconcile agreements and disagreements as well as compromises accordingly portray importantly how they *push deliberations away from the formal institutionalised venue of deliberation*. In the last example with government PPG leaders, what happens is that the deliberative autonomy achieved through deliberative means is rendered to the hands of those who may lack similar deliberative commitment but also relevant informational capacities. A deliberatively and politically robust outcome goes in vain and the original stipulation of compromise in the bill gets enforced. In these circumstances analysed from the perspective of deliberative representation the authority relies on the idea of consensus. Surely, agreeing to a compromise can be a consensual result but here it is projected through the discussed

⁴² A *chicane* is, by definition of Merriam Webster dictionary, an obstruction on a racecourse. It is not placed due to geography but by institutional design for example for the purpose to reduce speed.

framework of undoing a compromise. One senior MP, while commenting on the dynamics between the ministers and committees, took a more general perspective on the value of holding one's ground and resisting the pressure to compromise.

You cannot too much accept that there are these decision-making paradoxes [expression that the interviewer used] because then you surrender yourself... others use your power. In this house you must claim your own power and make sure that no-one takes it from you. There are always people who try to do so, just as in all power games. For this reason it is important that people hold their ground against the minister in the committee. If you want to change the way someone thinks, you cannot achieve that in other ways than by familiarising yourself with the subject. And then win the argument with your own knowledge and argumentation. You don't get by with slack, but you need to get into the substance. (III: 14: 53:35)

This subsection has illuminated how compromising have boundaries that appear in practices and institutional mechanisms. As such, deliberative representation in the operative context encounters limitations and stalling elements, especially when it comes to cross-party and interparty agreements. Deliberative control is exercised, and alternative paths of reasoning may not be opened or ventured. Legislative compromises facilitated by the committees are also significant when considering the horizontal institutional relations between the parliament and the government. Procedural mechanisms such as the by the book principle seem to violate committee's legislative autonomy, thus making them agents of the (governing) parties and not the whole parliament. This 'partisan perspective' to parliamentary committees (Mattson and Strøm 2004) frustrates the committee members and undermines collective efforts in coming up with good policies. Also, for the MP as a representative and assumingly informed about the policy field in question, it may necessitate some level of resistance against the party collectives—something that is most likely more probable with more established senior MPs. As also discussed earlier with the affirmative context, the motivations of such manoeuvres are kept in close check: they cannot be interpreted as campaigning measures.

v The (relative) spirit of compromise

The discussion of the many surfaces that compromises appeal to in the operative context will continue in this section. I will explore how the presented strategic action logics do not necessarily rule out deliberative aspiration and the 'spirit of compromise' (Guttman and Thompson 2012). That said, the fact that elected representatives act politically is not big news. However, one-sided assumption of the political drivers leaves out many other pertinent perspectives about what goes on in the legislatures. There is also a significant spirit of compromise to be endorsed, which benefits MPs who can master it.

A sense of collegiality is often portrayed when representatives address in the interviews the actor of the committee: it is 'we as the committee'. These appear in expressions like 'shared understanding', 'shared view', and 'common perspective' that are used when describing committee work. Committee's collective incentives are also important

reflections of mutual respect that expresses ‘constructive attitude towards, and willingness to engage in good faith with one’s political opponents’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 34). Features of open-mindedness, readiness to hear each other out are willingly demonstrated, thus making prevailing attitude adaptive (and not tenacious, as I claim the case to be in the performative context). This adaptive attitude in the face of opinions that are closer to defined than in the making affects the deliberative process so that it is marked by contingency. In practice, the committee often aims at producing unanimous reports to which the sense of commonality refers to. Surely some committees are more conflictual, something that can depend on policy field and its political and budgetary relevance in the current political climate and parties in government.

Let us use here a metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle to *ideally* describe the drafting process of the committee report. Each actor takes a turn. Since the operative context concentrates on goal-orientation and legislative trouble-shooting, representative deliberation outlines the shape of the individual puzzle piece in terms of strategic-deliberative mode. Preferably, the deliberation should be able to signal quite clearly the view that has been arrived at. However, by doing so the rendered representation is simultaneously deliberative in the sense that by offering enough a clear-cut formation it informs what shaped piece could possibly be fitted onto it. Being sensitive and responsive to another’s point of view is connected to the general idea of reciprocity, valued by many deliberative democrats. If a fit is not found at that time, it is possible to move on to other parts of the puzzle. Sometimes the puzzle is finished by all actors and sometimes not. If opposition (or individual representatives) withdraws and sets about creating an alternative puzzle, missing pieces are quickly wrapped up by remaining actors (usually the government). Many feel that trying to make others change their minds goes in vain. In politically decisive questions persuasion is futile, it is a waste of effort when knowing that no one will budge. When it comes to political, adversarial settings, what might be more decisive in the long run is the ability of representatives to keep an open mind when interacting with others and dealing with opposite perspectives and opinions.

Notwithstanding the fact that committees as parliamentary actors do not always get to do what they want, the niche for intraparty compromising still is more significant in deliberative sense than one would assume. From the perspective of deliberative theory, the novelty in the idea of deliberative negotiations is that it distinguishes more clearly what agreement seeking procedures in real-world politics can be. As such, preference aggregation is interwoven in deliberative negotiation. Unlike in Bessette’s account,⁴³ compromises are not only about ‘splitting the difference’ (Bessette 1994, 59) of ‘hard-headed calculation’ (ibid., 60) but also ‘deliberative negotiations’ (Naurin and Reh 2018; Warren and Mansbridge 2013 Mansbridge et. al 2010).

⁴³ Analysing numerous case studies, Bessette (1994) finds the role of bargaining tendered by group and bargaining theorists less important in congressional decision-making from 1940 to 1970.

Defining deliberative negotiation, according to Naurin and Reh (2018, 730), requires

... acknowledging the complexity of the social interaction space in which negotiators exist, where different forms of relationships, assumptions concerning common interests and underlying conflict structures, modes of communication, and perceptions of oneself and the others are intertwined.

Deliberative negotiations can accommodate range of integrated and distributive compromises. In their framework authors Warren and Mansbridge (2013, 94) situate deliberative negotiation in between 'pure deliberation' and 'pure bargaining'. Whereas pure bargaining depicts an outcome of power-based compromise or zero-sum capitulation (appropriation of all surplus) grounded on strategic demands, pure deliberation claims a common interest and results in consensus or clarified and structured conflict. Deliberative negotiation can accommodate distributive elements as in fair compromise (everyone gives up something) claimed by acceptance of fair offer. Also, contemporary deliberative theory now generally accepts bargaining to the deliberative toolbox especially with the case of compromise. In the same account, side payments could be considered when meeting certain conditions like transparency. (Warren and Mansbridge 2013, 113–114; see also Naurin and Reh 2018, 731–2.)

If the puzzle is finished by all actors it denotes then a unanimous report. Namely, constructive politics has been exercised either in the form of compromise or through other agreement-seeking procedures. It should also be noted that many bills are accepted without alterations. In those cases, central interests represented by the parties are 'of interest to no-one', or instead are so general or technical in the sense that no one really opposes them or there is nothing really to disagree on. Usually there are no financial benefits involved and no goods to distribute. Here, 'pure deliberation' can indeed be accomplished when tangible distributive elements are missing.

However, it becomes clear, as Pekonen (2011) suggests, that the spectrum of deliberative negotiations is available and can be described what is happening in the committees. Even though the undeniable starting point with politically significant bills is that they are left often untouched, i.e. that the committee does not change the paragraphs, accommodating and appropriation of perspectives are still brought forward and endorsed. Deliberative representation in the operative context takes on the practice of reasoning and negotiation where reciprocal statements are made, such as '*I understand that as such, but could it perhaps be possible to...*' (II: 1: 14:23). Overall referring to others' viewpoints and showing respect to them and those who present them is essential. Within those best circumstances that also reflect a positive committee atmosphere '*government-opposition line is tried to be converged with a softening [articulations] and not just blurt that you support the other*'. This may take several turns to speak and '*also the opposition member comes halfway and we seek to overcome somehow these government-opposition lines*' (ibid.). As one former opposition member (II: 8: 23:07) describes, opposition is kept on board so that '*if we've gotten some emphasis of our own there [in the report] then we, as if as compromise, might refrain from making an objection. And it's seen as a cooperative matter, as something good... when thinking that those objections don't really have much significance in that sense.*'

One government MP describes the adaptability of the ways in which concessions and mutuality can be accounted for when preparing the committee draft with others:

Yes, we also make changes to the draft, but of course, when we propose changes, we already seek those things that others can accept. There needs to be a sense of what the others think of that matter if you, for example present, something to be added. In that situation either it's not worth steering yourself in the opposition. It's not advisable to present such an alteration you know that the others will never accept. Unless of course it's a matter of a principle and you want to leave your own handprint on it. Then you can do it, of course. (II: 15: 23:07)

The idea of a handprint mentioned above, or 'fingerprints', as Pekonen (2011) describes them, bring out the fact that while committee reports could be discarded a mere case for semantics, they entail an overall significance within the paradigm of compromise. Particular wordings, choice of expressions and relatively small semantic things spell out the domain that facilitates deliberative negotiations. It can, in theory, be a novel, completely new representation that is put out that no one has detected before. More probable, however, is that the addition is of the modest kind. Having something stated in the committee report as your fingerprint is relatively easy when there is a lack of particular political enthusiasm connected with the bill. Namely, the reality could be that such compromising is easy when the stakes are low or non-existent. Similarly sceptical perspectives on the significance of what is stated in the report in comparison to the tangible committee decision (to accept, alter or reject the bill) were brought up in the interviews. Formally, in accounts of judicial disagreements, when the law is interpreted, the 'law-makers intent' can be checked from the committee reports. They play a role in this exceptional yet official and judicial context. In that sense, a particular choice of wording can make a difference. But there is a point missing here that is important to acknowledge: reports can be treated as communication towards the ministries. Committees can signal as cohesive entities and as parliamentary actors (as 'will of the parliament') what they most likely will accept or not accept in prospect legislation that is proposed by the cabinet. It is plausible then that the committee, when acting in unison, can steer public policies with longer timeframes, when the committee influence extends over that particular moment (also in Pekonen 2011).

Fingerprints on the committee reports can be antithetical to compromising and as such, manifestations of holding on to principles (also a resource for campaigning purposes). For now I will discuss this balancing act between the compromising and uncompromising mindsets that entails cost-benefit calculations. This notion seems empirically valid especially in the case with the opposition when Gutmann and Thompson (2012, 32, emphasis added) write that 'the cost depends on the difference between *what credibly can be achieved* by compromise and what the *status quo offers without compromise*'. Since the US context where Gutmann and Thompson place their argument does not recognise coalition governments, in this research the practice compromise has been introduced to an additional layer. In that status quo is already seen as a result of a compromise, and therefore cultivating the uncompromising mindset secures the practise of governing.

While it holds true that in majority systems criteria for evaluating accountability of opposition actors is perhaps less clear, opposition MPs give a lot of thought for where to draw the line. In political systems that have majority governments opposition is stripped

from legislative powers other than through formal procedures of minority reports (i.e. objections and protesting opinions left in committee report in the former case and statements in the latter), interpellations and raising a vote of confidence. On the other hand, particularly in the Finnish parliamentary democracy for impacting legislation the committee level is where the opposition have the slightest chance to do so (also committee chair positions are allocated to opposition parties). For this reason, deliberative representation detects willingness to compromise and more tempered and prudent attitudes while in the operative context. Opposition committee members tie such questions to revolve around their political credibility: if they conclude with the government committee members that unanimous report is drafted, they are signalling that they agree with government policy. All committee members who accept the committee report sign it. By doing that they become accountable for their decisions, also when in opposition. Once the opposition (party) has not resisted the compromise and gone along with the committee report and the government, there is no going back to deploy a highly partisan mode and criticising the bill when the report is handled in the plenary. Opposition is stripped from their weaponry. Objections to the committee report are always presented and deliberated in the plenary when the report is introduced on the floor.

What opposition members need, perhaps more critically than governing party MPs, is the sense of what they are agreeing on if they go along with the report and the potential compromise that is constituted and proposed. To put things bluntly, the government may need fewer affirmative credentials, whereas *‘in the committee the true work is done by those who disagree with the government policy’* (III: 4: 14:19). Underlining active processing of judgment and discretion in the scrutiny of the bill is then, arguably, job of the opposition.

Here, we have a saying that it’s easy in Parliament when in government and difficult on the turf [home district]. When in opposition it’s difficult in Parliament but easy on the turf. It really means that, it’s true that you must go deeper into the opposition when you make objections. When you start making an objection, the process involves that you must think pretty hard what is the clue here. [...] Finding what is essential in that substance plus what is the core [emphasised] of my stance. (III: 10: 23:29)

**

It is life-threatening when a person who doesn’t know his opinion makes a compromise [laughs]. I do underline that a good representative must be able to compromise. It means that he has his own stand, own interest. He sees his own leeway and makes such compromises that don’t have to be ashamed of when meeting one’s supporters. (III: 4: 1:27:49)

Especially the latter citation raises the salience of self-interest, which also speaks to what was discussed in the affirmative context. Engaging in deliberation about public policies requires that participants are aware (or become aware) of the interests they wish to pursue for them to become even considered in the first place. When the MP in the citation sees compromising without realisation of one’s interests ‘life-threatening’ relates to the notion that ‘[I]f members of the group speak only as “we” and not “I”, neither they nor the other

participants may be able to discover what is really at stake and forge integrated solutions' (Mansbridge et al. 2010, 73).

Next, we need to address the procedures of the process that are essentials in willingness to compromise, and in upholding the fairness of procedures (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 37.) I will first address how some notions of fairness are captured in the interviews and then discuss the role of committee chair as the key actor in producing sense of fairness and commonality. In the midst I will show how the ability to compromise is generally appreciated and can be used as a resource but simultaneously it spells out the way in which the spirit of compromise meets with the limits of it.

Acting in good faith might invoke to accept a compromise that is not fully satisfactory. On the other hand, if the opponent it allowed to 'play dirty', then accepting a bad bargain is out of question. Remember, fully integrative 'win-win' solutions, where everyone wins and nobody loses, came rare in politics. Especially when there is a lot in stake. Nearly always somebody needs to give up something, and the more you move towards the other end of the continuum you will find 'pure bargaining' that can result in a zero-sum outcome (Warren and Mansbridge 2013). On the other hand, majority rule can also induce arrogance of the winning side, disregarding counter-arguments made by the opposition which is something that is tried to restrain for the sake of commonality in the committee. Such dynamics, on which social interactions also have an impact, elevate chances for conflict and turning down any agreement-seeking solutions. From there, the disagreement is taken to the public that also serves a crucial deliberative function for allowing 'losers' to know 'what justifications for existing decision they will need to counter if they are to argue themselves into the majority' (Naurin and Reh 2018, 735).

The importance of acting in good faith and in a spirit of fair play is something that comes across strongly in the interviews. Despite its undemocratic underpinnings that the by the book principle that stalls the committee deliberation, there is another aspect that MPs recognise: it articulates fairness of practices and procedures. There are also some other informal norms in the committee (like the one not using the temporary imbalance between the majority and the minority and call a vote) regulating strategical incentives that restrain the politicians' power-mongering behaviour. Descriptions of committee work generally underline the tendency to strip down politics and embrace issued-based collaboration (Pekonen 2011, 206). The normative expectation seems to be that conspicuously partisan behaviour should be avoided.

However, the argument about toning down the political and accounts described in the interviews is somewhat mixed when we look at how opposition is engaged in the process of working together towards a unanimous committee report. I illustrated this a bit earlier with an idea of a puzzle. Apparently, the topic of when to call off negotiations is something that has been under discussion in some PPGs (e.g. III: 2, III: 10). It has been discussed how far one can venture into the negotiations about making a compromise, to back up the committee report. For one, it concerns also something that is referred as 'milking'—where the opposition (or a disagreeing individual) tries to invoke too many concessions from the governing parties. In some cases *'these human factors appear, and people lose their nerve and someone declares that "now we have given so many concession that now there are none to come". And the other demands. No more.'* (II: 1: 28:10) Opposition is brought along in the

negotiations and then the rug is pulled under one's feet that '*leaves a bad taste*' to the others (II: 2: 28:10).

In defining what the boundaries of compromises are, to what each participant can credibly chip in, statements that are upfront can be made. In those MPs state very clearly what their position is when it comes to negotiation and dealing with the disagreement. The second citation portrays a completely different take on negotiations.

Sometimes I declare early enough that it's no use to try to submit a unanimous [report]. There is too much disagreement. To me, it's useless to waste time to something like wresting and not showing your cards as if we're playing a game. Instead I say that now I disagree with this thing and I'm going to leave an objection. But then there are some situations when I say that it would be better if I remain in the background, but if it goes too far I'm not going to be part of it, if this is what is going to be written in it. (II: 6: 6:50)

**

Discussion in the committee is just pretty much about that seeking, so that you cannot shove all your cards on the table right away [amused], and then the game is over. Instead you need to very much listen carefully and, in that way, find out about other groups what is perhaps coming. And then knowing how to choose the right timing for coming forward with your opinion. With that you must be very [emphasis] careful. Politically it is extremely important that you can perceive the right time to come out with something and in the right way. (II: 14: 6:31)

A somewhat neglected, yet powerful, point of deliberative democracy is raised: social interactions and personalities impact the deliberative process. On the part of deliberative theory, Parkinson remarks how 'those who can show mutuality in a deliberative setting are not only enhancing the legitimacy of their claims by making the effort to demonstrate 'co-performance' (Parkinson 2006, 14). From the perspective of deliberative representation this also relevant when these *actors are given a better advantage than those who cannot demonstrate such capabilities*. This point is made throughout the interviews, on many levels: the ability to compromise portrays well the novelty of deliberative representation in action, but it is also a crucial resource when cooperating with others. Social conditions matter tremendously when faced with disagreements:

You should remember to respect that person who has a completely different opinion from your own. And when that person notices this. That way that kind of, better atmosphere is created where a common solution is easier to be found, that can usually be a compromise. But we try to deal with personal chemistries here all the time. And it makes a tremendous difference. With other you sync better than with some other, that is obvious. And often you cooperate with those who you sync with, naturally. (II: 9-1: 47: 58).

**

A good representative is compromise-seeking. It is so, and many times that good representative, good politician is measured by whether they are willing to compromise. Can they create them? And of course you must also think that she must have empathetic ability to put herself in the position of the partner. Then you are able also to find that compromise that satisfies both, or all three. (III: 12: 06:41)

What these citations above and on the previous page show us is that MPs endorse different kinds of roles, also unconsciously, which ascribe to the varying capacities and modes of operation. Why is this important? It is important because it affects representatives' capability for reflection and judgment. This is linked to the ability to shape-shift, as suggested by Sawad (2014). It means that representatives can read off from the contexts (time, place, situation) whether shape-shifting is applicable. These examples above paint an initial picture of 'deliberative players' who can advance the collective aim of the committee by their ability to adapt and modify positions. By acting strategically this way they push their own initiative but not at other's expense. The interviews bring up is how '*good deliberators, like good negotiators' or mediators, can often figure out what other people want and help them to achieve their ends while also obtaining the ends they want for themselves*', as Cameron (2018, 128) argue. It calls for interest as well as the readiness to hear out what others have to say, but understanding the subject matter well enough to make accommodating proposals (as a source of compromise) and perhaps most importantly, respect and trust:

For example, from someone who is an opinionated expert in one's own field, you rarely end up with a joint committee report. But if there is someone else present, someone who can come up with a wording that can be accepted by all, that requires that you know your stuff. Then you can yourself think, "to what our party can agree to and in what way this can be written so that these common views can be brought up?" And we need them all. And then some of the representatives, who don't belong to any of these, withdraw in one way or another from the discussion. (II: 7: 5:31)

**

Between other groups, trust is emphasised when making decisions. In committee work, it is at present very, very, very, very clear. You can never emphasise that enough. Indeed just to that making decisions are based on, that those who can make cross-party collaboration and function with other people, they draw the longer straw precisely with that, that they have discreet confidential relations. (III: 27: 1:01:34)

**

[...] when a negotiation becomes very tough, I say clearly in what I can partake in and in what not, I simultaneously have an enormously strong constructive [power]. If there are two extremes [opinions] and I am left in the middle, my constructive power is bigger in that moment than my political mandate would assume. I just want to find it, and have the guts to say it [...] The committee group [name withheld] would have walked out many times if I hadn't switched role from quarrelling to negotiator, "now boys and girls, let's try to reach a suitable compromise". (III: 20: 1:04:56)

We have seen how individual representatives can make a difference when the committee works together in a way that displays commonality and constructive attitudes. It is also a matter of good atmosphere when a committee can engage in constructive politics and deal with disagreements in a reasoned and justified manner. It is also a matter of sustaining fair procedures that committee chairs oversee. Here a good committee chair fosters compromise: in nurturing the element of the compromise-based mindset that crystallises in upholding an atmosphere of mutual respect. These figures can indeed represent the committee, also building up committee credibility that showcases most importantly '*a reputation for good judgment*' (Bessette 1994, 117). Representatives who have been operating as committee chairs are aware of their power to influence, despite that chair can be from the opposition party as well.

Trust and impartiality towards everybody, and setting your own opinion aside. It's something that means respecting others in these cases. You cannot abuse your status, that's my opinion. Another thing is what you do in the drafting stage. As a chair you can influence pretty much what kind of initial text is made in the first draft. And as you know, we have representatives who pretty roughly dictate what that draft should look like. I never went with that; we did the drafts in cooperation with the secretary. We tried to formulate such wordings that would pass with everybody. And would strike home. For me I don't think it makes sense to try to shove your own opinions by banging your head to the walls, knowing that they will certainly not go through. It makes no sense. (III: 27: 1:33:36)

**

A good chair can manipulate. And manipulate in a way that the other doesn't notice. How should I say this? You calculate how far you can come to meet the other party's standing for them to accept the report. Then you take away their eyeteeth [Finnish expression for canine sharp teeth, i.e. weapon] when they come the Hall. If you can go as far as you can without altering the paragraphs but taking there some motion [added into the report] or such. [...] [a case example withheld to maintain anonymity] In that moment I thought that I'm damn good at manipulating. Not with ill cause but that we sought those... I listened with a careful ear that 'ahaa, this is important to them, and this is important to you' [...] Then I used a lot of my, how should I say, my ability to manipulate. But I did do it in such a way that I was still able to sleep at night. It wasn't deceitful, certainly nothing like that. But those were perhaps those moments when you thought--this was a successful thing! We got a unanimous report. Outsiders don't perhaps understand how big of a deal it is for the committee to say that we made it unanimous. (III: 22: 1:33:36)

Committees that operate under a skilful chair can become powerful, also bringing them to become credible counterforce to the government. From perspective of deliberative representation in the operative context of the committee resonates with what Bessette is describing when studying the portrayals of Congressmen. Combining ‘desire to earn power and prestige [...] was served by exhibiting the very qualities that promote good public policy’ (Bessette 1994, 114–5, emphasis added). It is hard not to see it plausible in Parliament for someone ‘developing a reputation for the kind of subject matter *expertise*, *hard work*, *openness to argument and persuasion*, and *thoroughness of analysis* that was necessary to produce sound legislation’ (ibid., 113–4, emphasis added). These qualities were associated with the concept of parliamentary pride (*eduskuntaylpeys* in Finnish), as well as the idea, discussed earlier, of parliamentarians being seen as refined representatives.

The quotations above are examples of the muddles that the role orientation theories lead to if we would be trying to discern actual behaviour of legislators. Motivations, such as aspirations towards common good, get enmeshed with other orientations that relate to maintaining good relationships within the house (another feature available in Fenno’s work) and gaining power (Bessette 1994, 108–109). When Strøm (1998) comes to endorse the rational theory oriented perspective when seeing roles as behavioural strategies distinguishable from sociological motivational explanations, I find here in the case of committee chairs the argument not fully convincing. When someone has already attained the goal of a legislative office, what is the analytical continuation when it comes to studying acting in that office? When positional role is fulfilled, then what motivates MP’s action after that? Legislative behaviour is clearly more contingent than the roles’ expectancy and orientations assume.

To summarise this subchapter on the operative context some key points can be made. I have shown that deliberative representation orients in this context towards seeing results and guiding the deliberative process to an end. Unlike in the affirmative context, here we have seen how MPs operate with more clearly formed preferences when reasoning with each other for the purpose of legislative trouble-shooting and overall scrutiny. These functions are aligned with the need to handle disagreements in a manner that mitigates outright political overtones in exchange for expertise-oriented conducts. For the necessary convergence of deliberative and strategic incentives displayed in the committee, I have called the major deliberative mode ‘strategic-deliberative’. It is reflected in the ways the reasoning, negotiations and compromising and decision-making are facilitated.

To illuminate the dynamics present in deliberative representation I have addressed the question to what extent the ‘spirit of compromise’ is embraced in the committee, what conditions it and what are the implications that coming up with an agreement have. I have argued that when it comes to building compromises and settling disagreements, MPs value adaptability and a certain kind of resilience. This means firstly that MPs can judge where they stand and make decisions accordingly. One of the most important findings supporting the strategic-deliberative mode is the observation that those who dig themselves deepest behind the trenches of party lines and expertise, surprisingly, may not be those who can influence committee work best. Now, despite these manoeuvres can also be tactical and strategic, deception and violating trust that maintains the relationship with others can be

politically fatal. When MP loses credibility and trust, one loses many of the resources for getting things done.

4.3 Performative context

Representation is not simply a product of what is done, by politicians and others, but importantly of what is demonstrated or shown to be done. (Saward 2017, 75)

The performative context draws from the idea that democratic institutions need to be able to operate and carry on the tasks and functions ascribed to it. These formal functions, as legislating and deciding on the budget, need to be visible and ‘performed’. When it comes to deliberative representation much of the work that MPs engage in is not perceivable from the outside. The transparency and publicity enunciated by the performative context draws from the very principles of representative government. Together with constitutional principles the plenary sessions very much articulate foundation for the legitimacy of representative rule. The performative context discussed in this subchapter addresses the public side of parliamentary life, focusing mainly on the plenary sessions.

The plenary sessions are the enactment of the accountability function that parliament as a representative institution grants to the public deliberations. As such, the checks and balances that parliament is also functionally charged with often borrow from adversarial notions of democratic politics. While performing these institutional tasks representatives also compete for publicity and electoral support. ‘Campaigning and the uncompromising mindset are in the DNA of the democratic processes,’ (Gutmann and Thompson 2012, 214), this is especially the case when we look at how deliberative representation occurs in the performative context.

The *expressive-partisan* deliberative mode defines the performative context. It is primarily demonstrated when there is no need for practical coordination to conclude something, something that is necessary in the operative context. However, plenary debates and discussions precede voting but by the time legislation has reached the voting stage minds have already been made. *Performative context is not the land for compromising*. As I showed, the strategic-deliberative mode aspires to contain the political and partisan tones and convey them to expertise and expert knowledge. Committees, as I situated them in the core of the operative context, work together in order to exercise legislative scrutiny on behalf of the whole parliament. Neither is the performative context a forum for affirmation and genuine insight when looked at from the perspective of plenary sessions—something that it may once have been as hinted at in some of the interviews.

Alternatively, performative context can demonstrate other faculties that are equally, if not most important in democratic politics. Individual MPs can plead for a particular cause or issue, demonstrating skills and expertise in a chosen manner and to a chosen, particular audience. For this reason, the performative context spells out how parliamentary politics is not only about the collective game played by the coalitions, parties or PPGs. Acknowledging the fact that united party fronts hold would seem to substantiate the unitary argument about parliamentary actors. By endorsing the kind of actor-centred perspective, the performative context discussed in the following sections show that the trajectory of unified strategic incentives for parliamentary deliberations is somewhat misplaced. Although the ‘show-do’

characteristics of performative representation argued by Saward (2017) are in action, the interactions and communications between representative can be rendered to the deliberative approach to parliamentary deliberations sought by Bächtiger (2014).

i Plenary sessions as the façade of democratic representation

Plenary sessions are, for better and worse, the epitome of parliamentary rule. What deliberative representation is to do here is that it most clearly reminds us of the communicative feature of representation. Deliberation endorses the partisan and adversary position of political deliberation. So far, I have examined deliberative representation in terms of reflection and deliberation within. I have viewed it from the perspective of representing to other MPs in interactive deliberative encounters and engagements that combines notions of compromises with operational efficacy. In both discussed venues, the PPG and the committee, the question of audience has left the larger public somewhat intact. Other MPs have been both the audience and the recipients of deliberative practices. The plenary sessions illustrate most vividly how only a relative proportion of the work done in the Finnish Parliament is visible to the public. It has been argued that the Parliament of Finland is as open as the Vatican (Arter 2012). Most recently, Seo and Raunio (2017, 631) have argued that the Finnish Parliament, partly also due to the ‘working parliament’ mode, which favours scrutiny over debating, embodies a ‘lukewarm attitude’ towards democratic innovations that would increase contact with the public. It portrays a challenge to the principles of transparency and permeability of democratic rule, which is also a central concern when talking about salience of legislatures.

This subsection concentrates what all this means to the conceptual idea of representation. This perspective that springs from contemporary theorising on representation seems to propose at least a partial but promising explanation worth considering when lamenting the quality of plenary deliberations. Rehfeld’s (2006, also 2018) novel argument about the function of representation connects the activity that representative is engaged in the definition of the audience. When interviewed MPs are aware of the lack of visibility and transparency raises theoretical and practical interrelated point that is cause of misunderstanding on what representation is. To the former point on visibility and transparency, practical paradox for the representatives is that many members of the public do not know what elected MPs do.⁴⁴ The purpose of national legislatures can be similarly disputed. Therefore, for those represented a picture of what representation really is can be argued to evoke mainly through plenary activities: through plenary addresses, debates, question hours and voting. These accounts are the culmination of the processes handled elsewhere—that is, in the committee and PPGs.

⁴⁴ Many general misconceptions were brought up in the interviews. They were mostly relating to mistrust and general hostility towards politicians that are also seen in the feedback MPs receive. One MP described the amazement in the shift the day after receiving the representative mandate, finding oneself overnight turned into ‘unreliable, seeker of self-interest and vile human being who is not to be trust and whose talk cannot be trusted’ (III: 24: 21:26).

Acknowledging the limited access to the other venues the plenary sessions are all the public gets. Equivalently, this notion demonstrates the feasibility of endorsing also the temporal notion embedded in the representative contexts: whereas bills can be scrutinised over an extended time in the committees, plenary discussion are MPs' 'only shot' for representing for the larger audience, constituency and such. This notion of transiency also becomes evident when we return to discuss the styles of deliberation and acclaimed worsening deliberative culture of plenary.

My analysis supports Saward's recent argument on the performativity of representation: MPs indeed recognise how central the showing doing element is in representation (Saward 2017, 81). A similar account, albeit in different terms, was available with studied Flemish and Belgian MPs (Severs, Celis, and Meier 2014, 630). Relating to the difficulty with the lack of transparency of work done in the Parliament posits a heavy strain on the public venue of plenary: activities get correlated to representing, while discerning that it actually 'works' as such. This is perhaps also due to skewed media coverage. Consequently, what happens, partly, is that the plenary hall becomes a *façade for representation*. This presents a paradox for representatives: the physical public and visible domain lays out a performative context that they are hesitant to use. This is because being successful, by resorting to means that seem to be accounted as 'representing' and proving that 'things get done' (or do not get done), may mean losing credibility, respect and—most importantly—the capacity to exert influence in other contexts. This view of deliberative representation puts emphasis on the other less discussed perspective that while deliberative representation captures communicating and interacting in the act of representation it is also the case among those who represent. As argued many times, deliberative representation is not exclusively about maintaining the representative–represented relationship and evoking constituencies as the contemporary theorising informs. Additionally, the communicative and claim-making flow should take note also of this horizontal perspective, that between those who represent, the representatives that is.

This leads to a conclusion that the attitudes portrayed towards the plenary sessions themselves, and the functions ascribed to it, are ambivalent. At the same time MPs acknowledge the democratic functions of plenary, of public justification and reasoning on legislation and public policies as inalienable democratic features of representative rule. Some of these views were especially teased out in the two subsequent interview rounds where I asked MPs to comment intentionally converse claims (see in Appendix ii) about parliamentary work. Presenting the interviewees with the proposition that plenary sessions are occasions for empty talk showcased some of the reasoning behind this interpretation. It is '*not completely untrue, but is problematic in many ways*' (III: 28: 1:23:37), but as choice of expression considered it to be '*too cruel*' (III: 27: 1:47:43).

For now, I will follow the argumentation started above, where plenary activities equal to what representation is as representing (Rehfeld 2018). While consistently defending the significance of the plenary sessions, this misconception about representing, that is partly due to the limited access to the other venues of Parliament, is connected in the interviews to discretion with participation to the plenary discussions. Many emphasised that they took part only if they had something to say. Like the norms present in the operative context, being mindful about the allocation with one's own voice was repeatedly brought up. Empty talk

is talk that is *deficiently motivated*. However, there is a constant tension with the understanding that the plenary sessions are the key source for legitimising their formal mandate and position as representatives, and that they are judged according to these activities:

I had this attitude towards the plenary discussions that you didn't go there as if you'd go to a theatre. You took part in the discussion if there was something to be discussed. Not that I need political lift. I discuss. And here's the joke—that I'm lazy [referring to the rankings of amount of speeches held]. Because it seems that some of the MPs, I cannot know what is in their heads, some make sure that they discuss sufficiently enough in the Hall. Continuously. And it is a signal that they are diligent and hard-working representatives. Or whatever their message is. I cannot interpret this any other way when I hear in the cafeteria when someone says 'I must go deliver a couple of speeches'. And off they go, almost as if to speak to the statistics. (III: 20: 41:44)

Distinctions are made between what MPs consider as good and bad plenary talk. In distinguishing the incentives one of the most pejorative one was the 'statistics speeches'. Statistics speeches earn their name from the practice that tabloids sustain. They publish annually tables and rankings showing the amount of plenary speeches held by each MP. The headlines that follow often showcase representatives with no plenary addresses. Even though these rankings were mostly ridiculed in the interviews, MPs cannot overcome the framework set by the media. Rankings are posed as record for 'slackers and hard-workers', an idea that consequently looms behind the rationalisation of talking in the plenary sessions. Despite most MPs do not agree with the quantitative approach to speeches (as they claim to argue for and support the quality), there is another point to be noted. The amount of speeches bears relevance also from the competitive partisan perspective. What is often forgotten is that while MPs tend to be measured in comparison to each other as representatives of the people, there is also another level to be found: internal party competition. Within the electoral district MPs compete against each other, and the fiercest adversary can often come from the same party.

Respondent: Too many parliamentary speeches are written beforehand. Those that are held because the media keeps count on speeches. If you have 50 speeches, well fine, but what if the other MPs in your electoral district have 100? Then you deliver 'parrot speeches' just in order to get markings in the statistics. For me this is the mockery of giving speeches, that you speak to the statistics... I did that myself when I started [in Parliament]...

Interviewer: Why did you do that?

Respondent: Because all the others did as well! It is said that here you must deliver statistics-driven speeches. But then I started to think that I don't speak because of that to get a marking, when there is nothing to say. Or it is said that you have to speak about the projects undergoing in your county even if there is nothing about that there, and it isn't related to the topic at hand, it is not handled in the parliament but you go and tell that here in [city name taken out] we have this and that. Nowadays this raises amused smiles when someone goes [...] Then everybody says, that representative also has advanced our projects! [exaggerated] But it distorts, that people deliver speeches for eye-service. [...] (III: 22: 1:44:20)

These performances are after the competence and credibility of being a representative that most representatives seek in the eyes of the represented. The show-do character of representation comes up in statistical speeches that allow the representativeness of representation to be measured in a quantitative manner. The more times a representative has taken the podium, the better she or he is as a representative. To question *'the correlation between what you've been accomplishing'* and logic that does not fully hold ground since *'the best measurement for your political activity is not necessarily the amount how many times you've been venting in the great hall'*. (III: 21: 13:03). When elections are near, it becomes even more important for an MP to remind their constituents of the MP's existence. At those times, *'we have these "evening sitters" who carry out this collecting'*, as one MP notes (III: 4: 1:21:17). Continuing on the deliberative style in question, the MP finds it *'craziest that these who deliver these statistical speeches read out the summary of the bill. "This is an important thing. Thank you". And then asks for a new turn to speak. And it goes on and on.'* (ibid.)

Representatives are subject to the 'deliberative imperative' (Pekonen 2011, 110). The public can exercise their (negative) freedom to opt out from deliberation. As autonomous subjects they have the right not to participate in deliberative process (see e.g. Rostbøll 2011). However, it is an intriguing question to what extent this also relate to those who represent us? In one way, MPs are entitled but also forced to deliberate on behalf of the represented, to raise issues and grievances near and dear to them. One MP especially emphasised the role of MP as a spokesperson, meaning that *'the statute of MP enables raising issues for public discussion that normal citizen cannot otherwise raise'* (III: 28: 2:54). For him, this was a *'central practice'* in acting as a representative, even though this was not confined exclusively to the plenary sessions. For Disch (2012), this is exactly her point that instead of talking about representative's responsiveness to the represented *responsibility* should be considered. In this case then, it is the responsibility of the representative to bring up issues and raise agendas relevant to the constituency (or those resonating with the representative claim, as Saward would argue). MP initiatives are one institutional way to affect the parliamentary agenda, to have a matter and a concern relevant to the electorate at least discussed.

However, from this perspective it casts a certain doubt on those representatives, where a constituent might hypothetically ask: What kind of a representative would not speak at all? Talking in the plenary sessions signals, then, that something is being done, that *'representation works'*. Severs and others (2014, 632) look at this from a similar perspective when they argue that the function of account-giving has an instrumental value that

‘compensates the “invisibility” of their voters and facilitates a representational relationship with them’.

For the current analytical endeavour, it would be unnecessary to say that plenary work would lack any deliberative purpose or value. We cannot argue here that the sole purpose for deliberating would be count-keeping,⁴⁵ i.e. to engage in discussions with such strategic pretences. However, with these addresses MPs are neither aiming to persuade each other nor even addressing their speech to them. It is mainly a tool for communicating to the constituency, sending a signal out to them. When concentrating on addressing the gallery what is found problematic is the lack of dialogue between the MPs. This is also partly due to the institutionalised format of plenary deliberations. It relates to practical reason how plenary session addresses are distributed: at a certain time the speaker list is opened, and MPs can reserve a place on the list. The distribution rule is based on first come-first serve (excluding the PPG addresses that are placed on the top of the list). With hot topics, the first set of speakers can extend over a hundred. This can often mean that those MPs on the list get their turn very late in the night, especially if the Speaker allows spontaneous commentary speeches and debates in between.⁴⁶ This reality, according to the interviews, lessens the willingness to take a plenary address. Then also, MPs can become frustrated about the ‘temporal play’ available in the parliamentary politics and used also as a tool for political manoeuvres by the government. Legislative agendas considered important, brought up in the interviews, might have a slot in the plenary sessions in the middle of the night when the plenary hall is ‘*as empty as the tomb of Jesus on Easter morning*’, as one MP (III: 4: 1:19: 34) put it. The gallery, the plenary and the media are not there, and ‘*salient issues are handled*’ (ibid.).

When a governmental bill is in handled in the plenary sessions—after the issuing discussion when the bill is introduced to the parliament—the committee chair always introduces the committee report, after which the floor is open for discussion. Most usually the official standings of the parties are delivered by the head of the committee groups. Combined with the fact that many speeches are pre-written and pre-planned that are ‘*pending in line*’ makes it that ‘*it’s not very productive work*’, as one MP (III: 11: 9:27) argues. ‘*And not many listens to them, really*’. (ibid.) There seems to be deficit on listening side. ‘*When no one listens to no one, is the biggest thing in this house*’, comments, former well-known Speaker of the House Riitta Uosukainen (III: 30: 11:15) who acted in that position almost ten years in around the turn of the millennium. ‘*You really can’t say what your pal next to you said. And it shows. It was like that then, and it is so now. It is sad*’.

The problem of incoherence and pressure to represent disguised in ‘speech-milling’ seems to be worst with handling of the budget upon which the Parliament decides on. Here, the argument that representation is tantamount to deliberation is linked to the lack of discursive orientation. On the subject of budgetary addresses, one MP (III: 27: 1:25:45) remarked:

⁴⁵ In many instances one long-gone group of MPs, nicknamed ‘the Bermuda Triangle’ were brought up when referring to very talkative MPs. They used to dominate the plenary ‘airspace’ in the late evenings so that the plenary sessions lasted long into the night. Usually present were a few MPs and the Speaker. Nowadays plenary sessions are normally scheduled to end by 10 pm.

⁴⁶ Having a turn to speak in the middle of night, to an almost empty plenary was a relief for one MP (III: 7) who recalled their first plenary address.

The subject motif was so vast and incongruous that I didn't see even a hint of sensibility in it. Why do we discuss so many days with such disarrayed arsenal of discussion? You didn't get any lead or clue. One is pulling that way, the other that way. Everyone speaks arbitrary things in one's own mandatory address. To me it was such a theatre that didn't have any script or director, but it happened on the terms of the discussants. When I was often thinking to myself was that if someone is following this discussion, they don't get much wiser from this. Other than "that person delivered a good speech, and that one didn't say anything."

This tension of these mandatory speeches and the acclaimed insensibility and condemnation of empty talk is something that all MPs need to come in terms with personally. In the logic of the performative context, 'talking is doing'. What has been accomplished and getting done in the operative context needs to be shown. But the prevailing mindset, perhaps due to the dominance of the operative context that MPs readily endorse in their daily work, does not recognise the plenary or associate it with tangible results that can be seen. One MP (III: 11: 11:36) reflected on this challenge of with the following:

The thing is, when you give a speech in the plenary sessions, does it lead to a concrete political decision? Very rarely. But, of course, parliamentary plenary sessions are an important forum of political discussion, and valuable in itself. But a wrong image shouldn't be created to the citizens that 'there they now decide about these matters'.

From what we have seen so far, and what the quotation shows nicely, is that representation facilitates different functions that are also connected to spatial and temporal contexts. The fact that representation refuses to be a one thing but translates and collapses into many functions and practices deem representation a difficult target to judge and evaluate. I take that the argument on the liminality of representation that mainly refers to the criticism of strict electoral and non-electoral distinction includes the idea of practical, functional multitude. This can be seen when Saward (2019, 282) writes that 'political figures seek and hold these statuses or enact these practices are best seen as liminal figures, negotiating transitional or ambiguous zones of practice'. For this reason, what representatives do, is that they take on many practices that travel across the contexts of representation. What they aspire to do in each respective context is not the same. Empirical inquiry resonates here with theoretical arguments (Saward 2014; Bächtiger and Beste 2017) by showing that representatives indeed shift according to these functions, as does their deliberation.

When connecting the idea of representatives as 'liminal figures' mentioned above, we are in a better position to understand how the functions of the affirmative and operative context are not recognised in the performative context. This is partly due to the audience in question—to whom the deliberative performances are addressed to—but more importantly to the functions. In the case of the plenary sessions, this is linked in particular to the shared notion that these sessions are not a venue for opinion-making, decision-making and compromise—and that the small amount of actual decision-making that remains in the domain of the committee. Campaigning urges are to be toned down and softened, as all members who are part of the compromise are expected to hold their ground in public.

Therefore, what we can argue is that the communicative power in question becomes more dispersed and less discernible. I will return to these notions soon when I discuss significance of the parliamentary tension as democratic practices of deliberation in the performative context, but at this point I want to continue examining the individual partisan perspective.

Parliamentary deliberations are often fleeting. For that reason the impermanence of show-do character of performative representation means that it requires constant sustaining and maintenance. Notably, however, on the large scale the institutional setting can help achieve in maintaining. Discussions and debates are often built on the adversary relations between the governing and the opposing parties. Adversarial political deliberation can help clarify political disagreements and conflicts which also then help fight back fragmentation of public sphere (Manin 2017). One showcasing example of overcoming the temporal character is writing a bulletin or a memo to be sent out after delivering a speech in the plenary sessions. The representative performance gets reproduced through this practice. The reality seems to be that only the very devoted members of the constituency watch every plenary to catch their representative give a speech, perhaps supporting their cause. According to the MPs, writing a bulletin and sending it out is an efficient and handy way to maintain communication with the constituency, keep them informed and convinced that they are doing their job and performing in it.⁴⁷ Naturally, these bulletins are also sent to the media. This practice demonstrates some of the ways representatives try to wrest control of the political agenda from the media.

Especially for MPs from small rural districts sending dispatches to their local news media is a viable way of penetrating the opaqueness of their work in the Parliament. The possibility of getting a news piece made is much bigger there than in the nation-wide large newspapers. These small papers keep track on their districts' representatives by underlining the accountability and responsiveness function of representation (similar with the speech rankings and records). They may also publish lists of how their representatives have been voting on matters that are consequential to the district. In the interviews some considered writing these bulletins and newsletters very dated considering the force of social media avenues. But then again, electorates differ, and not all are keen on using social media platforms.

These practices described above can be seen as 'spin-offs' of representative activity, where the plenary sessions constitute for the faculty of re-making representation. What is worthy to note here is that this re-making needs to be validated and, more importantly, legitimised. The plenary sessions do just that. The opinion, perspective or claim carries less democratic credentials if presented and brought up elsewhere. Commenting on the constituency communication that bulletins and weekly newsletters facilitate one MP states that *'[I]t's natural to come out with it that you've said something. The plenary is a natural place to refer to or cite'*. (III: 15: 1:37). Considering the mixed notions about the significance of the plenary talk, MPs are uncomfortably aware of the need to state matters

⁴⁷ When discussing constituency work and how to keep your supporters in the loop some have a weekly or monthly bulletin sent out to their support group mailing list. In them MPs tell about the activities they have been engaged in, positions they have taken, etc. In general, constituency work has not been vastly studied in Finnish context (Raunio and Ruotsalainen 2018), nor in Nordic countries since recently (Arter and Raunio 2018). This is somewhat surprising considering the fact that our electoral system highlights individual candidates. It would assume that maintaining close relations with the 'home turf' would be important.

in the plenary sessions and not elsewhere. What this, in its limited part, tells us is that the plenary sessions have not lost its democratic appeal in the minds of representatives.

Another important aspect that draws together the meaning of seemingly isolated and temporarily impermanent speeches is that all utterances in the plenary sessions, even heckling are recorded and filed in parliamentary archives. This electronic archive is open to the public almost instantly after each plenary session. This brings us to another point that demonstrates that speeches that could be considered as ‘empty talk’ have value for deliberative representation. Parliamentary work, especially plenary discussions (from which the transcripts are available unlike from the committee sessions held in camera), leaves behind a traceable record. This opens up vast opportunities for all kinds of follow-up purposes for the represented and representatives alike. We have already covered part of this idea, touching on the issue of statistical speeches where the judgment on the effectiveness of representing is grounded more on quantity. They had a less menacing motivation to ‘make a mark’. As in the previous examples, the position is better secured and, more importantly, legitimised if it has been stated in the plenary sessions. It gives those claims a different kind of *authority of positions*. Transformed into textual accounts representing is validated in good and bad.

When taking the podium some consider it relevant from the perspective of ‘speaking to the history books’. When democratic representation at large can be thought to be series of sequences stretching over time, marking a position by giving an address can be seen as an attempt to fight back the inconsistency of politics. It is a powerful, responsive claim or justification in politics to be able to show retrospectively, for example, ‘I was already at that time holding this position. It was right then, and it is right now’. This relates to the ‘principled tenacity’ of the uncompromising mindset that testifies that the drivers for representation have neither ceased nor changed (Gutmann and Thompson 2012). The consistency in claim-making can also be thought to enhance the features necessary to selection-model (Mansbridge 2009; 2016): selecting intrinsically motivated representatives whose interests communicated as representations (or representative claims, if you wish) are aligned also over time. These demonstrations are therefore not only snapshots of certain timepoints but can be seen to form an extended temporal claim on representing. Accumulated track-record feeds the favourable characteristics of selecting these gyroscopic representatives (Mansbridge 2003; a similar point about relevance of selection is made by Fearon 1999).

Retrospective perspective of speaking to the books and all plenary deliberations that leave a traceable track-record can be turned into political ammunition. This is done when accusing your opponent as unreliable. In hypothetical words: ‘You (and your party) took this position then, and now you are saying something else. You have given up your principles’. These retrospective argumentative grounds as means of ‘politicking’ (Palonen 2003) were defined in one interview (III: 21) as ‘*a treasure box*’ for somebody who has enough energy to go through plenary transcripts. Wary of this political weaponry MPs seem to be mindful of statements made in public.

Some means of ‘making a mark’ and securing a position are institutionalised. One such account that illustrates the logics of performative representation is the legislative initiatives of MPs. Like the amount of speeches, they are also easily quantified measurements for how

well a representative is representing. Also, smaller districts' local newspapers keep count on their representatives' initiatives (as well as on budgetary proposals), how many there are by each local MP. And there are many: approximately 350 MP initiatives are raised per parliamentary term.⁴⁸ While the initiatives are tangible cues highlighting the general impact and result-oriented viewpoints of, plenary speeches and initiatives do not get things done, as discussed earlier. In reality this is true with legislative initiatives: only less than one percent is passed in the Finnish parliament (Solvak and Pajala 2016; Pajala 2014; see also 2012). The rest never advance to committee proceedings but get buried under other more urgent legislative matters handled in the committee, and get expired when parliamentary term ends.

Why, then, propose legislative initiatives if their impact is close to null? The perspectives on this differed among MPs who the subject came up in the interviews. Where it is possible to see them as being conducted under false pretences, as with the previously mentioned statistical speeches, they are also ways of getting a small discussion out of it and making the case public. Within this backdrop it should be remembered that Finnish political agenda is very much government-led. Although the committee system of Finnish Parliament ranks relatively high (9 out of 30 parliament) in international comparisons when it comes to defining committee autonomy (Mickler 2017), the overall agenda-setting powers, especially with committees are limited (Mattson and Strøm 1995; 2004). Practically, however, it is but non-existent, since regrettably Finnish committees lack independent rights of legislative initiative.⁴⁹

The nihilist interpretation on the relevance of the MP initiatives draws again to the contrast with the operative context. For those who prefer seeing the focus of representative's task as actually pushing matters forward, in the framework of influence, then the plenary sessions and the performative context lacks this feature. Also referring to acquiring enough influencing power through statuses one interviewee bluntly stated (II: 10: 46:33) that *'if I'm forced to do initiatives, I'm not doing my job well'*. I would be inclined to argue that the same understanding would be associated with those who put a large amount of effort into preparing for the plenary sessions. It testifies again how the 'ecology' of Parliament as a working community takes different perspectives to deliberative representation and the idea of distributed deliberation in the contexts discussed in this research. It also tells us that representatives nurture and defend very different ways of acting as a representative.

On these assumptions presented above, I am using the term 'expressive-partisan' to describe the deliberative mode in use in the performative context. The orientation is partisan and not 'deliberative' in the sense that it would try to mediate matters between participants or seek affirmation and assurance. Instead deliberation orients at articulating and communicating with the constituency not only in substance but also in form. What I mean here is that performative context urges representatives to appear in public and take a stand (through speeches and other procedural practices as discussed initiatives) as means of

⁴⁸ The amount of MP initiatives has dropped one thirds in the past decade (from 558 in 2010 to 312 in 2018).

⁴⁹ The general initiative rights expanded in 2012 when citizens' initiatives were introduced. They allow putting issues on the parliamentary agenda and therefore to be discussed in the plenary sessions. As with MP initiatives, citizens' initiatives do not necessarily lead to an impact. At the time of writing, only two such initiatives have been passed.

expression. Through plenary speeches MPs may seek to set up and claim a particular agenda in addition to legitimise and verify an opinion that can be used in other contexts. We will advance this argumentation further as this subchapter unfolds.

Next, we begin to look at the dynamics of the basic parliamentary tension that facilitates many of the central democratic practices of deliberation. They revolve around the government and the opposition, but again, in accordance to what is argued in this research: individual MPs negotiate their roles which ‘are not areas for action confined to set or fixed [...] institutionalised positions’ (citing Parkinson 2015, Saward 2019, 286). These positions of governing MP and opposition MP, however, are able further to allow discussion on the performative context.

ii Structuring and maintaining parliamentary tension

The institutionalised parliamentary style of political speech underscores the basic setting where the viewpoints are debated from opposite perspectives. The parliamentary ideal, and one of the principles of representative government, is that political matters are settled by ‘trial by discussion’ (Manin 1997). The government (or, more specifically in the Finnish case, the coalition government) defends and justifies the bills and policies that go along with them. The opposition is against them, demanding better justifications and offering alternative options and solutions. The performative ‘show-do’ character of representation is embedded in the parliamentary form of ‘pro et contra’ talk (Palonen 2008) that endorses adversary yet reasoned argumentation where the other side gets heard. Deliberative trial in the context of political deliberation distances itself from the idea of impartiality. Contrary to the judicial trial, members in political deliberation are expected to embrace their partiality. They should not escape their involvement in the conflict that is embedded in the confrontation. (Manin 2017, 39–41.)

Hearing the other side, facilitated by adversarial political deliberation, has many virtues. Firstly, criticism has epistemic credentials. Decisions that have been surrendered to criticism tend to be better. Secondly and thirdly, whilst adversarial deliberation clarifies the positions in terms of comprehension of choices, it fights back the fragmentation of the public sphere (see empirical counterargument in the study of Mutz 2006). And finally, dynamics of arguing for and against establishes respect to the minority. (Manin 2017, 42.)

In what follows, I will rely on Manin’s perspective when discussing the aforementioned virtues. In doing so, I will also continue to connect proposed expressive-partisan deliberative mode presented in the performative context: through argumentative practices that are founded on adversary and positional logics of deliberative representation that focuses on the partisan perspective. The elementary feature of parliamentary tension, that between the government and opposition, is applicable also in the committee but it is most evident in the plenary sessions. Here I illustrate how the principle of trial by discussion manifests throughout the parliamentary institution, and in the case of the performative context I argue that the expressive-partisan mode of deliberation effectively captures these political and adversarial features and dynamics.

As outlined previously, from the very practical perspective of MPs the plenary sessions mark a minor but essential formality in the process of democratic representation. That is where the legislative process comes to an end, when the vote decides the matter. Importantly, however, it should not be conflated with the view that it is where political decision-making takes place, even though legally and formally it is so. It goes without saying that the plenary sessions bear other, inalienable functions when it comes to democratic rule. For one, the government-versus-opposition division spells out the main frame through which the ideals of accountability and responsiveness are checked. Looking from the perspective of understanding representation as praxis, how these practices of accountability and responsiveness are played out differently depending whether one looks at things from perspective of the government of the opposition.

Minority plays an essential democratic role. Considering the tenacity in attitudes portrayed in the performative context (when it comes to the well-defined and possibly refined opinion-formation), opposition challenges the performance of the government. Notably, ‘the majority should be checked’ by pluralist counterforces (Manin 1987, 361). The goal of this dynamic is ‘not equilibrium; it is deliberation itself’ (ibid.,). These viewpoints regarding the general idea of political deliberation blend into the accountability function in two ways. First is the way in which the legislature, as a whole, is accountable to the represented. These were the ‘people have the right to know’ type of justifications expressed in the interviews. *‘As long as you are breathing you need to talk, and even after that when you have ended in the minority and been defeated, the issue has to be declared to the public’* (III: 4: 1:19.)

The second notion, more evident in the quotations below, portray how it is in fact the opposition who performs the accountability functions on behalf of the represented. The process of judgment that is granted to the represented (as an audience) can be thought to entail two overlapping levels: first is about judging the original representative claim offered by the government, and the second judgment, perhaps more critical, is about judging the credibility of the rendition that the opposition has created of the representation made by the government. These observations are made in the following citations:

It has an effect. Yes, plenary talk makes a difference. This is something that I didn’t realize when I came to the parliament in xxxx [year removed to maintain anonymity] but now I do. [...] Every time, in a way, there is a mental battle who is right. There could be a gallery that gives points. And even if there isn’t one, a kind of mental combat is held about who here is right? And it has an impact on what the government does. Or what the governing parties do. Never there have been so many bills that have changed in Parliament than during this government. Quite a few things, when they have been questioned here, with a great publicity or discreetly they have been forgotten or changed. (III: 19: 43:51)

But the opposition has ‘speech power’ in the sense that in fact government must in advance consider what the opposition is going to say. Based on that the talk has an anticipatory effect], in one way. Let’s assume that the opposition, moving now to the plenary sessions, speaks in one way. In that case you must make certain kinds of proposals that would not be attacked from this and that exact perspective. (III: 10: 10:37)

Adversary political deliberation, discussed in this study through the idea of expressive-partisan deliberative mode, assist in structuring and clarifying the horizon of conflict. Partly due to what was described as ‘consumer-friendly’ there has been a push towards increasing debate format in the plenary sessions. Evidently, politically the plenary sessions bear more meaning to the opposition than it does to government. This is because, for the opposition, the plenary sessions are the only venue to ‘exist’. Since opposition lacks much of the legislative power compared to the government, their influence within the operative context is limited. Drawing on this their ‘show-do’ character in the performative context is consequently much more limited. They have less to ‘show’. However, according to the interviews, governing parties cannot disregard the counterclaims that the opposition will most likely present during the plenary debates. Acknowledging this point assigns deliberative work to be addressed in the affirmative context, as was discussed in the case of PPG meetings taking place only among the same party members.

According to what we know, opposition, when operating skilfully through their MPs, has avenues to impact decision-making. But as was discussed, they don’t get ‘things done’ in the same way the government does.

Being in the opposition incentives expressive-partisan deliberation differently than being in the government. This point was brought up earlier in the text when arguing that the ‘true work’ is done by those who oppose. They are forced to find counterarguments and weak points in the policies that are, or should be, credible enough to be taken seriously. Consequently, the hackneyed view of opposition politicians merely ‘yapping’ obscures an inalienable democratic function that eschews it and thus highlights the deliberative stance. Without the ‘pluralist counterforces’, as Manin (1987) put it, majority may be less inclined to engage in a deliberative process that would reveal sources of opposite viewpoints. Alternative paths of understanding would not be induced, also within the majority. This perspective, a negation of opposition functions, is made visible in the following:

When we were in the government, in all honesty, it led to a point that you became a bit lazy sometimes. There was no pressing need to start elaborating the bills and their justifications, because they would pass regardless. That perhaps leads to becoming a bit passive. (III: 21: 14:15)

It may also be so that when the disagreement has been found unsurmountable in the committee, the mutual reasoning and argumentation is not continued. This observation demonstrates the urgency of maintaining political deliberation. Inter-related dynamics between the affirmative and performative context, and operative and performative context helps illuminating why, in this case, being in the opposition *‘forces the PPG to take parliament work seriously in a different way’* in comparison to governing PPGs (III: 21: 14:15). To put it in a more striking manner, one MP (III: 10: 23:29) illustrated how *‘one*

gets by easier' in the government where one *'manages by finding the green button in the plenary debates'*. *'It's easy to find—always pressing the green button'*. Moreover, relevance of plenary and attending the roll calls satisfy the function that *'there are more green dots and red dots'* (III: 25: 17:19) on the voting board. In other words, for the government, while being able to make a difference by enacting preferred policies, may not constitute legitimate representation by itself. Giving an account as in justifying policies and initiating and taking part in plenary deliberations may become less prioritised. This again, for me, speaks for the need to distinguish the contexts of representation to get a better grasp which functions are taken on accordingly. The idea of deliberative representation and the way I treat it lends a hand to explore these accounts where criticism towards (deliberative) practices is being presented.

For the majority, the governing PPGs and their MPs, more effort may be put on the operative context, not to mention the affirmative functions in the PPGs, while less consideration may be given on the performative counterpart. When governing requires the ability to compromise but the locus for demonstrating that ability is not in the plenary sessions, the justifications and arguing for and against are to some extent reliable on the activity of the opposition. I am not arguing that governing would automatically suggest disregard towards such democratic practices of deliberation but in all fairness, there may be less inherent incentives to engage in deliberative process—especially if the policy at hand is conflicting and MPs are collectively and individually torn. On these accounts the level of authenticity is negotiated.

Before we advance, I will briefly mention another institutional mechanism that sustains the accountability function in the performative context. That is the question hour (or period, as in many parliaments). According to the interviews it has become more and more a tool for the opposition MPs to challenge and demand answers from the cabinet in a more timely and current manner.⁵⁰ Here, very explicitly showing respect to the minority through providing an answer is institutionalised. According to some, however, in these replies condescending and arrogant attitudes are sometimes portrayed. In any case, question hour allows targeted opportunities to underline the ways in which government is responsible for its legislation to the parliament (see overview in Martin 2011). Relating to reasons discussed earlier—that plenary activities count as important partisan cues for representing—getting a turn in question hour is highly wanted. This is also due to favourable media coverage. The weekly parliamentary question hour is broadcast live on national television. In contrast to earlier days, nobody except the Speaker of the House did not know who gets a turn to ask. Notably, it was suggested in the interviews that PPGs are gaining more and more say in who

⁵⁰ According to the interviews, new ministers can fear the question period. Referred as 'the minister test', question hours reveal what ministers are made of. Even though one can anticipate potential questions only by looking at the parliamentary political agenda and preparing accordingly, there is never any kind of certainty of the focus or range of the questions coming up. The cabinet members need to be able to respond to critical and pressing questions that aim at questioning and weakening the legitimacy of decision-making as well as the whole legislative process prior to parliamentary handling. Albeit sometimes tricky, the ministers are always substantially better informed about upcoming legislation and e.g. know background of drafting of the law in the ministry and in the preparatory working groups. This information is not available to all thus easing the burden of providing a sufficient answer.

gets to pose a question hour question.⁵¹ Some PPGs rotate equally the question hour turns but it is evident that internal hierarchies can affect also to whom questions are allocated within the PPG. Also, in the PPG meetings question hour strategies can be discussed and planned—underlining their tactical purpose.

A debate format, a recent procedural development that induces and structures the adversary setting, has been more and more initiated in recent years. It demonstrates a more up-tempo format of plenary discussion. In the interviews it was thought that the reason why the Speaker's council has wanted to add debate format is that it alleviates the unstructured nature of plenary discussions. Addresses do not refer to each other or form a dialogue. They merely follow one after another, isolated, as was discussed earlier. Political deliberation when used in such a manner that can articulate the ongoing disagreement engages people into the deliberative process. From this perspective, here then the role of the Speaker, as a conductor or a playwright for maintaining the tension in the plenary sessions, is central. Regardless of their neutral position as guardians of overseeing that everything in the plenary sessions goes according to the rules and procedures, they have substantial amount of power. This power is symbolic and practical. Former Speaker Riitta Uosukainen (who wanted to appear here with her own name) came up with the analogy of the Speaker as a conductor who 'orchestrates' the plenary sessions. Excluding the pre-reserved turns in the normal plenary format, she can note a momentum for a debate and rather freely decide accordingly who gets a turn to speak (Eduskunta 2018). Uosukainen (III: 30: 1:00:15) continues with the figurative illustration:

When the plenary work goes well, it's like being a conductor. You can reserve space for that kind of discussion when you know that that person and that person is good. And you make sure that the whole orchestra resonates and sings. You really feel joy when you allow people to shine.

However, in order to be able to make this happen it is necessary that the Speaker has skills and knowledge, to have a finger on the 'pulse of Parliament'. She needs to know and 'feel' the Parliament and its members: their formal and informal position within the PPG, their committee placement, their interests and apparently, their oratory skills as MPs:

It is a bit like... writing a script for a play. You need to have a little bit of sense of where this tension is, where lies that interesting issue. Who knows this issue? Who talks about it? It is not that easy, when you think of it, to distribute turns to speak, that they are only distributing turns to speak. When you have the situation that you can give that turn to almost 200 people, then it's decisive that you give it to a person who can light up the discussion, who can simplify it. But it wasn't the only criteria. And the order of the turns also matters. (III: 19: 33:15)

⁵¹ In 2016, there was uproar when it emerged that the leader of the Social Democratic Party parliamentary group, Antti Lindtman, had provided the Speakers lists of MPs who would be most suitable in their group⁰ for posing questions during the question hours. According to the news, the practice had extended also to other plenary discussions, like the debate, and that the Speakers had been unaware that such a practice had not been agreed among the PPG members (Helsingin Sanomat 2016).

As mentioned, the Speaker often tries to learn about who the MPs are. Uosukainen describes how *'the Speaker sees and hears everything'*, which extends also to knowing those MPs who leave after the cameras are turned off (17:55). *'You really see the whole "gang", including the parties and the message coming from them. I followed closely the happenings of parties, to what kind of a position one has, and how one knew to behave there'* (23:08).

What the Speaker is capable to do, in a debate, is that by choosing who gets a turn to speak he can critically tap into the constructivist feature of representation. Most simply, the plenary debate itself can be seen as a representation that is created by and through deliberation. Alternatively, it is a claim, or, in line with Ankersmitt, a re-presentation, a rendition of how things are, and how they should be. All this is conducted in a debate through which perspectives are positioned against which others. A skilful Speaker(s) know who and how can set the debate 'on fire'.

The MPs who have acted in this position acknowledge the responsibility and in general seem aware of the impetus they can have over structuring the debate and discussion. It is a well-respected and impartial position, suggesting features of representation that allows arguing that the Speaker represents the whole of Parliament as an institution. Despite the notions that Speakers can be seen as embodiments of legislatures that form a link to Manin's description of adversarial political deliberation, the deliberation in question here is managed and administered. Political deliberation is not completely free-flowing; as in any institutionalised setting, turns to taken in the presenting of arguments in favour of and against a given issue. When explicitly asked about the temptation of ordering and framing the debate towards a certain preferential direction, one interviewee admitted that such a temptation is indeed present. Leading this playwright role allows to induce tension or other adversary features in the debate. It can also be used, or be tempted to, to give a debating turn to some MP whose opinions are thought 'foolish' or generally known to be overly passionate. This would highlight the senselessness of that position or perspective in that given context. Here, I underline that these qualifications play out only in a given topic-related context, and not generally. MPs have unrestricted freedom of speech, and by this it is meant that different viewpoints (and groups of people) deserve to be represented. For this reason, definitions relate to the nature of representational relationship that the MP in question subscribes to. Some may be known for their differing positions vis-à-vis the party represented, or some may have strong and specific constituency commitments.

When bringing up this constitutive or constructivist character in the role that Speakers assume, at the same time it was pointed out that those who become Speakers are most often experienced and respected parliamentarians. Through these acquired features, often by long incumbency, these people are thought to be able to assert judgments fairly and impartially. But this balancing act required is not an easy task, and feedback is always sought and received, as one member of the Speakers' council describes (III: 12: 51:10):

The Speaker, she is like a “dictator”, in quotation marks, when she does her work. It’s not an easy task despite you’d think that it’s just a mere ceremonial position that calls for sitting muscles, to only endure. It calls for that as well. Hour after hour you sit and listen to the addresses of those who compete in the amount of addresses [laughs]. It calls for one and another thing! It’s a balancing act when it’s the question hour or some other fierce debate, that you are impartial and at the same time you can maintain a tension all the time. In the discussion there needs to be a tension all the time. Government against the opposition. Or that these duels appear, combats are created between the representatives. You must orchestrate it such a way that you can maintain this tension, but at the same time, secure that the whole plenary is brought along. A certain even-handedness is preserved. Not in terms of time but from a wider angle. Even-handedness always needs to be demonstrated within some timeframe.

Debates are ‘user-friendly’ from the citizen perspective: with a short glimpse you get a sense of the different positions around the issue at hand. If we endorse the idea that politics is profoundly about settling disagreements in a democratic manner, then the problem with normal plenary format with pre-reserved addresses is that they can fail in clarifying what the disagreement is about, and who the disagreeing parties or views are. In here we see in an important way how the dynamics of the operative context again resonates with the performative: the reason why the government often wants to include the opposition into the unanimous report. Sustaining this compromise downplays and reduces the adversarial deliberative element available in the plenary sessions. You really cannot, without losing all mutual trust, begin to elaborate counter-arguments and criticise the bill if your signature is on the report. A similar de-politicising tendency can also be a strategic choice for political parties. Maintaining a workable responsible party government in the case of large coalition governments necessitates that the campaigning function is kept in check.

The dominance of expressive-partisan deliberative mode, and the adversary political deliberation that it invokes also by structuring the plenary debates have also a less discussed downside. Deficit of the so-called Socratic reason (Chambers 2004)—that reasoning is poor and shallow—is one thing but the exclusiveness it invokes is another. If in the debate most extreme perspectives and opinions are intentionally sought, and a feature that the media elevates, the *discussion ends up being rather exclusive*. This is to the dismay of some MPs who consider themselves ‘moderate’ or even prudent, and who do not associate themselves in either end in debating on a topic. Surely, this could be interpreted as defect in oratory skills on the part of MPs (or unwillingness to shape-shift) but a democratic impediment appears if the middle-ground get no say, so to speak. One interviewee (III: 17) pondered that in order to get a debating turn, should one steer away from the grey middle? Here I have been demonstrating how the institutional structuring of the plenary discussions induces the kind of expressive-partisan mode. Then, at the same time, representatives question and defy to the extent they surrender to the setting or frame that the adversarial back-and-forth situates them in.

iii Deliberative control and ‘means of survival’

So far, I have been discussing how the performative element is institutionally spelled out in the plenary sessions. The plenary in many is the representation of representative rule. The paradigm of representation, and its linkage to deliberation, becomes perhaps more negotiable in public than it is in other discussed contexts. Deliberative representation may have less ground to roam when it comes to, for example, re-consideration and reflection. Instead it takes on other functions relevant to democratic politics. This section discusses this point how representatives deal with questions of coercion and group cohesiveness: when agreement-seeking solutions are brought forward to be deliberated in public.

To connect the foregoing with earlier discussions of affirmative and operative contexts of representation, I now turn to the theme of deliberative control. In the performative context, opinions are presented as well-defined and the attitude that MPs generally endorse is tenacious and rigid. While making this argument it can also imply that when engaging in the practices of deliberation, justifications and adversary debate over the reasons behind the proposed policies and such, the reference point for those opinions and stances is stated in the agreement that is presented in the compromise, if there is such. In those cases representatives might not agree on the policy they defend or oppose in the plenary. Participants to a compromise may not fully embrace or commit to the compromise, yet they yield to it. If, then, the committee report is not unanimous and the opposition is not with it, the setting is often clearer and comes down to the watershed of debate between the government and opposition. Regardless of which case is currently predominant, it comes down to an intrapersonal deliberation of judgment and discretion by representatives. In that they seek to balance virtues in both ‘governing’ (legislating, attaining ‘good public policies’) and ‘campaigning’ (e.g. re-election, constituency communication). (Gutmann and Thompson 2012.)

Therefore, deliberative control often manifests in the level of openness that varies accordingly. In the PPG there is a certain expectation to demonstrate candidness when it comes to opinions and perspectives. This articulation of sincerity and expression by the MPs promotes not only the individual, but also—and more importantly—the collective opinion-formation process. Criticism and hesitations should be voiced out also when it comes to sharing of information. Additionally, promotion of self-interested argumentation help illuminating what is at stake to each participant therefore benefitting to intraparty deliberation and forming of collective stands (Mansbridge et al. 2010).

The operative context speaks to the settling of democratic disagreements between political adversaries. Deliberative control is exercised more, and portraying authenticity in the sense of sharing information and perspective becomes more strategic, especially in the case of governing parties who need to maintain relations with their coalition partners spelled out in the compromises. Obligated by prior deliberations within the affirmative context MPs commit themselves to compromises. This requires sometimes zipping one’s mouth.

Considering the spectrum of forms of deliberation now accommodated relatively smoothly into deliberative theory, still a few rather absolute restrictions are in place (Dryzek 2010a; 2000; Bächtiger et al. 2018; Mansbridge 2015). One of them is use of coercive measures, and the other is lack of respect. Posing threats for the outcomes for (any part of)

deliberative process ultimately affects and fundamentally diverts decision-making. Additionally, they can also function as preventative for even bringing up certain themes, opinions or point of views to be discussed and put on the agenda. Further, this tendency enunciates the relevance of responsibility over responsiveness when MPs take part in the formation of democratic agendas (Disch 2012). As the constructivist turn in representation argues, preferences and interests of the represented are connected to the representative agency. The fact that deliberative representation in legislatures is subject to such a thing as deliberative control makes it suspect in this regard.

In representative democracy, however, coercion is inbuilt and institutionalised. By and large, elections can be seen as the ultimate coercive measure that incentivises representatives' actions in the likely ways: on one hand, seeking electoral support from their voters and on the other, acting in ways that would secure democratic governance as it currently stands. It is difficult as well as redundant to envision legitimate democratic representation that did not entail electoral sanctioning as coercive measure for removing bad or otherwise unfit representatives out of office.⁵² Sanctions are positive (e.g. gaining leadership positions) or negative (e.g. getting suspended from the PPG) in nature. The last mentioned positive and negative sanctioning are though relevant when turning to the overture of legislative roles: MPs behaviour and role endorsements can be motivated by gaining leadership positions either within the party (i.e. party office) or the legislature (i.e. legislative office). (Strøm 1998, 160, 167–71.)

Constructive deliberative representation throughout the deliberative processes in a legislature invoke communication between the representatives and represented. It helps strengthening the epistemic grounds for allowing judgment to work by revealing what opinions representatives hold, how they justify them, but also allow them to give an account of their decisions especially if they collide with those who they claim to represent. Performative context places many of these practices out in the open. Compared to the other context the rules of the game seem to change somewhat significantly, yet the deliberative control persists and gets perhaps amplified. New aspects relating to transparency and publicity rise when the audience changes. This setting can be understood from the perspective of the functions of representation—what to do with representation? What *can* be done with it?

In the case of performative context, as the interviews illustrate, representatives and the parties they represent cannot fully exchange campaigning for governing in the plenary sessions, although this view is available in the reasoning of the MPs. Signals of disapprovals and disagreements are often thought of as ways to deviate from the party line. Representatives are seeking individual lift for their public demonstrations of principledness.

⁵² On a more philosophical note, Mansbridge (2015, 36–37) rightly points out that power relations cannot fully be erased from any human action. We all insert some power-based expectations towards each other either through personal interactions or through larger societal structures while being subject to them ourselves simultaneously. Here Mansbridge uses an example of use of language: when operating with a language that is not your mother tongue you risk being misunderstood and ridiculed. Secondly, yielding to threats connected to use of coercion is always relative. Also, what counts as consent to power authority and to what extent can we resist it as a source of our autonomy?

There is a significant level of deliberative control at play in the performative context, but it is unable to fully dictate what MPs are to do (nor should it). Also, the power of the media adds to this relative unpredictability and precariousness.

This section addresses mainly the question how the elements of compromises and collective representative efforts are reflected in the public venue—when the balancing of campaigning and governing are made visible and observable to the public and the media. It implies also that deliberative control is exercised. All this affects to the ways in which MPs rely and resort to the various roles they assume. The tensions with shape-shifting (Saward 2014) can be tangible when it comes to institutional structures allowing (and not allowing) them to do so. Some roles, like the committee chairs and party leaders, are institutionalised, restricting considerably the ability of those representative agents to shape-shift. As the structures imply, as in the case of the plenary sessions, there are certain rules of the game that MPs cannot afford to be ignorant of.

The power of media adds a flavour to the interpersonal perspectives that highlights the salience of cooperation and coordination within the Parliament. Namely, it is an uneasy marriage between the MPs and the publicity that the media ensures and elevates. In contemporary democracies the performativity of representation does not really function without the media. It is a double-edge sword for the MPs. On one hand, they cannot completely shrug away from enabling and enforcing transparency into one's line of work, something that translates the permeability of the entire representative institution (see IPU guide for good parliamentary practise, Inter-Parliamentary Union 2006). On the other hand, representatives must seek attention of the media to some extent. According to the interviews, this is especially true with those MPs who do not stand in the media limelight as cabinet ministers, for example, do. For many, it seems to be true that *'the media has perhaps taken too big a role'* (III: 21: 11:27) when it comes to assessing the practical significance of the plenary about matters that are considered important.

Even though corresponding deliberation are sequenced or distributed as per the context at hand they speak across the contexts. Confining oneself fully to the media logic that looms behind the expressive-partisan deliberative mode may not be a successful strategy for a representative who wants also to strive within the parliament. They also need to immerse themselves in scrutinising legislation and manage deliberative representation the ways in which that were discussed in the other contexts. The 'halo' of these contexts reflects into the performative context. In the case of operative context, that compromise-seeking measures were successful and common decision was achieved with reasons everyone accepts for their own varied purposes, also strategic kinds, it restrains deliberation in public. If the deliberative process has reached its end and resulted in compromise at the committee level, the decision is not re-opened in the plenary sessions. Stances and opinions are presented instead as definite and tenacious. Even though functions of representation changes from negotiating and 'issue based' reasoning, as Pekonen (2011) defines it, to justifying and arguing for and against, representative cannot risk their credibility as a rectified colleague and plausible coalition partner in the eyes of others. The compromise gets defended and reasoned in the plenary sessions, even though not all (or none) embrace it with an open heart. On the contrary, if in the committee level the disagreement remains and the committee report is not unanimous, there is less need for such deliberative control.

However, when it comes to the exercise of deliberative control, something that representatives are rarely completely free from, the case of achieving compromise is more intriguing here. It illuminates some of the dynamics of representative practices when exploring the idea of sequenced deliberation. For one, the ambiguity in claiming representative achievements comes up, again, in the theme of compromise. It was discussed earlier how one single MP can at times make a tangible impact in the committee. Battles can take place over wordings, as a compromising solution for finding agreement and reaching a unanimous committee report. Issuing ‘fingerprint’, getting a certain favourable wording included in the report, can be used, if wanted, as a trophy and a token of your ‘representing’. Not to mention a significant change (which are rare). These achievements can be declared to one’s home turf.

What representatives meticulously emphasis and jealously defend is that operative context should exclude publicity. Remaining outside the public glare would sustain the focus on the matter since, as argued, representatives can be very covetous for publicity. Specifically, they underline that in making a difference, budging a change into something, should kept within the boundaries of the legislative institution itself. Trying to get something done by going through the media is a mission often doomed to fail. It is though as a means for gathering media points for building up a public image of an efficient and principled politician. Instead, one should accept that when acting collectively, you are just a name among other names:

Yes, if you cannot do it [compromise], you are left alone pretty quickly. It has to be accepted that if there’s something that you came up with and you get your group along, and you decide that as a group this is to be moved forward, then you don’t inform the papers that you’ve taken care of it. Even though you are the father of that idea. It’s a different thing if someone from the group says that this is put forward on the motion of representative xx [name of the representative removed]. You must accept that your name is in the row alongside with other when it’s put forward (III: 24: 1:52:22)

**

If you begin hoarding for yourself that glory for something that is collectively achieved, others start feeling the same pressure. In the worst case, in the end, nothing comes from it. If someone is thinking that ‘now that one took all the glory, then why in the first place let this pass?’ (III: 16: 28:02)

Performativity, portrayed in claiming an achievement as your own, seems to call for considerable amount of restraining. Deliberative control is exercised by the representatives when the origin of an idea or viewpoint is hidden, and matters are articulated in collective terms. On the other hand, when it comes to representative profiles, regarding the general style of advancing and influencing matters, MPs assume different ones. One rejected the whole idea of fingerprints as unfitting to his profile: ‘*My voters would think, what the hell is she bragging with a single sentence?*’ (III: 9: 54:44).

Regardless of the representative profiles that many ascribe to more or less consciously, some institutionalised positions are such that calls for more consideration regarding deliberative control. In the performative context, this is even more so due to its public

nature. But at the same time, it offers representatives strong incentives to stand out. When it comes to formal positions that are defined in the working orders, as the case with Speaker and the chair of the committee, there are no further instructions, or very little on *how to carry out* these tasks ascribed to these positions. Considering the democratic inclinations of the performative context, the question about actual practices and the informal norms guiding them is ambivalent.

The restraints regarding deliberation come up especially in these leadership positions. As discussed, the role of committee chair is significant. They have a tangible impact on the working atmosphere in the committee. Nurturing balanced and fair procedures—*‘being mindful of the hygiene’*, as one claimed (II: 9-1: 17:06)—has an effect in reaching unanimous committee reports. It often calls for various compromise-seeking solutions, e.g. inclusion of above-mentioned fingerprints or statements (obligating the government to act in the future). When the report, in the case it represents a compromise, is handled in the plenary sessions, representatives are expected to stay in line accordingly. It gets reasoned based on the matter, without elaborating too much about the distributive details on ‘who got what, where and when’. However, what needs to be remembered is that a big part of bills is considered as ‘bulk’. A remark has been made that Finland is one of the most productive countries when it comes to legislating, but we lack more current data on this argument (seemingly the only reference is from almost 20 years ago; see Wiberg 2000, 164). In any case, it is still safe to say that not all bills and committee reports that scrutinise them raise political passions and get fiercely debated in the plenary sessions.

Generally, in the performative context, MPs manage two (or three) overlapping roles: that of the committee member and that of the PPG (and coalition) member. The third role that of representative of the constituency, is consequent and assumed by the committee and PPG memberships. By inhabiting the position of a committee chair brings about one more role. I briefly approached this point with those MPs who had been or were currently acting in that position. It is worth remembering that the Finnish committee system allocates committee chair positions also to the parties in opposition. When communicating the report in public the chair needs to be able to distinguish the roles currently she or he is managing and operating from. Presentation of the committee report, a task reserved for the committee chair should be kept as a technical reference of the report, and not i.e. as a party or government manifesto. This presentation represents the committee as a whole and the chair *speaks in their name*:

The chair has a big role when coming out with the committee resolution. It is of great significance how the chair is able speak with the mouth of the committee—not with one’s own or the party’s. Not everyone can do it. (III: 24: 58:45)

A chair who fails in speaking with the collective voice, deviating from the internal norms of balanced presentation and refraining from partisan cues, signals a lack of deliberative control on one’s part. For example, revealing discreet details on committee deliberations or critiquing the overall legislative credibility and performance of the committee would be badly received. A likely consequence would be that the chair loses trust of the committee, at least to some degree. In the case of committee chairs wanting to bring up a certain point that is not applicable in the presentation address due to its partisan or strategic nature must

take a turn to speak in later parts of the plenary discussions. Sometimes, explicit reference is made to the position from which a committee chair is speaking. One with experience in chairing a committee (III: 11: 57:46) stated that

it's not very advisable to seek those situations where you are forced to represent two different opinions. And if you are, then it's good to declare that this is our committee's stand but I perhaps myself think about this more towards this way.

This kind of negotiation that the above quotation assumes is most striking perhaps with party leaders. They need to take an official stand and represent the collective. Their leeway in avoiding the possible conflict is more congested. Again, here, my data is limited but regardless it allows us to make some observations. As one with experience in party leadership positions (III: 2: 33:57) claimed: *'It is true that the hands of the party leader are tied the most [makes a physical gesture]'*. It requires also the critical ability to form the party stand on the go. Such representations or representative claims result from extrapolation: a projection of potential perspectives and scenarios. This internal process taps into the Habermasian idea on ideal-role taking. *'The party leader needs to think of the line of thought of the party, line of thought of the different people in the party - - it must be placed in the background what representative xx [name withheld] from xx [voting district name withheld] would think, but what the member and the supporter of the party [withheld] think'*. (ibid.) Generally speaking, the practice of articulation of any opinion within the legislative context strongly presumes and anticipates deliberation as a dialogical communicative action (with various participants in contemporary democracies).

What this short illustration can show is that unlike in the affirmative or the operative context, the performative context cannot afford much relaxation to the tenacity of attitudes. As pointed out, plenary transcripts are available and can be used for strategical purposes. Another brief observation with the discretion of the party leaders and deliberative control further relates to particular plenary practices. Another interviewee (III: 3), with experience of party leadership positions, brought up how s/he sometimes decisively pulls out from plenary discussion. This is done to increase the likelihood of their other party members getting turns to speak. There are certain general rules stating the preference order for speakers (Keskuskanslia 2018). These favour party and committee leadership, and relate also to the subject matter at hand, giving priority to committee members involved in handling of the bill but also to seniority. The presence of the party leader in the plenary discussion may take too much 'airspace' from other PPG members. This is also due to the practice that if an MP is named—usually in a critical way—they can should be given a chance to respond immediately. The named representatives are often members of the party leadership.

On these assumptions, when it comes to the performative context, some representatives possess more representative capital in order to give it away. Deliberative control, taken to the extreme of abstaining from deliberation completely, formulates a promising theoretical compound to play with. Such extreme demonstration of control may take a toll on one's electoral control. It may not be severe in the cases illustrated above very briefly since party leaders usually are never really forgotten in the public eye. However, as was touched on in the interviews, the Speakers and especially the deputy speakers can be vulnerable to it in

this regard. In their case, the control is institutionalised. The Speaker never takes a vote, but neither it is expected from them to take strong political, party-affiliated stands. Some mentioned that they have encountered situations where they have been faced with accusations from voters about their limited presence and overall political ownership.⁵³

At this point, I re-connect this discussion with what I described earlier as decision-paradoxes. Whilst they can be individually and collectively menacing in other explored contexts as well, the performative context stands out differently. The reasoning is best illustrated in a quotation where practices elsewhere are secondary when it comes to the plenary sessions. What one does there is decisive, regardless of what one says or does in the PPG or committee. The theme of compromise is always present, and in the following citation it becomes portrayed in terms of loyalty:

Who are you loyal to in the end: to your PPG or your voters? Your goal is to get re-elected so most likely you are more loyal to your voters than your PPG if [emphasised] your goal is to get re-elected. They don't necessarily rule out each other but sometimes they do. [...] Here I think that a good team player's ability to compromise, nothing comes from it if you only advance your cause with other parties. It is constant compromise-making, it's nothing more than the art of compromise the work done here. (III: 10: 47:27)

As discussed earlier, compromising and non-compromising mindsets are grounded on calculations on the prospective gains. Although some proponents of deliberative democracy inform us of the principles that should be given priority—that is, that matters should be decided based on the balanced reasoning about the subject-matter itself (e.g. Bessette 1994)—it is impossible to erase distributive and strategic elements from settling disagreements in politics. Sometimes locating the smallest common denominator, as a form of meta-consensus (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010) or economy of moral disagreement (Gutmann and Thompson 1996), might be enough.

People commit to democratic decisions for different reasons, and in politics this point is illustrative. In the interviews, MPs constantly returned to the theme of pondering the worth of yielding to a compromise. In summary, what is at stake is glory, integrity and trust, when lending a look from the inside of the legislature. *This constant weighing is embedded in the affirmative context, becomes a practice in the operative, and is decisive in the performative context.* Representatives become conflicted. Situation when they are caught between a rock and a hard place are handled and solved in different ways in different contexts of representation. It was implied that conflictual sentiments could be felt the hardest in smaller PPGs. In contrast, in bigger groups representative tasks and responsibilities become differentiated, thus in a way representation becomes 'surrogated' by the organisation of trust-based relations. Paralleling to what has been already argued, what it meant for one MP (III: 17: 35:25) when analysing past performances is that *'when in a small party you are*

⁵³ In the Swedish parliament, the Riksdag, this contingency in constituency representation is resolved by the requirement that the representative who is elected parliamentary Speaker ('talman') must give up their mandate for the duration of their time as Speaker and a new member stands in as a replacement (Sveriges Riksdag 2019).

forced to follow up on everything, your conscience may start disturbing you with all matters'. Reflecting the theme of reasoned congruence and accountability in relation to decision-making and past performances is *'a question that cannot be solved'* (ibid.) It was also implied that in sufficiently deliberated matter and in the case MP has won (the majority of) the PPG on one's opposing side, the group takes the stand collectively. They protect the representative from being labelled as a defector.

Notwithstanding these unresolvable questions regarding 'the torment' (*tuska* in Finnish) there exists something that is called 'means of survival'. They relate not only in the compound of 'red and green dots' on the voting chart but also to the deliberative control that MPs exercise. These accounts relate also to the roles prescribed by the parliamentary tension of opposition against the government. Coalition governments necessitates holding on to compromises despite the cost of selling out a principle. People feel uneasy:

Our group were exhorted that why aren't our people defending these bills in the plenary sessions. The plain answer was that we don't feel them as our own or the kind that we could defend them ... even the committee members couldn't be holding harangues for it when they knew the torment' (III: 13: 18:59)

In the Finnish parliament, as I assume in any other legislature as well, there are some rules dealing with cases when an MP decides to resolute one's torment by voting against the party line. An MP with experience in being in a leadership position explains: *'We held discussions beforehand. We suggested that if it's a difficult vote, should you take part? Or if one must vote, could we agree so that you don't at least comment on it and go bad-mouthing your own group'*. (III: 2: 1:18:59.) Means of survival are an informal yet institutionalised responses to the decision paradoxes. With them, MPs try to get out of the situation with dry feet and with dignity. Such means, mentioned in the interviews, include being absent from a decisional vote in a committee or plenary by being away (i.e. stuck elsewhere as in an elevator, meeting, or calling in sick). When being elsewhere your name is not included in the decision, allowing not take political responsibility for the decision. However, as representatives argue throughout the interviews, living with the torment for the exchange of governing (and getting something in return) is mandatory.

Dodging the decision-making momentum by not being available is the last resort when not wanting to openly go against one's party—to which plenary activities are analogical. Sometimes severe discontent with the party line manifests in a form of protest. As described in the interviews, a representative shows up in the plenary vote but does not press the button. This course of action infuriates the party leadership, whereas to the citizen—by not being present—it gives the impression that the MP has merely been absent from the vote.

As we see, deliberative control discussed here entails the tendency to extend beyond the act of deliberation, thus underlining a closer linkage to representing. Institutionally speaking, voting as a democratic practice is always decisive and therefore gets priority vis-à-vis deliberation. It is a matter of judgment on the part of the represented whether they see the politically incentivised deliberative control over the justifications and reasoning about the decisional vote, fit and proper. Theoretically speaking, these cases also point out to an interesting detail in the Rehfeldian understanding of representation. What Rehfeld (2018) is rightfully arguing is that while the interest-and-responsiveness account (IRA) provides a

necessary (but not yet sufficient) evaluative criteria for democratic representation, it fails in distinguishing particular activities that constitute representing. This allows us to discuss cases of ‘non-responsive representation’ instead of seeing them as cases of not representing at all.

From this perspective, it is instructive to explore accounts where a representative purposefully does not engage in a specific and particular activity that is in the repertoire of wielding the social power—as defined as the first sense of representing—of being an elected member of a parliament. When she refuses the vote or remains absent? Curiously, when representatives are absent of the vote, as in ‘being stuck in the elevator’ raises a question of representing in the active sense. Taking the elevator, or ‘Tom swimming in Barbados’ as Rehfeld uses in his various examples, are not activities that normally would constitute practices for representation. But in the passive sense representative remains a representative: she ‘represents’ even while taking the lift.⁵⁴

In contrast, when means of survival are examined through the active sense, but in negation, of *not doing* what she would in normal instance be doing, like in exercising her prerogative of voting, the line of analysis is different. This is a kind of anomaly: to my understanding we have a case where through an arbitrary and random activity presents itself in terms of representing (Rehfeld 2018, 13). In this example, a representative may trade ‘representing’ by not taking the vote to ‘representing’ by riding the elevator. But as said, final judgment on the evaluation on the responsiveness is left to the voter, a representative may represent one’s electorate, be responsive to them, when acting in the ways that the means of survival suggests. This line of analysis includes also the exercise of deliberative control as completely refraining from deliberation or tuning it down considerably. A completely another question is to what extent, when and where representatives provide reasons and justifications for such actions where deliberative control is apparent.

iv Sailing close to the wind: negotiating the rules of the game

In this section I take on the general claim about the low deliberative standard that prevails in legislatures. These viewpoints highlight the assumption that politics is rarely noble, in which case I will additionally address the democratic implications of this assumption. Also from this perspective the actors that inhabit representative institutions are not only corrupt but also keen on using forms of communication that are aligned with ruthless power-plays. The idea of performative representation situated in the performative context can partly be seen to yield these interpretations that also tap into the competitive nature of electoral politics. Here we deepen the argumentation about how the democratically necessary performance that, on one hand, legitimises the rule of the people. But on the other hand, the

⁵⁴ An enlightening example of this discussion was the case of former Foreign Minister Timo Soini, who participated in an anti-abortion candle vigilance during his state visit to the US. The case was discussed publicly, since the government’s official standing supports women’s right to abortion. Finally, the Chancellor of Justice, after being asked to give an opinion, articulated that activities and occasions that ministers attend as private persons are considered public. The theoretically aligned verdict was that Minister Soini could not resign from representing in the passive sense the Finnish government when being physically present in an occasion as that. (Helsingin Sanomat 2018)

dynamics of the performative context display the difficulty of to what extent ‘governing’ can be exchanged to ‘campaigning’. This is a setting, again, that MPs need to come to terms with, when they reflect and balance these two objectives. I claim that contemporary representatives must constantly negotiate the rules of the game when it comes to their exercise of expressive-partisan mode.

In the previous section I discussed how especially the debate format sets an enduring structural frame that can induce polarisation and elevate the role of dexterous and catchy word duelling. The debate also favours artful rhetoricians, those with oratory skills—something that not many interviewees claim to be, despite quite a few saying they enjoyed discussion and debate in the plenary sessions. Representatives spice up their deliberation rhetorically when intending to address mainly their own constituencies. This is also facilitated and becomes motivated by grabbing media’s attention.

These tendencies were explicitly noted by the former Speaker of the House Paula Risikko in her speech in the closing ceremony of parliamentary term in April 2019. She illustrated this with an allegory about the deliberative atmosphere where representatives look at each other the way that a hawk looks at a sparrow. ‘*The other party member, and sometimes one’s own, may have be considered more as prey than the same kind of person as oneself,*’ she says and continues: ‘*Things get exacerbated, and the words of others are deliberately misinterpreted*’ (Yle 2019).

In the MP interviews when the overall deliberative culture and claims of its declining quality came up, many admitted, some hesitantly, to have tactically come up with stingy puns and catchy ‘one-liners’. They are most used for attacking and ridiculing the adversary, thus seeing them as prey, as Risikko illustrated. The national papers often have dialogue boxes reserved for quotations from the plenary debates. Knowing that the media is sitting in the gallery and if the topic is important for you ‘*must come up with more provocative perspectives or new perspectives, and hope you get a line in the Helsingin Sanomat. That’s a hugely important and valuable thing. That’s why you might sit there and talk*’. (III: 1: 48:34). To continue exploring this reasoning, more perspectives are highlighted. For now, in the case of one-liners we can take them as examples of ‘set piece performances’ (Saward 2017, 78) that mark prevailing or ‘winning’ in the face of overwhelming quantity of plenary speeches. Just as one MP put it (II: 11: 1:02:50): ‘*If you give one speech from which one sentence is remembered afterwards, you’re a winner*’. Some of the one-liners and the like are remembered even many years later, and thus can either embellish or diminish an MP’s reputation for the long term.

Some of the senior MPs interviewed—some of whom had held office for over a decade—noted a slow but steady decline in the deliberative culture of the plenary sessions. Overall, the political cleavages and subsequent polarisation has potentially acted as a catalyst for hardening tones in public discourse especially when large value-based matters are discussed.⁵⁵ But, more importantly in the context of the Finnish Parliament, disrespectful

⁵⁵ None provided a systematic analysis of possible causes, but I would argue that the breakdown of the party array traditionally governed by three large parties (Social Democrats, National Coalition party, the Centre Party), making room in 2011 elections to conservative right-wing True Finns –party (officially now The Finns Party) has had an impact. All this can be seen to be in accordance with the rise of populist parties in Western democracies: political agenda themes dodged by some other (ruling) party have now been put on

blurts are a signal of lack of judgment on the part of MPs that also bears implications. We can draw two line of analysis from here. The first one is the most obvious as it applies to democratic principles and the role of legislatures nurturing those principles. The second one links the discussion to the inherent constitutive idea of representation that includes multiple audiences. It takes into account the ways in which deliberative practices endorsed by the MPs are understood as signals and translated into representative currency. Both lines of analysis progress towards a conclusion where representatives get less out from the deliberations in the performative context. Spelling this out furthers the attempt to understand why this context might be most vulnerable to the pejorative features of democratic politics, thus mitigating potentially harmful deliberation.

Deliberative deficit, when demagoguery runs rampant in the plenary sessions, exhibits how the democratic principle of respect is treated in the representative institutions. In deliberative theory, the principle of respect is still prevailing and perhaps less complicated than the principle of non-coercion. Surely, as with non-coercion, we could claim that some representatives would feel that common courtesy or politically correct framing restricts what it is possible to say. However, respect is inalienable in the way that it warrants dignity and recognition of seeing individuals as capable of self-determination. Therefore, it bears profound democratic credentials not only for the life in the *polis* but also for the cornerstone of democratic representative institutions that legitimately insulate and encapsulate political conflict. Adversary political deliberation, encouraged by Manin (2017) for reasons discussed earlier, is necessary in a well-functioning democracy. Deliberative dynamics that the parliamentary setting ensures is that majority should be ‘checked,’ as Manin (1987) puts it, but not destroyed. Extreme and manipulative rhetorics, ‘plebiscitary reasoning’ (Chambers 2004) can be harmful in the way that it mitigates capability of judgment of autonomous subjects. In the process, the majority or the minority may lose touch with demonstrating reciprocal trust and recognition the opponent as a worthy adversary.

These claims of respect are also constitutionally based. Section 31 of the The Constitution of Finland, on ‘Freedom of speech and conduct of Representatives,’ states that representatives must conduct themselves ‘with dignity and decorum’ ‘and not behave offensively towards another person’. Only the first part of the above was mentioned in a few interviews alongside with the reminder that representatives have the unrestricted right to speak in the Finnish Parliament. Taking part in provocative and extreme deliberations that are motivated mainly by media attention has larger implications to the integrity of representative institution. I discussed in the beginning of this analysis part how many MPs seem to share the former Speaker’s worry about the disgrace the deliberative culture of Eduskunta. If representatives misbehave, it puts the respect and integrity of the representative institution in jeopardy.

These notions about the plenary sessions, which seem to shed some light on what is going on within the Finnish Parliament as a whole, illustrate how stretching the boundaries of acceptable speech has become more of a rule than an exception. In one way, the kind of negotiation and discretion resonates with the following view of Goodin: ‘Players in parliament are invariably ‘gaming the system,’ *sailing as close to the wind* of the formal

debate. It has raised formerly neglected themes on the public political agenda to be discussed.

rules as necessary, in order to *secure their own particular objectives* as best they can' (Goodin 2008, 191 citing Goodin 2000; emphasis added). A similar point, but in terms of trust as an institutional norm, is made by Mykkänen. He argues that MPs' ability to navigate in delicate situations where discretion is called for defines the thin line between trustworthiness and untrustworthiness of those MPs (Mykkänen 2010, 221). The style of deliberative representation that MP endorses and enacts is always also a portrayal of the representative herself, and more specifically, about her judgment and discretion.⁵⁶ Formally, all representatives are equal in their mandates given by the electorate—an undercurrent theme in the interviews—but success in passing legislation also depends on the personal ability and capacity whether one strives in legislatures or not.

To remind ourselves, this is explicitly noted by Cameron (2018) in his idea of the Aristotelian 'wise practitioner,' but it was something that was also very briefly mentioned by Pitkin (1967, 219–22). Namely, she noted how great complexities are at work when it comes to considering practices and legislative behaviour. Pitkin concludes that there might be *something external to the three forms of representation* she develops in her book. When emphasising the substantive view that links representation to an (responsive) activity she notes that there are elements that exceed this view. Representation, in action, *takes place in an actual setting that include human interaction*, internal rules and practices as well as procedural factors that need to be considered.

Regardless the tendency of offering one's plenary addresses towards the gallery and using them for various avenues for constituency communication, representatives cannot control the receiving audiences. This point is especially relevant in the performative context of representation. The representative claim-making view rightly notes, audiences can be numerous even though the claim might try to address only a particular one. The view of representing that connects with the function of practices makes deliberation in plenary a purposive performance. For this reason, if this is true, and representatives perceive their deliberative task through the adversary setting, the expressive-partisan mode of deliberation prevails. Striving in legislatures necessitates proper navigating, sometimes as close to the wind as possible. Moreover, what it means that, for example, use of strategic-deliberative mode more prone in the operative context, does not meet the objectives of the performative context. Solutions, agreements or understanding are not the faculties that are sought in the deliberation that seemingly takes place between the representatives.

What the interviewed MPs inexplicitly underline is the *ability to differentiate which context is being used* and taken advantage of. For this reason, strong language or even mockery is part of the show, not something to get upset about.⁵⁷ To illustrate the contextual

⁵⁶ It was pointed out by several interviewees when asked what kind of speaker they see themselves as that they were not the best person to ask. In a way, this kind of modesty is curious, since most politicians are masters in self-reflection in the sense of being able to choose the best (in relational terms) course of action, e.g. being constantly aware of surroundings and feelings.

⁵⁷ Heckling is a curious case, as it has an anti-deliberative purpose, being aimed at derailing and distracting the speaker. However, they are an inherent part of the parliamentary tradition. Their temporal context as a 'set-performance' (Saward 2017) is limited to a specific moment in time, and the function is to in an instant support or weaken an argument posed in the plenary sessions. Spontaneous as they are heckling is often meant to disturb and confuse the speaker, and because often invoke counter-heckling, their deliberative intentionality is weak. Rather than trying to seek any kind of dialogue, heckling are often attacks that serve

shift from the operative context to the performative, this MP (III: 13: 1:09:17) describes how the argumentative practices change:

When arriving to the hall, the party harness is immediately put on. Why I defend and why I'm intended to have this opinion, and I can denounce you since your group always has that opinion and you don't get this. The whole thing completely changes. The exact same people who have been around the table just a moment before'.

However, again, what is imperative is that one differentiates which context is in question. One MP explains this curious dynamic:

Of course, in the Hall you tell somebody off, and try to make that person look as unreliable as possible. Afterwards you go to the cafeteria and are the best of friends. It's part of it. It is completely different that you don't comply with it, where it belongs and where it doesn't. You start jumping over, slandering in the cafeteria. Well it happens also that if up front one would say what is said behind your back, then politics would not be impossible. -- But there are invisible boundaries that are so clear you cannot cross over them. You must be able to cooperate even though it sounds inconceivable to those unacquainted, that those [boundaries] are followed. If boundaries are not complied, then you lift yourself to the other side of the fence. You cannot get back, it's hard to get back in the game. (III: 29: 2:36:55)

These quotations state the rather obvious line of analysis that plenary deliberations are subject to different deliberative practices than other contexts discussed so far. Expressive-partisan deliberative mode demonstrates that deliberations are not impartial and often deliberators prescribe to their partisan 'roles' accordingly, *if* they wish to do so. The chosen style of deliberation features expressiveness as well as partisanship, something that supports the democratic functions embedded in the performative context: pro et contra debate and justifications corresponding to the sides being taken.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the uncontrolled Nietzschean will to power demonstrates that the representative in question is ready to use all available resources. It was often brought up in the interviews how adversaries who target each other in the plenary leave the together only to share a cup of coffee in the upstairs cafeteria. Contrary to what the general public may think when watching the debates, many of the adversaries are friends in real life. But there were some mentions (made without names) of occasions and general tendencies when in the plenary discussion an MP '*gets under your skin*' (II: 10: 8:55). Due to demonstrated ruthlessness, red flags may be raised among the representatives. This analysis applies not only to the performative context. Representatives who are hyperpartisan, to borrow a definition from Cameron (2018), and end up losing trust are in trouble. A point that arose repeatedly in the interviews is that both in politics and daily life in the Finnish Parliament, one cannot achieve much alone. Without cross-partisan networks

no greater purpose than often humorous trouble-making. Some MPs are seemingly dedicated to preserve the heckling culture, also seeing it from a gender perspective as most of the industrious hecklers are men.

to cooperate with and assist in advancing a cause, life in the legislature can become difficult for a solitary member of parliament.

The informal norms that apply also to the plenary make it difficult to criticise those who advance their cause with means that are considered questionable. Describing how MPs deal with colleagues who have acquired a bad reputation offers an insight into how the contexts of representation operate. Knowing that

with the volume of speech and “twisting the screw” that person is pursuing their own agenda makes the situation more manageable, observable and open to criticism within the committee system or in a smaller group than in the plenary hall where you are yap open to the Finnish people, and everyone seeks to score those points with their speeches’. (III: 17: 16:29)

It is not thought credible or even legitimate to criticise such an MP, since ultimately everyone is pursuing some agenda or other to some degree. What differs is that personal partisan agendas should be—in the logic of party representation and the way representing is informally following norms in the ecology of the parliament—incorporated in collective agendas. To representatives this is perhaps the most sensitive matter of all: maintaining collective efforts but not getting one’s own causes, their significance depending on the representative, trampled or overshadowed by it. Advancing this partial argument asserts that the impetus of different electoral systems is recognised. Therefore, the question posed before, in the words of an interviewee—‘to whom you are ultimately loyal’—makes it so that MPs cannot disregard the PPG, but lack of a party list enables much more leeway in negotiating these dynamics.

Navigating rhetorically in the performative context, and resorting to resources that are available for advancing preferred objectives, has implications that resonate in other settings and contexts as well. In this section I’ve shown that MPs take their cue from their colleagues’ utterances in the plenary also as signals of their capacities for judgment and discretion. Crossing some invisible boundaries in the sense of how performative representation translates into questions of reliability and trustworthiness of that representative. As such, it might critically hinder their status when collaborating and planning joint ventures, or refuse associating altogether with such representatives.

v Why deliberate?

We can draw the assumption that public life, its venues and decision-making they entail, is a setting that inherently invites demagoguery. This final section turns to the democratic question about the reasons why deliberate in the public and as such, arrives back to the beginning of this subchapter that discussed the deliberative imperative of MPs. From the perspective of the contexts of representation and sequenced deliberation, the persistence of demagoguery makes sense: the plenary is not meant for settling or overcoming of disagreements. Deliberative representation takes on other democratically essential functions of arguing for and against, making claims and articulating grievances as well as raising agendas. The kind of understanding and hearing others out is not necessary or even expected

in the performative context. The underlying function is not about cooperativeness or affirmativeness. The democratic practice of deliberation in the performative context is to argue for and against for it in order to highlight and clarify the political conflict and the opinions participants disagree upon. Most importantly, however, the performative context legitimises the disagreement and the perspectives and views going along with it. As Mill (2008, 82) famously notes, the value of plenary debate is in that ‘every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded’. It also means that different opinions ‘have the right to become *publicly heard*, they can become *publicly defended* and they require a *public response* from the government and in presence of other interests and opinions’ (Pekonen 2011, 114; emphasis in the original).

As discussed throughout this analysis, representatives seem to struggle with the initial idea of performative context. It articulates the dualism embedded in the public reasoning: on one hand, representatives acknowledge the democratic merits of establishing and facilitating discussion. On the other hand it is seen shallow and prone to strategic use. Partly this is due to the way the media gets incorporated into the picture, something to which this research at hand cannot extend. The merits of the plenary are portrayed through its institutionalised significance. According to the interviews, this comprehension appears clearest when operating from the opposition. In the government it was important to ‘move things forward’ but time spent as an opposition MP

you start respecting this institution and see the significance of procedures and that matters go through thoroughly and systematically. At first it felt a bit frustrating, when you were very subject-oriented and wanted results, that then you still need to discuss them. Sometimes it felt like a waste of time. (III: 19: 5:49)

Admittedly, deliberation has theoretical inclinations towards decision-making, which is why governing MPs might be less inclined to take part in the plenary deliberations. This reality encompasses the deliberative process to a foreseen closure, and in the case of the plenary the process is closed. Plenary deliberations precede voting, but in the Finnish example, in extreme cases the decision taken by the committee gets overturned in the second handling of the bill in the plenary session. It is reflected in the ways that deliberative representation in the performative context lacks the transformative element that is echoed also in the interviews: ‘nobody seriously expects to be able to change any other MP’s mind’ (Goodin 2005, 40). When the deliberative desideratum of changing preferences is eased and turned into a notion of open-mindedness (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 22), the question still remains. In deliberative theory authenticity of deliberators has been a thing that is difficult to discern, empirically or otherwise. However, the way I read deliberative representation in the performative context to function is that the level of authenticity is more negotiated. From this point, the reluctant attitude on the part of governing MPs to engage in full-fledged plenary deliberation is this: the performance conveyed as the compromise, to which coalition partners have committed, can be fickle. Therefore, the correct answer to the question in the heading, ‘*why deliberate?*’, is not that someone would decide in that moment suddenly to oppose the piece of legislation after hearing the discussion. The answer relates to reluctance about the depth of reasoning in defending the legislation. To MPs, this is

discernible, and to whom the kind of justifying and reasoning would not likely be credible in other discussed context (given the strategic openness of the operative context). But the question about the audience is another.

Asserting that legislatures are ‘strong publics’ as per Habermas—able to serve their function as a ‘context of justification’—it is worthwhile to be aware of the argumentative styles in which audiences are addressed (Flynn 2004, 440). People are not mobilised and motivated by reason only, as the critique of deliberative democracy has showed time and time again, but they are moved also by emotions and feelings. As we know, consequences depend on whether representatives tap into them in a constructive manner or invoke darker undertones of human sentiments. Here, Chambers (2004) argues that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with rhetorical appeals. However, if justifications and reasoning of arguments become shallow or false, we are dealing with ‘plebiscitary rhetoric’. Plebiscitary rhetoric is the outcome of the dynamic where the Socratic and democratic elements are pulled to opposite directions. As such, the inevitable plebiscitary character of public speech should be contained since it crucially undermines the democratic capacities of the citizens to judge democratic politics. Paradoxically, plebiscitary rhetoric can be also seen to some extent as a product of differences in epistemic capacities. But as any constitutive phenomenon it does not only feed off from them, it can create and enhance collective sentiments of, for example ignorance and prejudice. When representative relationships are fused and forged in such a manner, the question of deliberation in public can be linked with will-formation processes in democratic societies, something that deliberative theory should also consider (Chambers 2009, 2012). Consequently, it enables the plenary to act as a vehicle for these tendencies that worsens democratic rule and harms its credibility and accountability:

Ok, well, I think that the plenary sessions could be done away with altogether. They’re just a nuisance. There should be another mechanism to facilitate voting. A discussion that paints a distorted and ludicrous picture of the Eduskunta only harms democracy, I think. I think that we could think about whether the plenaries could be abandoned in their current form. On average, it gives the impression of MPs being more foolish than they really are. (III: 9: 36:42)

There is a worry among representatives that they are reduced to mouthpieces or facilitators who are not interested in engaging in insightful discussion. According to a few senior MPs, in the past plenary addresses often contained something one could learn from. In addition, a political vision was often presented where the perspective was far in the horizon. There seems no place for political analysis. One blamed the retrospective argumentative strategies, of ‘digging up the past’ as an evidence for that fact that parties don’t have anything to say about the current times or the future. There is no ‘art of the possible’ to define democratic politics, and to which the performative context gives keys (for better or worse). I draw from this that everyone seems to be gaining less from the deliberations. The burden is on the representatives, as one MP remarked: *‘If you want to emphasise the significance of the plenary sessions, then it means that you personally must be able to have the kind of conversation that matters about issues that matter’*. (III: 21: 11:27)

As Pekonen (2011, 111) notes, in the interviews there are evaluative criteria that representatives use to distinguish between ‘true work’ and ‘contrived acting’. True or real work that parliamentarians do takes place in the committee, outside the public glare to which the feature posits. There seems to be a genuine fear that people are unable to detect a plebiscitary reason used, thus fusing representative relationships as discussed above. Performative representation seeks to move and affect people (Saward 2017, 82). What the performative context does as portrayed here is that ‘performed claims invoke and render visible and audible the very notions of representative, represented, and a sense of the dynamic or relation which simultaneously distinguishes and unites the two’ (Saward 2017, 80–1).

Drawing on Nietzsche and Arendt, Pekonen (2011, 111–5) provides an insight into the defence of seeking parliament in theatrical terms. This is relevant when seeking to defend the accounts of deliberative representation in the performative context. These perspectives highlight the making of representations from aesthetic and ethical standpoints. Importantly, they facilitate the faculty of judgment–re-presentations or representative claims, to be regarded as such, presume the reading by the audiences. For the representative claim to be accepted, that the elements of the claim have the necessary constitutive character, takes the receiver to be active and not just a passive observer. Overall, the unpredictability in succeeding with a ‘performative call’ makes the whole process of representative claim-making contingent (Saward 2017, 84–5). Further, the fundamental constitutive character of representation, depicted in the many theatre metaphors present in the interviews, sets out also the electoral and competitive nature of claim-making (see also Pekonen 2011, 114–15). It is not therefore completely mistaken to describe the dynamics of deliberative representation described here as ‘deliberative Schumpeterianism’ (Goodin 2005, 194). Deliberation in the performative context also serves the function where ‘parties propose and electors dispose’ (ibid., 193).

Seeing representation in terms of performance and performativity entails the themes of casting and scripting. Throughout this subchapter we have entertained the discussion with these, and showed how representatives discursively place themselves in the ‘play’ acted out in the plenary sessions. We have encountered the governing and the opposition MPs, party leaders and committee chairs as well as the head of the committee group. I have shown how the institutional casting puts MPs in different roles that impute to them particular argumentative practices when it comes to debating and discussing in the plenary sessions. The way the debate format that has been incorporated more and more into the plenary sessions also structures and maintains the parliamentary tension. If thought of as a script, one that the Speaker can also influence, the adversarial setting helps the represented to differentiate and distinguish different representations that are offered and claimed. Representatives also defy the roles, as assumed by the idea of shape-shifting, and seek ways to re-arrange them.

The way I think of it is that it is fair play in a certain sense, where the good ones succeed after all. You learn the rules of the game. The cleverest there realise that you, in fact, need to cross the boundaries in order to succeed. Those who think of it the least, who don't succeed, are those who go deepest in those roles. It's completely anti-intellectual just to be that 'everything is lousy and going to hell'. Or, on the other hand, compliment everything. It is anti-intellectual—everyone sees through it. I somehow trust the recipient in the end. That's why I think it's fair. (III: 10: 20:46)

**

If it appears that the parliamentary work is only or mainly about representatives taking their roles, and acting the pre-scripted play from those roles, then it surely crumbles the trust in legislative institution and in democracy, in general. I think that aspiring for intellectual honesty in parliament work is in the long run better for democracy. Based on my experience and in fact in practice, this kind of impartiality and intellectual honesty also helps to push issues through. However, it doesn't mean a straightforward manner that the parliament handles a bill in the plenary sessions, and you consider to have delivered an impartial speech and all of the sudden the decision changes into something else. It means that when a colleague, regardless of their party affiliation and regardless of the government-versus-opposition setup, hears you trying to argue balance-based and rational-based and basing on some objective evidence, that kind of style is pretty much respected, at least in my own experience. (III: 28: 36:45)

These citations address the same notion, but are democratically consequential in other ways. The first reflects the perspective of the audience, of the people who judge these representative performances. These are also others who do not imply the kind of underestimation of the represented to have the capacity to differentiate and judge the performances accordingly. Trusting that the receiver sees through 'anti-intelligence,' as described above, were supplemented with corresponding statements: '*The electorate know. We may say that they don't, but they do. Dry leaves fall off, in time*'. (III: 30 Uosukainen: 59:00) or '*the voter is king*' (III: 19: 5:49). In order to complete the argument we would need to have evidence from the other side, that is how people respond and resonate with plenary deliberations. Ultimately, however, the performative context is one avenue for the constituency to observe and assess the legislative performance, regardless that it does not give out the full spectre of deliberative representation in parliaments.

The question about a representative's connections with the public can read into the constructivist turn in representation.⁵⁸ Here, the deliberative feature of the constructivist

⁵⁸ The question of who the actual voter, constituency and electorate seems to unclear to the interviewed MPs. The same notion was brought up in the research of Severs and others (2015) with Flemish and Belgian MPs. Those few who were asked about it in the interviews, when it fitted the situation, many still have a vague sense of who they might be. One MP explained the role of a MP to be, as translated from Finnish, a representative of the people. It means that MP should be '*an interpreter between legislation and sentiments of the people*' (III: 11: 3:22). To the question whether one can represent one's constituency '*makes it a bit hazardous expression because who knows exactly who votes for you and what they think about*' (ibid.). In the same breath, MPs underline their extensive citizen contacts. In addition to receiving countless e-mails from people (some claiming to be 'constituent,' something that can thought to imply urgency and relevance), MPs meet in person a lot of people more or less frequently when partaking in various events and such.

conception is referred to in the study of Severs and others as to when the representation process takes on the form of an extended conversation (Severs, Celis, and Meier 2014, 619). Despite that they bypass the conceptual distinctiveness that deliberation can offer, they describe further how the two-way communication between the representative and the represented fosters ‘trust, recognition, and accountability’ which are typical of democratic relationships (ibid.).

According to Severs and others, however, the optimism embedded in the indirectness of representation in contemporary theorising could be short-lived. The ascribed deliberative virtues in Belgian and Flemish MPs’ practices do not take the electorate as ‘genuine interlocutors’. This position is expected in the constitutive conception of representation. Instead, MPs retreat to the contrary ‘electoral conception’ that prescribes them an authorised position to act on their behalf, also as a moral obligation. For this reason, the researchers describe their studied MPs as ‘electoral trustees’ (ibid., 624). Regardless of the close association with electoral programmes and government platforms, ‘political artistry’ is not completely non-existent since they understand the way the represented need to be mobilised. Although MPs’ self-conceptions have been widely studied, they do not rely on contemporary theorising on representation (ibid., 619).

Difficulties in merging these discussions of accounts of representing further tell us about the mismatch between the empirical and theoretical scholarship on political representation. It may be, as the current theoretical standing holds and what MPs seem to unconsciously grasp, that democratic representation is not only a matter of who or what is represented, but also how they are represented. To some extent, however, we must assume that the question of how is deducted from the former, hence cannot be discussed without the linkage to the question of who and what. It also would be too hasty to make far-reaching assumptions about the relationship between the representatives and the represented on the given premises that the constructivists advocates. This is regardless of the fact that there are many aspects that the Finnish Parliament could do better in terms of permeability and transparency, as well as dialogical communication with the public (Arter 2012; Seo and Raunio 2017; see also Raunio and Ruotsalainen 2018).

Considering the complexity with these representative standings to what extent is the idea of accountability practically applicable? We can approach accountability in terms of deliberative accountability (Mansbridge 2009). Most plainly, it highlights the activity of *giving an account*. We can expect our representatives to provide public reasoning and justifications of their doings, and we also have reason to expect that the whole institutional structure resonates with this democratic ideal.

In some interviews, the theme of accountability was automatically linked to the making of electoral promises. According to them, it is all too easy to make concrete, specific promises, e.g. to provide a particular benefit to the district or the hypothetical electorate (such as repairing or rebuilding a road in the district). The reason is purely strategic. It may be wiser not to promise ‘*any fun to anybody*’, as one interviewee put it (III: 9: 5:01), for fear of not being able to live up to the promises after election. Courting the populist vote might severely backfire if it proves difficult to keep those promises once in power. Sources

for accountability should therefore be kept less evident and clear. Instead of particular interests, general interests could be advanced. Promises, if any, are better linked to the party platform accordingly. MPs themselves rarely support the idea of ‘promissory representation’ (Mansbridge 2003). Curiously though, they still can detect that form of representation among some colleagues. Empathetically, if someone has come to the Finnish Parliament ‘*with promises that are half too big*’ (III: 11: 38:03) deems that a representative has profiled themselves as a dedicated proponent of some cause. Such MPs are especially vulnerable to the discussed torment in the face of inevitable decision-making paradoxes.

Ultimately, all this comes down to the ways in which representatives are forced to negotiate in the riptide of expectation, pragmatic and normative alike. Some resort to the party representation and the role-taking they prescribe to. This can also swing to the extreme thus appear unconvincing. According to a few existing surveys about Finnish MPs (Esaïsson 2000; Bengtsson 2014) neither party representation nor ‘individual’ or ‘geographical’ representation stands a chance against MP making up one’s mind by oneself. If this is true, then what this MP (III: 7: 35:45) explaining one’s viewpoint about accountability, might articulate some of the points that others may feel as well. For now it must be taken as a very tentative argument. It does, however, turn into a question of judgment and self-reflection – attributes that hopefully prevail in democratic politics.

Interviewer: Did you think of this kind of question of accountability?

Respondent: No. Pretty early on I understood that there are just too many... If one starts to think that what do they think of this then you would just be lost. I have somehow very strongly thought that I follow the voice of my conscience and vote and be angry and vote against. Against whoever. When I compromise, I can somehow justify what they serve, so that they have some meaning or have been decisive. I’ve been very content that during all the years, it has felt the only way to know what to do is to follow what you yourself think. Participating in NGOs, organisations and activities, of course it affects, those people, to your thinking. Clearly you are not in a vacuum. [...] In the beginning you noted that so many odd questions come by that you just can’t treat those issues in any way through your voters or your electoral campaign. You haven’t even understood anything about them. And you must make decisions. I think that it is more of this kind of issue of trust and identification who you vote for.

Clearly, what is referred here is gyroscopic representation, along the lines of Mansbridge (2003), and I am relatively convinced that many representatives would share this perspective at least to a certain degree. Importantly, it likewise stands in support with the selection model of representation (Mansbridge 2009). In democratic politics, it seems rather insensible and counterintuitive to base our understanding about representation solely on sanctioning. This what the MPs quote above seem to be saying. Similarly overlooking the features that initiates, facilitates and sustains representation are equally important, if not even more. The selection idea of representation outlines a durable frame through which representation can be explored. This exploration supported by useful conceptualisation of representation can be done also without adopting the language of responsiveness, as Rehfeld (2018, 9) notes.

For this reason, it is imperative to outline a framework that helps in seeing how deliberation is invoked and restrained, and what constitutes for such actions in democratic settings. When claiming that representation can be addressed without references to accountability and responsiveness, it does not mean they would be irrelevant. Importantly, to summarise, what these central concepts do is that they provide an evaluative standard to which accounts of representation can be measured against. What they do not do is constitute representing, as Rehfeld (2018) argues. Representatives in the Finnish Parliament very much recognise their mandate and how it ensues them to act as a representative of the people in the first place. Secondly, despite that assumption that there is a lack of clarity in distinguishing the exact constituency enacting this mandate, MPs are aware, some even painfully, of termination of it. Partly could be for this reason why the idea of accountability manifests in a perverse way when collecting points and keeping up appearances with gratuitous speeches.

Some of the friction comes from the fact that in contemporary democracies there are other methods and avenues of communication for maintaining relations. They bypass the locus of plenary sessions, where the audiences are multitude, unstable and contingent. More targeted or restricted communications may even be more deliberative in the sense that the quality might be more salutary. Many interviewed MPs refer to their support-groups that they keep regular contact with. MPs also host a wide variety of guests and groups that advocate and lobby for a particular cause (these were extensively covered in the first set of interviews, marked I). Social media accounts also provide these avenues. Importantly, what this means is that plenary sessions are not necessarily needed to put forward their political message. The supporters and constituencies can be reached through other venues with a less cost than spending hours waiting for a chance to address the plenary sessions. From this perspective, for some MPs plenary discussion become redundant, or a necessary evil.

To summarise, this subchapter has discussed how deliberative representation operates in the performative context. The main finding, resonating with the study of Pekonen, is that the performative context invokes the essentials of representative rule, especially in the electoral sense. Interviewed MPs struggle with this domain of representing due to the self-evident democratic credentials it bears but then at the same time, many misuse the forum. Expressive-partisan deliberative mode exercised here seems to take the turn to worse when it comes to the quality of deliberation, something that many notice. Deliberative representation explains here how public contestation and testing political adversaries is required thus allowing justifications and partisan perspectives to be expressed. While doing this MPs need to be able to stand out as principled and credible representative actors. Simultaneously they must confine themselves to the implicit rules of collective action. The interviews illustrate how these judgments relating to such questions are constantly made, being aware of the possible consequences and thus actively weighing options. Deliberative control is sometimes exercised, implying also to the negotiated level of authenticity when it comes to acknowledging the path-dependency inherent in political compromises and agreements made with coalition partners or with adversaries. Within this framework, the expressive-partisan deliberative mode is perhaps internally most conflicted than the other discussed modes.

5 What can be gained from deliberative representation?

Three objectives were set for this research. While I go through the relevant observations, I will also discuss some implications that are methodological and theoretical in nature. Since research that takes such an approach to the Finnish parliamentary landscape is scarce, I will additionally make some short remarks about the Parliament of Finland.

Firstly, I wanted to examine, as my first research question, a prospect of deliberative representation as something that could provide a better grasp of the convergence of two related concepts, political representation and deliberation. Here, my attempt has been in narrowing down the sphere of inquiry by pursuing an *analytical idea of deliberative representation*. Crucially, it is also a response to the call for arms by Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 131) when they declared that deliberative democracy needs to search for ‘modes of representation’ also within legislatures that would support ideals of deliberation. Not many have answered this call. As I have shown in the theoretical chapters, deliberative theory has over the years referred to some questions that relate to political representation: themes of power and interests, inclusion and selection, dynamics of representation as principle-agent model have been discussed. These discussions, which connect to varying degrees with the constructivist turn in representation, make the idea and concept of representation more complex and fluid. As such, they welcome attempts that would seek ways to make use and benefit of both strands of theory.

Deliberative representation adopts its features and substances from the understanding of deliberative democracy. It is the aspirational and analytical quality of deliberation—that of deliberativeness—that makes deliberative representation appealing and meaningful. This is especially so when thinking of its empirical applicability. Seen this way, this research can be seen as an open invitation for further work that revises, focuses and specifies the idea of deliberative representation. To keep pushing for a horizon of finding dialogue and bridges across the scholarships of deliberation, representation and legislatures, attempts like the one here are needed.

Taking conceptual liberties that the study of parliaments from the deliberative angle arguably calls for, seems to be fitting to the newer deliberative paradigm that already looks well past set criteria in defining ‘real’ deliberation. Also, there is little to contribute to the general discussion about deliberative systems, if we would lose hope on legislatures and ignore them altogether from deliberative analysis. Within this framework, which remains contested, we could consider deliberation as a spectrum, as Mansbridge has suggested. There situations and settings are ranging from little or none of the features of deliberation being present to full-fledged inclusive and non-distributive deliberation where all ideals are present (Mansbridge 2006, see also Warren and Mansbridge 2013).

Most recently, Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019) have also argued for such an approach, looking into deliberation in summative terms that make deliberativeness a feature that is a product of dynamic interactions. These interactions are sensitive to contextual and functional variations just as I have been describing in the analysis. Deliberative representation seeks out the ‘deliberative timbre’ in representation. As Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 7, 10) argue, deliberativeness is something resonating here and there in the events of democratic politics, but nonetheless in a distinctive way. In my treatment of

deliberativeness in representation, a few key elements have been distinguished through which deliberative representation can be analysed. What I have made central to my analysis of the developing scholarship is an examination of the practices of deliberative representation, activities that entail deliberation and representation, through the idea of functions. We have seen that different contexts in legislatures host and induce, for example, of practices of debating, disagreeing and compromising, reasoning and reflection in different ways. I have also concentrated on the overall deliberative process and, within that, have pinpointed features of open-mindedness, opinions and preferences and authenticity. Tapping into these features helps locate action logics available in parliamentary work and offers an overview what goes on in a legislature when representation is in action. First and foremost, what can be gained from a proposal of deliberative representation is that these ideas together enable looking at actual empirical accounts of representative activities.

The idea of deliberative representation highlights the role of context. This was the objective of my second research question. Through uncovering the idea of contextuality, something that is only gradually being focused on in the literature, I have empirically shown how practices of deliberative representation occur in the different contexts of representation. This research has detected three major contexts: affirmative, operative and performative.

In addition to showing how certain functions mainly draw from respective contexts, I have argued that their relevance lies also in the way these practices are reflected throughout the contexts. The contextual approach has made it possible to generalise about how the three contexts provide resources for practices and orient the incentives of representatives. The analysis offered in this study provides a response, albeit not an exhaustive one, to Goodin's claim that there are 'interactions between different deliberative virtues, and across stages of the deliberation, which must be considered in sequencing the deliberative virtues' (Goodin 2005, 193). We see that representative institutions are forced to distribute deliberative tasks within, highlighting also the efforts for accountability and performing well. These objectives derive from enabling and prompting resources for reflection, expertise and specialisation, and reasoning. Adding to Goodin's description on spatial stages of legislation the contexts of representation provide much-needed analytical depth to what happens inside parliaments.

Overall, the chosen contextual and functional treatment of deliberative representation speaks to the 'problem-based approach' of democratic theory (Warren 2017). Theorists should consider the extent to which political practices can solve democratic problems. Along these lines, this research has shown, with an illustration of the Finnish parliament, how organising collective decision-making, as one of the democratic functions defined by Warren, takes place through practices of deliberation and representation. Finnish scholarship prior to this research was characterised by a somewhat reserved attitude to the deliberative features of legislative processes, not only regarding which interests are given a hearing in the parliamentary committees (Holli and Saari 2009), but also regarding the overall role of speech in the Parliament of Finland (Pekonen 2011).

Institutional and procedural settings provide important resources (which also guide and restrict action) for representative actors and induce deliberation in various ways. However, what I have attempted to demonstrate with the idea of deliberative representation is that there is more to it—arguably, all representatives in their activity of representation recognise

the three-part ethos of affirmation, operation and performativity. Claiming that this argument includes legislators and non-institutional actors alike suggests that the contexts argued here resonate also outside the parliamentary setting. Since accounts of representation differ from time and place, deliberative representation may not be linear or similarly traceable through particular institutionalised deliberative processes like the ones presented here.

This sequenced and distributive character embedded also in deliberative representation is a challenge that the deliberative systems approach is also up against. Through contextual examination of one specific legislative venue this research can contribute to thinking ‘systemically’. As the overall picture of deliberative systems is getting clearer, it is becoming increasingly necessary to revisit the so-called institutional and empirical turn in their focus on, for example, representative institutions (Bächtiger et al. 2018: 18, see also Dryzek 2017; Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019). These studies may be hit by limited communication between political theory and empirical political science, something that is endemic especially within deliberative democracy (see Dryzek 2007; Thompson 2008; Elstub 2010). Recently the differing ontological perspectives have reached also the concept of representation (Fivaz and Bühlmann 2016; see also Sabl 2015).

Although Thompson (2008) argues that normative theory of deliberation has the ‘upper hand’, this does not mean that empirical research should not test the claims made by political theorists. It can profoundly illuminate what representative democracy can and cannot do, thus implying favourable conditions for such democratic practices as deliberation and representation. For this reason, a normative democratic theory must indicate the extent to which trade-offs between actual democratic processes and normative theory should be made (Elstub 2010, 256).

The emerging empirical research on deliberative systems also calls for a wider methodological programme (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 14, 75). Bevir and Ansari (2012) summarise the dilemma that the empirical turn in deliberative theory is facing: the ‘modernist approach’ that is endorsed in contemporary political science maintains that structures and institutions have priority over the actor’s perspective. This bias makes the approach ‘ill-suited to identifying and explaining deliberative democracy’ (Bevir and Ansari 2012, 2). On the contrary, the actor-centred perspective is endorsed by interpretative political research, which accommodates the ‘multiplicity inherent in political life’ when it comes to varied and overlapping interpretations by many actors and participants (Ercan, Hendriks, and Boswell 2017, 199).

Interviewing elected representatives, as done in this research, shows how the interpretative approach can be applied to parliaments (Bevir and Rhodes 2006; Geddes and Rhodes 2018). As such, parliaments are seen as particular deliberative ecologies. Interviewing can ‘provide important insights into *what deliberative systems* look like *from the ‘inside’* but also enable a stepping stone that can ‘help to inform ideas about how interactions and interconnections between components of the system can be steered, in order to achieve more inclusive and reflective deliberation at the larger scale’ (Ercan and al. 2017, 204, emphasis added).

On the other hand, fully committing to interpretative research may necessitate abandoning ‘some of the explanatory ambitions’ (Bevir and Ansari 2012, 3). A similar

worry is presented with purely qualitative approaches where, in the case of deliberative systems, studies might become ‘blind to complex dynamics and transmissions’ (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019, 141). For this reason, although my research provides only a limited look at public deliberation and to the prevailing question about deliberative transmissions across the sites within a deliberative system, it does show how policy-makers engage with deliberative processes in a legislative context. Future research could supplement the approach proposed here with participant observation—doing research in Fenno’s (1986) methodological style of ‘soak and poke’. In any case, there is a need for an overarching research programme to tackle these methodological complexities, and mitigate the unnecessary division between empirically and theoretically oriented scholars.

**

The empirical analysis presented here points towards how contextual features inform the conditions in which representatives encounter each other. Hence, deliberation is not a virtual act but a physical occurrence between two or more people. Curiously, this relevant democratic perspective available in interactions (that are also staged in physical surroundings) has been eschewed by democratic theory (Parkinson 2012, 6). For this reason the deliberative stance embedded in deliberative representation is inherently ethical. By this I mean, as proponents of deliberative systems argue, that ‘to deliberate with another is to understand the other as a self-authoring source of reasons and claims’ (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 11). My aim has not been to pursue the ‘ethical-evaluative’ approach (Schäfer 2017), but instead to acknowledge the elements that the perspective of interactions spells out. However, the kind of ethical evaluation discussed here is done implicitly by the representatives themselves. This is the feature of mutual respect. What many of the interviewees stated is that despite fiercely disagreeing with their political opponents in some cases, the opponent and what they represent should always be respected. This principle also draws on the premise that every representative has an equal mandate to represent. However, there are some indications in the interviews that a few polarised agendas are found so fundamentally different that some struggle with the principle of respect.

More generally speaking, this ethical perspective of democratic politics orients more often towards how representatives conduct themselves in different situations and contexts. The kind of ethical reinvigoration has also recently been argued by Cameron (20018) in his theoretical pursuit for legislators as Aristotelian ‘wise practitioners’. The internal perspective of the parliament that I offer in this research relates to more specifically to the question of how one represents. Again, this articulates the deliberative stance in representation. Ultimately, what matters is how representatives negotiate and handle various situations that they come across daily.

Accounts of judgments are not the only indications that representatives seek to sail as close to the wind as possible in the performative context—to steer on the borderline of being articulate and rude and disrespectful. However, these abovementioned relate to main genealogy that can be traced when approaching my final research question of how

deliberative acts are facilitated. To indicate these dynamics, I formulated three deliberative modes, namely the expressive-deliberative, strategic-deliberative and expressive-partisan deliberative mode.

If one would summarise the overall findings, it would be about crucial consideration regarding controlling the starkest urges of strategic action. There is also another point to be made here: strategic behaviour does not always refer to the pejorative single-minded partisan aspirations and publicity-seeking stunts. The analysis pinpoints occasions where strategic action contributes to the aspiration to hear out various perspectives and seeking solutions in that moment. Strategic action, when used wisely, can enhance cooperation, solidarity and commonality. But the strategic-deliberative mode highlights the ability to engage in political negotiations (and to know when to call them off) or propose an out-of-the-box solutions. Assumingly, representatives who succeed in these functions demonstrate that the incentives for re-election, gaining respect within the house as well as pursuing good politics can appear side by side (Bessette 1994, following Fenno's work).

While it may not appear credible that political actors would condemn acting politically in a legislature, there is another discernible aspect in their reasoning. This relates to the integration of functions and the discussed contexts. For example, the way representatives argue curbing outright political conducts is that it makes no sense to operate with an expressive-partisan mode in the committee: that is, to deliver long and eloquent persuasive speeches or endorse a fully adversarial position on the issue on the table. If opinions are well defined to begin with, and the compromise or solution to the disagreement between parties turns out to be futile, then the committee handling and the corresponding process is formally taken to the end (this point is also made in Pekonen 2011). Majority wins and the minority will take up their case later through other means. The time and place to unravel the disagreement is elsewhere. Such demonstration of deliberative-strategic mode displays the practical orientation in getting pass political differences that slows down the process in the operative context. As one interviewee stated: 'Best speeches to the Hall!'

However, plenary discussions are marked by superficiality and epistemic redundancy that draws the analysis that everyone seems to be getting less out of them. Excluding the general democratic merits of public reasoning and debate raises a worry shared by Pekonen (2011): how can we ensure that decisive political disagreements are reasoned and justified to the fullest within the legislature? Unless we resort to solving matters simple by voting, it can turn out to be a democratic problem if the democratic function of collective decision-making undermines such deliberation. Many virtues relating to constructive politics are demonstrated in the operative context where partisan-oriented, plebiscitary reasoning is generally shunned. Consideration about the merits of policies and what is thought to imply general good is reflected through the expert hearings in the committees. Expert hearings now take up most of the committee's time, which is thereby taken away from time spent deliberating. The sheer amount of legislation in Finland makes committee work often congested, therefore decreasing their deliberative capabilities and potential.

Also, as I have shown, parliamentary party group (PPG) meetings can facilitate deliberation, depending on the size of the group and the number of items on the meeting agenda. Deliberative culture, the kind of discussion where perspectives are tested and reflected, fostered by the PPGs makes a difference. Given that representatives engage with

what I have been calling expressive-deliberative mode, affirmation about a personal or party position is produced. But does the process of reasoning and justification, practices that do not belong only to textbooks but exist in reality, travel across the contexts of representation? Here Mykkänen (2010) makes a fair yet distracting point that goes against the general assumption of deliberative theory. He claims that contrary to what is assumed, the way trust operates in parliaments actually inhibits deliberation. Trust facilitates intraparty bonding that encourages keeping matters ‘in the family’ and to appear loyal to the outside. While it is true that committees and especially the PPGs, in the best scenario, form an enclave surrounded by mutual trust and shared expertise that induces authenticity. I have also shown that committee members and PPG members can exercise deliberative control. They withhold from offering their informed reasons when it comes to the question of revealing overlapping conflicts and other such matters that could be politically decisive. However, we also have to consider the opposite perspective: within a PPG where intraparty trust is low, would we be seeing more of those who publicly go against the party and not only when voting? Would low intraparty trust enhance the kind of deliberation described here?

From this it follows that the deliberative principle of reciprocity, where reasons are recognised also through their mutual acceptability (Gutmann and Thompson 1996), is incompatible with how participants aim for compromise in the committee. To increase acceptability of presented reasons representatives as party members may withhold or restrain from sharing all details. But this violates the reciprocity and the embedded fundament of respect, according to the view by Gutmann and Thompson. Weinstock (2017, 647) is correct in pointing out that norm of intelligibility should be preferred rather than mutual acceptability or ‘shareability’ to elude the theoretical ‘duplicity’ when it comes to question of authenticity of deliberation. I have shown that, in the PPG meetings at least, a certain level of sincerity is expected in order to contribute to collective opinion formation and testing of arguments, whereas this feature becomes more negotiated when advancing to the performative context and the plenary sessions. This argument also connects with the question of who the interlocutors are, whether intended audience is one’s own group, committee members or the whole parliament as well as and the electorates and media.

In the interviews, several interviewed MPs emphasised the readiness to take a stand in all situations, as this is expected of them. But when functions of opinion-building and expression and contestation are explicitly encouraged in the affirmative context, it may very well be that they remain there. Origins of disagreements and the corresponding perspectives presented in the PPG may not be shared with committee members when legislation is scrutinised. This has effects on the nature of compromise in a legislature.

What we can conclude from this is that the urgency of political compromise lies in its deliberative virtues displayed at that moment when the compromise is made. Consideration of the perspectives and stands of the participants of compromise are not explicitly visited after the agreement on the compromise is made. If compromise is defined in terms of giving up or abandoning (at that time) some positions or objectives, then the ‘notion of reciprocal concession’ (Weinstock 2017, 650) articulates a certain path-dependency. Elements of compromise are held throughout the legislative handling. Similar deliberative virtue in articulating the ‘nuts and bolts’ of compromise, that may take place within the committee, do not exist when the legislative process moves on to the plenary stage. The political and

epistemic credentials discussed above should regardless be at display also in the performative context. A working parliament, such as the Parliament of Finland, puts more effort into ‘governing’ and law-making, and not so much into debating.

In addition to the abovementioned observation about dealing with disagreements raises another concluding point that takes a completely different view to them. My analysis suggests that the centrality of compromise in democratic politics seems to take for granted that there are, firstly, issues that are in conflict and, secondly, that legislators have a sense of what they are. Only the former argument holds ground, while the latter is plausible. When Bessette (1994, 54–55) discusses the role of persuasion in the US legislature he makes a point worth considering: it is not so much about changing but *making up* minds. Among other things, the focus on legislative contexts of representation has offered a way to unfold and discern the prospect of preference change. This feature that early deliberative democrats held central can now be perceived in terms of open-mindedness (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019) that allows a better look at how opinions are made and how political actors are making up their minds. We can argue that based on the analysis offered in this research we can agree with Bessette (1994, 51) that information works indeed as a resource for persuasion and educating representatives. Here it is noteworthy to underline how scrutiny of legislation in committees toggles accordingly between the operative context and affirmative context. The former expects a rather uncomplicated, straightforward decision-making oriented manoeuvres, whereas in the latter positions and perspectives informing those manoeuvres are less constrained. As such, they need affirmation and validation.

It is very plausible that representatives do not always have a clear sense of what their personal position is in the face of massive amount of legislation. Therefore, the reality also may be that representatives do not often *profoundly* know the subject matter on which they are deciding. However, the division of labour that takes place—and is supported and structured by the institutional setting—mitigates what here seems to be a democratic deficit. This research has shown how representatives can rely on their colleagues for validation and better judgment—curiously hinting at an intra-parliamentary surrogacy representation of some sort).

Again, all this highlights the paradigmatic role of the performative context. Representatives should also individually display the range of their skills and capacities as representatives. Importantly, since contexts overlap significantly it also implies that the practical virtue—how to represent—appears differently in each context. Quite obviously, not all participants share understanding about what purposes deliberative processes might serve. Representatives may choose to treat passing moments and situations differently. However, it is often the case that implicit norms orient and set expectations for communicative action in those moments. This could be one way to think of Burke’s (1774) much-cited passage about how representatives ‘owe their industry’ to the represented: the knowledge of and capacity to navigate in a legislature requires familiarity with norms, formal and informal alike, as well as great deal of judgment and tact. It necessitates the ability to detect when an agreement can be made and when to resist compromise; when to be bold and raise an issue. We could argue that *a practically wise legislator is able to succeed in all the contexts*: genuinely affirming and reflecting issues and working them out with others. When the practices of deliberative representation are rewarded differently in different contexts of

representation can also be a problematic thing. We are faced with an unresolved question: how can democratic politics nurture and educate legislative practices that help in selecting as well as in rewarding constructive political practitioners, especially when much of the parliamentary work is done outside the public venue? PPGs partly do this by advancing the career paths of reliable MPs within the Parliament, but sorting out ‘wise practitioners’ cannot be left in their hands only. Making the committee sessions public is one plausible option. However, as the majority of interviewed MPs argue, this action would introduce the campaigning and posturing dynamics to the committees. Therefore could be a flawed remedy in this respect.

When we arrive at the question of overall performance of representatives and conditions enabling and restricting representative functions and deliberative acts, we can make a few final remarks. What can be drawn from this research is *that not all elements in deliberative representation in a legislature are equal in terms*. When thinking of the argument of MPs as shape-shifters that modify and adapt their activities and aspirations, the willingness to shape-shift is one thing but structures ‘*allowing them to do so*’ is another (Saward, 2014, 728, emphasis added). I would argue that while Saward seems to assume that structures for shape-shifting are enduring (as they are in cases of institutional structures) some other structures are negotiable and flexible. For this reason, the shape-shifting quality of representation may not equally be available for all but are in fact subject to hierarchy that is drawn from the informal structures of institutional norms. Senior MPs have more leeway when it comes to deliberative representation. Also, for them, from the intraparty perspective, it may not be similarly politically harmful to go across the floor in a vote or defy even publicly one’s party on some policy matter.

A completely different matter is the incentive for re-election, the ultimate strategic consideration in legislative behaviour. I will draw two examples from the interviews. First was already brought up in the expressive-partisan mode dominating the plenary. Apart from the debate format that institutionally guides who is given a turn to speak, if my analysis is correct, *there is nothing in performative context that would block or restrict endorsing a more moderate, mediating deliberative mode that could also aspire for far-reaching political envisioning*. The only thing that formally restricts this is that it can affect, critically I am afraid, the incentives of MPs to engage in this kind of deliberation. Another reading would suggest a yearning for nostalgia, or refer to an ideal that never existed. In any case, the functional overlap of affirmative and performative contexts is small when it comes to plenary sessions. This is not to suggest that MPs should pour their hearts out about personal uncertainties about political decisions or other (potentially political) details backing up the legislation. But we tend to see too little of the kind of pondering and reasoning that would not only be engaging and appealing but also reflective and constructive.

What connects these features is the idea of listening and the overall democratic transmission between the representatives and the represented. Just as Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019, 101), accompanying Ankersmit (2002), put it, representations are never ‘the thing itself’; they are proposals and claims made and rendered to judgment of others. The show-do characteristics (Saward 2017) of the performative context, despite its fundamental democratic underpinnings, tend to reduce the kind of elusiveness that appears necessary to deliberative transmissions. The affirmative context and the corresponding

expressive-deliberative mode articulate exactly these features where the participant implicitly asks, ‘did I get this right, is this how these things would work out?’ (to use the example of Bächtiger and Parkinson 2019). In a more striking way, to engage in deliberative process in the first place displays the willingness for listening and affirmation. I would lay down the argument that, among other things, we need more public articulation of these reflective and reflexive aspects in democratic politics *without* political practitioners appearing weak, incompetent or indecisive. This is the likely case when considering how the media tends to frame parliamentary deliberations.

Finally, these abovementioned questions can be perceived from the perspective of legislature and through the theme of ‘de-parliamentarisation’. Representative institutions and elected representatives have fewer formal powers to influence policy-making in general. In more detail, due to the influence of government platform policies that are programmatically issued and accepted, leaves less room for legislative aspirations by individual MPs. In accordance with Holli and Saari (2009) and Pekonen (2011), influencing should take place prior to the bill reaches the parliament. From the perspective of simple interest aggregation, this kind of ‘output representation’ might be preferred. When being suggested that instead of initiating a formal and democratic procedure of putting forward an individual MP initiative, and if one wishes to see a result and be effective in a matter, the issue should be taken up privately with the minister or the cabinet. Evidently, when the kind of back-channelling comes into question, the parliament and the public deliberation it ensues becomes by-passed. This is one of micro-mechanisms that relate to Beetham’s (2011) diagnosis of parliaments getting trampled by more effective avenues of political influence.

On another note, committees of the Parliament of Finland have a considerable amount of legislative potential. Some of the reasons include the institutional design of long and steady incumbency, vast access to expert-knowledge, and overall accumulated expertise and ‘institutional memory’ (that experienced committee secretaries also stand for). Together with demonstrated public spiritedness, aspirations to strive towards good policies, as many interviewed MPs claimed, constructive politics is possible. Given that the power of lobbyists are kept in check, it is worth considering *granting rights of legislative initiative to the parliamentary committees* of the Parliament of Finland. This could mitigate and control some of the features that impoverish present-day legislatures.

Evidently there is a struggle for parliamentary power over the executive, and more urgently, in a larger sense, struggle over parliament’s legitimate existence (Beetham 2011). For such, it is not only representative institutions in terms of institutional representation that is called into question (Judge and Leston-Bandeira 2017; Judge, Leston-Bandeira, and Thompson 2018). Parliamentarians also need to find ways to justify their position and significance in a narrowing operational field. And presumably on a global level, with lessening impact. Better oversight, visibility and ‘permeability’ have been called in the face of comparisons of Finnish parliament being as open as the Vatican (Arter 2012). Not only would increasing transparency of parliamentary practices induce the ‘civilising force of hypocrisy’ but also make visible the decision-making processes of parliament. ‘Transparency of process’ would ensure that through cross-cutting publicity of parliamentary practices the accountability principle can be redeemed (Mansbridge 2009).

Proposed originally by Mansbridge (2009), distinctive from processual transparency is ‘transparency in rationale’ which reintroduces the traditional reading of accountability as in *giving an account* in order to be informed and to ‘rule’. Democratic hazards present in the lack of transparency, however, may not be mitigated if the rationale is not genuine (Warren and Mansbridge 2013, 108). In hindsight, when matters contributing to the decision are not available, or especially if the impact of interest group lobbying is not made visible, then transparency in rationale seems less appealing. All this relates to what I have argued about the role of representatives in the democratic landscape. There is an overdue need for discussion of the purposes of democratic representatives, and of how legislatures as representative institutions can host various representative practices. And not only that, the ways in which functions of representation change over time when looked from the viewpoint of contemporary legislatures need more focus. Deliberative representation, and the range of deliberation it accentuates and explains by drawing from the function and context-sensitive perspective, is a good beginning.

APPENDIX

i List of research interviews

Total amount of research interviews n=65.

INTERVIEW SET I

18 interviews (conducted and transcribed by Anne Maria Holli and Milja Saari), 2008

1. 29 May 2008
2. 16 June 2008
3. 23 May 2008
4. 9 June 2008
5. 11 June 2008
6. 10 September 2008
7. 23 September 2008
8. 8 October 2008
9. 7 November 2008
10. 4 November 2008
11. 11 November 2008
12. 9 October 2008
13. 5 November 2008
14. 1 October 2008
15. 11 June 2008
16. 1 June 2008
17. 16 June 2008
18. 19 June 2008

INTERVIEW SET II

17 interviews (interviews conducted and transcribed by Jenni Rinne), 2008–2009

1. 4 December 2008
2. 12 December 2008
3. 17 December 2008
4. 18 December 2008
5. 30 December 2008
6. 20 January 2009
7. 22 January 2009
8. 3 February 2009
9. 5 February 2009 (9-1) and 18 February 2009 (9-2)
10. 20 February 2009
11. 25 February 2009
12. 17 March 2009
13. 18 March 2009

14. 20 March 2009
15. 24 March 2009
16. 17 December 2008
17. 26 November 2008

INTERVIEW SET III

16 interviews (conducted and transcribed by Jenni Rinne), 2015

14 interviews (conducted and transcribed by Jenni Rinne), 2016

Interviews conducted between 24 June 2015 and 29 June 2016

Exact dates of the interviews are removed for securing the anonymity of the interviewees. Codes (III: 1-29) have been shuffled.

1. xx.xx.xxxx
2. xx.xx.xxxx
3. xx.xx.xxxx
4. xx.xx.xxxx
5. xx.xx.xxxx
6. xx.xx.xxxx
7. xx.xx.xxxx
8. xx.xx.xxxx
9. xx.xx.xxxx
10. xx.xx.xxxx
11. xx.xx.xxxx
12. xx.xx.xxxx
13. xx.xx.xxxx
14. xx.xx.xxxx
15. xx.xx.xxxx
16. xx.xx.xxxx
17. xx.xx.xxxx
18. xx.xx.xxxx
19. xx.xx.xxxx
20. xx.xx.xxxx
21. xx.xx.xxxx
22. xx.xx.xxxx
23. xx.xx.xxxx
24. xx.xx.xxxx
25. xx.xx.xxxx
26. xx.xx.xxxx
27. xx.xx.xxxx
28. xx.xx.xxxx
29. xx.xx.xxxx

30. 22 May 2016, former MP and minister, Speaker of the House Riitta Uosukainen wanted to appear with her own name in this research.

ii Framework for the semi-structured research interviews

INTERVIEW SET I, 2008

Semi-structured interview frame (translated from Finnish)

1) Recruitment to the committee

1. Recruitment for committee membership: did you yourself wish to be a member of this committee. If so, why (or if not, why not)?
2. What kind of position do you have in the committee? What are your tasks?
3. How would you describe your career path in committee work? Has it been progressing to tasks of increasing responsibility within one committee, or “lateral” progression, for example transitioning from a rank-and-file member in one committee to a committee responsible, chair etc.?
4. How typical do you assess your committee career to be in this respect (in comparison to other MPs)?
5. How does the selection of MPs into different committees happen within your PPG? Which criteria dictate who gets to go to what committee? How about leadership positions?

2) Changes in committee work

6. In what ways do you estimate that the committee work has changed since the mid-1990s? What factors have been influencing these changes?
7. How has Finland’s EU-membership affected committee work?
8. *How is the reform of basic rights (1995) apparent in committee work? How about the strengthening of human rights internationally and in Finland?*
9. *How are gender perspectives strived for into the mainstream apparent in committee work?*
10. *How has the increased number of female MPs affected committee work in general?*
11. How do you assess the committee’s working: harmonious, quarrelling, amount and effect of differing opinions, something else? How has this changed, and what factors affect the committee’s working and routines in your opinion?
12. Is there, for example, collaboration between different groups, with whom, on what grounds (party, agenda-specific interests...)?
13. Do you yourself have this kind of collaboration across party boundaries, with whom, in which matters?
14. What things/changes have eased or disturbed committee work in your opinion?

3) Representation

16. *Which groups, which interests are best/worst represented in the committee, if we are considering this specifically from the point of view of the entirety of the committee?*

17. *The so-called quota act (1995) is not applied to the line-up of the committees. Has this ever been discussed in the parliament or in the committee, or have the possible effects of gender balance been considered?*

18. *Are the different gender distributions in different committees apparent in their work?*

19. *How do you assess the women's network and its influence in the parliament – on committee work in general and on this committee in particular?*

20. *Do the male MPs have similar groups, which look after men's interests and/or bring male perspective into the work?*

21. *In what ways do other groups and identities become visible/represented among the members of the committee and in their committee activities?*

22. *In what ways are party membership, social class, and employer/employee/agriculture confederations visible/represented among the committee members and in their committee work?*

4) Experts

23. *How are experts chosen? Who proposes experts, who doesn't, and on what grounds?*

24. *Is a person or an interest group proposed? Is ever a woman or for example minority group representative (NGOs) demanded to be invited as an expert? Are there any problems associated with this and if then what?*

25. *How do you estimate the gender distribution of the experts in your committee to be? What factors explain it?*

26. *How do you assess the versatility of the experts your committee uses in general?*

27. *What principles guide the hearing of the experts? Is the aim for example to fill gaps left there during earlier preparation, is there coordination with preceding preparation process?*

28. *Individual experts: who are chosen, from where, on what grounds? Are experts from women's studies or critical study of men utilized and if, in what matters?*

29. *How do you assess the effectiveness of experts – in general and by interest groups? Are there differences in the importance of experts or groups and if, then on what grounds? Are there changes to be noticed (for example ministries, unions, NGOs?) and to what direction?*

30. *How is the attitude towards experts in the committee work – in general and for different interest groups?*

- Are members present?

- Are they only politely listened to, are they taken seriously?

- Are questions being asked, discussed, or matter-of-fact?

31. *How do the experts' views influence the committee's stance—are there differences in relation to experts/groups?*

5) Influence

32. How do you estimate the influence of committees to have grown/diminished in general? In relation to the amount of government bills
33. The importance of different committees has been seen to be different. How do you estimate this hierarchy between committees has prevailed/changed?
34. Have changes happened in this committee's position within the aforementioned hierarchy? If, then why? How about new committees' position in the hierarchy?
35. How is the influence distributed within this committee? Who has power/influence, on what factors is this based on? (position, party, government/opposition-constellation, seniority, expertise, individual properties, age, gender etc...)
37. Whose opinion has influence—on others' opinions, how about the end result?
- chair, secretary, committee responsible person etc.
 - relationship between head of committee group /PPG
 - head of committee group position in their own party
 - position of a rank-and-file MP, new MP?
 - position of female/male MP—is there a difference?
38. Who are active in committee work? Is this related to influence?
39. Are there core groups and cliques and outsiders, and on what basis?
40. What do you see your own influence as being based on?

INTERVIEW SET II, 2008-2009

Semi-structured interview frame (translated from Finnish)

GENERAL

- 1) Is it possible to have influence in the committee and if so, then with what kind of talk?
→ Yes: how and with what kind of talk can you influence?
→ No: what are the arenas and forums for influencing talk in the parliament? (parliament group etc.)
- 2) Is it a common practice that compromises are made, improved and argued in the committee meeting, or does it happen in some even smaller constellation?
- 3) How does the common goal of the committee—a unanimous report—affect talk in the committee or does it have any effect?
- 4) By whom is the common view formed?
- 5) Can you remember speeches that were important for you or other participants?

1. PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCUSSION:

- (1) Activity in the committee in general?

- (2) In the end, how much are topics discussed in the committee?
- (3) Does everyone participate, or most, or always only the same few?
- (4) What is the discussion like?
- (5) How would you in general describe the practices of talking in the committee?
 - Things are discussed thoroughly, so that different points of view are debated (to what extent are they heard)
 - Things are argued and disagreed without giving much justifications
 - Some smaller things or details are negotiated
 - There is exchange over some things, e.g. “if you [...], then we in turn..”
 - bargaining
- If all of the above, then where is the most weight?
- (7) To where are things developing in this respect in your opinion? Why?

2. PRESENTATION OF VIEWS AND TAKING A STANCE

- (1) How actively do the committee members take a stance and present their stance on present topics?
- (2) Do those participating in the discussion present only the views of their own party and/or their own views on the active topics?
- (3) What formulations do they use when presenting their views: “I”, “we”, “the parliamentary group”, “the party”, “the field”, “the supporters” or what?
- (4) Is it usually everyone, some, or few that present their views on the active topics?
 - what could be causing the differences?

3. REASONING

- (1) How is one’s own stance argued for?
- (2) Direction of the argumentation, internally or externally? How are the party’s or the MP’s own views argued?
- (3) How would you describe the atmosphere and goals of talking and arguing: is it discursive, negotiative or debate-driven?
- (4) To whom is the talking directed to? Is the talk directed in a way more to the committee chairperson and/or committee secretary than to the rest of the committee members?

4. TAKING THE OTHER SIDE INTO ACCOUNT

- (1) Are those taking part in the discussion really ready to listen and understand—even if they would not change their opinions—the opposing arguments, and do they in this regard

respect the other discussants?

(2) How well do the different sides (government vs opposition, other parties) in the end really understand the other side and their arguments? → Are they ready to acknowledge their value, even if they would not agree? Are the opinions and argumentation of others genuinely respected?

(3) Attitude towards colleague, and respect? Are there possibly differences between the parliament and other forums?

(4) How equal are everyone in the committee and how does this affect practices of speech?

(5) Taking others into account and respecting them as one side: how would you describe the direction that the act of taking others into account has taken? Why?

5. THE MEANING OF SPEECH

Are the views presented by others genuinely respected?

(2) What is the attitude towards counter-proposals and differing views?

(3) Is it as if the views of the speakers were decided in advance, or can views change?

(4) Can party or governing-opposition boundaries be crossed? How often?

(5) Can you think of any situations and occasions, where “something new” would have emerged as a result of open discussion and exchange of ideas, for example a new point of view or an interpretation, upon which e.g. a compromise (as a temporary mutual understanding) as a unanimous report could be built?

(6) Are there these “committee personalities” to be found, who may quite often engage and initiatively take part in the discussion? (picking up on things in the discussion in such a skilful, aggressive way, or because of their formal position?)

(7) How strongly is the committee work and discussion in the committee defined by MPs’ individual qualities (or is party politics and PPG resolutions still the more dominant factor?)

(8) What is this expert talk and what are its political possibilities and boundaries?

Finally:

Do you have anything to add to the discussion had here or possibly something on your mind that would be important to remember or notice, but that has not been addressed here, or has not received enough attention?

INTERVIEW SET III, 2015-2016

Semi-structured interview frame (translated from Finnish)

I BEGINNING AND CANDIDACY

1. Please go through in short your MP history, how did you end up being a representative?
 - a. What issues and things are important to you in your work?
 - b. Did these change while in office? Why?

II REPRESENTING IN MP WORK

1. What did you like the best in being an MP? What the least?
2. (to those who gave up seat) Did something in representing or in the work affect your willingness to give up your seat? Could something have changed your mind?
3. What is the task of an MP? Is there something that is generally misunderstood? *(these are handled when asking to comment claims in section VI)*
 - a. How did you perceive your MP profile? Did you ever think of this and in what kind of situations?

III PLACES OF REPRESENTING

1. When you think about representing in your representative work how does it relate to the following places; what meanings do they bear (what kind of "representation" goes on in these forums)
 - a. The plenary
 - b. Committee sessions
 - c. Parliamentary party group (PPG) meetings (weekly)
 - d. Committee groups (within PPGs)
 - e. Informal parliament (cafe, sauna, clubs)
 2. How is your assessment and consideration bounded and guided by these previously mentioned forums?
 - a. Differences in being in the governing / opposition parties?
- ➔ Have you planned your representative work in relation to these forums?
3. What kind of a meaning does publicity and media have to your representing? How does it differ in relation to these forums of representation?
 - a. Follow-up question about the lack of transparency of MP work in relation to constituency

IV SPEECH AND DELIBERATION AS TOOLS FOR REPRESENTATION

1. *Can you remember a meaningful situation where you have felt that speaking has made a difference? How was it?*
2. What kind of role do the following arenas have for your opinion-formation?
 - a. The plenary
 - b. The committee

- c. The committee group
- d. Parliamentary party group

3. *To what extent does the idea of accountability affect your work? (How does relate to if one happens to change one's opinion in the light of new information?)*
4. What kinds of experiences do you have from disagreeing with your own group?
5. What are the good and the bad sides of the unofficial principle of 'by the book'?

V THE ROLE AND STATUS OF THE PARLIAMENT

1. How do you perceive the role of the Parliament in the Finnish political system? Has it changed?
2. Citizens' initiatives can be seen as a way to strengthen direct democracy. How do you see their role?

VI CLAIMS (asked to mark in scale 1-10, open questions, are to be discussed)

"Representatives have estranged from the people."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"Parliament should be a mirror-image of the people."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Edmund Burke (v. 1774) Speech to the Electorates of Bristol

Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"The plenary is a place of 'empty talk'"

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"The real work is done in the committees."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"Individual representative cannot influence decision-making."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"You cannot influence decision-making with talk."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"The most important decision has been made in advance."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"It's no use to talk at length if the matter has been decided."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"The Finnish Parliament has too little real possibilities to control the government."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"A good representative (a good team player) needs to be able to compromise."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"Party discipline is mandatory/needed/inevitable."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

"In the elections the toughest competitor comes from the same party."

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

REFERENCES

- Aalto, Pami. 2001. "Syvähaastattelu: Identiteetti, Merkitys ja Poliitiikka." *Politiikka* 43 (2): 128–41.
- Ahtonen, Riitta, Anssi Keinänen, and Mia Kilpeläinen. 2011. "Eduskunnan Valiokuntien Näkemys Lainvalmistelutyön Laadusta." Helsinki.
- Anckar, Dag. 1992. "Finland: Dualism and Consensual Rule." In *Parliamentary Change in Nordic Countries*, edited by Erik Damgaard, 152–90. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
- Andeweg, Rudy B. 2014. "Roles in Legislatures." In *Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*, edited by Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld, and Kaare Strøm, 267–85. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Andeweg, Rudy B., and Jacques Thomassen. 2005. "Modes of Political Representation: Toward a New Typology." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30 (4): 507–28.
- Ankersmit, F.R. 2002. *Political Representation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Arter, David. 2003. "Committee Cohesion and the 'Corporate Dimension' of Parliamentary Committees: A Comparative Analysis." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 9 (4): 73–87.
- . 2012. "The Finnish Eduskunta: Still the Nordic 'Vatican'?" *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 18 (3–4): 275–93.
- Arter, David, and Tapio Raunio. 2018. "Concluding Remarks: Constituency Service or Constituency Effort?" *Representation* 54 (1): 1–4.
- Bagehot, Walter. 1873. *The English Constitution*. Second edi. http://aspirant.at.ua/Books/bagehot_english_constitution.pdf
- Bächtiger, André. 2005. *The Real World of Deliberation: A Comparative Study of Its Favourable Conditions in Legislatures*. Bern: Paul Haupt.
- . 2014. "Deliberation, Discourse, and the Study of Legislatures." In *Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*, edited by Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld, and Kaare Strøm, 145–66. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bächtiger, André, and Simon Beste. 2017. "Deliberative Citizens, (Non)Deliberative Politicians: A Rejoinder." *Daedalus* 146 (3): 106–18.
- Bächtiger, André, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren. 2018. "Deliberative Democracy: An Introduction." In *Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy*, edited by André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren, 1–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bächtiger, André, and Dominik Hangartner. 2010. "When Deliberative Theory Meets Empirical Political Science: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges in Political Deliberation." *Political Studies* 58 (4): 609–29.
- Bächtiger, André, Simon Niemeyer, Michael Neblo, Marco R Steenbergen, and Jürg Steiner. 2010. "Disentangling Diversity in Deliberative Democracy: Competing Theories, Their Blind Spots and Complementarities." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 18 (1): 32–63.
- Bächtiger, André, and John Parkinson. 2019. *Mapping and Measuring Deliberation: Towards a New Deliberative Quality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bächtiger, André, and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2004. "The Real World of Deliberation. A Comparative Study of Its Favorable Conditions in Legislatures." 2004/17. EUI Working Papers SPS. San Dominico.
- Bailer, Stefanie. 2014. "Interviews and Surveys in Legislative Research." In *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*, edited by Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld, and Kaare W. Strøm, 167–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Beetham, David. 2011. "Do Parliaments Have a Future?" In *The Future of Representative Democracy*, edited by Sonia Alonso, John Keane, and Wolfgang Merkel, 124–43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bengtsson, Åsa. 2014. "Kansanedustajien Roolit ja Kansalaisodotukset." In *Eduskunta: Kansanvaltaa Puolueiden ja Hallituksen Ehdoilla*, edited by Tapio Raunio and Matti Wiberg, 66–76. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Bengtsson, Åsa, and Hanna Wass. 2011. "The Representative Roles of MPs: A Citizen Perspective." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 34 (2): 143–67.
- Berry, Jeffrey M. 2002. "Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing." *PS - Political Science and Politics* 35 (4): 679–82.
- Bessette, Joseph. 1994. *The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bevir, Mark, and Nabil Ansari. 2012. "Should Deliberative Democrats Eschew Modernist Social Science?" *Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association*.
- Bevir, Mark, and R. A. W. Rhodes. 2006. "Interpretive Approaches to British Government and Politics." *British Politics* 1 (1): 84–112.
- Bohman, James. 1998. "The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 6 (2): 400–425.
- . 2012. "Representation in the Deliberative System." In *Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale*, 72–94. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Boswell, John, and Jack Corbett. 2017. "Why and How to Compare Deliberative Systems." *European Journal of Political Research* 56 (4): 801–19.
- Brito Vieira, Monica, and David Runciman. 2008. *Representation*. Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press.
- Brown, Mark. 2018. "Deliberation and Representation." In *The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy*, edited by André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren, 171–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bühlmann, Marc, and Jan Fivaz. 2016. *Political Representation: Roles, Representatives and the Represented*. Edited by Marc Bühlmann and Jan Fivaz. Abington: Routledge.
- Burke, Edmund. 1774. "Speech to the Electors of Bristol." Selected Works of Edmund Burke 4. 1774. http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=659&chapter=20392&layout=html&Itemid=27. Accessed 15.2.2017.
- Caluwaerts, Didier. 2012. *Confrontation and Communication Deliberative Democracy in Divided Belgium*. New York: P.I.E- Peter Lang S.A.
- Cameron, Maxwell A. 2018. *Political Institutions and Practical Wisdom: Between Rules and Practice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Castiglione, Dario, and Mark E. Warren. 2006. "Rethinking Democratic Representation: Eight Theoretical Issues." In "Rethinking Democratic Representation", *Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British Columbia*. <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.565.9652>.
- . 2019. "Rethinking Representation: Eight Theoretical Issues and a Postscript." In *The Constructivist Turn in Political Representation*, edited by Lisa Disch, Mathijs van de Sande, and Nadia Urbinati, 20–47. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Chambers, Simone. 2003. "Deliberative Democratic Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6 (1): 307–26.
- . 2004. "Behind Closed Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12 (4): 389–410.

- . 2009. "Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?" *Political Theory* 37 (3): 323–50.
- . 2017. "Balancing Epistemic Quality and Equal Participation in a System Approach to Deliberative Democracy." *Social Epistemology* 31 (3): 266–76.
- Cohen, Joshua. 1997. "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy." In *Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics*. Edited by James Bohman and William Rehg, 67–92. Cambridge; London: MIT Press.
- "The Constitution of Finland." n.d. Accessed December 12, 2019. <https://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf>.
- Crewe, Emma. 2015. *The House of Commons. An Anthropology of MPs at Work*. London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Curato, Nicole, John S. Dryzek, Selen A. Ercan, Carolyn M. Hendriks, and Simon Niemeyer. 2017. "Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research." *Daedalus* 146 (3): 28–38.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1998. *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Damgaard, Erik. 1995. "How Parties Control Committee Members." In *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, 308:308–25. Mannheim Centre for European Social Research Mannheim.
- Decreus, Thomas. 2013. "Beyond Representation? A Critique of the Concept of the Referent." *Representation* 49 (1): 33–43.
- Disch, Lisa. 2011. "Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation." *American Political Science Review* 105 (01): 100–114.
- . 2012. "Democratic Representation and the Constituency Paradox." *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (3): 599–616.
- . 2015. "The 'Constructivist Turn' in Democratic Representation: A Normative Dead-End?" *Constellations* 22 (4): 487–99.
- . 2019. "Introduction: The End of Representative Politics." In *The Constructivist Turn in Political Representation*, edited by Lisa Disch, Mathijs van de Sande, and Nadia Urbinati, 1–18. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Dovi, Suzanne. 2007. *The Good Representative*. Wiley-Blackwell.
- . 2018. "Good Representatives Foster Autonomy." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 51 (2): 323–26.
- Dryzek, John S. 2000. *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*. Oxford Political Theory. 2002nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2010a. *Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2010b. "Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systemic Appreciation." *Political Theory* 38 (3): 319–39.
- . 2016. "Symposium Commentary: Reflections on the Theory of Deliberative Systems." *Critical Policy Studies* 10 (2): 209–15.
- . 2017. "The Forum, the System, and the Polity: Three Varieties of Democratic Theory." *Political Theory* 45 (5): 610–36.
- Dryzek, John S., and Simon Niemeyer. 2008. "Discursive Representation." *American Political Science Review* 102 (04): 481–93.
- . 2010. "Pluralism and Meta-Consensus." In *Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance*, 85–115. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Eduskunta. 2018. *Puhemiesneuvoston Suositukset Täysistuntotyön Menettelytapojen Osalta*. Eduskunnan keskuskanslia.

- Elster, Jon. 1997. "The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory." In *Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics*. Edited by James Bohman and William Rehg, 3–33. Cambridge; London: The MIT Press.
- . 1998. "Deliberation and Constitution Making." In *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by Jon Elster and Adam Przeworski, 97–122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Elstub, Stephen. 2010. "Democracy in Theory and Practice." *Representation* 46 (3): 255–60.
- Elstub, Stephen, Selen Ercan, and Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça. 2016. "Editorial Introduction: The Fourth Generation of Deliberative Democracy." *Critical Policy Studies* 10 (2): 139–51.
- Ercan, Selen A., Carolyn M. Hendriks, and John Boswell. 2017. "Studying Public Deliberation after the Systemic Turn: The Crucial Role for Interpretive Research." *Policy and Politics* 45 (2): 195–212.
- Esaïsson, Peter. 2000. "How Members of Parliament Define Their Task." In *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience*, edited by Peter Esaïsson and Knut Heidar, 51–82. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Eulau, Heinz, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson. 1959. "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke." *American Political Science Review* 53 (03): 742–56.
- Fearon, James D. 1999. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan S. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 55–97. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fenno, Richard F. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*. Little: Brown.
- . 1986. "Observation, Context, and Sequence in the Study of Politics." *The American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 3–15.
- Fishkin, James S., Robert C. Luskin, and Roger Jowell. 2000. "Deliberative Polling and Public Consultation." *Parliamentary Affairs* 53 (4): 657–66.
- Flynn, Jeffrey. 2004. "Communicative Power in Habermas's Theory of Democracy." *European Journal of Political Theory* 3 (4): 433–54.
- Forsten, Timo. 2005. *Valiokuntapalapeli Eduskunnassa. Valiokuntajäsenyydet 1945-2002*. Turku: Turun yliopisto.
- Geddes, Marc, and R. A. W. Rhodes. 2018. "Towards an Interpretative Parliamentary Studies." In *Soziologie der Parlamente: Neue Wege der politischen Institutionenforschung*, edited by Jenni Brichzin, Damien Krichewsky, Leopold Ringel, and Jan Schank, 87–110. Wiesbaden: Springer Vs.
- Goldstein, Kenneth. 2002. "Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews." In *PS - Political Science and Politics* 35 (4): 669–72.
- Goodin, Robert E. 2000. "Democratic Deliberation Within." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 29 (1): 81–109.
- . 2005. "Sequencing Deliberative Moments." *Acta Politica* 40 (2): 182–96.
- . 2008a. "First Talk, Then Vote." In *Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn*, 108–24. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2008b. "Sequencing Deliberative Moments." In *Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn*, 186–203. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2008c. "The Place of Parties." In *Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn*, 204–23. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Goodin, Robert E., and John S Dryzek. 2006. "Deliberative Impacts: The Macro-Political Uptake of Mini-Publics." *Politics & Society* 34 (2): 219–44.

- Goodin, Robert E., and Michael Saward. 2005. "Dog Whistles and Democratic Mandates." *The Political Quarterly* 76 (4): 471–76.
- Grönlund, Kimmo, André Bächtiger, and Maija Setälä. 2014. *Deliberative Mini-Publics. Involving Citizens in the Democratic Process*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Grönlund, Kimmo, Kaisa Herne, and Maija Setälä. 2015. "Does Enclave Deliberation Polarize Opinions?" *Political Behavior* 37 (4): 995–1020.
- Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. 1996. *Democracy and Disagreement*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 2004. *Why Deliberative Democracy?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2012. *The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1994. "Three Normative Models of Democracy." *Constellations* 1 (1): 1–10.
- . 2006. "Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research." *Communication Theory* 16 (4): 411–26.
- Hagevi, Magnus. 2000. "Parliamentary Party Groups in Swedish Riksdag." In *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies: Political Parties behind Closed Doors*, edited by Knut Heidar and Ruud A Koole, 145–160. London: Routledge.
- Harden, Jeffrey J., and Christopher J. Clark. 2016. "A Legislature or a Legislator Like Me? Citizen Demand for Collective and Dyadic Political Representation." *American Politics Research* 44 (2): 247–71.
- Hardin, Russell. 2004. "Representing Ignorance." *Social Philosophy and Policy* 21 (01): 76–99.
- Harvey, William S. 2011. "Strategies for Conducting Elite Interviews." *Qualitative Research* 11 (4): 431–41.
- Hayat, Samuel. 2019. "Representation as Proposal." In *The Constructivist Turn in Political Representation*, edited by Lisa Disch, Mathijs van de Sande, and Nadia Urbinati, 20–47. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Hayward, Clarissa Rile. 2009. "Making Interest: On Representation and Democratic Legitimacy." In *Political Representation*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elizabeth Jean Wood, and Alexander S. Kirshner, 111–35. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidar, Knut. 2000. "Parliamentary Party Groups." In *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience*, 183–209. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Heidar, Knut, and Ruud A Koole. 2000a. "Approaches to the Study of Parliamentary Party Groups." In *C: Political Parties behind Closed Doors*, 4–22. London: Routledge.
- . 2000b. *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies: Political Parties behind Closed Doors*. Edited by Knut Heidar and Ruud A Koole. London, New York: Routledge.
- Helsingin Sanomat. 2016. "Sdp:n Eduskuntaryhmässä Kuohuu – Ryhmä Raivostui Puheenjohtaja Lindtmanin Toimintatavoista." *Helsingin Sanomat*, October 27, 2016
- . 2018. "Oikeuskansleri: Soinin Osallistuminen Abortinvastaiseen Tilaisuuteen Oli Ongelmallista – "Olenainen Asia on, Etten Ole Toiminut Laittomasti", Soini Sanoo." *Helsingin Sanomat*, September 18, 2018.
- Herzog, Lisa, and Bernardo Zacka. 2017. "Fieldwork in Political Theory: Five Arguments for an Ethnographic Sensibility." *British Journal of Political Science* 49: 763–84.
- Himmelroos, Staffan. 2017. "Discourse Quality in Deliberative Citizen Forums—A Comparison of Four Deliberative Mini-Publics." *Journal of Public Deliberation* 13 (1:3): 1–128.

- Holdo, Markus. 2018. "A Relational Perspective on Deliberative Systems: Combining Interpretive and Structural Analysis." *Critical Policy Studies*, August, 1–17.
- Holli, Anne Maria. 2012. "Does Gender Have an Effect on the Selection of Experts by Parliamentary Standing Committees? A Critical Test of 'Critical' Concepts." *Politics & Gender* 8 (3): 341–66.
- Holli, Anne Maria, and Milja Saari. 2009. *Sukupuoli Eduskunnan Asiantuntijakuulemisissa*. Helsinki: Sosiaali- ja terveystieteiden ministeriö, TANE.
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2006. *Parliament and Democracy in the Twentieth Century: A Guide for Good Practice*. Edited by David Beetham. Geneva: Inter-parliamentary Union.
- . 2012. "Global Parliamentary Report. The Changing Nature of Parliamentary Representation." Denmark.
- Judge, David, and Cristina Leston-Bandeira. 2017. "The Institutional Representation of Parliament." *Political Studies* 66 (1): 154–72.
- Judge, David, Cristina Leston-Bandeira, and Louise Thompson. 2018. "The Future of Parliamentary Politics." In *Exploring Parliament*, edited by Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Louise Thompson, 347–57. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Karpowitz, Christopher F, Chad Raphael, and Allen S Hammond. 2009. "Deliberative Democracy and Inequality: Two Cheers for Enclave Deliberation among the Disempowered." *Politics & Society* 37 (4): 576–615.
- Keskuskanslia. 2018. "Puhemiesneuvoston Suositukset Täysistuntotyön Menettelytapojen Osalta." 17.4.2018.
- Kontula, Anna. 2018. *Eduskunta - Ystäviä ja Vihamiehiä*. Riga: Into Kustannus.
- Kuyper, Jonathan W. 2016. "Systemic Representation: Democracy, Deliberation, and Nonelectoral Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 110 (2): 308–24.
- Kuyper, Jonathan W., and Fabio Wolkenstein. 2019. "Complementing and Correcting Representative Institutions: When and How to Use Mini-Publics." *European Journal of Political Research* 58 (2): 656–75.
- Lafont, Cristina. 2015. "Deliberation, Participation, and Democratic Legitimacy: Should Deliberative Mini-Publics Shape Public Policy?" *Journal of Political Philosophy* 23 (1): 40–63.
- Landemore, Hélène. 2017a. "Deliberative Democracy as Open, Not (Just) Representative Democracy." *Daedalus* 146 (3): 51–63.
- . 2017b. "Beyond the Fact of Disagreement? The Epistemic Turn in Deliberative Democracy." *Social Epistemology* 31 (3): 277–95.
- Landwehr, Claudia, and Katharina Holzinger. 2010. "Institutional Determinants of Deliberative Interaction." *European Political Science Review* 2 (3): 373–400.
- Leech, Beth L. 2002. "Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews." In *PS - Political Science and Politics*, 35 (4): 665–68.
- Lipjhart, Arendt. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. Second ed. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
- Loat, Alison, and Michael MacMillan. 2014. *Tragedy in the Commons: Former Members of Parliament Speak Out About Canada's Failing Democracy*. Toronto: Random House Canada.
- Luomala, Anne, and Tuomo Puumala. 2010. *Budjetti – Julkinen Salaisuus Vai Salainen Julkisuus?* Sastamala: Kunnallissalan kehittämissäätiö.
- Macedo, Stephen. 1999a. *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement*. Edited by Stephen Macedo. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1999b. "Introduction." In *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement*, 3–14. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Manin, Bernard. 1987. "On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation." *Political Theory* 15 (3): 338–68.
- . 1994. "The Metamorphoses of Representative Government." *Economy and Society* 23 (2): 133–71.
- . 1997. *The Principles of Representative Government*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2017. "Political Deliberation & the Adversarial Principle." *Daedalus* 146 (3): 39–50.
- Mansbridge, Jane. 1983. *Beyond Adversary Democracy*. New York: The University of Chicago Press.
- . 1992. "A Deliberative Theory of Interest Representation." In *The Politics of Interests. Interest Groups Transformed*, edited by Mark P. Petracca, 32–57. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- . 1999a. "Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System." In *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement*, edited by Stephen Macedo, 211–39. Oxford University Press.
- . 1999b. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes.'" *The Journal of Politics* 61 (3): 628–57.
- . 2003. "Rethinking Representation." *The American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 515–28.
- . 2006. "Conflict and Self-Interest in Deliberation." In *Deliberative Democracy and Its Discontents*, edited by José Luis Martí and Samantha Besson, 107–32. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- . 2009. "A 'Selection Model' of Political Representation." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17 (4): 369–98.
- . 2011. "Clarifying the Concept of Representation." *American Political Science Review* 105 (03): 621–30.
- . 2015. "A Minimalist Definition of Deliberation." In *Deliberation and Development: Rethinking the Role of Voice and Collective Action in Unequal Societies*, 27–50. Equity and Development. The World Bank. https://doi.org/doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0501-1_ch2.
- . 2016. "A 'Selection Model' for Political Representation." In *Political Representation: Roles, Representatives and the Represented*, edited by Marc Bühlmann and Jan Fivaz, 12–29. Abington: Routledge.
- . 2019. "Recursive Representation." In *Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation*, edited by Dario Castiglione and Johannes Pollak, 298–338. Chicago: The Chicago University Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, Thomas Christiano, Archon Fung, John Parkinson, Dennis F. Thompson, and Mark E. Warren. 2012. "A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy." In *Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale*, edited by John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, 1–26. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mansbridge, Jane, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund, Andreas Føllesdal, Archon Fung, Cristina Lafont, Bernard Manin, and José Luis Martí. 2010. "The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8 (1): 64–100.
- Martin, Shane. 2011. "Parliamentary Questions, the Behaviour of Legislators, and the Function of Legislatures: An Introduction." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 17 (3): 259–70.

- Mattila, Mikko. 2014. "Valiokuntalaitos." In *Eduskunta: Kansanvaltaa Puolueiden ja Hallituksen Ehdolla*, edited by Tapio Raunio and Matti Wiberg, 119–31. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Mattson, Ingvar, and Kaare Strøm. 1995. "Parliamentary Committees." In *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, edited by Herbert Döring, 249–307. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- . 2004. "Committee Effects on Legislation." In *Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior: Passage of Legislation across Western Europe*, edited by Herbert Döring and Mark Hallerberg, 91–111. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate.
- Mendelberg, Tali, Christopher F. Karpowitz, and J. Baxter Oliphant. 2014. "Gender Inequality in Deliberation: Unpacking the Black Box of Interaction." *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (1): 18–44.
- Mickler, Tim A. 2017. "Committee Autonomy in Parliamentary Systems—Coalition Logic or Congressional Rationales?" *Journal of Legislative Studies* 23 (3): 367–91.
- Mill, John Stuart. 2008. *Considerations on Representative Government*. New York: Cosimo Classics.
- Montanaro, Laura. 2012. "The Democratic Legitimacy of Self-Appointed Representatives." *Journal of Politics* 74 (4): 1094–1107.
- Morrell, Michael E. 2010. *Empathy and Democracy*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
- Moscrop, David, and Mark E. Warren. 2016. "When Is Deliberation Democratic?" *Journal of Public Deliberation* 12 (2): 1–12.
- Muirhead, Russell. 2006. "A Defense of Party Spirit." *Perspectives on Politics* 4 (4): 713–27.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. 2000. "Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work." *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (3): 309–33.
- Mutz, Diane C. 2006. *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mykkänen, Juri. 2001a. "Eliittihaastattelu." *Politiikka* 43 (2): 108–27.
- . 2001b. "Inside Rationality: The Division of Labour in a Parliamentary Party Group." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 7 (3): 92–121.
- . 2010. "Keskusteleva Edustaminen ja Luottamus Eduskunnassa." *Politiikka* 52 (3): 219–33.
- Näsström, Sofia. 2006. "Representative Democracy as Tautology: Ankersmit and Lefort on Representation." *European Journal of Political Theory* 5 (3): 321–42.
- . 2011a. "The Challenge of the All-Affected Principle." *Political Studies* 59 (1): 116–34.
- . 2011b. "Where Is the Representative Turn Going?" *European Journal of Political Theory* 10 (4): 501–10.
- Naurin, Daniel, and Christine Reh. 2018. "Deliberative Negotiations." In *Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy*, edited by André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren, 728–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norris, Pippa. 1999. "Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?" In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, edited by Pippa Norris, 1–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Oksanen, Matti. 1972. *Kansanedustajan Rooli: Tutkimus Kansanedustajien Suhtautumisesta Edustajantoimeensa Vuoden 1969 Valtiopäivillä*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

- Owen, David, and Graham Smith. 2015. "Survey Article: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Systemic Turn." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 23 (2): 213–34.
- Pajala, Antti. 2012. "99 % Raukeaa Tai Hylätään. Entä Millaisia Ovat Hyväksytyt Eduskunta-Aloitteet?" *Politiikka* 54 (4): 318–26.
- . 2014. "Lonely Riders and Cooperation Networks – Member of Parliaments Private Motions in the Finnish Parliament 1999-2010." *World Political Science Review* 10 (1): 107–26.
- Palonen, Kari. 2003. "Four Times of Politics: Policy, Polity, Politicking, and Politicization." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 28 (2): 171–86.
- . 2004. "Max Weber, Parliamentarism and the Rhetorical Culture of Politics." *Max Weber Studies* 4 (2): 273–92.
- . 2008. "Speaking pro et Contra. The Rhetorical Intelligibility of Parliamentary Politics and the Political Intelligibility of Parliamentary Rhetoric." In *The Parliamentary Style of Politics*, edited by Suvi Soininen and Tapani Turkka, 82–105. Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association.
- . 2018. "A Comparison between Three Ideal Types of Parliamentary Politics : Representation, Legislation and Deliberation." *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 38 (1): 6–20.
- Parkinson, John. 2003. "Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy." *Political Studies* 51 (1): 180–96.
- . 2006. *Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2012. *Democracy & Public Space. The Physical Sites of Democratic Performance*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Parkinson, John, and Jane Mansbridge. 2012. *Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Pateman, Carole. 2012. "Participatory Democracy Revisited." *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (1): 7–19.
- Pekonen, Kyösti. 2008. "Two Versions of Representative Talk in Finnish Parliament." In *The Parliamentary Style of Politics*, edited by Suvi Soininen and Tapani Turkka, 208–29. Helsinki: Finnish Political Science Association.
- . 2011. *Puhe Eduskunnassa*. Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Pekonen, Onni. 2017. "The Political Transfer of Parliamentary Concepts and Practices in the European Periphery: The Case of Obstruction in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Finland." *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 37 (3): 281–300.
- Pettit, Philip. 2009. "Varieties of Public Representation." In *Political Representation*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elizabeth Jean Wood, and Alexander S. Kirshner, 61–89. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The Politics of Presence. Oxford Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pitkänen, Ville, and Jussi Westinen. 2019. "Tietopaketti Eduskuntavaaleista – Mitä Aikaisemmat Vaalit Osoittavat?" https://e2.fi/file_attachment/get/Eduskuntavaalipaketti_FINAL.pdf?attachment_id=692.
- Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 2004. "Representation and Democracy: Uneasy Alliance." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 27 (3): 335–42.
- Plotke, David. 1997. "Representation Is Democracy." *Constellations* 4 (1): 19–34.

- Przeworski, Adam. 1998. "Deliberation and Ideological Domination." In *Deliberative Democracy*, edited by Jon Elster and Adam Przeworski, 140–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Susan Stokes, Adam Przeworski, and Bernard Manin, 12–17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pulliainen, Erkki. 2006. *Kansanedustajan Valta Ja Vastuu*. Helsinki: Ochre Chronicles.
- Quirk, Paul J., William Bendix, and André Bächtiger. 2018. "Institutional Deliberation." In *Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy*, edited by André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren, 273–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raunio, Tapio. 2011. "Finland. Moving in the Opposite Direction." In *The Madisonian Turn. Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Nordic Europe*, 112–56. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Raunio, Tapio, and Taru Ruotsalainen. 2018. "Exploring the Most Likely Case for Constituency Service: Finnish MPs and the Change towards Personalised Representation." *Representation* 54 (1): 37–53.
- Raunio, Tapio, and Matti Wiberg. 2008. "The Eduskunta and the Parliamentarisation of Finnish Politics: Formally Stronger, Politically Still Weak?" *West European Politics* 31 (3): 581–99.
- . 2014. "Johdanto: Eduskunta Suomen Poliittisessa Järjestelmässä." In *Eduskunta: Kansanvaltaa Puolueiden ja Hallituksen Ehdoilla*, edited by Tapio Raunio and Matti Wiberg, 7–38. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Rehfeld, Andrew. 2005. *The Concept of Constituency: Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Institutional Design*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2006. "Towards a General Theory of Political Representation." *The Journal of Politics* 68 (1): 1–21.
- . 2009. "Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation and Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 103 (02): 214–30.
- . 2011. "The Concepts of Representation." *American Political Science Review* 105 (03): 631–41.
- . 2016. "Beyond Trustees and Delegates." In *Political Representation: Roles, Representatives and the Represented*, edited by Jan Fivaz and Marc Bühlmann, 29–47. Abington: Routledge.
- . 2017. "What Is Representation? On Being and Becoming a Representative." In *Reclaiming Representation: Contemporary Advances in the Theory of Political Representation*, edited by Mónica Brito Vieira, 50–74. New York: Routledge.
- . 2018. "On Representing." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 26 (2): 216–39.
- Rinne, Jenni M. 2016. "How Not to Talk Past Each Other: The Convergence of Political Representation and Deliberation." *Representation* 52 (1): 29–41.
- Roger, Léa, and Gary S Schaal. 2013. "The Quality of Deliberation in Two Committees of the European Parliament: The Neglected Influence of the Situational Context and the Policymaking Stage." *Politics and Governance* 1 (2): 151–69.
- Rosenblum, Nancy L. 2008. *On the Side of the Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rostbøll, Christian. 2011. "Freedom of Expression, Deliberation, Autonomy and Respect." *European Journal of Political Theory* 10 (1): 5–21.
- Rostbøll, Christian, and Theresa Scavenius. 2017. "Introduction: Compromise and Disagreement." In *Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory*,

- edited by Christian Rostbøll and Theresa Scavenius, 204. London, New York: Routledge.
- Runciman, David. 2007. "The Paradox of Political Representation." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 15 (1): 93–114.
- . 2009. "Hobbes's Theory of Representation: Anti-Democratic or Proto-Democratic." In *Political Representation*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Susan C. Stokes, Elizabeth Jean Wood, and Alexander S. Kirshner, 15–34. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sabl, Andrew. 2015. "The Two Cultures of Democratic Theory: Responsiveness, Democratic Quality, and the Empirical-Normative Divide." *Perspectives on Politics* 13 (2): 345–65.
- Saward, Michael. 2006. "The Representative Claim." *Contemporary Political Theory* 5 (3): 297–318.
- . 2008. "Representation and Democracy: Revisions and Possibilities." *Sociology Compass* 2 (3): 1000–1013.
- . 2010. *The Representative Claim*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 2014. "Shape-Shifting Representation." *American Political Science Review* 108 (04): 723–36.
- . 2017. "Performative Representation." In *Reclaiming Representation: Contemporary Advances in the Theory of Political Representation*, edited by Mónica Brito Vieira, 75–94. New York: Routledge.
- . 2019. "Liminal Representation." In *Creating Political Presence: The New Politics of Democratic Representation*, edited by D Castiglione and J Pollak, 276–97. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schäfer, Andreas. 2017. "Deliberation in Representative Institutions: An Analytical Framework for a Systemic Approach." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 52 (3): 419–35.
- Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Dvora Yanow. 2012. *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes*. New York: Routledge.
- Searing, Donald. 1994. *Westminster's World: Understanding Political Roles*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Seo, Hyeon, and Tapio Raunio. 2017. "Reaching out to the People? Assessing the Relationship between Parliament and Citizens in Finland." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 23 (4): 614–34.
- Setälä, Maija. 2017. "Connecting Deliberative Mini-Publics to Representative Decision Making." *European Journal of Political Research* 56 (4): 846–63.
- Severs, Eline. 2012. "Substantive Representation Through a Claims-Making Lens: A Strategy for the Identification and Analysis of Substantive Claims." *Representation* 48 (2): 169–81.
- Severs, Eline, Karen Celis, and Petra Meier. 2014. "The Indirectness of Political Representation: A Blessing or a Concern? A Study of the Conceptions of Members of the Flemish Regional Parliament." *Parliamentary Affairs* 68 (3): 616–37.
- Shapiro, Ian. 1999. "Enough of Deliberation: Politics Is about Interests and Power." In *Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement*, edited by Stephen Macedo, 28–38. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, William. 2016. "The Boundaries of a Deliberative System: The Case of Disruptive Protest." *Critical Policy Studies* 10 (2): 152–70.
- Solvak, Mihkel, and Antti Pajala. 2016. "Sponsoring Private Member's Bills in Finland and Estonia: The Electoral Context of Legislative Behaviour." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 39 (1): 52–72.

- Steiner, Jürg. 2008. "Concept Stretching: The Case of Deliberation." *European Political Science* 7 (2): 186–90.
- . 2012. *The Foundations of Deliberative Democracy. Empirical Research and Normative Implications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Steiner, Jürg, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2004. *Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Strøm, Kaare. 1997. "Rules, Reasons and Routines: Legislative Roles in Parliamentary Democracies." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 3 (1): 155–74.
- . 1998. "Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 4 (1): 21–59.
- Strøm, Kaare, and Torbjörn Bergman. 2011. "Parliamentary Democracies under Siege?" In *The Madisonian Turn. Political Parties and Parliamentary Democracy in Nordic Europe*, edited by Torbjörn Bergman and Kaare Strøm, 3–34. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Sunstein, Cass R. 2002. "The Law of Group Polarization." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 10 (2): 175–95.
- Sveriges Riksdag. 2019. "The Tasks of the Speaker." 2019. <https://www.riksdagen.se/en/how-the-riksdag-works/the-speaker/the-tasks-of-the-speaker/>.
- Teivainen, Teivo, and Silke Trommer. 2017. "Representation Beyond the State: Towards Transnational Democratic Non-State Politics." *Globalizations* 14 (1): 17–31.
- Teorell, Jan. 1999. "A Deliberative Defence of Intra-Party Democracy." *Party Politics* 5 (3): 363–82.
- Thomassen, Jacques, and Peter Esaisson. 2006. "Role Orientations of Members of Parliament." *Acta Politica* 41 (3): 217–31.
- Thompson, Dennis F. 2008. "Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 497–520.
- Tormey, Simon. 2015. *The End of Representative Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Turja, Timo. 2012. "Tiede Ja Poliitikka Eduskunnassa." *Tieteessä Tapahtuu* 30 (1): 36–40.
- Uhr, John. 1998. *Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing Place of Parliament (Reshaping Australian Institutions)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Urbinati, Nadia. 2006. *Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2014. *Democracy Disfigured. Democracy Disfigured*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Urbinati, Nadia, and Mark E. Warren. 2008. "The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 387–412.
- Vet, Benjamin de, and Bram Wauters. 2018. "Follow the Leader: Testing a Deductive Approach for Studying Parliamentary Party Leadership Roles." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 24 (3): 359–72.
- Warren, Mark E. 2017. "A Problem-Based Approach to Democratic Theory." *American Political Science Review* 111 (01): 39–53.
- Warren, Mark E., and Jane Mansbridge. 2013. "Deliberative Negotiation." In *Negotiating Agreement in Politics. Report of the Task Force on Negotiating Agreement in Politics*, edited by Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Joe Martin, 86–120. Washington DC.
- Warren, Mark E., and Hilary Pearse. 2008. *Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly*. Edited by Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Weinstock, Daniel. 2017. "Compromise, Pluralism, and Deliberation." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 20 (5): 636–55.
- Wiberg, Matti. 2000. "The Partyiness of the Finnish Eduskunta." In *Parliamentary Party Groups in European Democracies. Political Parties behind Closed Doors*, edited by Knut Heidar and Ruud A Koole, 161–76. London, New York: Routledge.
- . 2011. "Hallituspuolueiden Eduskuntaryhmien Yhteistoimintasäännöt." *Politiikka* 53 (4): 321–22.
- . 2014. "Puolueryhmät Eduskunnassa." In *Eduskunta: Kansanvaltaa Puolueiden Ja Hallituksen Ehdoilla*, edited by Tapio Raunio and Matti Wiberg, 163–83. Tallinna: Gaudeamus.
- Wilde, Pieter de. 2013. "Representative Claims Analysis: Theory Meets Method." *Journal of European Public Policy* 20 (2): 278–94.
- Williams, Melissa S. 1998. *Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Woliver, Laura R. 2002. "Ethical Dilemmas in Personal Interviewing." In *PS - Political Science and Politics*, 35:677–78.
- Wolkenstein, Fabio. 2016. "A Deliberative Model of Intra-Party Democracy." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 24 (3): 297–320.
- Yanow, Dvora. 2006a. "How Built Spaces Mean. A Semiotics of Space." In *Interpretation and Method Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, edited by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 349–66. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- . 2006b. "Thinking Interpretatively: Philosophical Presuppositions and the Human Sciences." In *Interpretation and Method Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, edited by Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 5–27. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- YLE. 2019. "Puhemies Risikko Moitti Kansanedustajia Kovasta Keskustelukulttuurista: 'Kollega Saatettu Nähdä Enemmän Saaliina Kuin Ihmisenä' – Yle Seurasi." *YLE Uutiset*, 2019. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10729597>. Accessed 10.4.2019
- Young, Iris Marion. 2001. "Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy." *Political Theory* 29 (5): 670–90.
- . 2002. *Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford Political Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

